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(8) ETUDE DE LA DYNAMIQUE FAMILIALE

Problèmes de définition des concepts et des outils de mesure

par

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Au début des années soixante, la famille "nucléaire" représentait pour plusieurs sociologues et démographes le modèle familial dominant des sociétés développées. Les indices démographiques du moment laissaient croire, en effet, que ce modèle, synonyme de couple marié vivant avec des enfants, s'imposait et qu'il était là pour durer. Comme l'écrit Prioux,

le mariage triomphait, le célibat n'ayant jamais été si rare, et même si les divorces étaient déjà fréquents dans certains pays, ils étaient rapidement suivis d'un remariage. Les couples se mariaient pour avoir des enfants, comme en témoignait le niveau élevé de la fécondité en début de mariage, et l'infécondité, à son plus bas niveau historique, était sans doute proche de la stérilité physiologique. (Prioux, 1990:3)

Certes, les couples commençaient à limiter volontairement leur fécondité et à restreindre à deux ou trois leur nombre d'enfants. Mais l'indice de fécondité du moment n'avait jamais été aussi élevé. Le renouvellement de la population paraissait assuré et la famille nucléaire promise à un bel avenir.

Dans un tel contexte, il n'était nul besoin de pousser plus loin l'analyse, ni de revoir les outils conceptuels développés pour aborder l'étude de "la" famille. Cela explique sans doute la stagnation de la recherche observée dans les champs de la sociologie et de la démographie de la famille au cours des années soixante-dix et au début des années quatre-vingt.

Durant cette période, la conception fonctionnaliste de la famille a dominé en sociologie. Assumant un modèle évolutionniste de développement, elle affirmait la primauté de la famille nucléaire comme forme achevée de l'évolution de l'unité familiale. Celle-ci y était décrite comme un oasis de paix, basé sur une division quasi immuable des tâches et des rôles entre conjoints, où le rôle affectif de l'épouse s'harmonisait au rôle instrumental du mari-pourvoyeur (pour une discussion critique, voir Sgritta, 1987). De son côté, la démographie formalisait en quelque sorte la conception fonctionnaliste de la famille, par le biais de son concept de cycle de vie. Celui-ci concevait le déroulement de la vie familiale des individus comme une suite linéaire d'étapes ordonnancées, allant du départ du foyer parental, à la mise en union, la conception d'enfants, etc.

Au milieu des années soixante, les indices démographiques du moment se sont mis à bouger. Le Canada, comme la plupart des pays occidentaux, n'a pas échappé à la révolution démographique qui allait suivre. La chute de la fécondité d'abord, amorcée vers le milieu des années soixante, la montée de la divortialité et la progression des unions libres observées dans les années soixante-dix, ou encore l'augmentation de la participation des femmes au marché du travail sont autant de phénomènes majeurs qui ont marqué les dernières décennies. Ceux-ci ont eu pour effet de modifier et de diversifier de façon notable la structure et le tissu des familles canadiennes et québécoises et d'affecter profondément les conditions de vie des individus.

En dépit de l'ampleur des changements observés, on connaît, somme toute, peu de choses sur la réalité des familles d'aujourd'hui. Les démographes et sociologues de la famille ont été, en fait, passablement lents à reconnaître les bouleversements profonds qui agitaient l'univers de la famille. Il est vrai que certains indices, tels les taux élevés de remariage notés en début de période, pouvaient laisser croire à la superficialité des changements de comportement observés du côté des ruptures d'unions. Mais surtout, le manque de données nécessaires à l'étude d'événements "nouveaux", comme les unions libres qui échappent aux statistiques officielles, ne permettait pas d'évaluer si ces nouvelles pratiques demeuraient marginales ou si elles se généralisaient à l'ensemble de la population.

Aujourd'hui, force nous est de constater le dynamisme de la recherche conduite en démographie et en sociologie de la famille. Les multiples ouvrages et numéros de revues scientifiques¹ consacrés à ce thème, ainsi que les nombreux

Voir, par exemple, pour le Québec le numéro (28:2-3) de Recherches sociographiques (1987) sur le thème "La famille de la Nouvelle-France à aujourd'hui" et le numéro (18/58) de la Revue internationale d'action communautaire (1987), intitulé "Famille/Familles"; hors du Canada, voir le numéro de L'Année sociologique (1987) consacré aux "sociologues face aux mutations de la famille", les nombreux numéros de la revue française Dialogue consacrés au thème "famille", sans oublier, bien sûr, la revue Journal of Marriage and the Family.

colloques² organisés sur ce sujet depuis le milieu des années quatre-vingt, le confirment. La recherche sur la famille se heurte cependant, à l'heure actuelle, à un ensemble de difficultés théoriques et méthodologiques qui vont de la définition même de l'objet d'analyse au développement d'outils de mesure nécessaires à l'étude des dynamiques familiales. Comment peut-on en effet définir la famille, ou plutôt les familles, dans un contexte de forte mouvance conjugale? Et comment peut-on aborder l'étude de la dynamique familiale à partir des données et des méthodologies disponibles?

L'objectif de cet article est d'essayer de formuler un certain nombre de définitions opérationnelles des différents types de familles existants, d'évaluer dans quelle mesure les données et méthodes disponibles permettent de traduire empiriquement ces concepts, et de suggérer les modifications qui s'imposent au chapitre de la collecte des données, le cas échéant. Pour cela, nous proposons d'effectuer une synthèse critique des travaux récents parus dans le domaine de la sociologie et de la démographie de la famille. Plus précisément, notre discussion sera organisée autour des notions de familles monoparentales et de familles composées (communément appelées "familles reconstituées"), qui nous forcent à revoir les présupposés théoriques attachés au concept de la famille nucléaire. Mais avant, voyons brièvement les changements démographiques qui sont à la base des transformations familiales majeures observées au cours des deux dernières décennies.

² A titre d'exemple, citons, pour le Canada, le colloque *Crise de la famille, crise démographique?*, tenu à Ottawa en novembre 1986 (voir Légaré, Balakrishnan et Beaujot, 1989); pour le Québec, le *Premier Symposium sur la famille*, qui a lieu à Trois-Rivières en octobre 1991, et le colloque sur *La famille contemporaine*, organisé par l'Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture et le Musée de la civilisation à Québec en 1989 (voir Lemieux, 1990); hors du Canada, le colloque de l'Association internationale des démographes de langue française tenu à Genève en 1984, dont les communications ont été publiées sous le titre *Les familles d'aujourd'hui* (1986); le Séminaire sur les nouvelles formes de vie familiale, organisé par l'Union internationale pour l'étude scientifique de la population à Vaucresson en 1987, dont l'ouvrage *La famille dans les pays développés* (Prioux, 1990) présente les communications; les Rencontres annuelles du Groupe de recherche sur la famille qui se tiennent en France depuis 1989.

LA TOILE DE FOND DES TRANSFORMATIONS FAMILIALES³

Parmi les changements qui ont modifié la configuration des familles, les transformations des pratiques en matière d'union occupent une place prépondérante. Depuis le début des années 1970, en effet, la nature et la durée des relations conjugales ont évolué de façon radicale (Dandurand, 1988). D'une part, on assiste à une chute marquée de la nuptialité ainsi qu'à un report net de l'âge au mariage parmi les générations récentes au Québec et au Canada (Péron et al., 1986, 1987a, 1987b). D'autre part, l'instabilité des unions s'est passablement accrue au cours des dernières décennies. La divortialité a enregistré une progression fulgurante depuis la promulgation de la loi sur le divorce par le Parlement canadien en 1968. Certains estiment que pas moins de 40 % des mariages contractés récemment pourraient se solder par un divorce. Quant aux unions libres, elles paraissent encore plus fragiles: seulement une union sur trois environ survivrait comme telle au-delà de dix ans (Burch et Madan, 1986).

Le recul de la nuptialité et l'instabilité croissante des unions ne traduisent pas nécessairement, cependant, une moins grande attirance envers la vie de couple (Dandurand, 1988). La progression importante des unions libres, comme première forme d'union chez les jeunes ou encore comme alternative au remariage à la suite d'un divorce parmi les générations d'âge moyen, confirme l'attraction qu'exerce toujours la vie à deux auprès des individus (Audirac, 1986). A ce chapitre, une étude sur le divorce a montré que la montée de ce type de rupture d'union ne doit pas être interprétée comme signifiant la mort de la vie de couple mais plutôt comme reflétant un changement profond du sens du mariage (Kellerhals et al., 1985). L'union légitime se vivrait de plus en plus souvent sur un mode analogue à celui de l'union libre (Kellerhals et Roussel, 1987); dans l'un et dans l'autre cas, semblerait émerger "un nouveau type d'union, centrée sur le

³ Cette section s'inspire largement d'un article qui doit paraître sous peu dans la revue *Plan Canada* (voir Germain et Le Bourdais, 1991).

couple, contractuelle, moins disposée à fonder une famille qu'auparavant" (Kellerhals et al., 1985:811).

Ces transformations du lien conjugal ont un impact majeur, dont on ne perçoit encore que les premiers effets sur les relations parentales qui se tissent à l'intérieur des familles (Dandurand et St-Jean, 1988). La désinstitutionnalisation des unions a fait croître de façon spectaculaire la fraction des naissances qui se produisent en dehors du cadre d'un mariage légal (Desplanques, 1986; Duchesne, 1991). Représentant 8 % du total des naissances vivantes enregistrées au Québec en 1971, ce type de naissances comptait pour 36 % de cet ensemble en 1989 (Duchesne, 1991). Naître hors mariage n'est cependant plus synonyme de naître hors famille puisqu'une fraction importante de naissances surviennent aujourd'hui chez des couples non mariés.

Par contre, la montée de l'instabilité conjugale fait que l'enfant, quel que soit le cadre légal de sa naissance, subit de plus en plus fréquemment et de plus en plus tôt au cours de sa vie la perte de la coexistence quotidienne avec l'un de ses parents, plus probablement son père (Bourquignon et al., 1985; Duchesne, 1989; Marcil-Gratton, 1989). Non seulement les enfants d'aujourd'hui sont-ils plus susceptibles de vivre la désunion de leurs parents, ils font aussi face à des contextes familiaux de plus en plus changeants et ils doivent s'adapter rapidement et fréquemment à la présence au foyer d'un nouveau parent qui n'est pas biologiquement le leur (Bumpass, 1984). Selon les données de l'Enquête sur la famille menée au Canada en 1984, 17 % des enfants nés entre 1971 et 1973 auraient ainsi vu le mariage de leurs parents se rompre et auraient connu la vie en famille monoparentale avant d'atteindre l'âge de dix ans, comparativement à moins de 10 % des enfants des générations 1961-1963. Plus de la moitié des premiers ayant connu une rupture d'union auraient célébré leur dixième anniversaire dans une famille composée; parmi ceux-ci, un enfant sur cinq aurait vécu un deuxième épisode de vie en famille monoparentale et un sur dix aurait même eu le temps d'appartenir à une seconde famille composée avant d'avoir dix ans (Marcil-Gratton, 1988). Les transformations notées au chapitre de la conjugalité font donc éclater le modèle "traditionnel" de la famille nucléaire stable et elles conduisent à une diversification croissante des relations parents-enfants.

On observe, par ailleurs, des changements importants du côté de la fécondité (Desplanques, 1988; Mathews, 1984; Romaniuc, 1989) qui se répercutent inévitablement au niveau de l'organisation des familles. L'âge des mères à la première naissance a augmenté. En même temps, la taille des familles se réduisait considérablement, suite à l'effondrement de l'indice synthétique de fécondité qui passait, par exemple au Québec, de 3,07 enfants par femme en 1965 à 1,41 enfant en 1987 (Rochon, 1991:93). Cette chute de la fécondité a pour effet de rétrécir la taille de la fratrie; ce faisant, elle contribue à produire des générations d'enfants qui sont soit des aînés, des benjamins ou des enfants uniques, et qui ne peuvent, par conséquent, compter sur un réseau plus large de frères et de soeurs (Duchesne, 1989; Marcil-Gratton, 1988).

Si le réseau de sociabilité de l'enfant se réduit du point de vue de sa famille nucléaire d'origine, les comportements conjugaux des parents d'aujourd'hui pourraient toutefois avoir pour effet de l'élargir par l'ajout d'une parenté composée comprenant demi-frères, demi-soeurs, beaux-parents ou beaux-grands-parents. Les transformations familiales induites par les changements notés dans les comportements conjugaux des parents ne recèlent pas seulement des traumatismes pour les enfants comme ont pu le laisser croire nombre d'études en socio-psychologie de l'enfance (pour une revue, voir Coleman et Ganong, 1990; pour une critique, voir Théry, 1987). Cette "effervescence" familiale peut aussi, comme l'écrit Pitrou (1990:226) "créer des richesses grâce à une possibilité de renouvellement des personnes qui la vivent, ne serait-ce que parce que le réseau familial s'élargit et se diversifie" lorsque les rapports des enfants avec les deux réseaux de parenté se maintiennent au-delà de la séparation des parents.

Enfin, panni les changements importants ayant modifié l'environnement familial d'aujourd'hui, il faut mentionner l'accroissement notable de la participation des femmes au marché du travail. En donnant une plus ou moins grande autonomie

financière à un certain nombre d'entre elles, le travail salarié a sans aucun doute constitué un facteur-clé dans la montée des ruptures d'union observée au cours des deux dernières décennies (Bastard et Cardia-Vonèche, 1984). A l'heure actuelle, près de 60 % des mères d'enfants de moins de six ans occuperaient un emploi au Canada (Ram, 1989), comparativement à 47 % en 1981 et 28 % en 1971. Une des conséquences de cette hausse de l'activité féminine est le transfert, du moins partiel, des responsabilités éducatives, traditionnellement assumées par la mère, à d'autres agents à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur du réseau de parenté (Fortin, 1987; Kempeneers, 1987; Lapierre-Adamcyk et Marcil-Gratton, 1986). Selon des recherches récentes, ce transfert deviendrait de plus en plus fréquent et il se produirait de plus en plus tôt dans la vie de l'enfant (Toulemon et Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1988; Marcil-Gratton, 1988).

Les diverses études qui ont été menées au Québec (Le Bourdais et al., 1987), au Canada (Marshall, 1990) ou ailleurs dans d'autres pays occidentaux (Nave-Herz, 1989; Kalleberg et Rosenfeld, 1990; Menaghan et Parcel, 1990) montrent toutefois que la présence des femmes en emploi a peu changé les règles du partage du travail domestique à l'intérieur du couple ou de la famille. Même si depuis le début des années 80, les hommes ont tendance à prendre un peu plus en charge certaines tâches (vaisselle, courses ou cuisine), les femmes continueraient d'être les principales responsables du travail domestique, quel que soit leur statut d'emploi (Zarca, 1990). L'exercice d'un emploi à temps partiel pourrait même, dans certains cas, renforcer la division traditionnelle des tâches à l'intérieur de la famille, les femmes tendant à réinvestir dans le domestique, au bénéfice de leur conjoint, toute diminution de leur temps de travail salarié (Pitrou, 1987a).

Au total, l'émergence de pratiques d'union et de parentalité échappant au modèle de la famille intacte (nucléaire) ou aux cadres légaux et institutionnels remet en cause les concepts théoriques et les outils méthodologiques dont nous disposions pour entreprendre l'étude sociologique et sociodémographique de la famille (Le Bourdais, 1989; Théry, 1987). En fait, l'accroissement de ce qu'il est

convenu d'appeler les familles monoparentales (particulièrement celles résultant d'une rupture volontaire d'union) et les familles composées nous oblige à réviser les notions de couples, de parents et de familles et rend, du coup, désuètes plusieurs des données utilisées jusqu'alors pour en aborder l'analyse (Bawin-Legros, 1988; Duchêne, 1990; Festy, 1990; Kuijsten, 1990; McCarthy et Cherlin, 1990). Plus encore, l'étude de ces types de "famille" pose à la sociologie et à la démographie de la famille les principaux défis théoriques et méthodologiques auxquels est confronté ce champ de recherche.

LES FAMILLES MONOPARENTALES

Les familles monoparentales constituent depuis quelques années un objet d'étude priviligié pour nombre de chercheurs en sciences humaines. Pourtant, le phénomène auquel réfère le concept de monoparentalité - qui n'apparaît dans la littérature qu'à partir des années 1970 - n'est pas nouveau; les diverses études réalisées dans le domaine de la démographie historique en témoignent (voir par exemple, Légaré et Desjardins, 1991). Cependant, la monoparentalité a pendant longtemps été considérée marginale et, jusqu'à tout récemment, elle faisait l'objet d'une désapprobation sociale d'autant plus forte qu'elle se conjuguait avec l'état de "filles-mères". Aussi, est-ce à la fois la configuration nouvelle prise de nos jours par la "monoparentalité" et sa plus grande visibilité sociale qui expliquent l'intérêt marqué qu'on lui porte maintenant.

L'importance de la monoparentalité au Canada a beaucoup varié au cours des dernières décennies. Entre 1941 et 1966, la proportion des familles monoparentales parmi l'ensemble des familles canadiennes a d'abord diminué à la faveur d'une baisse du nombre d'unions dissoutes par la mortalité d'un conjoint (Le Bourdais et Rose, 1986a). Par la suite, le mouvement contraire s'est

⁴ Au Québec, un programme gouvernemental mis en branle sous l'ère duplessiste pour venir en aide à ces femmes les désignait par l'expression "mères nécessiteuses" (voir Vaillancourt, 1988).

enclenché: la montée en flèche de la divortialité et des séparations à partir des années 1970 a fait croître de 130 % entre 1966 et 1986 le taux de monoparentalité, tandis que les familles biparentales augmentaient de 42 % seulement durant cette même période. Aussi, 13 % des familles canadiennes (avec ou sans enfant) vivaient en situation de monoparentalité en 1986 comparativement à 8 % en 1966, approchant ainsi le niveau record de 14 % enregistré en 1931 (Moore, 1987).

Les transformations matrimoniales observées dans les sociétés développées au cours du dernier quart de siècle sont étroitement liées à l'émergence d'une nouvelle catégorie de mères seules, qui ne sont plus des filles-mères ou des veuves, mais plutôt des "mères sans alliance", c'est-à-dire des mères ayant rompu leur union (légitime ou non) et ayant obtenu la garde de leur(s) enfant(s) (Dandurand et St-Jean, 1988). Ainsi, alors qu'en 1951 les veuves et les femmes divorcées représentaient 66 % et 3 % respectivement des femmes chefs de famille monoparentale au Canada, trente-cinq ans plus tard en 1986, la situation s'est complètement inversée: les veuves ne comptent plus que pour 28 % des mères seules, tandis que les femmes divorcées ou séparées en représentent dorénavant 57 % (Moore, 1987).

Les changements notés au chapitre de la conjugalité ont favorisé la mise en place d'une "nouvelle monoparentalité", marquée sous le sceau de la féminisation des responsabilités parentales, et du rajeunissement et de l'appauvrissement des parents uniques (Dandurand et St-Jean, 1988). En 1986 par exemple, 82 % des chefs de familles monoparentales étaient des femmes, et près du tiers d'entre elles avaient moins de 35 ans (Stastistique Canada, 1987). La majorité de ces familles à chef féminin vivaient dans des conditions de vie précaires (voir, entre autres, Le Bourdais et Rose, 1986a, 1986b; Beaudoin et al., 1987). En 1985, 60 % des familles monoparentales sous la conduite d'une femme disposaient d'un revenu inférieur au seuil de faible revenu fixé par Statistique Canada, et leur revenu moyen représentait moins de la moitié de celui des familles époux-épouse ayant des enfants (Moore, 1987). Comme ces

femmes chefs de famille proviennent plus souvent que les pères seuls de groupes socio-professionnels défavorisés, il y a tout lieu de croire cependant qu'une partie des problèmes matériels qu'elles rencontrent "ne tiennent pas tant à l'absence d'un conjoint qu'au fait de leur position sociale spécifique" (Le Gall et Martin, 1987a: 29). D'où la nécessité de tenir compte des caractéristiques particulières des mères seules.

Les familles monoparentales ont, par ailleurs, fait l'objet de nombreuses études psychologiques et psychosociales. Les questions d'ajustement et de santé mentale des enfants au-delà de la rupture des parents ont beaucoup retenu l'attention des chercheurs. Comparant les comportements des enfants de famille monoparentale à ceux des enfants de famille nucléaire intacte, les recherches ont d'abord mené à un premier bilan fort négatif de la monoparentalité (voir Claes, 1989). On peut douter cependant de la pertinence et de la validité des résultats de ces recherches qui considèrent comme des touts monolithiques les familles monoparentales d'une part, et les familles nucléaires de l'autre, sans égard aux caractéristiques spécifiques (situation économique, catégorie socioprofessionnelle du parent, nature des relations entre les parents, etc.) des diverses unités les composant. Comme l'écrit Roussel, cette approche considère

le divorce comme une réalité univoque et ses effets sur l'enfant comme mécaniques (...). La variété des conflits, dans leur durée, leur intensité, leur nature, la diversité des attitudes parentales, le souci, présent ou non, de tenir le plus possible l'enfant à l'écart des tensions, toutes ces caractéristiques créent des situations différentes et induisent chez l'enfant des conséquences difficilement comparables. La première conclusion qui s'impose est donc qu'il n'existe pas, parmi les enfants, une catégorie homogène dont le trait principal serait que leurs parents sont divorcés (Roussel dans Bourguignon et al., 1985:4).

En fait, si le vocable "famille monoparentale", popularisé au début des années 1970, a permis une certaine déstigmatisation de situations parentales autrefois condamnées, cette dénomination est aujourd'hui remise en cause par nombre de chercheurs (Dandurand et Saint-Jean, 1988; Lefaucheur, 1988a, 1988b; Le Gall et Martin, 1987a). Leur constat est sévère: cette catégorie dénominative serait inapte à traduire la réalité familiale contemporaine, autant celle des enfants qui

ne vivent pas au quotidien avec leurs deux parents, que celle de leurs parents séparés. La pluralité des situations monoparentales observées, la place et la durée relative qu'elles occupent dans l'itinéraire familial des individus concernés rendraient pratiquement caduque cette catégorie englobante qui, justement, tend à occulter cette diversité.

Le concept de "famille monoparentale" a néanmoins permis de documenter dans le temps l'évolution de la "monoparentalité traditionnelle" à partir des données provenant des recensements. En ce sens, il décrit passablement bien la situation vécue par les "mères célibataires" et les veuves avec enfants. Centrée sur l'unité résidentielle, cette catégorie ne peut toutefois rendre compte du phénomène de la "nouvelle monoparentalité" associée aux ruptures volontaires d'unions. Le qualificatif "monoparental" ne reflète pas, en effet, la bi-parentalité (au moins de droit) exercée par le parent biologique non gardien (Lefaucheur, 1988b).

En effet, la parentalité ne cesse pas nécessairement de s'exercer une fois la dyade conjugale rompue. Souvent les ex-conjoints, liés par leurs enfants, maintiendront des relations plus ou moins suivies et se partageront la prise en charge des enfants, lesquels circuleront d'un foyer à l'autre. Dans ces conditions, il serait sans doute plus exact, à la suite de Lefaucheur (1988a), de parler de "ménages monoparentaux" et de "familles bifocales" ou même "multiparentales" pour décrire ces modes de fonctionnement familiaux. Comme elle l'écrit,

l'enfant qui est "gardé" dans un foyer monoparental a deux parents vivants, et donc au moins potentiellement deux foyers parentaux; il se trouve même inclus dans un réseau "parental-familial" élargi aux nouveaux époux, compagnons ou partenaires (légalement et/ou statistiquement "invisibles") de ses parents, ainsi qu'à leurs enfants éventuels, voire à leurs parents (Lefaucheur, 1988a: 4).

La majorité des données disponibles (recensements, enquêtes à grande diffusion) ne permettent malheureusement pas de distinguer ces formes d'organisation familiale, encore moins de faire le lien entre les deux fovers

parentaux entre lesquels l'enfant circule (voir Golini, Menniti et Palomba, 1987). Elles autorisent tout au plus la mesure, à un point donné dans le temps, de l'incidence d'un type de "famille monoparentale" bien précis: celui défini en fonction du critère de la cohabitation parent-enfant.

Le Canada n'échappe pas à cette règle. La définition officielle retenue par Statistique Canada lors des recensements est fondée sur la notion de ménage. Elle comprend toute personne qui vit sans conjoint et avec au moins un enfant célibataire (sans conjoint, ni enfant), quel que soit son âge. Cette définition n'est pas, on l'a vu, sans poser problème. Qui, par exemple, se déclare "parent seul" au recensement lorsque les deux parents séparés partagent la garde des enfants? La mère, le père, ou les deux parents? En fait, dans la mesure où "ce n'est pas tant l'union qui prédétermine la famille", que l'enfant lui-même", il est vain d'espérer appréhender correctement le phénomène des familles monoparentales à partir de données qui ne permettent pas de cerner les responsabilités effectives assumées par chacun des ex-conjoints et la manière dont l'enfant se positionne par rapport à eux (Le Gall et Martin, 1987a: 115) Clairement, des critères autres que la notion de résidence doivent être introduits pour aborder l'étude de ce phénomène.

L'analyse des situations monoparentales ne saurait, par ailleurs, reposer sur la seule utilisation des données de recensement; elles fournissent tout au plus une série de portraits instantanés de ménages monoparentaux à différents points dans le temps. Compte tenu de la mobilité conjugale croissante, le phénomène de la monoparentalité ne peut être compris que resitué "dans le déroulement d'une trame" (Le Gall et Martin, 1987a:91), que s'il est vu comme un "moment" à l'intérieur d'une trajectoire ou d'un cycle de vie. L'analyse de cette dynamique nécessite le recours à des données longitudinales (rétrospectives ou de type "panel"). Elle ne va pas toutefois sans soulever des difficultés méthodologiques de taille lorsqu'il s'agit, par exemple, de recréer à rebours les mouvements d'entrée et de sortie de l'état de parent seul, et ce à partir d'enquêtes

rétrospectives ayant recueilli l'histoire matrimoniale et reproductive des individus (Le Bourdais, 1988).

Par conséquent, très peu d'études ont tenté de mesurer la durée de vie des familles monoparentales et ont essayé de les resituer dans les histoires de vie des individus. Moore est une des rares chercheurs à voir mené des études sur le sujet au Canada. Elle a montré que si seulement 16 % des mères rejointes par l'Enquête sur la famille en 1984 vivaient en situation monoparentale à ce moment, environ 26 % des répondantes ayant eu des enfants s'étaient déjà retrouvées seules à la tête de leur famille avant cette date (Moore, 1989a). La durée moyenne du premier épisode de monoparentalité chez les femmes s'établirait à cinq ans et demi environ (Moore,1988), révélant ainsi l'aspect transitoire de ce statut familial. Douze pour cent des femmes auraient assumé le rôle de chef de famille monoparentale pendant une courte période de moins de six mois, alors qu'une proportion un peu plus élevée d'entre elles aurait gardé ce statut plus de dix ans (Moore, 1989a).

Une recherche récente que nous avons réalisée montre, par ailleurs, que la formation d'un couple constitue l'issue la plus fréquente des épisodes monoparentaux: le mariage et l'union libre auraient mis fin à cette situation dans près de 40 % et 25 % des cas respectivement (Desrosiers et al., 1991a). Les événements à l'origine de la situation monoparentale, et surtout l'âge auquel les femmes se sont retrouvées seules à la tête de leur famille, détermineraient fortement la durée de l'épisode de monoparentalité et à la façon dont celui-ci prendra fin (Desrosiers et al., 1991b; Moore, 1989b; McCarthy et Cherlin, 1990). Enfin, notre étude révèle que si les comportements observés en 1984 se maintenaient, une femme sur trois connaîtrait l'expérience de la monoparentalité au cours de sa vie (Desrosiers et al., 1991a).

Vue sous cet angle longitudinal, la monoparentalité, plus qu'une destination, semble ainsi inaugurer un ensemble de "trajectoires familiales et individuelles variées", qui seront dans certains cas, "constituées de plusieurs séquences et transitions" (Le Gall et Martin, 1991:61). Dès lors, ressortent à nouveau les

limites des statistiques officielles (recensement, état civil) qui, en ne donnant qu'une image instantanée des situations familiales, ne permettent pas d'aborder dans sa dynamique l'étude "des monoparentalités" et, par ricochet, d'en évaluer les incidences réelles sur les conditions de vie des individus (Kuijsten, 1990).

Il est donc clair que pour renouveler la connaissance du phénomène, il nous faut non seulement réviser la notion usuelle de monoparentalité mais encore disposer de données longitudinales qui relatent l'histoire familiale des individus (Duchêne, 1990:122). Nous y reviendrons. Mentionnons, pour l'instant, que l'émergence de nouveaux types d'union, tels les "couples stables non cohabitants" (LeGall et Martin, 1988) - aussi appelés *LAT* (Living Apart Together) dans la littérature anglophone (Trost, 1990) -, et de nouvelles configurations familiales comme les familles composées dont l'ampleur a été révélée dans certaines études étrangères (Crosbie-Burnett et al., 1988; Théry, 1987), illustre avec acuité les problèmes de définition auxquels se heurtent les chercheurs oeuvrant dans le domaine de la famille.

LES FAMILLES COMPOSÉES

La notion de "famille composée" (parfois appelée famille "reconstituée" ou "recomposée") ne renvoie pas à une définition très claire dans la littérature. On désigne généralement sous ce vocable toute unité regroupant "au moins un enfant vivant avec un parent naturel et un beau-parent" (Duchêne, 1990:120). Voilà décrite en peu de mots une forme familiale spécifique qui "conjugue deux modes de relation adulte-enfant dans un même couple" (Théry, 1987:119). Cette définition peut paraître relativement simple. Cependant, comme on le verra, l'étude des "familles composées" soulève des enjeux majeurs qui vont de la dénomination même de l'objet de recherche à sa mesure, à partir de données qui le rendent, par moment, invisible.

Les familles composées, au sens défini plus haut, ne constituent pas un phénomène nouveau des sociétés occidentales. Au contraire, comme le note

fort à propos Théry (1987:123), le remariage était quasiment "force de règle" aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles en France, en raison de la mortalité élevée prévalant à l'époque. Dans un tel contexte, le fait pour un enfant de vivre avec un beauparent était chose fréquente.

Ce qui est passablement nouveau, par contre, c'est la formation de familles composées suite à la remise en union d'un parent divorcé ou séparé. En France, ce mouvement s'enclenchera assez tôt avec le rétablissement du divorce en 1884 (Théry, 1987). Dans les autres pays occidentaux, il sera plus tardif. Au Canada, il faudra attendre les années soixante-dix pour assister à l'apparition de ce phénomène, rendu possible par l'adoption de la loi sur le divorce en 1968 et la progression des unions libres. Les évolutions conjuguées de la mortalité et de la conjugalité mèneront d'abord à une diminution du nombre de "familles composées", suivie par la suite d'une hausse de ce type d'unités familiales dorénavant marquées sous le signe de la diversité. On ne connaît toutefois pas l'ampleur réel de ce mouvement, les données nécessaires à cette mesure étant inexistantes.

Fait paradoxal, si le phénomène des familles composées induites par divorce est assez ancien dans certains pays, les recherches dans ce domaine sont passablement récentes. De plus, on ne peut qu'être frappé par l'absence de mots dans la littérature scientifique ou le langage populaire pour traduire cette organisation familiale (Crosbie-Burnett, 1988; Théry, 1987)⁵. Le terme de beauparent, par exemple, renvoie à un ensemble de situations fort diverses; il réfère tout aussi bien au nouveau conjoint du père ou de la mère d'un individu, qu'aux parents de son propre conjoint. Comme le mentionnent Crosbie-Burnett et al. (1988), aucun terme n'existe, par ailleurs, pour décrire les relations spécifiques

⁵ La littérature anglophone dispose d'un mot usuel, la *stepfamily*, pour décrire ce type de famille; selon Théry (1987), cela expliquerait peut-être la tradition plus ancienne de recherche dans ce domaine aux États-Unis. Pas plus qu'en français cependant, ce terme n'est dépourvu d'ambiguïté. Il tirerait son origine "d'un vieux mot anglais (*steop*) qui désigne l'orphelin" et non, contrairement à une idée répandue, de "la racine *staep* qui a donné en anglais *step* (la marche)" (Théry, 1987:121).

des familles composées, telles celles qui existent entre la mère d'un enfant et sa belle-mère (c'est-à-dire la conjointe du père). Bref, on le voit, la dénomination même de cet objet de recherche fait problème.

Les premières recherches sur le sujet, menées aux États-Unis, datent du milieu des années cinquante. Jusqu'à la fin des années soixante-dix, celles-ci s'inscriront en majorité dans le champ de la psycho-sociologie de la famille et elles aborderont l'étude des familles composées (induites par veuvage ou par divorce indistinctement) sous l'angle des problèmes d'ajustement et de déviance qu'elles créeraient comparativement à la famille nucléaire traditionnelle. En fait, le terme "reconstituted family", employé communément dans cette littérature, traduit bien l'idée que la famille nucléaire intacte, que l'on tente de reconstituer, représente l'aune à laquelle les problèmes associés à la première seront mesurés. Ces études, basées sur des petits échantillons non représentatifs, ne tenant pas compte des caractéristiques des divers types de familles sous observation, généreront des résultats souvent contradictoires et surtout non généralisables (pour une revue, voir Coleman et Ganong, 1990; Théry, 1987).

Ce n'est véritablement qu'à partir des années quatre-vingt qu'émergera une nouvelle tradition de recherche, moins normative, et davantage centrée sur des études empiriques à grande échelle. Ces études se heurteront toutefois à un manque crucial de données. Aussi, peu de travaux aborderont directement l'analyse des familles composées, et lorsqu'on y fera référence, ce sera la plupart du temps via l'étude des remariages ou de l'après divorce (pour une revue, voir Théry, 1987).

Au Canada, aucune recherche à notre connaissance n'a porté spécifiquement sur les familles composées autrement que par le biais des enfants.⁶ Sans doute est-ce en partie parce que les données officielles de l'état civil ou des

⁶ L'étude de Marcil-Gratton (1988) s'est attachée, par exemple, à estimer la proportion d'enfants de diverses générations qui, avant d'atteindre l'âge x, vivront avec une mère seule, dans une famille composée, etc.

recensements permettent mal d'en aborder l'analyse. En effet, pour évaluer à un moment donné le nombre de familles composées au sens où nous l'avons défini précédemment, il faut pouvoir disposer de l'histoire matrimoniale et génésique de chacun des deux conjoints. Or, le recensement canadien, à l'instar de la majorité des recensements effectués ailleurs dans le monde, ne collecte que très peu de données longitudinales sur l'histoire de vie des individus. En outre, plusieurs des données nécessaires à cette analyse n'ont pas été recueillies par le passé. Aussi, est-il impossible à l'heure actuelle d'estimer avec précision le nombre de familles composées vivant au Canada.

Des travaux préliminaires que nous avons menés à partir des données du recensement canadien de 1981 et de l'Enquête sur la famille réalisée par Statisque Canada en 1984, nous amènent à estimer de façon grossière à 10 % environ la proportion de familles composées parmi l'ensemble des familles avec enfants; celles-ci sont définies comme regroupant les unités familiales où l'un des conjoints n'est pas le parent biologique (ou adoptif) d'au moins un des enfants présents (Dupont et Le Bourdais, 1991). Dans une perspective longitudinale, nous avons montré ailleurs qu'une femme sur six risque d'appartenir à un moment ou l'autre de sa vie à une famille composée si les comportements des Canadiennes âgées de 18-65 ans rejointes en 1984 par l'Enquête sur la famille se maintiennent dans l'avenir (Desrosiers et Le Bourdais, 1991). En fait, comme l'incidence de ce type de famille est nettement plus forte dans les générations récentes, il y a tout lieu de croire que cette proportion sera plus élevée parmi les jeunes femmes d'aujourd'hui.

Ces résultats sont nettement plus faibles que les pourcentages établis aux États-Unis à partir de données d'enquêtes. En 1980, la proportion de familles américaines comptant au moins un beau-parent parmi l'ensemble des couples

⁷ Soulignons, à titre d'exemple, qu'on ne connaît les dates de naissance des enfants que pour les femmes vivant en union au moment du recensement ou ayant déjà été mariées; cette information n'a pas été recueillie auprès des femmes sans conjoint au recensement, qui ont eu un enfant hors union ou dans le cadre d'une union consensuelle.

mariés avec enfants a été estimée à 16 % (Moorman et Hernandez, 1989), et elle s'établissait à 17 % en 1987 (Glick, 1989). Certes, les données des deux pays ne sont pas directement comparables puisque les unions libres sont incluses dans nos analyses, alors qu'elles ne le sont pas dans les études américaines. Il y tout lieu de croire néanmoins que le phénomène des familles composées est plus fréquent chez nos voisins du sud (McCarthy et Cherlin, 1990).

En dehors des États-Unis, peu de pays disposaient jusqu'à tout récemment de sources de données autres que les recensements pour approcher l'étude des transformations familiales. Cette situation a eu pour effet d'empêcher la mesure du phénomène des familles composées. Pis encore, le recours aux recensements qui ne distinguent pas les premières unions des unions subséquentes, et les enfants naturels des beaux-enfants, a rendu invisible ce type de familles. Cette pratique des statisticiens de la population est révélatrice de la "relative indéfinition des rôles et des relations" qui touche les membres des familles composées (Théry, 1987:134). Elle reflétait jusqu'à tout récemment l'imposition de la famille nucléaire intacte comme modèle familial dominant dans notre société et le désir, tant des chercheurs que des individus, de s'y conformer ou de former des unités familiales qui lui ressemblent (Coleman et Ganong, 1990).

Aujourd'hui, de plus en plus de chercheurs s'entendent sur la nécessité d'examiner plus à fond la spécificité des familles composées et d'en revoir la définition. Comme l'écrit Théry,

l'une des raisons qui ont incité les chercheurs, quelle que soit leur discipline, à distinguer de plus en plus nettement les secondes unions après divorce des secondes unions après veuvage, est qu'elles diffèrent non seulement par leur origine mais par la configuration même des liens familiaux qu'elles organisent, en présence d'enfants de la première union. Les murs du foyer enclosent le groupe domestique, mais la porte en reste comme entrebâillée pour les incursions et excursions qui traduisent la permanence, même sous des formes considérablement transformées, des relations dont hérite la "famille reconstituée" après divorce, et qui participent de sa spécificité (Théry, 1987:139).

Par opposition à la famille composée qui, après veuvage, se créait à partir d'une famille amputée définitivement d'un de ses membres ou, si l'on veut, d'une de ses composantes, la famille composée après divorce diffère en ce qu'elle se construit par l'ajout d'un nouveau membre.

Certes, plusieurs travaux antérieurs ont montré que la prise en charge des enfants par les deux parents est loin d'être toujours égale suite à la rupture d'union. Dans la majorité des cas, la mère assumera la charge des enfants au quotidien, et le père naturel ou biologique n'entretiendra bien souvent que peu ou prou de relations avec ceux-ci (voir, par exemple, Dandurand et Saint-Jean, 1988). Sauf exception, le parent non gardien n'en perd pas cependant pour autant ses privilèges (au moins de droit) de garde et de visite. Il pourra toujours après quelques années d'absence revoir ses enfants et peut-être même, dans certains cas, en assumer la garde. C'est du moins ce que suggèrent diverses études où l'on a montré que la cohabitation avec le père s'accroît avec l'âge des enfants (Careau et al., 1987; Léridon et Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1988).

L'approche qui conçoit la famille composée comme étant formée de deux foyers parentaux entre lesquels les enfants circulent, repose sur un changement de perspective fondamental. Elle suppose que l'étude des relations familiales soit abordée par le biais de la circulation des enfants entre deux foyers, entre deux ménages, et non simplement à partir de la notion de résidence avec le parent gardien (Pitrou, 1987b; Théry, 1987). Du coup, le concept même de ménage, comme entité économique regroupant une ou plusieurs unités familiales, vacille (Théry, 1987). Par le biais de la circulation des enfants et leur prise en charge entre deux ménages, la famille en vient en fait à déborder et à recouvrir la notion du ménage. Ce changement de perspective, on s'en doute, n'est pas sans entraîner des modifications importantes au chapitre de la collecte des données; nous y reviendrons plus loin. Il a aussi pour effet de modifier radicalement la définition même des familles composées proposée en début de section, à tout le moins pour les familles d'après séparation ou divorce.

En effet, la définition de base avancée est tout à fait inapte à rendre compte de la réalité des "nouvelles" familles composées résultant d'une rupture d'union. Basée sur la notion de résidence de l'enfant avec le parent gardien et son conjoint, elle a pour effet, par exemple, d'exclure la famille composée suivante: un enfant résidant avec sa mère seule les jours de semaine, et habitant avec son père et sa nouvelle conjointe les fins de semaine. L'approche par le biais des enfants comme outil d'analyse permet pourtant de découvrir une famille composée formée de deux noyaux résidentiels: un "foyer monoparental" organisé autour de la mère, et un "foyer bi-parental composé" formé autour du père, comme Lefaucheur (1988b) nomme cette unité familiale pour la distinguer des "foyers bi-parentaux simples". Glick (1989) propose une démarche similaire. centrée non seulement sur le ménage principal de résidence mais incluant aussi l'autre unité biparentale, pour aborder l'étude des familles composées. Pour faire sens, elle devrait toutefois s'appuyer sur une analyse empirique des relations concrètes que les enfants entretiennent avec leurs deux parents séparés. Car s'il est incohérent de ne pas considérer comme famille composée deux ménages parentaux séparés qui se partagent la charge d'un enfant, il est sans doute tout aussi illogique d'envisager comme appartenant à un réseau familial composé un enfant qui ne verra jamais son parent non-gardien. Bref, on le voit, au-delà d'une simple question théorique, la notion de famille composée pose aussi le problème de son opérationnalisation.

POUR UNE APPROCHE OPÉRATIONNELLE DES FAMILLES

Ce qui frappe suite à ce retour sur les notions de famille monoparentale et de famille composée, c'est, comme l'écrit Dandurand,

que les deux composantes principales de la famille, la conjugalité et la parentalité, ont connu un changement analogue: ils sont tous deux devenus plus délibérés (Dandurand, 1990:57).

D' un côté, le divorce et la progression des unions libres ont permis aux individus de rompre des *mariages malheureux* et de former des unions sur une base

davantage contractuelle. De l'autre, l'apparition de méthodes contraceptives efficaces a permis aux couples d'empêcher les naissances non désirées.

Cette évolution fait que l'entrée en union - libre ou légitime - n'est plus aujourd'hui synonyme de projet d'enfant pour le couple (Trost, 1990); l'existence des *DINKs* (Double Income No Kid), dont le mode de vie a été amplement décrit par les médias, en témoigne. D'un autre côté, elle signifie que la famille est "de moins en moins associée au projet conjugal" et plus directement liée "à la mise en oeuvre d'un projet d'enfant" (Dandurand, 1990:57). Par conséquent, l'approche utilisée depuis longtemps par les statisticiens de la population, qui consiste à privilégier le lien conjugal, plus particulièrement le mariage, dans les études sur la famille, devient désormais caduque.

De même, les liens de consanguinité sont tout aussi inopérants pour approcher la réalité multiforme des familles dans un contexte de forte mobilité conjugale. L'émergence de modèles familiaux variés suite aux ruptures d'unions amène, on l'a vu, un changement de perspective dans la façon d'aborder l'objet famille. Plutôt que le couple, c'est l'enfant qui ouvre maintenant la porte sur l'univers familial. Il permet de lier entre eux des foyers parentaux distincts formés à la suite d'une rupture volontaire d'union et de tenir compte de l'arrivée de "beaux-parents" qui s'ajoutent aux parents biologiques. Plus que la filiation biologique, ce seraient donc les responsabilités qu'assument les parents - biologiques ou ajoutés - au niveau de la prise en charge et de la socialisation des enfants qui contribueraient à définir la famille contemporaine (Pitrou, 1987b). Celle-ci pourra déborder le cadre physique du ménage (Höhn, 1990). Pour que le concept de famille soit véritablement heuristique, il faudrait pouvoir dissocier les notions de "parenté" et de "co-résidence", encore souvent confondues dans les statistiques officielles et le langage populaire (Lefaucheur, 1988b).

Ce changement de perspective théorique entraîne nécessairement des modifications importaines au chapitre de la collecte des données. Comme l'écrit Höhn (1990: 303), "dès que l'on veut rendre cette définition (de la famille) opératoire en statistique, les difficultés commencent". Le besoin de données

plus appropriées se fait donc pressant. Mais la tenue de nouvelles enquêtes sur le terrain nécessite au préalable que l'on forge des "définitions de travail". Des définitions "claires", ne s'inscrivant pas "dans des cadres normatifs", et "qui couvrent toutes les formes familiales, y compris les nouvelles situations domestiques, souvent informelles" (Höhn, 1990: 303).

C'est dans cette optique d'opérationnalisation du concept de famille que nous proposons la typologie présentée ci-après. Celle-ci est fondée sur les relations "théoriques" qui unissent parents, beaux-parents et enfants. Elle n'entre donc pas dans le détail des variations que peuvent prendre les configurations familiales selon le type d'enfants présents (demi-frère, demi-soeur, beau-frère, belle-soeur). Elle ne tient pas compte non plus des *pratiques* concrètes qui se tissent entre parents et enfants.

Le concept de famille avancé ici ne repose pas sur le critère de résidence. Celuici est réservé à la notion de foyer parental. Une famille pourra, par conséquent, englober deux foyers lorsque les deux parents vivent séparés.

Une première distinction oppose famille biparentale et famille monoparentale: le premier terme recouvre l'ensemble des configurations familiales où les deux parents biologiques⁸ de l'enfant sont vivants, peu importe leur lieu de résidence; à l'opposé, la seconde expression renvoit aux situations où l'enfant n'a qu'un seul parent vivant. L'expression famille monoparentale simple est donc beaucoup plus restrictive que celle véhiculée usuellement: elle ne s'applique qu'aux seules familles rompues par veuvage ou encore à celles résultant d'une naissance hors union (les "maternités célibataires").

La référence à la notion de famille *simple* ou *composée* vise à distinguer, dans un deuxième temps, la présence ou non dans le réseau familial d'au moins un beau-parent (les nouveaux conjoints des parents biologiques). Ainsi, trouvera-t-on à la fois des familles biparentales et a familles monoparentales qui peuvent

⁸ Y inclus les parents d'enfants adoptés.

ESSAI DE TYPOLOGIE DES CONFIGURATIONS FAMILIALES CONTEMPORAINES

Famille biparentale simple

- Intacte: comprenant un foyer biparental simple, où vivent les deux

parents biologiques

- séparée: regroupant deux foyers monoparentaux simples, où les deux

parents biologiques vivent chacun sans conjoint

Famille biparentale composée

- à un beau parent: comprenant un foyer monoparental simple (parent biologique sans conjoint) et un foyer biparental composé (parent biologique avec un nouveau conjoint)

- à deux beaux-parents: regroupant deux foyers biparentaux composés (parents biologiques vivant avec de nouveaux conjoints)

Famille monoparentale

- simple: un seul parent biologique vivant et sans conjoint (un foyer monoparental simple)

- composée: un seul parent biologique vivant et habitant avec un nouveau conjoint (un foyer monoparental composé)

être simples ou composées. Parmi les familles biparentales simples, on distingue deux formes d'organisation: l'une, la famille intacte, qui regroupe sous le même toit les deux parents biologiques des enfants; l'autre, la famille séparée, dont les parents biologiques vivent sans conjoint dans des foyers séparés. Les familles biparentales composées seront organisées autour de deux foyers distincts; la famille à un beau-parent regroupera un foyer monoparental simple et un foyer biparental composé, tandis que la famille à deux beaux-parents réfèrera à deux foyers biparentaux composés.

L'identification des catégories familiales décrites dans la typologie à un moment donné nécessite que l'on dispose de données sur la situation matrimoniale et parentale des deux parents biologiques des enfants, et non seulement sur un seul d'entre eux comme c'est souvent le cas dans les enquêtes à grande diffusion. Elle implique également que l'on ait pris soin de recueillir des informations semblables sur le nouveau conjoint du parent répondant.

Tel que mentionné précédemment, la typologie proposée est théorique en ce sens qu'elle n'intègre pas les pratiques des acteurs concernés. Celles-ci devraient cependant être examinées si l'on souhaite rendre compte véritablement de la réalité vécue par les familles. Toute nouvelle source de données doit, par conséquent, fournir non seulement les informations nécessaires à la reconstruction des différents types de famille identifiés, mais permettre également de décrire le réseau familial dans son fonctionnement, plus particulièrement en regard de la prise en charge des enfants (Dandurand, 1990; Pitrou, 1987b). La catégorie familiale observée dans les faits pourrait ainsi diverger de la configuration théorique lorsque l'enfant perd, par exemple, contact avec le parent non gardien (voir Léridon et Villeneuve-Gokalp (1988) qui montrent que cette situation est loin d'être marginale).

La typologie avancée ne tient pas davantage compte de la notion de durée qui est pourtant au coeur des trajectoires familiales. Elle ne fournit qu'un portrait transversal des configurations familiales observées à un moment donné. Compte tenu de la mobilité conjugale observée au cours des dernières

décennies, chaque situation familiale ne peut pourtant être analysée que comme un moment s'inscrivant dans une trajectoire: le résultat d'une histoire antérieure qui, à son tour, constitue le point de départ d'une nouvelle séquence. L'étude des transformations familiales ne saurait donc être approchée autrement que dans sa dynamique, c'est-à-dire à partir d'une lorgnette longitudinale (Höhn, 1990).

Les méthodes lourdes de collecte traditionnelle de données (état civil, recensement) s'avèrent tout à fait inadéquates à la poursuite de cette analyse (Festy, 1990; Kuijsten, 1990). D'une part, les statistiques de l'état civil ne permettent pas de dénombrer les événements qui se situent en dehors des cadres légaux, telles les unions libres. D'autre part, les recensements exhaustifs de population sont beaucoup trop onéreux pour permettre la collecte des histoires familiales (Duchêne, 1990). L'ajout de quelques questions sur les membres du ménage et sur les unions antérieures et les enfants issus de ces unions pour la personne-repère et son conjoint lors des recensements pourrait néanmoins fournir une photographie de la configuration des familles à divers points dans le temps.

Comme l'écrit Duchêne (1990:123), "la base idéale de données devrait reposer sur l'enregistrement continu de tous les événements qui impliquent, pour une famille, le passage d'un état vers un autre". Elle devrait donc, au minimum, contenir des informations sur l'histoire des unions libres ou légitimes (date d'entrée, de sortie, issue) et sur l'histoire des enfants (date de naissance ou d'entrée dans la famille, date de départ, lieu de destination, motif) des répondants. A défaut d'un tel enregistrement continu, le recours à des données d'enquête s'impose. Ces enquêtes pourront être rétrospectives, c'est-à-dire recueillir à rebours les événements constitutifs de la vie familiale des répondants et de leurs conjoints, ou de type panel, c'est-à-dire suivre les individus et les familles à mesure que s'écrit leur histoire. Chacune de ces deux stratégies comporte avantages et inconvénients (voir Höhn, 1990). Soulignons toutefois que les enquêtes rétrospectives, qui ne nécessitent pas de s'étaler sur une

longue période de temps et qui sont par le fait même moins coûteuses, ont été nettement plus nombreuses.

Les deux enquêtes rétrospectives menées en 1984, et portant l'une sur la famille, l'autre sur la fécondité, constituent un point tournant pour la recherche sur la famille au Canada. Recueillant pour la première fois les histoires matrimoniales et reproductives complètes d'un large échantillon d'hommes et de femmes âgés de 18 à 65 ans, l'Enquête sur la famille, en particulier⁹, a ouvert la voie aux recherches sur la dynamique familiale. 10 Celles-ci, on l'a vu, ont porté sur l'analyse des épisodes de vie en monoparentalité (Moore, 1988, 1989a, 1989b; Desrosiers et al., 1991a, 1991b) et en famille composée (Desrosiers et Le Bourdais, 1991; Dupont et Le Bourdais, 1991).

L'étude de la dynamique des transformations familiales à partir de données d'enquêtes rétrospectives soulève toutefois des difficultés méthodologiques sérieuses. Elle suppose que soient recréées à rebours les diverses séquences familiales des individus, c'est-à-dire les épisodes de vie passés en famille monoparentale, en famille composée, à partir de la combinaison des données recueillies sur les unions et les enfants. Elle nécessite, par la suite, le recours à des méthodes longitudinales d'analyse qui intègrent la notion de temps (de durée) et tiennent compte du passé des individus (Höhn, 1990). La méthode des tables de survie, bien connue des démographes, est particulièrement bien adaptée pour décrire le déroulement de la vie familiale des individus. La méthode de l'analyse des transitions ("event history analysis") s'avère, de son côté, particulièrement précieuse quand vient le temps d'examiner les facteurs qui influent sur la durée de vie passée dans chacune des situations familiales (Kuijsten, 1990).

⁹ L'enquête sur la fécondité est restreinte à un échantillon de femmes âgées de 15 à 49 ans.

¹⁰ A noter toutefois que les questions posées aux hommes ne permettent pas véritablement de reconstituer leur histoire reproductive.

L'Enquête sur la famille de 1984 comportait plusieurs défauts, dont celui de n'avoir pas colligé de données sur l'histoire matrimoniale et reproductive des conjoints actuels et passés des répondants. Cela a eu pour conséquence de rendre impossible l'analyse des configurations familiales au sens où nous les avons définies précédemment. Les données disponibles autorisent au mieux l'identification du foyer parental, et encore, seulement dans les cas où parents et enfants résident sous le même toit. En aucune façon, elles ne permettent une étude des pratiques concernant la prise en charge des enfants.

La récente Enquête sur la famille et les amis, menée par Statistique Canada en 1990, comble en partie cette lacune puisqu'elle a amassé nombre de renseignements sur la prise en charge des enfants, quel que soit leur lieu de résidence. Elle fournit également des informations sur le partage des tâches domestiques à l'intérieur du ménage qui permettront de caractériser plus à fond l'organisation des différents types de famille.

L'enquête de 1990 a recueilli des données sur les échanges que les répondants entretiennent avec leurs propres parents, de même que sur les circonstances qui ont entouré leur départ du foyer parental, le cas échéant. Cela rend donc possible l'étude d'un réseau familial élargi à la verticale, dans la mesure où sont prises en compte trois générations¹¹ (dans les cas où les répondants sont euxmêmes déjà parents). Par contre, tout comme l'Enquête sur la famille de 1984, l'enquête de 1990 interdit en partie l'étude du fonctionnement de la famille élargie horizontale. Nous ne disposons en effet d'aucune donnée rétrospective sur le conjoint cohabitant et sur l'ex-conjoint, à partir desquelles nous pourrions enfin concevoir les formes diverses que prend l'institution familiale aujourd'hui.

A peine l'enquête de 1990 terminée, voilà donc que le besuin de nouvelles données ressurgit à nouveau. Avant de concevoir de nouveaux projets d'enquête, il y a toutefois lieu d'explorer au maximum les données collectées en

¹¹ Et même quatre, puisqu'on a aussi posé quelques questions sur les grandsparents.

1990. Même si notre analyse est appelée à demeurer partielle, ces données devraient néanmoins faire avancer notre connaissance des configurations familiales contemporaines et fournir moult informations sur la dynamique qui se profile derrière cette distribution transversale. Ce sont là des informations qui s'avèrent essentielles à l'élaboration et au développement de toute politique de soutien adaptée aux familles d'aujourd'hui.

Suite aux transformations de la conjugalité et de la parentalité observées au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années et à la mobilité familiale qui a résulté, certains ont conclu, un peu rapidement il s'en faut, à l'affaiblissement, voire à la mort de la famille (pour une discussion, voir Bumpass, 1990). Pourtant, à la suite de Trost.

on pourrait déclarer que la famille consanguine a été renforcée puisque, parmi les ménages parents-enfants qui se dissolvent, minoritaires désormais sont ceux qui le doivent à la mort d'un des deux parents, et que le cas le plus fréquent est le divorce ou la séparation. Ainsi, après la dissolution de l'unité conjugale par divorce ou par séparation, chacune des deux unités parentenfant peut continuer à exister comme groupe social, aujourd'hui bien plus qu'hier. On peut dire qu'en tant qu'institution sociale, la famille est toujours présente et continuera probablement à l'être dans l'avenir ... (Trost, 1990:37).

... dans des formes différentes, bien sûr, et davantage centrée sur la relation parent-enfant que sur la dyade conjugale. Plus qu'auparavant, les responsabilités parentales s'affichent publiquement comme une affaire de femmes (Dandurand, 1990). De la sphère privée, celles-ci gagnent indubitablement le domaine public.

Enfin, le niveau de complexité des familles composées devrait demeurer relativement modéré dans l'avenir: selon McCarthy et Cherlin (1990), les familles regroupant sous un même toit trois types d'enfants (enfants biologiques de chacun des conjoints et enfants conçus dans le cadre de l'union) seraient passablement rares. Par ailleurs, le nombre de familles composées pourrait être

encore plus élevé que ne l'annoncent les premiers chiffres issus d'enquêtes rétrospectives incomplètes, si le phénomène de la conjugalité non cohabitante (que d'autres ont nommé semi-cohabitation ou *Living Apart Together*) recensé dans certains pays comme la France ou la Suède s'affirmait au cours des prochaines années (LeGall et Martin, 1988; Trost, 1990). Sans remettre fondamentalement en question la typologie des configurations familiales que nous avons élaborée auparavant, il reste que ce phénomène pourrait avoir comme effet de complexifier quelque peu certaines d'entre elles.

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
THE FAMILY AND MORTALITY IN CANADA

(1)

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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA 1991 AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL HEALTH AND WELFARE.

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THE FAMILY AND MORTALITY IN CANADA

INTRODUCTION

Research in the United States and in other industrialized nations has shown that the married have lower death rates than the nonmarried population (Gove, 1972; Hu and Goldman, 1990; Berkman and Syme, 1979; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Vallin and Nizard, 1977; Rosengren et al., 1989; Livi-Bacci, 1984; Kisker and Goldman, 1987; Zick and Smith, 1991; Mergenhagen et al., 1985; MacMahon and Pugh, 1970; Kobrin and Hendershot, 1977; Boyd, 1983; Trovato and Lauris, 1989). Single individuals are usually found to possess higher rates of mortality than married individuals of similar age, while divorced and widowed persons tend to show the highest death rates of all marital status groups. These differentials are generally wider for males than for females.

Explanations for the marital status differential are typically based on two competing theories. The protection of marriage theory (Durkheim, 1951; Gove, 1973; Kobrin and Hendershot, 1977) posits that marriage entails a protective influence for the individual due to the role obligations and responsibilities to the family members. This explanation originates from the classic work of Durkheim (1951), who argued that marriage is a significant source of social integration for the individual. The second thesis for the marital status differential in human mortality is the health selection hypothesis. Proponents of this explanation view the superior longevity of married people as a function of differential health; that is, persons who are physically and psychologically healthy get married (or remarry) while unhealthy persons tend to remain single or unmarried (Sheps, 1961; Shurtleff, 1956; Livi-Bacci, 1984; Kisker and Goldman, 1987).

The literature has also considered the possibility that the observed marital status mortality differentials are caused by data errors. For example, Sheps (1961) warned that there is misclassification of population data by marital status. Thus, in addition to the possible effects of health selection in accounting for observed mortality differentials, there may be errors in the classification of marital status in census figures and/or in death certificates. Others however, have concluded that data problems are unlikely to play a major role as a cause of mortality differentials by marital status (Kraus and Lilienfeld, 1959; Adams, 1981).

The consistency of the association between marital status and death over time across societies suggests that there may something about being in a marital union that is salutary for the individual. Recent sociological and epidemiological research has provided direct evidence that marriage is indeed "protective," as the influence of being married on mortality in prospective studies remains significant even after health differences and a host of other relevant control variables have been taken into account (Berkman and Syme, 1979; House et al., 1988; House, 1987; Berkman, 1985; Cohen and Syme, 1985; Wolfson et al., 1989; Schoenbach et al., 1986; Haan et al., 1987; Rosengren et al., 1989; Zick and Smith, 1991; Helsing et al., 1981). This recent literature is especially important because it not only serves to establish firm evidence for the authenticity of the marital status differential in longevity, but also reflects a concerted attempt in explaining why marriage is "protective" and salutary for the individual.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The aim of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of official mortality data concerning marital status differentials in general and cause specific mortality in Canada for the period 1985-1987. The analysis will follow the basic approach developed by Gove (1973) in the context of the United States. The central hypothesis to be investigated is that the married will show relatively low death rates in comparison to single, widowed and divorced people with respect to overall and cause specific death rates that are attributable to what Gove (1973) termed "overt social acts." Such causes of death include lung cancer (mainly due to smoking) cirrhosis of the liver (highly associated with excessive alcohol consumption), suicide (associated with extreme distress), and so on. A more detailed discussion of these causes of death will be given later in the methods section of this study. It is anticipated that mortality differences across marital status classes will be negligible for causes of death that do not have a predominantly behavioural etiology (e.g., leukemia).

As indicated earlier, most of the relevant literature is based on countries outside Canada. There are few systematic studies in this area of research within Canada. The analysis done by Boyd (1983) is based on the period 1970-72; while the analysis undertaken by Trovato and Lauris (1989) covers the time span 1951 through 1981. Therefore, this study represents a more recent assessment of the relationship between marital status and mortality differences in Canada.¹

These earlier studies have a number of shortcomings which will be rectified in the present analysis. For example, Boyd (1983) had • confine her analysis to two broad age groups (25-44 and 45-64), and to a limited classification of the marital status variable that

consisted of single, married and "other," making it impossible to distinguish the divorced from the widowed population. The age groupings in Boyd's study are too broad and the marital status groups are not refined enough for an adequate assessment of mortality differences by marital status.² Trovato and Lauris (1989) included more age categories in their analysis, but failed to examine the population aged between 15 and 34 due to lack of data. Furthermore, their study focused on two broad causes of death, cardiovascular diseases and neoplasms.

Given the limitations in previous work, this study will examine general and cause specific mortality for the population aged 15 through 85, classified into five broad age intervals, and will compare death rates for the single, married, widowed and divorced populations during the three-year period centred around the census year of 1986.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Durkheim's study of <u>Suicide</u> is perhaps the most influential work in the sociological study of mortality differentials. Although the focus of his analysis was on the phenomenon of suicide as a social fact as opposed to a psychological act, his conclusions about the association of marriage with self-inflicted death have sparked numerous investigations. After observing that the suicide rate varies by marital category Durkheim advanced the following empirical generalizations: (1) widowed persons commit suicide more than married persons but generally less than unmarried persons; (2) men find widowhood and divorce more distressing than women; (3) divorce is the most distressing of all marital conditions; and (4) widowed and divorced persons with children commit suicide less than those without children (Meer, 1976). Furthermore, it was concluded that married persons

after age 20 have a high degree of immunity against self-inflicted death; parenthood increases the "protective" effect of marriage; divorce and widowhood aggravate the chances of suicide; and that married men are more "protected" from suicide than are married women. The odds of committing suicide among the married and ever-married was observed to vary inversely with the number of children. These and other observations led Durkheim to postulate that suicide in society varies inversely with the degree of social integration to the family institution, to the religious institution, and to the political institution.

The concept of social integration plays a central role in explaining marital status mortality variations. By social integration, Durkheim meant the presence of enduring, meaningful social ties to significant others and to the collectivity (i.e., family) for the individual. Thus, married individuals have lower suicide rates because they are regulated by accepted social norms inherent in the marital institution, and as such, couples are provided with a sense of moral equilibrium where each spouse recognizes his/her responsibility to the other and to the household, overriding the self's individualistic tendencies. This state of integration provides a context of enduring and meaningful social ties, and it is this sense of meaning that decreases one's propensity to commit suicide. This idea is conveyed by Durkheim's account of why divorce is associated with high suicide propensities:

"... divorce implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation. Where it exists, and especially where law and custom permit its excessive practice, marriage is nothing but a weakened simulacrum of itself; it is an inferior form of marriage. It can not produce its useful effects to the same degree... One can not be strongly restrained by a chain which may be broken on one side or the other at any moment (Durkheim, 1951:271-272).

Thus, in Durkheim's conception of the suicide phenomenon, the crucial factor

concerning the incidence of it is social integration; that is, the presence of meaningful and enduring social bonds for the individual. The more one is socially integrated, the more he/she is constrained (regulated) in seeking and actualizing individualistic tendencies, and the more one is likely to emphasize the importance of the collectivity. It is this dual role of integration and regulation that deters the individual from committing suicide. In general, the sociological and epidemiologic literature has provided overwhelming support of Durkheim's views on the relationship between marital status and suicide (Gibbs and Martin, 1964; Danigelis and Pope, 1979; Breault, 1986; Stack, 1980, 1981, 1985, 1990; Trovato, 1986, 1987).

Although the literature has established strong support for the Durkheimian theory of marital status and suicide, there has been, until lately, less effort directed towards emphasizing how social integration relates to other causes of death. The social integration explanation is merely a starting point in unravelling the causal mechanisms responsible for the married's relatively low death rates, not only from suicide, but also from a host of other causes of death.

Gove (1973) based his research on Durkheim's theory by executing a detailed study of cause-specific mortality differences among marital status groups in the United States for the period 1959-1961. He was interested in testing the thesis that the lower mortality of the married is due to the roles married people occupy. Hence, marriage entails obligations and responsibility to a spouse and children. This view that is consistent with Durkheim's concept of social integration.

But how do role responsibilities and obligations translate into differential mortality?

Gove (1973) argued that married people smoke less, consume less alcohol and take better care of themselves than do single people, the widowed and the divorced, due to their greater sense of responsibility to the family. Furthermore, when a spouse falls ill or develops some disability, the healthy spouse usually provides essential care and support -- a situation that differs for the unmarried who do not have the benefit of having a spouse to give support.

In order to better test his hypothesis, Gove (1973) classified causes of death in accordance with their presumed etiology being associated with overt social acts, psychological states, or socially approved narcotics. Examples of these are: cancer, which is largely due to smoking; cirrhosis of the liver, which is largely due to alcohol consumption; and suicide and homicide, which are largely a consequence of distress and personal conflict. Diseases such as diabetes can also be considered to have a social component to them since they require prolonged diligence in following medical care on the part of the patient and possibly the close supervision by a spouse to ensure compliance with prescribed medical treatment. Viewed in this manner, it is possible to classify causes of death by their presumed etiology (e.g., social psychological bases as opposed to deaths for which their etiology is largely due to nonsocial factors, such as leukemia and other blood disorders).

Marital status differentials in mortality were found for all causes of death assumed to have social psychological bases to them, with the married of both sexes experiencing the lowest mortality, singles an intermediate rate, and the divorced and widowed populations of each sex and age group, the highest rates.

Gove (1973) examined mortality due to leukemia, which he assumed has little or no social or psychological basis. Differentials due to this cause of death were not found,

providing indirect evidence for the protection theory of marriage. If the selection theory were the one most able to explain mortality differentials it would follow that mortality discrepancies would be seen for all causes of death, and not simply for those having a predominantly social or psychological etiology.

Of course, the problem of testing for a health selection effect is not so easily resolved. Ideally, one would need to examine prospective data on individuals with regard to marriage proneness, health status prior to and after marriage, and survival probabilities over the life course. Such data are not easily accessible. The few studies that do apply a prospective design have provided strong confirmation for Gove's and others' contentions that marriage provides "protection" from premature death (e.g. Kobrin and Hendershot, 1977; Stroebe and Stroebe, 1983; Stroebe et al., 1982; Boyd, 1983; Geerken and Gove, 1974; Trovato and Lauris, 1989; Mergenhagen et al., 1985; Verbrugge, 1979; Wingard, 1984). During the midsixties and early seventies, epidemiologists began to pay attention to the role of social ties (marriage being an example) as determinants of morbidity and mortality.

In epidemiology, the early formulations of this postulate were introduced by Caplan (1974), Cassel (1976) and Cobb (1976), who are considered to be the pioneers of the social support-stress-disease domain of epidemiological research.³ The basic premise underlying these authors' conceptualizations is that the social environment in the milieu of the individual is an important factor in not only explaining the amount of stress to which individuals are exposed, but also the extent to which the effects of stress on health are buffered or mediated by the social supports within the person's immediate environment of action (House, 1987; House et al., 1988; Berkman, 1984; Kasl, 1984; Barrera, 1986).

The introduction of social support as a concept in the epidemiological literature has sparked numerous investigations, but as House (1987:137) has stated recently, "There is no consensus on the conceptualization and measurement of social support." He notes that the term "social support," and related terms such as "social integration" and "social networks" are often used interchangeably to refer to three distinct aspects of social relationships -- their existence or quantity (social integration), their formal structure (network), and their functional content (the degree to which they involve flows of affect or emotional concern, instrumental or tangible information) (House, 1987:137).

So what is exactly social support? Berkman provides the following definition (1984:415):

"Social support may be seen as the emotional, instrumental, and financial aid that is obtained from one's social network. Support is generally considered as an exchange or transaction between people of (a) emotional concern, (b) instrumental aid (goods and services), (c) information, or (d) appraisal (information relevant to self-evaluation). . . Hence it is clear that social networks may or may not be supportive."

The structural dimensions of social support pertain largely to the individual's network such as (a) density and complexity (the extent to which members of one's network know and interact with one another), (b) size (the number of people in a network), (c) symmetry or reciprocity (the extent to which supports and obligations are equal among members), (d) geographic proximity or dispersion (the extent to which network members live near the focal person), (e) homogeneity (the extent to which network members are similar in characteristics), and (f) accessibility (the ease with which the focal person is able to contact other network members) (Berkman, 1984).

House et al., (1987) have reviewed the most important prospective studies executed

in the last 10 to 15 years by social epidemiologists and have concluded that both American and Swedish based studies show that social support, however measured, has a significant net effect on mortality, even after controls for a variety of confounding variables are controlled. For example, in 1965, Berkman and Syme (1979) carried out an 11-year prospective survey involving 4775 respondents residing in Alameda County, California. Based on self-reported measures of social ties, the authors found that marriage, contact with friends, church membership, and other formal and informal group affiliations, combined into an index of social ties, predicted survivorship over the study period. People who lacked social and community ties were more likely to die in the follow-up period than those with more extensive contacts. The association between social ties and mortality was found to be independent of self-reported physical health status, year of death, socioeconomic status, and health practices such as smoking, alcoholic beverage consumption, obesity, physical activity, and utilization of preventive health services as well as a cumulative index of health practices. These researchers also concluded that marriage, as an intimate social bond, was a better predictor of subsequent mortality than were contacts with church and other loosely defined groups.

House and associates (1981) executed a similar prospective investigation known as the Tecumseh Community Health Study. In 1967-69, 2754 adults were selected for a 12 year follow-up study. A composite index of social relationships and activities were found to be inversely related with the probability of mortality during the follow-up period, even after adjustments were introduced into the analysis 'or age, blood pressure, cholesterol level, respiratory function, electrocardiogram diagnosis, and self-reported risk factors.

In other prospective studies, investigators have confirmed the importance of social ties as a predictor of cause-specific mortality (Blazer, 1982; Zeed et al., 1983; Kotler and Wingard, 1989; Schoenbach et al., 1986; Kaplan and Camacho, 1983; Haan et al., 1987). The study of Blazer (1982) also suggests that both the presence of social ties and the perception of having social support are important predictors of mortality, with the latter being more influential. This supports the notion that social ties can be a source of material and psychological support for individuals.

Concerning marital status as a form of social ties, Rosengren and colleagues (1989) carried out a prospective investigation of middle-aged men in Gothenberg, Sweden, starting in 1970-73. They reported that heart disease was more common in non-married men in univariate analysis of the data, but not after controls were taken into account. However, among the sample, married men had an overall death rate of 9 percent, compared with 20 percent for those who were divorced; and after adjustments for risk factors including alcohol problems, smoking and occupation, the association between marital status and total mortality was still highly significant. In virtually all risk factors analyzed the odds ratios of divorced versus married men were well above 1.00. Alcoholism, cirrhosis of the liver, suicide and other forms of violent death were excessively high among the divorced and the widowed men in contrast to married men. The authors concluded that " . . . alcohol abuse seems to be the most important [variable] in the present study, and a substantial part of the increased mortality in the divorced men could be attributed to this factor" (Rosengren et al., 1989:62).

Divorce and widowhood have been observed to be detrimental to health. In most

studies that examine marital status mortality differentials, these two social categories display the highest odds of death (Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Hu and Goldman, 1990; Trovato and Lauris, 1989; Smith and Zick, 1986; Zick and Smith, 1991; Wolfson et al., 1990; Helsing et al., 1981, 1982; Helsing and Szoklo, 1981; Mergenhagen et al., 1985; Stroebe et al., 1982, 1983; Verbrugge, 1979).

Recently, attention has been devoted to the effects of marital transitions on health and mortality (Trovato and Lauris, 1989; Zick and Smith, 1991; Helsing et al., 1981; Perkins, 1990). The basic premise common to this area of investigation is that becoming unmarried as a consequence of divorce or widowhood precipitates emotional, psychological and physical stress, ill health and premature mortality. It has also been suggested that such marital status transitions have different effects on the sexes. According to Gerstel and associates (1985), marriage dissolution for men often leads to a loss of significant others as a source of social support; for females, divorce and separation result mostly in a loss of material well-being. Hence, the distress experienced by the sexes as a result of family dissolution occurs through different mechanisms. Divorced men generally lose what has been established in research, a critical source of well-being and good health -- social support; and divorced women experience distress due to their reduced economic well-being (Smith and Zick, 1986).

The literature concerning the widowed demonstrates that men who lose their spouses have greater levels of health problems and higher odds of mortality as compared to widowed women (Bowling, 1987; Helsing et al., 1981, 1982; Stroebe et al., 1982, 1983) In a prospective study, Helsing and associates (1981) investigated the association between marital

status transitions and mortality. They were specifically interested in examining the impact of a change in status from married to widowed, and from widowed to remarried. It was discovered that widowed males who did not remarry had a significantly higher hazard of dying when compared to never-widowed men and widowers who remarried. Based on their findings, these authors concluded that the remarried are less likely to die prematurely for two reasons: first, healthier individuals were more likely to be selected into remarriage; second, remarriage creates a supportive environment that insulated the newly widowed individual from the stress of having lost a loved one.

According to Stroebe and colleagues' (1982) review of this literature, bereavement is more devastating for men: they suffer from excessive risk of heart disease, suicide and accidental death. It is generally agreed that a key mechanism for this differential is that the death of a spouse leads to a loss of social integration, social validation, emotional and material support (Stroebe et al., 1982; Bowling, 1987).

Recently, Zick and Smith (1991) reported on their prospective study of marital status transitions, poverty and gender differences in mortality. They suggest that a change in marital status often leads to a loss of socioeconomic status and that both have independent effects on health and mortality.⁴ These authors apply a health production framework to hypothesize that persons who live below the poverty line will have lower life expectancies because they have insufficient resources to ensure a healthy lifestyle and to afford good medical care. Moreover, they posited that married individuals have a lower risk of mortality than the divorced, the widowed and the never married because (a) individuals who marry are healthier, and (b) the marriage environment discourages unhealthy behaviours and

provides a strong social support network for individuals. Persons who have recently made the transition from being married to some other state (e.g., divorce, widowhood) were hypothesized to have elevated risks of mortality due to the higher levels of emotional stress that is generally associated with the new life-style (Zick and Smith, 1991). The results of this study indicate that while poverty is deleterious to both sexes, especially the women, current marital status and marital status transitions are only significant for men in predicting mortality:

"[M]en who have been divorced or widowed for three years or more have a significantly higher probability of dying than do married males, with other factors held constant. Furthermore, males who have recently divorced have a significantly higher hazard of dying than men who had no recent marital status transition. These findings suggest that, for men, both their current marital state and any transitions they may have recently made are important predictors of mortality" (Zick and Smith, 1991: 333).

Why should the social environment of marriage be more protective of men than of women, and why should a change in status from marriage to remarriage be more deleterious to males? The literature on sex differences in morbidity and mortality suggests a number of possible explanations. First, men generally have riskier life-styles than do women. They are more likely to drink excessively, smoke, have poorer dietary habits, and are more likely to experience accidents and violence (Nathanson, 1984; Wingard, 1984; Waldron, 1976, 1986; Verbrugge, 1981). Therefore, the marriage environment may often serve to restrict much of these health-damaging behaviours. The man who leaves single lood or an unmarried state (widowhood or divorce) for marriage essentially improves his life expectancy due to the "protection" family life affords. Women generally have less risky life-styles, and although they experience more psychiatric and physical ailments than do men, they live longer; and

a change in status from single to married is less "beneficial" to them in this sense (Wingard, 1984; Nathanson, 1984; Verbrugge, 1990).⁵

A second explanation given in the literature is that married people generally possess larger social networks than nonmarried people. According to Zick and Smith (1991), it is the wives who are usually responsible for maintaining links to the couple's social support networks. Thus, men who are no longer living with a spouse because of either widowhood or divorce, may find that their access to the support network declines considerably. Over a prolonged period of time, such individuals will likely experience a loss of social ties and hence, increased risk of mortality.⁶

According to House (1987), "prospective mortality studies show that being married has much more beneficial effects on longevity among men than among women. . . In many of these same studies, women appear to benefit more than men from contact with friends. Since friends tend to be of the same sex, the hypothesis emerges that women are better at providing social support than are men and hence that social relationships with women are more beneficial to health and well-being than relationships with men. Thus, women appear, on the average, to be better providers of social support than men. . ." (p. 142). However, "women's greater capacity to form intimate relationships is not on unalloyed blessing for them . . . since they also appear to bear greater burdens than men of providing support for friends and relatives with consequent adverse effects on their mental and perhaps physical health" (House, 1987:142). This gender difference in provision for support may be yet another mechanism that helps to explain why marriage appears to be of greater benefit to men than to women with regard to longevity.

What conclusions can we draw from the literature reviewed concerning social ties and mortality? The first conclusion is that marriage, as a form of meaningful and enduring social bonding, has significant salutary effects. Both cross-sectional and prospective data support this generalization. Secondly, it has been established by prospective studies that health selectivity cannot account for the strong and significant effects of marital status on health and mortality (Zick and Smith, 1991), something cross-sectional studies could not disprove (e.g., Gove, 1973; Trovato and Lauris, 1989). A third conclusion is that in virtually all studies, longitudinal or cross-sectional, the benefits of marriage are greater for men than for women, suggesting that marriage entails a larger reduction in mortality risk for men than for women. Fourth, research on the effects of marital status transitions' effects on health and mortality indicates that divorce and widowhood are more devastating for men than for women, but both sexes experience elevated risks of illness and mortality from such transitions in comparison to married couples. Also, re-entering the state of marriage after either divorce or widowhood appears to afford more "protection" than for those who remain unmarried. Fifth, the manner in which family life affects health, well-being and longevity has been postulated to be largely a function of the social support and normative regulation that the family environment imposes on the individual. This effect operates largely through increased intimacy, the ability to communicate to a significant other feelings freely and without self-consciousness; an increased sense of belonging to others with similar objectives and concerns; and the ready access to nurturant and supportive behaviour in times of need (Berkman, 1984).⁷

Although we have knowledge regarding the social psychological aspects of how

marriage promotes well-being and reduced mortality risk, the biomedical mechanisms through which family life affects the individual's health remain largely unexplored (House et al., 1988). According to House and colleagues' (1988) extensive review of the epidemiological literature in this area of investigation, and experimental and quasiexperimental studies of humans and animals suggest strongly that social isolation is a major risk factor for mortality from a variety of causes. "These developments suggest that social relationships, or the relative lack thereof, constitute a major risk factor for health -- rivalling the effects of well-established risk factors such as cigarette smoking, blood pressure, blood lipids, obesity, and physical activity" (House et al., 1988:541). There is some indication that social relationships affect our anterior hypothalamic zone in such a manner as to stimulate the release of human growth hormone, while at the same time inhibit the posterior hypothalamic zone, and hence the secretion of adrenocorthetic autonomic activity (House et al., 1988).8 According to Berkman and Syme (1979), social isolation leads to physiological changes in the body which increase general susceptibility to disease. In other words, stressful circumstances can have severe physiological effects in weakening host resistance to morbidity and mortality. Nervous, hormonal and immunologic control systems can be affected by prolonged stress in such a manner as to cause disease.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MARRIAGE AND MORTALITY

While it is a well-established fact that the married are relatively advantaged in survival probabilities as compared to the nonmarried, the causal mechanisms responsible for this relationship are less than certain. A causal model is developed to explain how marriage relates to health, morbidity and mortality. The model will serve as the theoretical

framework for the statistical analysis in this study. It must be understood that the model can not be tested directly, given the cross-sectional nature of the data available. Nevertheless, it will help to specify the important causal linkages between marital status and longevity based on the main postulates of this association as suggested by the literature.

We have seen that marriage entails a special form of social ties and that both prospective cross-sectional studies indicate that marital status is an important factor in the explanation of mortality differentials. The preceding section identified a number of mechanisms that are thought to affect health, illness, and mortality. In this section, a theoretical model will be developed by using concepts such as social support, social networks, and health behaviours. The theory synthesizes a number of theoretical formulations into one overall explanation of how marriage affects mortality. Figure 1 presents the theory in schematic form. As can be seen from the diagram, marriage is an exogenous variable and does not have a direct effect on mortality; rather, it operates through a number of intervening variables.

Marriage provides a context where spouses can share support by way of material, validational and informational means, as discussed earlier in the literature review.

Being married also means that the individual is subject * normative constraints with respect to the range of risk behaviour that is tolerated or expected by society and the family

unit (Umberson, 1987). Most studies that have examined this issue show that the married tend to smoke and drink less and are less inclined to take risks which may compromise their health or their lives (Umberson, 1987).

Married people, by virtue of being in a conjugal union, have greater access to larger and more supportive social networks. Not only is the spouse present in the marital bond, but most often, there are corresponding relatives and kin that can offer social support. The amount and quality of social support available to the individual is a function of one's social network. House (1987) has suggested eleven dimensions of networks which singly or in combination serve to afford social support to individuals. Thus, the quality and quantity of support is dependent on the size, density, proximity, structure, intensity, durability and other factors of the network.

Marital status transitions influence one's access to support in a number of ways. First, divorce or widowhood entails the loss of a marital partner and hence an important source of social support. Secondly, normative constraints on risky behaviours are weakened by divorce and widowhood. Both of these states are associated with greater levels of distress, alcohol consumption and accidents as reflected in prospective and cross-sectional studies of mortality among the divorced and the widowed (Stroebe and Stroebe 1983; Stroebe et al., 1982; Verbrugge, 1979; Weingarten, 1984; Bowling, 1987).

Another way in which a change in marital status from married to either divorced or widowed statuses affects social support is through social networks. An unmarried individual usually experiences a reduction in his/her social network, especially if the focal person is male. Based on their analysis of the effects of marital transitions on mortality, Zick and

Smith (1991:334) concluded that ". . . the most striking finding . . . is that the social environment of a marriage decreases men's but not women's risks of mortality." They also they argue that one reason why marriage is more important for men in reducing the risk of death is:

"There is growing evidence that social relationships alter health status and mortality risk. It is also generally agreed that married people have larger social networks than nonmarried individuals, and it is the wives who are usually responsible for maintaining the links to these larger social support networks. Taken in combination, this suggests that men who are no longer living with their wives (either because of a divorce or the death of the wife) may find that their access to these larger social support networks declines. Over time, the accumulated loss of these social relationships may increase their risk of mortality" (p. 334).

Normative constraints on risky life-style have both direct and indirect effects on mortality. The direct influence can be explained by considering that the more "adventurous" or "risky" one's life-style, the more likely one is to suffer a fatal accident on the road, at home, at work, or during leisure activities.

One's health practices on a day-to-day basis will ultimately affect the person's overall health, which in turn, has bearing on one's mortality probabilities. Normative constraint on risk-taking, associated with being married, means that the individual is more likely to avoid risky behaviours such as smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. According to Umberson (1987), good health is desirable by all in society, and therefore it is normative. To be in poor health is deviant. Being married implies that the person is in a normative status. For this reason, and due to the social support and social networks functions within marriage, the individual is more likely to conform to normative health standards, such as moderate exercise, a healthy diet, adequate sleep and compliance with prescribed health

regimes (Belloc, 1980; Berkman, Breslow and Wingard, 1983). Social support and networks also determine the extent to which one behaves normatively in regards to health behaviours through their constraining, informational, and regulation functions.

The relevance of stressors on both health and mortality has been a subject of much attention. Hans Selye (1956) demonstrated in his laboratory experiments on animals that excessive psychosocial stress has deleterious impacts on the organism. Although it is not always appropriate to generalize the results of animal based studies to humans, there is now abundant empirical evidence to suggest that life stresses, in the form of acute life events such as job loss or the death of a spouse or a family member, pose an increased risk of ill health to humans, primarily through their effects in weakening the immune system (House et al., 1988; House, 1984; Gottlieb, 1983; Berkman, 1984; Berkman and Syme, 1979; Umberson, 1987).

Acute life events may engender immunological, physical and psychic complications in the individual; some of these effects may increase mortality probabilities on an immediate or on a long term basis. For example, the loss of a loved one may engender so much grief and psychological distress in the individual to precipitate suicide. On the other hand, prolonged exposure to stressful life situations could, in the long term, translate into the development of chronic conditions such as hypertension and heart disease, which are major causes of death.

The relationship between stress and social support has received considerable attention in the literature. In the diagram, both social support and social network affect stress, but there is an additional reciprocal relationship between stress and social support. This

feedback is consistent with the "buffer theory of social support" (Barrera, 1986; Gottlieb, 1983). The quality, quantity and nature of social support and networks determines how much stress one is exposed to over the life course. To the extent that stress is present, the individual may respond in a number of ways. Barrera (1986) has identified six models describing the social support-stress relationship. The one adopted in Figure 1 is the "stress-buffering model of social support," which implies that the occurrence of chronic hardships or acute life events lead the individual to activate his/her social support system in order to gain help. Once help is enacted, the effects of stressors on the focal person should diminish.

In order to test the proposed model one would require data that is unavailable at this point in time. Ideally, we would require micro-level data based on prospective studies of individuals over a long interval of time. Unfortunately, such data are not available in Canada.¹¹

The theoretical model in Figure 1 is intended to serve as a basis for a statistical analysis of marital status and mortality in Canada for 1986, recognizing that the data at hand cannot possibly measure all of the specific causal linkages shown. Our expectation is that the variable of marital status will be a significant differentiator of mortality risk since it is a key exogenous factor in this causal system.

-- FIGURE 1 IN HERE --

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Most of the literature on the topic of interest to this study is based on countries outside Canada. There are only two systematic studies dealing with cause-specific mortality differentials by marital status in Canada. The research of Boyd (1983) is based on the period 1970-72 only, while the analysis of Trovato and Lauris (1989) covers the four census periods 1951 through 1981. These two studies need to be complemented by more recent evidence. Therefore, the present investigation uses information for the period 1985-87.

Data

The data for the analysis were taken from the Mortality Data Base stored at Statistics Canada in Ottawa. The file adapted for the study consists of deaths in 1985-87 by cause of death, age, sex and marital status. In order to compute death rates classified by cause, age, sex and marital status, population counts were taken from the 1986 Census of Canada.

The variables are classified as follows:

- (1) SEX:
- (a) male
- (b) female
- (2) AGE:
- (a) 15 29
- (b) 30 49
- (c) 50 69
- (d) 70 79
- (e) 80+

		(b) marri	ed
		(c) widov	ved
		(d) divorc	ced
(4)	CAUSE OF DEATH:		ICD9 CODE
	(a) heart disease		391, 392.0, 393-398, 402, 404, 410-414, 415,
			416, 420-429
	(b) cancer of the stoma	ach	151
	(c) cancer of the trache	ea,	162
	lung and bronchus		
	(d) lymphoid leukemia		204
	(e) diabetes mellitus		250
	(f) chronic liver diseas	e and	571
	cirrhosis		
	(g) pedestrian deaths		E814
	(h) accidental falls		E880-E959
	(i) motor vehicle accid	lents	E811.0, E812.0, E813.0, E815.0, E816.0,
	(excluding pedestri	an fatalities)	E810.0-E810.9, E811.1, E812.1, E811.2-
			E811.9, E812.2-E812.9, E813.1-E813.9,
			E815.1-E815.9, E816.1-E816.9, E817-E819
	(j) suicide		E950-E959
	(k) homicide		E960-E969

(3) MARITAL STATUS: (a) single (never married)

Statistical Methods

In order to assess the possible protective effects of marriage on mortality, Relative Mortality Ratios (RMRs) are computed with this general formula (see Appendix A):

$$RMR = \frac{DR_{ijk}^{(nm)}}{DR_{ijk}^{(m)}},$$

where: RMR = relative mortality ratio,

DR = death rate,

(nm) = a non-married category (e.g. single, widowed, divorced),

i = gender group,

j = age group,

k = cause of death,

(m) = the married category.

The RMR is a measure of relative risk, denoting the odds of dying for a given unmarried class in relation to the married population. An RMR greater than 1.000 will indicate that the married have a lower mortality risk than the unmarried, while a ratio less than 1.00 will mean the opposite. From this measure, it will be possible to infer whether a marriage protection effect may be evident across the age-sex groups in this study with respect to cause of death or general mortality.

The causes of death denoted earlier can be classified into various etiologies as suggested by Gove (1973): (1) mortality due to overt social acts (suicide, homicide, motor vehicle accidents, other accidents); (2) mortality associated with the use of socially approved narcotics (e.g., lung cancer, cirrhosis of the liver); (3) mortality associated with diseases requiring prolonged and methodical care (e.g., diabetes); (4) mortality largely unaffected by

social factors (e.g. leukemia); (5) mortality associated with stress (e.g. heart disease, cancer of the stomach); and (6) mortality from all causes.

Marriage Protection or Health Selection?

In the event that most, or all RMRs are greater than 1.000, one can never be certain that health selection is not a predominant cause of the apparent superior survival probabilities of the married class. The health selection hypothesis is an important competing explanation to the marriage protection thesis. It may be that the observed survival benefit of married people is a function of healthy persons sharing a greater likelihood of marrying in comparison to those who remain in the single state. If this is so, the lower risk of the married is due to better health in comparison to the single. Moreover, if there is a differential probability of remarriage on the basis of health among those who divorce or become widowed, the healthier individuals who re-enter the married state will typically show lower death rates than those who remain in the unmarried statuses because of poor health.

The major issue surrounding this hypothesis is how to test for it given that the necessary data are extremely difficult to obtain. In general, researchers have relied on indirect methods to evaluate the health selection thesis. In this study one method used to evaluate the selectivity hypothesis is similar to that proposed by Gove (1973). He reasoned that if there is a strong health selection effect on mortality, the observed superiority of survival probabilities among the married should manifest itself across all causes of death as opposed to only those that have social psychological etiologies (e.g., suicide, lung cancer, etc.). In other words, if selectivity does explain mortality differentials across marital status

groups, the married should demonstrate relatively lower risks across all causes of death, including those which are largely unaffected by social factors (e.g., leukemia and cancer of the brain).

Rejection of the health selection thesis requires that the mortality risk across all marital status groups is non-existent or is minimal. For such causes of death, such a statistical outcome could be interpreted to denote indirect evidence that health selection does not explain the better mortality experience of the married; that it is the social psychological context of marriage which is largely responsible for reduced mortality probabilities for the individual. In Gove's words:

"Another piece of evidence that strongly suggests . . . the selective processes are not of major importance are the mortality patterns associated with diseases where the role explanation suggests little variation in mortality across the marital statuses but where the selective explanation suggests there should be marked variations. The mortality rates, associated with leukemia . . . provide an excellent example. These diseases are almost inevitably fatal, but persons who have been stricken with them may live for a long time, time for the selective processes, if they are important, to produce marked variations in the mortality rates associated with the different marital statuses. However, . . . for these diseases there is little variation in the mortality rate between the marital statuses" (Gove, 1973:64).

Another statistical approach used to evaluate health selection effects on mortality is that developed by Kisker and Goldman (1987). They tried to assess whether mortality differences by marital status are similar across national populations and the importance of marriage (health) selection in producing the excess mortality of the single population in relation to the married population.¹²

The role of marriage selection (health selectivity) was investigated by examining correlation coefficients relating the proportion of the population that is single and the

mortality rates of the single relative to the rates of the married across countries. They found that virtually all coefficients are negative, suggesting that marriage selection (based on differential health) may be an important contributor to mortality differentials across marital status groups. That is, a small percentage single would suggest that the relatively few who remain single are selected out of the marriage market, presumably due to poor health. Therefore, the correlation of percent single with the single death rate would be inverse. In a recent article, Hu and Goldman (1990) also suggest that the correlation should be inverse for the divorced as well.

Livi-Bacci (1984) has added that if there is marriage (health) selectivity in mortality, the ratio of death rates of singles to married should correlate positively with the proportion single for ages 15 through 50, and stabilize or decline thereafter. The underlying assumption for this prediction is based on the fact that few people marry after age 50; and therefore, selectivity should intensify over the prime marriageable ages and not beyond.

Data Quality

Data problems could affect the results of this analysis. For example, there could be differential age misstatement by marital status in either the death records or the census returns. Such errors could result in an over or underestimate of the death rate by age for a given marital status category. Another problem may be the misreporting of marital status in either or both death certificates and census forms which would serve to either inflate or deflate a given class' mortality rates. If the numerator is underestimated while the denominator is overestimated, the result could be a grossly deflated death rate. An inflated numerator with a deflated denominator will lead to an unrealistically high death rate.

Moreover, there could be differential underregistration of deaths by marital classes, or possibly, differential undercounts of the population by marital status. All of these potential problems could seriously distort an analysis of mortality by marital status. Fortunately, previous studies have shown that existing data problems are not sufficiently severe as to explain away the mortality differential by marital status (Adams and Nagnur, 1981; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Hambright, 1968; Kisker and Goldman, 1982).

Data Analysis

General Mortality

Table 1 shows results from a multivariate statistical analysis involving the overall death rate for Canada in 1985-87. The nonmarried possess relatively higher death rates than the married.¹³ The relative risk is substantially larger for males than for females. The range of RMRs is from 1.35 (divorced males) to 1.95 (widowed males). For both sexes, the widowed appear to suffer greater odds of death than either divorced or single categories. In fact, judging from the overall main effects, the difference in RMRs between divorced and single categories is rather small, especially for males.¹⁴

The RMRs based on the interaction effects of marital status with age demonstrate that in virtually all cases, each of the age-marital status groups exhibit elevated risks of death in relation to their married counterparts. Across age categories, males tend to show higher RMRs than do females, with the exception of the age classes 15-29 and 30-49, where single females display slightly higher relative risks. This does not mean that young women have higher death rates than young men, rather it demonstrates that the difference between the death rate of young women and their married counterparts is larger than is the case for

young single and widowed men vis-a-vis young married men. 15

For men, the largest RMRs appear among the widowed and the divorced aged 15-29 and 30-49. The relative risk of widowed men 15-29 is over six times that of the married, while divorced men in the same age group have a 60 percent higher mortality risk than the married. The situation for women suggests that their relative mortality risk is also highest among the very young widowed, with a RMR of 4.92. Single women aged 15-29 share a 65 percent higher risk than their married counterparts. It would appear that while both males and females would benefit from either entering or re-entering the married state, the benefit would be especially greater for widowed men and women who are 15-29 years of age. Since none of the RMRs are below 1.000, our conclusion is that overall, the married in society have a relatively lower risk of death than do single, widowed and divorced people.

Mortality Associated With the Use of Socially Approved Narcotics

Lung cancer and cirrhosis of the liver can be considered as the end result of excessive smoking and alcohol consumption over one's lifetime. In Table 2, the overall average effects of marital status indicate that single and unmarried men differ significantly in risk from their married counterparts. The divorced display a 51 percent excess mortality level. Single women do not display any difference in their risk of lung cancer when compared to married women in Canada. However, both widowed and divorced women experience substantially higher rates of lung cancer mortality in comparison to married women.¹⁶

It is generally thought that people who use narcotics like tobacco and alcohol in excess do so to drown their sorrows and difficulties in life (Gove, 1973). The evidence presented in connection with lung cancer suggests that in a general sense, the married enjoy lower

death rates, implying that singlehood entails more sorrow and distress, culminating in more smoking and death from lung cancer. Table 3 extends this analysis by showing results corresponding to cirrhosis of the liver.

Death from cirrhosis of the liver is more likely to occur among the divorced and the widowed. The RMR is largest for divorced men (RMR = 1.94); their risk of dying from liver disease is almost twice that of married men. Widowed men are almost fifty percent more likely to die from cirrhosis as are married men (RMR = 1.47), whereas single men have a 38 percent greater chance of perishing from this ailment.

Female ratios are somewhat lower than those corresponding to males, but the pattern of results is consistent with that established for men. That is, the risk is highest for the divorced and is lowest for the single. However, there is a high degree of similarity in risk between single and widowed women, with RMRs of 1.23 and 1.25 respectively, which is in sharp contrast to the 1.83 RMR of divorced females.

Mortality Due to Overt Social Acts

In this part of the study, I examine causes of death whose etiologies are highly associated with psychological states of mind (suicide), carelessness (motor vehicle accidents, pedestrian fatalities, accidental falls), and conflict in life (homicide).

Table 4 displays results with respect to suicide mortality. Judging from the overall effects, the divorced lead in relative risk of self-death, men by 92 percent, women by 202 percent. Widowed men show a substantial risk of suicide (RMR = 1.67). Both single men and women have RMRs above 1.000, but the latter show a 53 percent excess risk, while the former display a 44 percent higher odds of suicide in comparison to their married

counterparts.

In Table 5, results for mortality due to accidental falls and pedestrian fatality are displayed. Concerning mortality from accidental falls, divorced men suffer an 85 percent excess risk, followed by single (RMR = 1.60) and widowed men (RMR = 1.28). Although the risk is somewhat lower for females, their RMRs are substantially above 1.000 to indicate that both single and unmarried females share a significantly greater chance of death than do married women. Single men also show a high risk of death from these two causes, while widowed men have a modestly higher risk of death from accidental falls.

Pedestrian fatalities are more likely to occur to single women (RMR = 3.04) and single men (RMR = 2.48). Widowed men and women do not differ significantly in their odds from their corresponding married counterparts, but both sexes in the divorced state have relative risks close to 2.00.

The situation with motor vehicle accidents mortality (Table 6) indicates that widowed and divorced men have particularly high incidences. In comparison to married men, widowed males have a 230 percent greater overall risk of dying as a consequence of a motor vehicle related incident. Divorced men share a 64 percent greater risk than married men. Among males, single men show the lowest relative overall risk (RMR = 1.11). For females, the situation is similar in the sense that the widowed have approximately twice the death rate as that of married women. Divorced women show a 25 percent excess risk, while single women have a modestly lower higher risk than married women (by 11 percent).

Since age interacts significantly with marital status, it is important to examine how groups differ in relative risk over age. Among single people, the critical ages for increased

odds of motor vehicle related fatality are the very young (age 15-29) and for males, the relatively old (age 70-79). The male RMR in the older age group is substantially greater than that of females. For both genders, the relatively young widowed display exceptionally high odds of death in relation to the married. For example, the risk is 12.33 and 8.63 for widowed men and women in the age 15-29 category. Among widowed and divorced men, the risk of death due to motor vehicle accidents remains substantial throughout all age groups, though in general, the risk reduces as one gets older. Interestingly, single men aged 30-49 have a lower chance of death than do married men (RMR = .95).

This is also true in connection with females aged 30 and above, where RMRs are below 1.000. From the results, it is clear that widowhood for women engenders a significant increase in mortality risk, though it declines with increasing age, from 8.63 for those aged 15-29, to 1.28 for women aged 70-79. Divorce is especially lethal for women in the age group 30-49, as their relative odds are over six times greater than those of the married. In the case of singlehood, the odds are below 1.000 for females aged 30 and older.

These results are indicative of the fact that in some cases, the married tend to suffer a higher incidence of motor vehicle accident related mortality than single people in certain age groups (beyond 30). For example, it has been reported that the married have more fatal car accidents in some cases than do single people (Hu and Goldman, 1990). What is unquestionably clear from our findings, however, is that in comparison to widowed (and generally divorced) persons, the overall risk of death as a result of motor vehicle related accidents is significantly lower among married people, irrespective of age.

Table 7 concerns itself with differences in homicide mortality. In all cases,

nonmarried men and women share an excess risk of death due to murder. It appears that the most vulnerable to this fate are divorced men (RMR = 2.15) and divorced women (RMR = 1.69). The lowest RMR is for single women (1.32). Widowed men and women do not differ greatly in their relative risk (46 and 43 percent above married men and women, separately).

As was the case with mortality associated with socially approved narcotics, differences in death due to overt social acts also denote that on balance, divorced, widowed and single men and women, in that order, share considerably higher odds of mortality than do their married counterparts. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that marriage is a protective institution for the individual, and that the state of singlehood or being unmarried engenders less protection and hence an increased relative risk of death. The issue of health selection in this matter will be undertaken later.

Mortality Associated with a Disease Requiring Prolonged and Methodical Care (Diabetes)

Diabetes is a disease which requires the individual take methodical care and precautions in order to stay alive. Usually, persons in the constellation of the individual's significant others, such as a spouse and children, contribute to ensure that the diabetic is diligent in his/her medical regime. According to Gove (1973) this cause of death should be lowest among the married and relatively high among the single and the unmarried.

In Table 8, the interaction of age with marital status is not important statistically; therefore, only the main effects of marital status are given. Widowed and single women show a significant overall effect on death as a consequence of diabetes, while divorced women do not. In the case of men, all three non-married groups demonstrate elevated risks

in relation to married men. On average, single men have a 46 percent higher risk of death than the married, while widowed and divorced males experience a 31 and 55 percent excess risk. Among women, the largest RMR is associated with widowhood (RMR = 1.40).

Mortality Largely Unaffected by Social Factors

In the previous analyses, the assumption has been that social and emotional states of individuals are the underlying forces behind the observed marital status differentials. We have seen that by and large, there is an association between one's marital state and death probabilities, with the married generally possessing the lowest odds (with few exceptions). However, in ailments where the etiology is thought to be predominantly biological and for which environmental factors would be of minimal importance, the relationship of marital status with mortality should be very weak or non-existent. Following Gove (1973) and Boyd (1983), I look at leukemia as one example of a disease for which social conditions are of minimal importance.

Table 9 concerns itself with lymphoid leukemia. According to the above argument, marital status differences in death rates from this cause should be minimal or non-existent. In fact, the only statistically significant mortality differentials are for single and widowed men, who show overall relative risks that are between 44 and 65 percent higher than the married. None of the remaining differences are significant. In the case of females, there is no evidence that differences in leukemia related deaths occur on the basis of marital status since none of the RMRs are significant.

These findings are partly consistent with the thesis that marital status mortality risk should not vary or be minimal for diseases such as leukemia. In his analysis Gove (1973)

found a very small differential in leukemia by marital status. Boyd (1983) found differentials for leukemia mortality which on the whole appear larger than those analyzed by Gove (1973). The present findings are closer to Boyd's results in that overall there is little variability, while at the same time, single and widowed men show a notable risk in relation to the married. Therefore, in an overall sense, there seems to be some basis to consider Gove's claim that the social environment of marriage is only protective in the case of diseases or disorders that have a predominantly social psychological etiology to them. However, this needs qualification in that some marriage protection seems to prevail even in the case of leukemia.

Causes of Death that are Partly Associated with a Stressful Lifestyle

It is possible to go beyond the various causes of death examined thus far to include afflictions that have a significant stress component to them. Heart disease and stomach cancer are two such examples. This is not to suggest, however, that life stress is the only cause of heart disease and stomach cancer, only that excessive stress is an important contributor to their etiology.

Table 10 shows that heart disease mortality is more frequent among single and divorced men. In relation to their married counterparts, unmarried males suffer anywhere from 30 percent (widowed) to 37 percent (single) greater risk (RMR = 1.37 for singles, 1.30 for widowed, and 1.34 for divorced men). The situation for females indicates that the widowed suffer a slightly more elevated risk (RMR = 1.25) than single and divorced women.

Table 11 concern itself with stomach cancer mortality differentials. Widowed men and

women show the largest relative risk (1.35 for men, 1.38 for women). Divorced women demonstrate no significant difference from married women.

Health Selection Tests

Earlier in this study, it was mentioned that health selectivity would be a potential cause of observed differences in death rates between the married and the nonmarried. While it is impossible to provide a definitive test of this potential source of mortality discrepancies, three indirect methods are applied here in order to derive a sense of whether selection effects are indeed important. The first approach is simply to reconsider our results concerning leukemia. The selection effects hypothesis would predict that the married would show significantly lower rates of mortality than either single or unmarried populations in connection with this cause of death. The assumption is that superior health explains both selection into marriage and continued lower mortality for the married. Our findings are mixed in that a few of the differentials in leukemia mortality risk turned out to be statistically significant. Therefore, this initial indirect test suggests some support for the health selection theory since, by and large, the married possess lower risks even for a cause of death which is not presumed to have an environmental etiology. Thus, it seems that health selection is a relevant factor in explaining these differentials.

A second way in which this question can be assessed is to rely on a procedure suggested by Kisker and Goldman (1987) and Hu and Goldman (1990). These investigators have argued that if health selection is an important cause of mortality differences across marital status groups, there should be an inverse correlation between the proportion single or divorced in a given age-sex class and their group-specific death rates. The rationale for

this prediction is based on the assumption that if in society most peop marry (or remarry in the case of divorce), the smaller the proportion of the population that is single or divorced, the higher their death rates. In essence, the fewer the numbers in these two categories, the greater the mortality levels for such people due to, presumably, negative health selectivity which keeps such individuals out of entering (or re-entering) marriage. Thus, as the relative size of these social categories increases, their death rates will decline.

This test is given in Table 12. A log-rate regression model was fitted to the data for males and females separately, including as predictors the percentage single (or divorced) and age. As can be seen from the coefficients in the table, all of the effects are in the predicted direction -- they are all negative and statistically significant. For example, among singles, the proportion male would multiply the overall death rate of single men by .998, which translates into a reduction in overall risk. This effect is a little stronger for the divorced (exp $\lambda = .931$ for males and .975 for females). Thus, this method provides a more definitive conclusion than our first indirect test of selectivity.

Livi-Bacci (1984) proposed another way to assess health selectivity effects which is largely based on the same assumptions as the previous method. He has argued that the interaction of age with the proportion in the population that is single or divorced should show an inverse correlation with the ratio of death rates of nonmarried to married, for the age groups 15 to 49 and then diminish for older ages. Presumably, such a pattern of results would denote strong health selection effects in the younger, prime marriageable ages, and not beyond. That is, the health salection effect should be strongest at ages by which the majority of persons marry (or eventually marry).

Table 13 displays regression equations of relative mortality risk of singles to married, and of divorced to married general mortality. The results support Livi-Bacci's thesis. The effects of percent single or divorced are positive and significant for ages 15-29 and 30-49 and then decline for subsequent age classes. The strongest effects are in the age group 30-49, as expected. Thus, our third indirect test also suggests that there may be a health selection effect on marital status differences in mortality. We have seen that two out of three tests tend to give strong support for the health selection thesis.

CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the association between marital status and mortality in Canada, 1985-87. A number of specific causes of death were investigated, including overall mortality in order to determine whether differentials exist by marital category. On the basis of the relevant literature, it was anticipated that the married would enjoy a greater degree of "protection" from death in relation to the single and unmarried groups in society. Marriage, it is argued, provides the individual with social, psychological and material support, making his/her environment safer and more predictable. Also, because marriage is a normative state, the individual in it must conform to the expectations of society and of significant others (family), expectations which view irresponsible and risky behaviours as unacceptable. Because marriage bonds the individual to a significant social group in terms of obligations, expectations and support, persons in this institution would practice safety in their environment and diligence in diet, lifestyle and health matters. Since in general, this form of social integration is lower for single, widowed and divorced persons, these social categories should experience relatively higher death rates than their married counterparts.

This "protection" thesis was tested by examining mortality differentials for diseases or conditions that have significant social and psychological etiologies. By and large, the statistical results of this investigation appear to be consistent with the "protection" of marriage explanation insofar as such marital status differentials in death rates can be assumed to reflect differences in degree of social integration (i.e., social support) for individuals in society.

However, it was also demonstrated that although there is a fairly consistent pattern of results concerning mortality risk by marital class, indirect tests for a possible health selection effect on death differences indicate that part of the apparent superior survival experience of the married is due to health selection. That is, marriage selects healthy individuals; and the less healthy remain single or stay divorced (or widowed). The combined effects of such a process (to the extent that it exists) would be to heighten mortality differences in favor of the married.

Does the family provide "protection" against early death? The results from this analysis suggest that, in agreement with much of the literature, marriage does indeed, seem to provide "protection"; however, health selection into marriage is also important. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to provide a definite answer as to how much "protection" accounts for the married's relative advantage in survival probabilities as opposed to "selection." A direct test of this question would require an experimental design where individuals would be observed early in life and then followed up over their life courses in order to ascertain who marries or remains single (who divorce or remarries) and for what reasons (health versus other) people enter, do not enter, or exit the various marital

status categories (i.e., death, widowhood, divorce, remarriage, etc.). Only a handful of prospective studies have been executed in this manner (see House et al., 1988, for a review of such studies). In general, these investigations show that even after controls for initial health status are taken into account, married people still enjoy lower mortality probabilities than the nonmarried.

Thus, the findings of this analysis suggest that both health selection and marriage protection mechanisms play important roles in explaining why married people in society tend to exhibit a lower death rate than either single or unmarried individuals. The mechanisms through which "protection" operates are social support and social networks, while the dynamics of "selection" imply that the married are superior in health and hence share a lower risk of premature death. However, judging from the relative magnitude of effects analyzed in this study, it would seem that "protection" accounts for more of the marital status mortality differential than "selection," since on the whole, the main effects of marital status are larger than the parameters for the health selection tests. Therefore, in the light of the theoretical framework proposed earlier, and the findings from this investigation, health selection would have to be integrated into the model in future work.

Many of the mortality differentials observed in this investigation denote that men have a higher risk of death than do women, both in connection with general and cause-specific mortality. In order to shed further light on this differential, Table 14 has been included. The table shows sex differences in general and cause-specific death rates, net of age and marital status. As demonstrated by the RMRs, men's relative risk is consistently above 1.000. The most pronounced sex differences are in connection with suicide, lung cancer,

cirrhosis of the liver and motor vehicle accidents -- all of which share a strong environmental etiology. In general, then, the results coincide with the literature on sex differences in mortality (c.f. Nathanson, 1984; Waldron, 1976; Wingard, 1984).

In future study, it would be important to replicate this analysis by introducing further controls for socioeconomic differences among the various marital status categories. Such an approach would help us to discern the potential influence of socioeconomic status differences on the observed mortality discrepancies. Also, it would be important to examine differences in death risk among the married on the basis of family related factors such as family size and family income variations. The recent literature indicates that these are important predictors of mortality differentials (c.f. Zick and Smith, 1990; Wolfson et al., 1989; Richard, 1990.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. By and large, Canadian studies on the question of marital status and mortality tend to be predominantly descriptive and of a statistical nature. Very little, if any, emphasis is devoted to the "why" aspect of the phenomenon (see for example, Adams and Nagnur, 1981; Adams and Nagnur, 1987; Kalbach and McVey, 1979; Peron and Strohmenger, 1985).
- 2. Boyd (1983) used the available tabulations published by Vital Statistics; therefore, she could not easily reclassify the data.
- 3. See Gottlieb (1983) for an excellent review of this literature. The works of Cassell (1976) and Cobb (1976) in particular, suggested that there is enough evidence from a large number of studies on humans and animals, to conclude that social relationships have an important influence on health by moderating or buffering potentially the deleterious health effects of psychosocial stress or other health hazards. This idea, that social support somehow sustains the organism by promoting adaptive behaviour or neuroendocrine responses in the face of stress has contributed toward the development of a general theory of why and how social relationships should affect health (House et al., 1988).
- 4. The study of Zick and Smith (1991) as well as that of Helsing et al. (1981) are

especially important in answering the questions of how a change in marital status affects mortality. First, they are micro studies based on individuals followed over time. Secondly, they are able to disentangle the main effects of marital status transition itself (e.g., the Zick and Smith study). It is worth noting that other studies tend to use indirect methods of determining the effects of marital status transitions on mortality using Vital Statistics and Census Data (see for example Trovato and Lauris, 1989).

- 5. Recently, Verbrugge (1990) has argued that the apparent paradox that men have higher death rates while women have higher morbidity rates, is not really as surprising as it seems. It turns out that in general, men get sick from conditions that are more lethal and hence have a higher mortality risk (e.g., cancer, cardiovascular and other degenerative diseases), while women experience more illness, but from less lethal causes such as psychiatric ailments. She also argues that once life-style and health behaviour differences are taken into account, the sex differential does not disappear, implying that there may be a biological basis for men's higher death probabilities in relation to women.
- 6. According to Klinger-Vartabedian and Wispe (1989), the literature should pay more attention to how the effects of gender and marital status on mortality operate within marriage. They find that age differences in spouses has an effect on mortality probabilities. Women married to younger men tend to live longer than expected,

while women married to older men tend to die sooner than expected.

- 7. Other important features of the marital relationship which serve to provide a healthier environment include the provision of advice, personal aid (material and nonmaterial), normative constraints on risky behaviour and the necessity to seek medical help when illness occurs, and reassurance of worth and information provided by a spouse (Berkman, 1984).
- 8. House et al., (1988) also state that we need to do more investigation into the biophysical mechanisms of how social relationships act on our physiological systems.
- 9. House (1987) has argued that more work is needed in determining the structural antecedents of social support. In the present theoretical formulation, I assume that marriage and marital transitions are exogenous. The causes of these variables are, of course, multifaceted, including cultural, demographic and personal factors. Theoretically, I also assume that social support and social networks are partly a function of marital status and marital status transitions.
- 10. The six models are: (1) the stress-buffering model, where the presence of stressors lead to the activation of the individual's social support system, which in turn helps to reduce the effects of stress on the individual; (2) the stress prevention model, where social support leads to a reduction of the occurrence and perceived stress in one's life;

- (3) the support deterioration model, where the occurrence of stressful life events leads to the individual's perception of having a diminished social support system; (4) the support seeking/triage model, where stressful events cause both distress and the enactment of support; (5) the additive model of stress and social embeddedness, where social embeddedness (social connections) helps to reduce distress, while stressful life events increase distress; and (6) the reciprocity of stress and perceived support model where the degree of distress is a function of perceived support, and perceived support and stressful events feed back on each other in an inverse direction of causation. It should be clear from this discussion that social support can have both positive and negative effects on the individual's well-being (see Barrera, 1986 for a discussion of this topic).
- 11. In the United States, a number of such studies have been conducted (see Berkman and Breslow, 1983; House and associates, 1988).
- 12. Kisker and Goldman (1987) did not examine cause of death in their study.
- 13. In this analysis, it was discovered that in all cases, the separated marital state shows a very low death rate, below all other marital statuses, including the married. Although I do not show these results, my hypothesis is that many decedents who are in actuality separated from their spouses at the time of death get classified as either single or divorced. To the best of my knowledge, no one else has ever examined this

problem, thus it is difficult to give an absolute answer to this issue. More direct investigation is needed to determine whether the very low death rates of the "separated" may be a function of incorrect reporting on the death certificate, undercount in the Census, or both. From a theoretical point of view, the separated should possess relatively high death rates since they suffer a loss of social integration. Their low death rates are therefore anomalous in this sense as well.

14. In the multivariate model, an additional term for "separated" is also included. I do not show the results for this class of marital status since it is not clear that the deaths and the population for this class are accurately matched. Results from simple univariate and multivariate analyses show that the "separated" have lower death rates and relative risks than the married. This result is consistent across every cause of death considered in this study. In the log-rate regressions, combining the "separated" with either the divorced or the married produced unbelievable results. For example, the single or the widowed would show a lower risk of death than the married. Judging from these results and from my overall assessment of the situation, the "separated" class probably is undercounted in the death records (see Note 13 above). That is, many "separated" decedents are probably classified as "married" or "single," or possibly "divorced" on the death certificate. In order to control for this possible source of error, I decided to enter a term for "separated" into the log-rate regressions, rather than to lump them with either the married or the divorced. Removing the "separated" from the analysis proved to be problematic in that inconsistent results would emerge

with respect to expected patterns of marital status differences, and also age effects.

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APPENDIX A

Statistical Model and Computation of Relative Mortality Risk (RMR)

Given a multiway tabulation of deaths (D) by age (A), sex (S), and marital status (MS), we make the assumption that the deaths in each cell of this table are independent Poisson random variables with means equal to the product of the population at risk (N) in each cell and an underlying hazard (μ). Given these assumptions, the expected number of deaths for each cell in the tabulation is:

$$E(D_{ijk}) = N_{ijk} \cdot \mu_{ijk}, \qquad (1)$$
where: $i = age group (1, ..., 5),$

$$j = (sex) (1, 2), and$$

$$k = marital status group (1, ..., 5).$$

Due to the exponential properties of the Poisson distribution, this expression can be described by a log-linear model for the expected deaths (Agresti, 1990; Clogg and Eliason, 1987; Laird and Olivier, 1981),

$$\log E (D_{ijk}) = \log N_{ijk} + \log \mu_{ijk}. \tag{2}$$

Given the definition of variables in this study, we can fit a log-linear model of the form:

log E
$$(D_{iik}) = log (N_{iik}) + \alpha + B_i + B_i + B_k,$$
 (3)

which is equivalent to fitting the equation,

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ijk}}{N_{ijk}}\right) = \lambda + \lambda_i + \lambda_j + \lambda_k, \qquad (4)$$

where: $\lambda = a$ constant term (baseline hazard),

 λ_i = parameters for age, with the constraint $\Sigma \lambda_i$ = 0,

 λ_i = parameters for sex, with constraint $\Sigma \lambda_i$ = 0, and

 λ_k = parameters for marital status, with constraint $\Sigma \lambda_k = 0$.

Interaction terms may be added to this equation. For example,

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ijk}}{N_{ijk}}\right) = \lambda + \lambda_i + \lambda_j + \lambda_k + \lambda_{ij} + \lambda_{ik} + \lambda_{jk}. \tag{5}$$

Note that since the married class is the reference group for the marital status variable, the exponentiated λ_k parameters become measures of relative mortality risk (RMR). That is,

$$RMR = \exp(\lambda_k). \tag{6}$$

Given the presence of significant interaction effects in the statistical analysis, (6) must be computed on the basis of this information. For example, in (5) the terms λ_k , λ_{ik} and λ_{jk} would have to be added together to derive appropriate RMRs as follows:

$$RMR_{ijk}^{(nm)} = exp\left(\sum_{k,ik,jk} \lambda^{(nm)}\right)$$
 (7)

where $\Sigma \lambda^{(nm)}$ = parameter values for a given unmarried group summed over the k main effect and the interactions of ik and jk.

For the purposes of this study, the log-rate regression analysis is partitioned by sex, since it is known that mortality varies substantially on the basis of gender.

The analysis proceeds by first fitting an equiprobability model of the form:

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ij}^{\cdot}}{N_{ij}}\right) = \lambda. \tag{8}$$

In virtually all cases, this model will not fit the data, and therefore alternative equations are fitted. The next model computed is the age effects model:

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ij}}{N_{ii}}\right) = \lambda_{age}; \tag{9}$$

followed by:

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ij}}{N_{ii}}\right) = \lambda_{\text{marital status}}.$$
 (10)

In this analysis, it was discovered that none of these models provide adequate descriptions of the data. Therefore, the following main effects model was fit:

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ij}}{N_{ij}}\right) = \lambda_{age} + \lambda_{marital \ status}. \tag{11}$$

In most cases, this model provided an excellent fit, giving R^2 levels close to 1.000. The index of fit is calculated by the following R^2 analog measure:

$$R^{2} = 1 - \left(\frac{\text{Model Log-Likelihood Chi-Square}}{\text{Equiprobability Model Log-Likelihood Chi-Square}}\right).$$
(12)

Should a main effects model fail to give an adequate fit of the data, then the saturated model below is computed:

$$\log\left(\frac{D_{ij}}{N_{ij}}\right) = \lambda_{age} + \lambda_{marital \ status} + \lambda_{age \ x \ marital \ status}, \tag{13}$$

which will always provide a perfect fit, but it is not parsimonious since it will contain many parameters.

Note that for the purposes of this study, the parameters are expressed in their multiplicative form and that no intercept is included in the model:

$$\left(\frac{D_{ij}}{P_{ij}}\right) = \gamma_{age} \cdot \gamma_{marital \ status} \cdot \gamma_{age \ x \ marital \ status}$$
 (14)

Thus, the interpretation of parameters is the extent to which a given term multiplies the overall death rate (general or cause specific) in relation to a given reference category.

The reference class for age is 80+, while for marital status it is the married group.

Therefore, the marital status parameters represent the RMR measure described earlier.



Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (General Mortality) TABLE 1.

		MA	MALES			FEM	FEMALES	
Overall Effect of Marital Status	씸	RMR*	2	Z**	% I	RMR	7	1
Single Widowed Divorced		1.37	7.7.	22.52 21.45 17.24	cord cord pred	1.45	22.30 16.18 12.03	30 18 03
Interaction: Age x Marital Status (RMRs):								
	15-29	30-49	69-09	70-79	15-29	30-49	69-05	70-79
Single Widowed	1.42	1.32	1.52	1.35	1.65	1.47	1.42	1.22
Divorced	1.59	1.78	1.37	1.35	1.21	1.56	1.26	1.34

For this and subsequent tables, refer to Appendix A for a description of the statistical model used in this analysis.

** In this and subsequent tables, the Z-test (one-tailed test) is used for statistical significance. Z scores below 1.64 denote insignificant effects.

NOTE: Results are net of age composition.

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Lung Cancer) TABLE 2.

	MA	MALES	FEMALES	LES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Single	1.18	7.66	0.97	98.0
Widowed	1.29	12.64	1.30	9.54
Divorced	1.51	15.88	1.67	13.02

^{*} Net of age composition

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Cirrhosis of the Liver) TABLE 3.

	MA	MALES	FEMALES	ES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Single Widowed Divorced	1.38	8.26 8.63 15.00	1.23	2.78 3.79 7.83

* Net of age composition

TABLE 4. Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Suicide)

	MA	MALES	FEMALES	ALES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Sinse	1.44	13.66	1.53	8.71
Widowed	1.67	5.06	1.06	98.0
Divorced	1.92	18.18	2.02	12.31

* Note of age composition

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Accidental Falls and Pedestrian Fatalities) TABLE 5.

	MA	MALES	FEMALES	LES
Cause of Death and Marital Status				ĝ.
Accidental Falls	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Overall Effect of Marital Status:				
Single Widowed Divorced	1.60	8.44 4.51 8.00	1.43	4.74 2.88 1.95
Pedestrian Fatalities				
Overall Effect of Marital Status:				
	2.48	10.82	3.04	6.84
Widowod	0 94	0.47	1:29	1.51
Divorce	16.1	5.36	2.09	3.77

* Net of age composition

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Motor Vehicle Accidents, Excluding Pedestrian Fatalities) TABLE 6.

		W/	MALES			FEN	FEMALES	
Overall Effect of Marital Status	⊠I	RMR*	·	7	찌	RMR*	7	Z
Single Widowed Divorced		1.11 2.30 1.64	_ `	1.34 10.25 4.75	- 2 0	0.83 2.03 1.25	∞	1.76 8.47 1.47
Interaction: Age x Marital Status								
	15-29	30-49	69-09	70-79	15-29	30-49	69-09	70-79
Single	1.34	0.95	1.10	1.70	1.41	0.87	06.0	0.84
Widowed	12.33	2.62	1.83	1.56	8.63	3.68	1.37	1.28
Divorced	2.32	2.26	1.58	1.44	0.84	6.62	1.09	1.09

* Net of age composition

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Homicide) TABLE 7.

	MA	MALES	FEM	FEMALES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Single Widowed Divorced	1.65 1.46 2.15	6.62 2.48 7.88	1.32 1.43 1.69	2.58 2.19 3.68

^{*} Net of age composition

Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Diabetes) TABLE 8.

	MALES	ES	FEMALES	ALES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
Single	1.46	8.44	1.17	3.01
Widowed	1.31	6.34	1.40	8.37
Divorced	1.55	7.11	96:0	0.50

^{*} Net of age composition

Rel: 'ive Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Lymphoid Leukemia) TABLE 9.

ES	2 0.14 0.12 0.16
FEMALES	9.87 7.46 12.94
ES	2.84 0.49
MALES	1.65 1.44 1.11
	Overall Effect of Marital Status Single Widowed Divorced

* Net of age composition

TABLE 10. Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Heart Disease)

	M/	MALES	FEMALES	ALES
Overall Effect of Marital Status	RMR*	7	RMR*	7
S	1.37	30.02	1.20	13.18
Widowed	1.30	27.60	1.25	19.08
Divorced	1.34	20.04	1.22	9.13

^{*} Net of age composition

TABLE 11. Relative Mortality Risks (RMRs) Derived From Dividing the Death Rate of the Nonmarried by the Rate of the Married, Canada, 1985-87 (Stomach Cancer)

	2.48 4.91 1.31	
FEMALES	RMR 1.22 1.38 1.16	
MALES	Z 3.82 5.60 2.89	
	1.25 1.35 1.27	
	Overall Effect of Marital Status Single Widowed Divorced	

* Net of age composition

TABLE 12. Log-Rate Regression Coefficients for the Effects of the Percentage of the Population in the Single or Divorced Marital Statuses on Their General Mortality Rates.

		SINGLE		D	DIVORCED		
Sex	λ	e ^{-λ}	z	λ	e-A	z	
Males	01164	.998	-3.82*	-:07283	.932	-6.28*	
Females	00295	.997	-1.70*	02559	.975	-1.98*	

 $P \le .05$ (one-tailed test)

OLS Regression Analysis of Relative Mortality Risk of Singles to Married and Divorced to TABLE 13. Married Rates (General Mortality)

	y =	Singles I	OR DR	$y = \left(\frac{\text{Divorced DR}}{\text{Married DR}}\right)$			
Effect	β	t	r (y, x _j)	β	t	r (y, x _i)	
\mathbf{x}_1	.0509*	3.86	.541	.0477*	2.43	.364	
\mathbf{x}_2	.0781*	8.41	416	.0644*	4.67	282	
x ₃	0146	-1.76	576	0105	83	386	
\mathbf{x}_4	0427	-4.31	600	0292*	-1.98	402	
Sex (Male)	.1890*	2.46		.3081*	2.70		
α	2.4400*	13.26		2.4100*	8.805		
\mathbb{R}^2	.504				.230		

NOTE: $x_1 = (Age 15 - 29 \times \% Single or Divorced)$

 $x_2 = (Age 30 - 49 \times \% Single or Divorced)$

 $x_3 = (Age 50 - 69 \times \% Single or Divorced)$

 $x_4 = (Age 70 - 79 \times \% Single or Divorced)$

The reference age groups for these interaction terms is 80+.

 α = Intercept term

^{*} $P \le .05$

TABLE 14. Sex Differences in Mortality Canada, 1985-87*

Cause of Death	Male Rate Female Rate	Z
All Causes	1.38	214.87
Lung Cancer	1.87	99.96
Cirrhosis of the Liver	1.66	36.50
Suicide	1.97	55.86
Accidental Falls	1.31	18.63
Pedestrian Fatality	1.42	12.39
Motor Vehicle Accidents**	1.68	44.78
Homicide	1.43	12.66
Diabetes	1.15	13.53
Lymphoid Leukemia	1.51	14.12
Cancer of the Brain	1.21	10.91
Heart Disease	1.43	135.47
Stomach Cancer	1.51	30.01

^{*} Controlling for Age and Marital Status

^{**} Excluding Pedestrian Fatalities



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Georges MATHEWS

Publicaso

LA FAMILLE ET LA CRISE DE L'ÉTAT-PROVIDENCE : ESQUISSE D'UNE PROBLÉMATIQUE

Octobre 1991



Le Canada connaît en ce moment la pire crise de son histoire. Crise politique, bien sûr, mais aussi crise financière. Les deux sont d'ailleurs interreliées. Cette crise financière apparaît beaucoup plus grave au Canada qu'aux États-Unis, qui connaissent également une accumulation de déficits gouvernementaux sans précédent en temps de paix, et donc une dette publique en croissance rapide.

D'une part le budget américain comprend une part plus grande de dépenses plus facilement «compressibles» que le budget canadien. On n'a qu'à songer à l'énorme budget militaire américain, qui s'élève à 300 milliards de dollars en 1991 et que la fin de la Guerre Froide pourrait sérieusement entamer. Au Canada, le budget de la défense atteint onze milliards de dollars (soit trois fois moins qu'aux États-Unis, per capita), ce qui ne laisse pas de place à des réductions majeures. D'autre part, les Canadiens sont relativement surtaxés par rapport à leurs voisins du sud, alors que les Américains seraient plutôt «soustaxés» : en 1991, ceux-ci paient le litre d'essence *moins cher* qu'en 1973, en dollars constants, et une taxe de dix sous le litre serait bénéfique à plusieurs égards. À l'échelle de l'OCDE, le poids des prélèvements fiscaux au Canada n'est pas en tête de liste, bien au contraire ¹, mais la concurrence américaine s'avère fort contraignante.

À part cette marge de manoeuvre qui n'existe pas au Canada, les États-Unis ont l'immense avantage d'avoir une monnaie qui est devenue la monnaie internationale. En cas de crise politique ou économique, beaucoup d'investisseurs échangeraient leurs avoirs canadiens en dollars américains mais l'inverse n'est pas vrai.

Le déficit canadien apparaît lié pour l'essentiel à la politique sociale, au sens large, c'est-à-dire à l'ensemble des prestations directes et indirectes versées aux Canadiens au titre de l'éducation, de la santé, de la sécurité du revenu, du développement régional et de la péréquation. Il s'agit donc en bonne partie d'un déficit de la «Sécurité sociale», comme on dit en France, où la Sécurité sociale couvre l'assurance-santé, les prestations de retraite et les prestations familiales, et dispose d'un financement autonome.

L'exemple français paraît pertinent : les coûts de chaque branche de la Sécurité sociale sont connus et suivis de près, et les comptes annuels sont l'occasion d'un débat public plus ou moins vigoureux selon les circonstances. En d'autres mots, il y a là une transparence qui n'existe pas au Canada. Deux programmes seulement sont ici financés à même un impôt et une caisse spécifiques, celui de l'assurance-chômage et celui du régime public de retraite. Pour les autres, on ignore non pas leur coût, que révèlent les comptes publics, mais leur «contribution au déficit».

D'où le paradoxe suivant : alors que la crise de l'État-providence provient au Canada de l'écart substantiel entre ce que les gens paient pour les prestations sociales et ce qu'ils reçoivent en retour, alors qu'il s'agit d'une crise structurelle et non conjoncturelle, ce qui signifie qu'on ne pourra pas se contenter de rafistoler à la marge, les concitoyens n'ont aucune réponse à certaines question fondamentales qui conditionnent toute réforme globale sensée de l'État-providence. À commencer par : qui paie pour qui, hier, aujourd'hui et demain ? La réponse à cette question suppose une vision d'ensemble et des analyses qui dépassent largement le cadre de ce rapport. Nous nous proposons par contre de poser des balises et d'ouvrir des pistes.

L'hypothèse qu'un système de financement à la française pour la Sécurité sociale canadienne aurait empêché l'escalade des déficits ne restera toujours qu'une hypothèse. Mais elle ne manque pas de vraisemblance.

1. LE PIÈGE DES MOTS

La politique sociale des pays occidentaux est fondée peu ou prou sur la célèbre formule de Marx : «De chacun selon ses capacités à chacun selon ses besoins». La plupart des programmes sociaux vont en effet bien au-delà de la simple assurance. Toux ceux qui achètent de l'assurance-vie ou de l'assurance-invalidité espèrent bien ne pas en bénéficier. Il n'y a là aucune véritable redistribution, mais simplement un partage rationnel des risques inhérents à la vie quotidienne. Tandis que ceux ne payant pas ou peu d'impôts ont droit à l'assurance-santé, aux prestations familiales et aux pensions de

vieillesse. Et cette évidente redistribution est fondée sur la solidarité entre les diverses catégories socio-économiques.

Mais dès qu'il est question de redistribution, le piège des mots embrouille la discussion. Car ce que le sens commun considère comme de la redistribution ne l'est pas forcément pour le milieu académique. Et le vocabulaire plus ou moins technique que crée ce milieu finit par atteindre le grand public et impose sa coloration aux débats. Le langage fiscal en constitue un exemple patent.

Ainsi, on a l'habitude de distinguer entre taxes progressives et régressives, les premières désignant celles dont le prélèvement croît plus que proportionnellement avec le revenu. Les termes utilisés ont d'ailleurs une forte connotation morale : qui souhaite être associé à une mesure «régressive» ? Et ces termes véhiculent de manière implicite une référence à la redistribution, positive dans le premier cas, négative dans le second.

En réalité, les choses sont bien différentes. Si deux personnes paient un prix différent pour un bien ou un service, et le surcoût payé par la personne la plus riche sert à subventionner la consommation de la personne la plus pauvre, il y a à l'évidence redistribution de la première à la seconde. Une taxe soi-disant régressive peut donc impliquer une redistribution substantielle.

Supposons une taxe de vente de 10 % sur toute dépense de consommation : la personne dont le revenu après impôt est de 50 000 dollars et qui en dépense 40 000 paiera 4 000 en taxe de vente, alors que celle ayant un revenu de 10 000 dollars et le consommant en entier paiera mille dollars de taxe. Si les deux consomment la même quantité de biens et services publics, et si le coût par tête s'élève à 2 500 dollars, alors la personne plus riche aura «versé» 1 500 dollars à la personne plus pauvre.

Or, les catégories socio-économiques payant le plus de taxes consomment plutôt moins de services publics (au sens large), ce qui accentue le caractère redistributif de taxes considérées «régressives». En fait, il n'y a plus depuis longtemps en Occident de taxes «anti-redistributives». La poll tax, qui a coûté si cher à Margaret Thatcher, a indigné tout le monde parce qu'elle supprimait toute redistribution dans le paiement des services municipaux.

De manière plus générale, on ne peut pas juger du degré de redistribution d'une fiscalité et d'une politique sociale données à partir d'un seul élément de l'une ou de l'autre. L'ensemble des recettes et des dépenses gouvernementales doivent idéalement être prises en compte.

Mais ces approches ne représentent qu'une partie de l'histoire. Elles concernent la redistribution purement transversale : au cours de l'année N, telles catégories socio-économiques ont subventionné les autres à hauteur de tant de millions de dollars. Mais les catégories aujourd'hui subventionnées ont été pour la plupart des contributrices dans un passé plus ou moins récent. Si la redistribution n'était que transversale, c'est-à-dire si les contributeurs ne payaient aujourd'hui que ce qu'ils recevront demain, l'ensemble du système ressemblerait davantage à une assurance généralisée qu'à un système fondé sur une réelle solidarité sociale.

S'il s'avérait par exemple que les personnes sans enfant reçoivent au cours de leur vieillesse l'équivalent, en dollars actualisés, de ce qu'elles ont versé au cours de leur vie active, il faudrait en déduire qu'il n'y a pas vraiment de redistribution des adultes sans enfant aux familles. L'analyse longitudinale apparaît donc nécessaire dans une étape ultérieure.

Un exemple parmi d'autres indique à quel point une analyse académique peut s'éloigner du sens commun. Dans un article consacré à la question du financement public de la garde des enfants dont les deux parents travaillent à l'extérieur du foyer, Hassouna Moussa écrit : «Many families decide that one spouse should take care of the children and stay at home. If a subsidy is paid to those families who decide that both spouses should work, the first type of family will subsidize the second and that is unfair ²». On verra plus loin que le premier type de famille paie nettement moins d'impôts et de taxes que le second. Comment celui-là peut-il alors subventionner celui-ci constitue un mystère. On peut prétendre que la subvention réelle, qui va du second au premier, est insuffisante, pour telle ou telle raison, mais il s'agit là d'une toute autre histoire. En fait, l'erreur consiste à confondre déduction fiscale et subvention.

De manière plus générale, le commentateur qui dénonce l'inégalité des revenus soutient en réalité que l'effort redistributif est insuffisant, plutôt que non significatif.

2. UNE QUESTION NÉGLIGÉE

Depuis vingt ans, les pays occidentaux connaissent une fécondité inférieure au seuil du renouvellement de la population, 2,1 enfants par femme. Le baby boom précédent accordait bien sûr une certaine marge de manoeuvre en ce domaine : il n'est pas dit que la fécondité doive atteindre 2,1 enfants par femme année après année. Mais cette marge de manoeuvre n'existe plus, particulièrement dans ces pays où la fécondité se situe loin de 2,1. Le Canada se trouve lui, dans une situation particulière, puisqu'il peut compenser une fécondité de 1,75 par une immigration soutenue, qui dépasse aujourd'hui l'accroissement naturel. Mais il n'apparaît pas évident qu'il faille s'en remettre uniquement à l'immigration pour assurer le dynamisme démographique du Canada.

Il faudrait donc s'interroger sur les moyens que la collectivité met à la disposition des familles pour compenser (partiellement) les coûts, au sens large, que représentent les enfants. Et l'on est amené à s'interroger sur l'existence et l'ampleur de la redistribution des ressources des personnes sans enfant à celles qui en ont. Il y a dans nos sociétés une redistribution évidente des riches aux pauvres, qui est l'angle habituel sous lequel on analyse cette question. Ainsi, les familles à l'aise «subventionnent» les familles à revenus modestes et les personnes fortunées sans enfant en font de même à l'égard des personnes seules pauvres. Mais quel est le sens des transferts globaux ? Si les transferts vont globalement des familles aux non-familles, ou si la tendance s'oriente dans ce sens, cela autoriserait certaines conclusions quant à l'orientation de l'État-providence.

La sous-fécondité persistante nous amène en effet à poser un regard nouveau sur l'éthique de la redistribution, regard qui prend en compte une différence essentielle entre parents et non-parents, à revenus identiques. Les premiers

laissent en héritage le matériau de base de la continuité sociale, c'est-à-dire la ressource humaine.

Mais la lecture des analyses disponibles en matière de fardeau fiscal et de redistribution des revenus indique qu'il s'agit là d'une question négligée.

3. LES MATÉRIAUX EXISTANTS

Il y a au moins deux études qui ont défriché une partie du terrain sur lequel nous voulons nous aventurer.

3.1 STATISTIQUE CANADA-1974

Statistique Canada a publié en 1977: Incidence de la répartition des avantages découlant des services de santé et d'éducation, Canada 1974 (Catalogue 13-561). Les données usuelles sur la répartition des revenus semblant n'indiquer que peu d'effets égalisateurs de la politique redistributive des gouvernements après le début des années cinquante, certains ont compris la pertinence d'inclure dans l'analyse non seulement les paiements de transfert qui arrondissent le revenu monétaire mais également les transferts en nature, et plus spécifiquement les services de santé et d'éducation.

Cette étude évalue donc pour chaque catégorie de revenu l'importance des paiements de transfert et la consommation des services publics d'éducation et de santé. A priori, on peut s'attendre à ce que la consommation de services de santé soit négativement correlée avec le revenu, les personnes agées en étant les plus grandes consommatrices. Dans le cas de l'éducation, la corrélation devrait s'avérer positive. Les résultats de l'étude sont conformes à ces attentes, mais malgré cela ces «transferts en nature» ont un certain effet égalisateur sur la répartition des revenus (voir le tableau 1).

Cette étude n'a malheureusement pas été reprise par la suite. Il aurait été intéressant de voir l'impact, quinze ans plus tard, de l'évolution exponentielle des dépenses publiques de santé et de l'accroissement notable du fardeau fiscal des classes moyennes, après 1984.

TABLE 1. Distribution of Income by Deciles of Unattached Individuals and Families by Different Concepts of Income, Canada, 1974 TABLEAU 1. Répartition en décile du revenu des personnes seules et des familles selon les différents concepts de revenu, Canada, 1974

Decile share	Money income before transfers received un cash ¹	Z Total money income ²	Income after	Total money income plus transfers received in kind*	Total money income plus transfers received in kind less income tax
Repartition en déciles	Revenu moné- taire avant les transferts reçus en espèces i	Revenu moné- taire total ²	Revenu après umpôt	Revenu moné- taire total plus les trans- ferts reçus en nature ⁴	Revenu mone- taire total plus les trans- ferts reçus en nature moins l'impôt
Unattached individuals - Personnes seules		pe	r cent - pourcenta	ge	
Lowest decile — Décile inférieur Ind decile — 2º décile 3rd — 3º 4th — 4º 5th — 5º 6th — 6º 7th — 7º 8th — 8º 8th — 8º	- 0.2 1.3 3.3 6.2 9.3 12.3 15.7	0.6 2.8 3.9 4.8 6.6 9.1 11.4 14.3	0.7 3.3 4.5 5.5 7.3 9.6 11.7	1.2 3.2 4.1 5.6 7.4 9.3 11.3	1.3 3.7 4.7 6.2 8.0 9.8 11.5
9th - 90 Highest decile - Decile superieur Total	20.0	17.5	16.9	16.7	16 0
	32.4	28.9	26.5	27.4	25 2
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average income — Revenu moyen Median income — Revenu median Gini coefficient 5 — Coefficient do Gini 5 Coefficient of skewness — Coefficient de dissymetrie Coefficient of variation — Coefficient de variation	5,365	6,099	5,234	6,597	5,732
	4,195	4,838	4,400	5,550	5,114
	0,544	0,441	0.404	0,406	0,370
	4,542	5,177	3.494	5,185	3,476
	1,162	0,971	0.837	0,893	0,768
Families - Familles					
Lowest decile — Décile inférieur 2nd decile — 2e decile 3rd — 3e — 44th — 4e — 5th — 5e — 6th — 6e — 7th — 7e — 8th — 8e — 9th — 9e — Highest decile — Décile supérieur Total	0.4	2.1	2.5	2,4	2.8
	3.1	4.2	4.7	4.5	4.9
	5.4	5.8	6.2	6.1	6.4
	7.1	7.2	7.6	7.4	7.7
	8.5	8.5	8.8	8.6	8.8
	9.9	9.7	9.9	9.7	9.8
	11.4	11.0	11.0	10.9	10.9
	13.1	12.6	12.5	12.5	12.4
	15.7	15.0	14.7	14.8	11.4
	25.3	23.9	22.3	23.0	6.21.7
Average income — Revenu moyen \$ Median income — Revenu median \$ Guni coefficient ⁵ — Coefficient de Guni ⁵ . Coefficient of skewness — Coefficient de dissymétrie . Coefficient of variation — Coefficient de variation .	13.695	14,833	12.576	16.776	14,520
	12.624	13,516	11.724	15.345	13,449
	0.372	0,325	0.297	0.307	0.285
	5.203	5,736	4.543	5.230	3.937
	0.795	0,710	0.620	0.660	0.582
All families and unattached individuals					
Ensemble des familles et personnes seules Lowest decile — Décile inférieur 2nd decile — 2e décile 3rd — 3e — 4th — 4e — 5th — 5e — 6th — 6e — 7th — 7e — 8th — 8e — 9th — 9e — Highest decile — Décile supérieur Total	- 0.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.5
	1.4	2.9	3.3	3.2	3.5
	3.8	4.6	5.0	4.8	5.1
	6.0	6.3	6.7	6.4	6.7
	8.1	8.0	8.3	8.1	8.3
	1.9.9	9.7	9.9	9.8	9.9
	11.8	11.4	11.6	11.4	11.5
	14.0	13.4	13.3	13.4	13.3
	17.2	16.3	16.0	16.2	16.0
	28.0	26.2	24.6	25.5	24.2
Average income — Revenu moyen \$ Median income — Revenu median \$ Ginu coefficient 5 — Coefficient de Gini 5 Coefficient of skewness — Coefficient de dissymétrie Coefficient of variation — Coefficient de variation	11,410	12,437	10,563	13,984	12.110
	10,225	10,993	9,564	12,447	11,022
	0.441	0.389	0,363	0.375	0.355
	4.753	5.086	3,843	4.522	3.267
	0.922	0.826	0,734	0.780	0.703

¹ Includes wages and salaries, net income from self-employment, income from investment and other miscellaneous sources, annuties and superannuation, etc. - Comprend les salaries et traitements, le revenu net provenant d'un emploi autonome, le revenu de placements et d'autres sources, de rentes, de pensions.

² Total money income is the sum of income from sources mentioned in footnote (1) plus all social security payments from federal, provincial and municipal governments. These payments include family allowances, unemployment insurance benefits, Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, persions under Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, etc. — Le revenu monétaire total est la somme des revenus mentionnés dans la note (1) et toutes les prestations de caractère social des administrations fédérale, provinciales et municipales. Ces paiements comprennet les allocaucions familiales, les prestations d'assurance-chômage, la pension de securité de la weillesse, les upplément de revenu garanti, les pensions du Régime de pensions du Canada et du Régime de rentes du Québec, etc.

3 Income after tax is defined as total money income less the amount of income tax payable, federal and provincial, on 1974 income and taxable capital gains. — Le revenu après impôt designe le revenu monetaire total moins le montant d'impôt à payer, féderal et provincial, sur le revenu et les gains de capital realises en 1974.

4 Transfers received in kind refers to the amount of benefits received from the utilization of educational or health or both services in 1974. See page 54 for a more détailed interpretation of such benefits — Les transferts reçus en nature désignent la valeur des avantages tirés de l'utilisation des services d'éducation ou de santé ou les deux en 1974. Voir à la page 54 une interprétation plus détaillée de ces avantages.

5 Calculated from percentile rather than décile data in order to reduce the grouping error. — Calculé à partir des données en percentile plutôt qu'en decile afin de reduire les erreurs de groupement.

Il faut cependant souligner quelques *lacunes» de cette étude eu égard à notre objectif. Du côté fiscal, celle-ci ne considère qu'une partie du fardeau fiscal total des individus, c'est-à-dire l'impôt sur le revenu (38 % des prélèvement fiscaux en 1974). Du côté des dépenses publiques, elle ne considère que deux catégories, qu représentaient environ 40 % des dépenses totales des divers paliers de gouvernement. Finalement, elle ne distingue pas suffisamment les familles sans enfant des autres familles. On peut cependant combiner cette étude avec celle sur la répartition des revenus après impôt en 1974, ce qui permet de dégager certaines conclusions.

Avant de poursuivre plus loin, notons que cette étude recèle une curieuse erreur méthodologique. Elle retient cinq définitions du revenu :

- 1- revenu monétaire avant les transferts publics en espèces;
- 2- revenu monétaire total;
- 3- revenu après impôt;
- 4- revenu monétaire total plus les transferts publics en nature (santé et éducation;
- 5- cette dernière définition moins l'impôt.

Et l'étude cherche à répondre à la question suivante : de ces trois méthodes de répartition du revenu (fiscalité directe, transferts en espèce et transferts en nature), laquelle a le plus d'impact ? Les coefficients de Gini indiqués en tableau E du document fournissent la réponse des auteurs : «les mesures favorisant la redistribution des revenus sont, par ordre d'importance, les transferts en espèces, la fiscalité et les transferts en nature 3».

Il est approprié de comparer l'effet des transferts en espèces et en nature. Par contre, considérer l'un ou l'autre séparément de la fiscalité n'a aucun sens. Il suffit de regarder de plus près le tableau 1. Les colonnes 2 (revenu monétaire total) et 4 (revenu monétaire total plus les transferts reçus en nature) sont purement abstraites, puisqu'elles ne correspondent à aucune situation réelle. Les transferts en espèces ou en nature ne sont possibles que si des impôts sont prélevés! On pourrait démontrer par ailleurs que les transferts en espèces sont toujours, dans la logique du tableau 1, plus redistributeurs que la fiscalité, si progessive soit-elle : c'est purement arithmétique. En d'autres mots, tout cela

ne nous avance guère. Notons que cette erreur méthodologique revient année après année dans le catalogue 13-210 de Statistique Canada, celui portant sur la répartition du revenu après impôt.

Par contre, on peut s'interroger tout à fait légitimement sur l'impact redistributeur de deux structures différentes de transferts en espèces, à fiscalité donnée, ou vice-versa. L'important est qu'il faut dans ce cas considérer l'impact conjoint des transferts et de la fiscalité.

3.2 GILLESPIE-1969

L'étude d'Irwin Gillespie ⁴ s'avérait plus ambitieuse que celle de Statistique Canada. C'est en fait la plus complète disponible sur le thème de la redistribution qu'effectue l'État par le biais de l'*ensemble* de ses prélèvement et de ses dépenses. Elle ne permet malheureusement pas de répondre à la question qui nous intéresse, puisqu'elle ne tient pas compte des personnes seules et ne distingue pas familles avec enfants et familles sans enfants.

Par contre les conclusions auxquelles arrive l'auteur s'avèrent fort utiles. Ainsi lorsqu'on prend en considération l'ensemble des impôts et des taxes payés par les citoyens de même que l'ensemble des dépenses gouvernementales, et qu'on les répartit en fonction du revenu des familles qui les paient ou en bénéficient, on aboutit à la conclusion qu'il y avait, en 1961 et 1969, une nette redistribution des classes de revenu plus élevées aux classes les plus faibles (voir le tableau 2). Le revenu auquel les familles deviennent des contributrices nettes est élevé, 10 000 dollars, plus élevé donc que le revenu familial moyen (environ 9 000 dollars en 1969).

Gillespie soutient cependant que les familles les plus riches contribuent moins (en termes nets) en 1969 qu'en 1961. Mais cela n'apparaît pas, bien au contraire, dans les tableaux publiés (plusieurs ne l'ont pas été). Il s'agit peut-être alors des centiles supérieurs. Il est remarquable par ailleurs que la conclusion générale de Gillespie prévaut alors même que sa méthodologie relative à l'étude de l'impact global de la fiscalité par classe de revenu l'amène à qualifier le système fiscal de nettement régressif pour les classes de revenu

au bas de l'échelle. Méthodologie qui soulève à première vue des interrogations, même sans l'avoir approfondie : comment est-il possible en effet que les familles ayant un revenu inférieur à 2 000 dollars en 1969 subissent un fardeau fiscal global pouvant varier de 60 % à 85 %?

Pour fournir des éléments de réponse à la question qui nous intéresse, il nous faudra adopter une approche très indirecte. Peut-on faire des rapprochements entre l'étude de Gillespie et celle de Statistique Canada portant sur l'année 1974 ? Quels sont, depuis 1974, les indices pertinents en ce qui touche l'évolution du fardeau fiscal et des dépenses gouvernementales ?

Tableau 2 - Impact fiscal net des recettes et des dépenses publiques selon le revenu familial, Canada, 1969

Revenu avant transferts	Bénéfice ou contribution (–) nets \$
-2 000	1 418
2 000-2 999	1 955
3 000-3 999	1 773
4 000-4 999	1 400
5 000-5 999	983
6 000-6 999	655
7 000-9 999	132
10 000-14 999	-1 080
15 000 et +	-3 275

Source: W. Irwin Gillespie, *The Redistribution of Income in Canada*, Ottawa, Gage Publishing Company, 1980.

3.3 À PROPOS DE L'ÉVOLUTION DE L'INÉGALITÉ

Beaucoup d'encre a été utilisée pour répondre à la question de l'évolution de la répartition des revenus. Avec le temps, celle-ci est-elle devenue plus ou moins inégalitaire? Il est de bon ton de prétendre, au Canada, que sur une longue période l'inégalité n'a pas été entamée. Mais, si on n'est pas en mesure de saisir l'impact de l'ensemble des dépenses et des recettes de l'État à deux moments différents, on ne peut rien affirmer de solide à cet égard. D'autre part,

toute analyse sérieuse de cette question devrait prendre en considération deux aspects qu'on a généralement tendance à ignorer.

Le premier concerne la signification de l'inégalité, ou plutôt l'évolution au fil du temps de cette signification. Cela implique des jugements plus qualitatifs bien sûr mais il est difficile de nier que l'inégalité entre celui qui possède une Mercédès et celui qui doit se contenter d'une Escort n'est pas de même type que celle qui opposait naguère la famille ayant une Ford ordinaire et celle ne pouvant s'offrir aucune auto. Cette dernière inégalité paraît plus sérieuse que l'autre, même si elle l'est moins en termes monétaires. Un même coefficient Gini n'a donc pas la même signification à trente ans d'intervalle, puisqu'il y a des seuils dans la consommation, i.e. des sauts qualitatifs.

Nous touchons ici l'inépuisable querelle du relatif et de l'absolu : vaut-il mieux être pauvre dans une société pauvre, ou pauvre dans une société riche ? Contentons-nous de souligner que dans les pays ayant instauré l'État-providence, les deuxièmes sont généralement moins pauvres que les premiers. En tout cas, lorsqu'on indexe vers le haut les seuils de pauvreté, on fausse les comparaisons historiques... et les débats sur l'État-providence. Le cas des personnes âgées est révélateur ⁵.

Le deuxième aspect concerne la nécessaire distinction entre l'évolution de l'effort de redistribution et l'évolution de la répartition des revenus. Une population vieillissante par exemple peut connaître simultanément une répartition plus inégalitaire selon les critères habituels et un effort redistributif croissant. Une population vieillissante verra à un moment donné le poids relatif de la population dépendante s'accroître.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS PRÉLIMINAIRES POUR 1974

Nous ne disposons donc que d'une partie des blocs nécessaires pour formuler une réponse solide à la question de départ. Il faudrait idéalement remplir toutes les cellules du tableau 3. En combinant l'étude de 1974 avec celle sur la

Tableau 3- Contributions fiscales et bénéfices publics moyens par type de ménage

1974

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	. (2)	(8)
	Revenu moyen Paiements de transfert reçus	Paiements de transfert reçus	Services de santé et éducation	Impôt sur le revenu	Autres taxes payées	Autres services publics	Bilan net	Poids
	•	4	49	49		₩.		
	2							
Familles sans enfant	12 850	1 200	730	1 750	n.d.	4 470	n.d.	0,205
Familles avec enfants	15 600	1 142	2 420	2 455	n.d.	4 470	n.d.	0,521
Dorconnos coulos	6 100	730	200	865	n.d.	2 235	n.d.	0,274

1989

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
	Revenu moyen Paiements de transfert reçus	Paiements de transfert reçus	Services de santé et éducation	Impôt sur le revenu	Autres taxes payées	Autres services publics	Bilan net	Poids
	64	49	69	49		59		
Familles sans enfant	4 3700	5 700	n.d.	8 372	n.d.	15 200	n.d.	0,216
Familles avec enfants	53 000	4 975 4 650	n.d.	10 226	n.d.	15 200	n.d.	0,473
Personnes seules	21 150	3 779	n.d.	3 674	n.d.	7 600	n.d.	0,311

• : (7)=[(2)+(3)+(6)]-[(4)+(5)]

répartition du revenu après impôt ⁶, ce qui implique une fouille systématique de tableaux où les pourcentages sont préférés aux valeurs absolues, on réussit à remplir pour 1974 les colonnes (1), (3), (4) et (8).

Quant aux paiements de transfert reçus, ils sont publiés pour l'ensemble des familles seulement. Mais des hypothèses plausibles nous permettent de contourner cette difficulté. Nous avons deux points de repère : la situation des personnes seules et de l'ensemble des familles. Pour les personnes seules et les familles sans enfant, les prestations de vieillesse constituent le paiement le plus important, suivi de l'assistance sociale. Or, la proportion des personnes âgées dans ces groupes est sensiblement la même, environ un tiers. À situation identique, une famille sans enfant (qui constitue généralement un ménage de deux personnes) recevra nettement plus qu'une personne seule en allocations sociales.

Par ailleurs, tout porte à croire que les familles avec enfants reçoivent moins de paiements de transfert, en moyenne, que les familles sans enfant, à cause de leur structure par âge. Supposons donc que pour ce dernier groupe, les paiements de transfert s'élevaient à 1 200 dollars en 1974 : il en découle une somme de 1 120 dollars pour les familles avec enfants.

Les familles avec enfants sont évidemment les grandes bénéficiaires des services d'éducation.

Lorsqu'on compare l'impôt sur le revenu aux transferts en espèces et en nature, on constate que chacun des trois groupes est un bénéficiaire net : 180 dollars pour les familles sans enfant, 365 pour les personnes seules et 1 085 pour les familles avec enfants. Si on s'arrêtait là, on conclurait que celles-ci sont nettement gagnantes au jeu de la redistribution, même si le gain net par tête est inférieur à celui des personnes seules.

Mais on ne peut s'arrêter là. Gillespie a montré par exemple que le gain net global dont bénéficient les classes de revenu plus faibles dépasse largement les gains, définis de manière plus étroite, auxquels aboutit l'étude de Statistique Canada portant sur l'année 1974. Le tableau 3 permet de le comprendre. Le bilan des colonnes (5) et (6) ne peut que leur être largement

favorable, puisque les «autres taxes» payées par les personnes seules et les familles sans enfant à faible revenu demeurent modestes relativement à celles payées par les familles à revenu plus élevé, qui comprennent une proportion plus importante de familles avec enfants (les biens de première nécessité comme l'alimentation sont peu taxés). Par contre, «les autres services publics» (services gouvernementaux, infrastructures urbaines, défense nationale...) bénéficient de manière à peu près équivalente à chaque adulte.

Les données de la colonne (6) pour 1974 ne se veulent que des ordres de grandeur. Elles ont été obtenues en divisant les dépenses publiques totales moins les paiements de transfert et les coûts publics de la santé et de l'éducation par le nombre d'adultes dans la population ⁷. Les familles sans enfant et avec enfants comptent en moyenne deux adultes chacune.

Même sans pouvoir inscrire de données précises dans la colonne (5), on aboutit à la conclusion que le bilan net global est nettement plus élevé par unité de personne seule que par unité de famille avec enfants. Étant donné le poids relatif de chaque catégorie en 1974, il n'est pas interdit de penser que le volume *global* de ressources redistribuées aux personnes seules était à ce moment-là égal sinon supérieur à celui destiné aux familles avec enfants.

4. L'IMPACT DES TENDANCES 1974-1989 SUR LA SITUATION EN 1989

4.1 QUELQUES DONNÉES POUR 1989

Les données les plus récentes concernant l'impôt payé sur le revenu portent sur l'année 1989 8. Elles permettent de remplir les colonnes (1), (2) et (4) du tableau 3. Pour les paiements de transfert, il nous faut cependant distinguer les deux types de famille. On aura remarqué la progession beaucoup plus rapide de ces transferts pour les personnes seules que pour les familles entre 1974 et 1989, qui s'explique notamment par la bonification des prestations versées aux personnes âgées. On hésite à imputer la même progression aux transferts destinés aux familles sans enfant. On choisira plutôt un taux d'augmentation se

trouvant à mi-chemin entre celui s'appliquant aux personnes seules et celui s'appliquant à l'ensemble des familles.

On voit déjà, en mettant en parallèle les colonnes (2) et (4), que la situation a évolué au bénéfice des personnes seules. Cela devient encore plus net lorsqu'on considère l'évolution relative des coûts de l'éducation et de la santé depuis 1974. Au Canada en 1974, le coût public de l'éducation s'élevait à 7,7 milliards de dollars, celui de la santé, à 5,2 milliards. Ces données ne sont pas disponibles pour 1989, mais nous utilisons l'hypothèse que le coût per capita au Québec ressemble beaucoup au coût canadien. Il suffit donc de multiplier les coûts québécois par quatre pour obtenir une estimation pour l'ensemble du Canada, ce qui permet également de remplir la colonne (6) pour 1989.

Les documents audgétaires du Québec ⁹ permettent d'évaluer le coût public de l'éducation à 7,9 milliards et celui de la santé à 8,9 milliards en 1989, ce qui signifie par extrapolation des coûts canadiens de 31,6 et 35,6 milliards (contre 7,7 et 5,2 milliards en 1974). On voit donc que le coût de la santé per capita a crû davantage que le coût de l'éducation par jeune. Cela ne surprend pas si l'on sait que la consommation des soins de santé, et particulièrement celle des personnes âgées, suit une dynamique qui lui est propre ¹⁰.

Comme les catégories «familles sans enfant» et «personnes seules» comptent une proportion de personnes âgées beaucoup plus élevée que celle des familles avec enfants, cette évolution depuis 1974 signifie que la redistribution en faveur de cette dernière catégorie s'atténue sans cesse, au profit des personnes seules et peut-être aussi des couples sans enfant plus âgés.

Il est vrai que le déclin de la fécondité a joué un rôle dans cette évolution (moins d'enfants signifie une consommation moindre de certains services publics) mais ce n'est pas là le facteur le plus important, tant s'en faut. La structure des programmes sociaux et l'essor du travail des femmes y contribuent davantage.

4.2 L'IMPACT DU TRAVAIL DES FEMMES

Depuis 1974, la participation des femmes, et particulièrement des mères, à la population active n'a cessé de gagner en importance. Les hommes et les femmes de 25-54 ans connaissaient respectivement des taux de participation de 95,4 et 49 %, en 1974. Quinze ans plus tard, ces taux s'élevaient à 93,8 et 74,5 % ¹¹. À fécondité constante, une plus grande participation des mères signifie une contribution fiscale nette supplémentaire de la part des parents.

Depuis 1974, l'indice synthétique de fécondité a peu évolué au Canada, par opposition au nombre moyen d'enfants dans les familles. L'impact fiscal de la participation accrue des mères au marché du travail se ramène donc au supplément d'impôts payé par un couple dont les deux membres travaillent relativement à ce qui serait payé par le couple si seulement l'un des deux est présent sur le marché de l'emploi. Une évaluation en profondeur de cette question dépasse évidemment le cadre de ce rapport, mais un exemple significatif peut être cité.

Il faut comparer deux familles semblables. Soit deux couples ayant deux enfants dont l'un est d'âge pré-scolaire, et les deux maris ont un salaire de 25 000 dollars. L'épouse dans le couple A occupe un emploi au salaire modeste de 15 000 dollars, tandis que l'épouse dans le couple B reste à la maison. Il s'agit là de situations relativement typiques. Comment se comparent leurs contributions fiscales ?

On attribuera à l'épouse A la déduction maximale pour les frais de garde du plus jeune enfant, soit 4 000 dollars. Tout bien considéré, et prenant 1990 comme référence, le couple A paiera près de 2 800 dollars de plus en impôts sur le revenu que le couple B. Il faut ajouter à cela les taxes sur la consommation. Le revenu disponible de l'épouse A atteint environ 9 000 dollars. Mille dollars de taxes diverses semble une estimation prudente. Le couple A contribuera donc au trésor public 3 800 dollars de plus que le couple B, pour une même consommation de services publics. Lorsque

l'enfant plus jeune ira à l'école, l'écart fiscal s'accroîtra encore de 1 400 dollars.

Plus les salaires de l'époux et de l'épouse sont élevés, plus l'écart fiscal le sera. Et même au salaire minimum (pour l'épouse), il y aura écart fiscal. Notons ici que l'impôt sur le revenu, qui demeure le prélèvement le plus progressif, occupe au fil des ans une place de plus en plus importante dans l'assiette fiscale globale. Dans ces conditions, il est ironique, pour dire le moins, que certains commentateurs considèrent que le fisc pénalise les mères au foyer. Celles-ci bénéficient, tout comme les ménages sans enfant, de la participation accrue des mères à la population active, qui leur permet d'avoir des services publics à moindre coût. En d'autres mots, les mères qui travaillent à l'extérieur du foyer contribuent à défrayer une partie des coûts des services publics consommés par les familles où l'un des deux parents est absent du marché du travail.

On pourrait parier que si les données disponibles nous permettaient au tableau 3 de ce texte de distinguer, au sein de la catégorie «familles avec enfants», celles qui comptent un seul actif et les autres, celles-ci rejoindraient les rangs des contributeurs nets. Elles seraient des artisans de la redistribution plutôt que des bénéficiaires.

CONCLUSION

Nous n'avons évidemment pas répondu, dans ce bref rapport, à toutes les interrogations proposées. Nous avons voulu suggérer des pistes, qu'il conviendrait d'approfondir. Si l'État-providence est en crise, ce n'est pas à cause des familles ayant des enfants, c'est *malgré* elles. Prises globalement les familles ayant deux actifs ou plus sont des soutiens de l'État-providence, dont l'effort redistibutif concerne de plus en plus les personnes seules et/ou les personnes âgées.

Nous n'avons pu explorer l'approche longitudinale de la redistribution. Mais il demeure troublant d'entendre régulièrement des commentateurs proposer, comme solution à la crise de l'État-providence, le désengagement partiel de

l'État à l'égard des familles en modifiant les barèmes des allocations familiales et les déductions pour frais de garde. En réalité, le problème n'est pas du côté de l'investissement social, il est plutôt du côté de la consommation sociale, source de l'endettement public croissant.

L'intérêt collectif et l'éthique devraient à tout le moins nous inciter à mettre fin à un très curieux paradoxe : l'essor du travail féminin enrichit tout le monde, mais la collectivité s'estime incapable de dégager les ressources nécessaires pour que les mères actives (et/ou les pères) puissent mieux harmoniser leur double activité ! Il est grandement temps de remodeler l'État-providence sur des bases plus solides.

NOTES

- Ministère des Finances du Canada, *Quarterly Economic Review*, décembre 1990, p. 50.
- 2 Hassouna Moussa, The Case Against Day-Care, and most Other Subsidies, *Policy Options*, juin 1991, p. 9.
- 3 Statistique Canada, catalogue 13-561, *Incidence de la répartition des avantages découlant des services de santé et d'éducation*, Canada 1974, Ottawa, juin 1977, p. 21.
- W. Irwin Gillespie, *The Redistribution of Income in Canada*, Ottawa, Gage Publishing company, 1980.
- Georges Mathews, Le vieillissement démographique et son impact sur la situation des personnes âgées et les services qui leur sont offerts, Conseil québécois de la recherche sociale, 1988, p. 37 à 39.
- Statistique Canada, catalogue 13-210, Revenu après impôt, répartition selon la taille du revenu au Canada 1974, Ottawa, tévrier 1977.
- 7 Ces données proviennent de Statistique Canada, catalogue 13-561, op. cit. et du ministère des Finances du Canada, Quartely Economic Review, Annual Reference Tables, juin 1991.
- 8 Statistique Canada, catalogue 13-210, Revenu après impôt, répartition selon la taille du revenu au Canada 1989, Ottawa, mars 1991.
- 9 Ministère des Finances du Québec, Budget 1991-1992, Québec, 2e trimestre 1991.
- 10 Voir Georges Mathews, op. cit.
- 11 Ministère des Finances du Canada, op. cit, p. 51.



DRAFT PAPER

HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY AND FAMILY WORK PATTERNS IN CAPE BRETON

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Household Economy and Family Work Patterns in Cape Breton

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Abstract:

I begin with an introduction to the research project which informs this contribution to the Demographic Review Secretariat's Family Research Programme. The purpose of the analysis of family economy and work presented here is threefold. First, I propose a framework for analysis of the social, cultural, and political economy dynamics of changing family relations in Canada. Household and family relations are differentiated. This is done through reference to the Cape Breton research project described here. Second, I argue that gender, culture, class, and region are critical factors in the shaping of household economy and the gender division of labour in family life and the organization of workplace relations. Finally, by way of illustration, I sketch out my arguments with some examples of livelihood practices in industrial Cape Breton.

Here, my main point is that gendered household economy and work patterns are embedded in a social and cultural framework which has been forged through historical processes in a local political economy defined by economic decline and economic insecurity. Given the uncertainties of employment in working class households in the region, household economic strategies exhibit various forms of self reliance but families have come to depend upon transfer payments as one reliable source of cash income. Therefore, I suggest, current social policy arrangements for transfer payments have contributed to the delicate balancing of extended household work patterns combined with unreliable wage labour inputs and the protracted domestic labour of women. It is women's work which is critical to this cultural and class context where the mobilization of household and family resources is 'managed' by women as they work constantly at "stretching the dollar to make ends meet" in this culture of "making do". In this setting, the Family Research Programme's model of the family tied to the application of resources is most applicable. I conclude by suggesting that household and family work patterns in Cape Breton should be supported by future social policy initiatives; Cape Bretoners should be allowed to choose where to live and work and should not be compelled into out-migration with its contingent risk of low wage, unskilled jobs, and associated patterns of poverty and the social isolation poverty encourages. Gender differences and inegalities are masked by familial ideologies and should also be addressed.

Introduction:

This discussion is based upon research in a community in industrial Cape Breton 1987 which was completed as part of the requirements for my doctoral degree in anthropology from the University of Toronto (Barber 1990). The research was ethnographic in nature, involving a nine month period of community residency during which time anthropological methods of participant observation guided the collection of various kinds of data. In-depth semi-structured interviews of between two to three hours were completed with one adult from a selected sample of forty households. In the main, the sample was drawn from households which had at least one person employed in the local fish processing sector, either on a part-time or full-time base. Many of these households also had ties with the mining industry, either in present or previous generations. Along with the coal mining industry and service sector employment, the fish processing sector was a major form of employment in the community. Other interviews were also conducted with community and industry officials.

One aspect of this research explored the relationship between political economy and developments in local culture on the one hand, and the linkages between processes of household economy and the organization of the labour process in the local fish processing industry on the other. To reflect the gender composition of employment in the local fish processing sector, the interviewees were one-third male and two-thirds female. The households represented different family structures, and families at different stages of the family's life cycle. Interview topics targeted household economic strategies, including patterns of wage work, the links between households and local labour markets, contributions to the resources of the household from non-monetary sources, the sexual division of domestic labour, and the life and work histories of adult members of the household and their close kin.

The participant-observation component of the research permitted many additional features of community life and labour markets to be studied. The research formal also allowed information acquired through interviews to be tested. This component of the study proved particularly useful in presenting further information about gendered aspects of family and community life and in generating new questions throughout the residency period. Sustained contact with a core group of informants and members of their extended families allowed for a deeper, more substantial, and more broadly based form of data collection, as well as providing a framework to guide the analysis of interview data.

For the purposes of the initial study, the informant's household, rather than the family unit, was selected as the unit of analysis through which to approach the primary theme of the study; livelihood and work processes in an historically defined regional context characterized by long-term de-industrialization. The main thrust of this research was to assess the relationship between historical processes of political economy and community-based forms of commitment to local culture, identity, and way of life. The most salient features of local political economy in the industrial area of Cape Breton are well known; a relatively early phase of corporate capitalism in the steel and coal industry, followed by long term decline in these industries (see Frank 1976, 1980). Periods of intense labour conflicts have marked the region's labour history (Frank 1979; MacGillivray 1973, 1974; MacKay 1983).

The local fishery has been less well documented (see Barrett and Apostle 1987). In several communities in industrial Cape Breton there is a long standing local fishery characterized by an in-inshore, mid-shore harvesting sector, and a range of capital forms in the processing sector, sometimes characterized by size and sometimes by the scale and form of the capital involved (Barrett and Apostle 1987). In 1987, the harvesting or processing sector in the community studied included smaller scale petty-production involving family-based capital, although the winds of change were soon to sweep through the processing sector in this area.

The town contained four processing plants, employing anywhere from a few full time workers supplemented by several more seasonal workers (between 6 and 10) through to a plant running two shifts employing up to 300 workers on a good day in the peak season. By the end of 1987 there were signs that larger-scale corporate capital, relying on more capital intensive and technologically complex forms of production would soon be active in the processing sector in this part of Cape Breton. In 1987, the town's largest plant initiated its own restructuring process which included significant reductions in the plant's seasonal labour force (down to approximately 200 from 300 employees), a process which met with considerable resistance from the plant's labour force. In the longer term the plant's management was projecting an increase in full time employment for employees remaining in the re-organized plant. Subsequently a further serious and widespread crisis has placed pressure upon all sectors of the fishery causing protraction of the seasonal agenda, even in larger corporate plants where production had previously been less vulnerable to cylic downturns in the production schedule.

Aside from the sudden flaring up of worker militancy, the paternalistic organization of production and the level of capitalization of the local fishery was much like the fishery in many smaller, more rural coastal communities in Nova Scotia. The industrialization of the Cape Breton male labour force, therefore, provided an interesting point of comparison in terms of the impact of community concerns about work and the

politics of the workplace upon the fishery, a smaller, less industrialized, yet enduring feature of the local economy.

To extrapolate from political economy and the structural conditions within which people live their lives and exercise forms of "agency", key questions guiding the research included such matters as; why do people remain loyal to community, kin, and place when the economic prospects for the community remain uncertain? How do people "get by" in this climate of uncertainty? And, what role do historical processes play in livelihood strategies and related expressions of identity and commitment to place, which is what I mean here by local culture? Finally, how do these issues and experiences affect women and men in terms of class, household, family, and community dynamics? For theoretical and empirical reasons, the most significant historical processes were associated with local labour history, most notably the coal industry, and more recently, various phases of regional development policy which have provided the backdrop for local perceptions about the community's economic future. In the doctoral thesis, I examined household and workplace gender divisions of labour, and how community and class-based culture and gender ideologies are produced and reproduced in family life and workplace politics. For the purposes of this report, only the most relevant aspects of the relationships between family life and workplace politics will be touched upon (see Barber 1990; 1992 for a more detailed discussion).

• In conclusion, theoretical models from the anthropology of development, used here to define the research project and process, hold that livelihood practices both produce and are reproduced through family and community relations. In this perspective the form and context of family life in a given place at a given point in time is situated within, although not determined by, the broader structural framework of political and economic conditions. Organization and experiential aspects of family life are thus, in part, tied to the factors associated with making a living, or livelihood practices, and the cultural meanings stemming from these activities.

More concretely, what this suggests in terms of understanding the changing role of the family in Canadian Society it that the processes of family life and the adaptations made by families to the economic conditions with which they must contend, are linked to various themes in local culture. Again, in my view key themes stem from livelihood, how people make their living, and how they project the security or insecurity of livelihood in the future. These views form part of local cultural understandings and will affect expectations of family life and well being.

Culture is used here in a materialist sense to refer to locally developed commitments, social practices, and identities, which are produced and reproduced through livelihood activities and the lived daily experiences associated with class relationships (for example, Smith 1989). In this way the concept of culture I am using follows in the tradition of British historians influenced by E.P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, and I have in mind here something which we might term working class culture (see Foley 1990; also Sider 1986).

Gender ideologies comprise a key element of the organization of livelihood practices and projections for the future. Men's and women's work in the domestic arena of family life and in the wage labour force are circumscribed by gender ideologies and systemic patterns of gender inequality which can take a particular form in a local niche of political-economy and culture. Therefore, it is critical to understanding patterns of change and, perhaps resistance to change, that we analyze both gender relations in labour markets and the impact of gendered labour markets on the organization of family life in Canadian society. For all too long family dynamics were treated in isolation from the dynamics of wage work and political and economic processes.

My research into gender and family dynamics in Cape Breton indicates that Cape Bretoners live in a variety of different family structures reflecting the same types of demographic features which characterize families in Canada today (see Eichler 1988). However, in industrial Cape Breton, people's views about families and the gender division of labour, their familial ideologies and their gender ideologies, have not been significantly altered. In Cape Breton, people remain committed to ideals of family and local community as contexts which provide social and economic support in times of need or hardship. Moreover, because of gender ideologies prescribing a clear-cut division of labour it is often the work of women, more so than men, which is applied to maintaining the social networks of kin and community so critical in providing access to necessary resources. It is also women who contribute the additional labour required to extend the limited cash resources of working class households.

Gender in Household and Family Relations:

The decision to focus the research upon households rather than families was based upon theoretical and empirical studies in anthropology, history, and sociology which suggest that co-residence and relations of kinship do not necessarily co-incide. Co-residence need not imply family relationships and family relationships need not imply co-residence. For example, Yanagisako, critiques the tendencies of researchers in anthropology and history to focus upon issues of household and family classification,

typology, and structural comparisons when, in her view, families and also households "... are as much about production, exchange, power, inequality, and status." (1979:199). Such an approach is useful in focusing our attention upon the economic and social dimensions of family life. This model also encourages us to assess the relationship between family dynamics and the broader environment of political economy. How are families and households organized in terms of work activities and what kinds of power relations follow on from the division of labour?

Some feminist critiques exposed forms of subtle biological reductionism in the literature on family-based forms of production (see Young et al 1981; Harris 1981; 1982; Harris and Young 1981). Ethnographers such as Whitehead (1981) and Sharma (1986) characterized this failure to deconstruct household and family relations as the "black box problem". The metaphor of the "black box" is used to communicate an image of a space which remains both unknown and unexamined. MacKintosh (1988) demonstrated that the organization of domestic relations and work processes should be examined with regards to inequalities between members of a household and/or family, for example on the basis of gender or age. A range of authors have also discussed this issue from the point of view of patriarchal aspects of the sex-gender system (see reviews by Fox 1988; and Eichler 1985).

In the Canadian literature, numerous studies emerged focusing upon the organization of domestic labour (Fox 1980; Luxton 1980), the gendered nature of waged work (Connelly 1978; Armstrong and Armstrong 1984) and the intersections between wage work and domestic labour (Armstrong and Armstrong 1983, 1985, 1990; MacDonald and Connelly 1989). Most recently, interdisciplinary and comparative studies of work patterns and household labour situate the Canadian context within the international framework of global processes of political economy and economic restructuring (Cohen 1987; Jenson, Hagen and Reddy 1988; Morris 1985, 1990; Pahl 1984, 1988).

By way of summary of the range of interests expressed in contemporary research on household and political economy, I quote here from Lydia Morris's recent comparative study. She poses the following framework for her comparison. Reviewing research from the post-war period in the United Kingdom and America, Morris's study explores:

... the organization of the household and its internal dynamics, viewed in the context of the social and economic environment in which it is located. Its purpose is to ask how changes in the market for labour interact with the way in which men and women organize their domestic lives and structure their relationships. How do household members use their time and labour to secure the means of survival? What different sources of income combine in the household economy? How do individual and collective interests interact? What implications do different combinations of income source have for men's and women's respective roles and domestic relationships? How far do established patterns of gender identity and their supporting ideologies constrain the organization of domestic life? In what ways and through what mechanisms is the household-labour market link established, maintained or transformed? (1990:1)

As I hope will become clear from this encapsulation of my own Cape Breton case study, similar concerns guided my much more modest doctoral research, albeit that my project was formulated at an earlier stage in the debates in the household literature and was constrained also by all the usual limitations of the doctoral production process.¹

Morris's comparison confirms that class and locality are critical factors in the organization of household resources. Furthermore, her findings are in accord with the Cape Breton data. Her conclusion states:

Briefly put, the evidence for both Britain and America indicates an absence of any significant change in established gender roles. Women do not, in significant numbers, take over from their unemployed husbands to become sole earners; unemployed men do not assume the housewife role; and married women's employment does not prompt a significant rise in domestic involvement on the part of husbands. (1990:189)

Particularly pertinent is Morris's conclusion that gender ideologies are generally resistant to change, even in the face of disruptions to the gendered pattern of livelihood associated with male redundancy in traditional industrial sectors such as steel and coal. Morris's comparative data concerning the gender division of labour in terms of non-wage work performed on behalf of other members of the household, reveal that an appropriate question to ask is not so much are men increasing their contributions to domestic labour? Rather, her discussion suggests, the issue is one of women's labour being reduced through the commoditization of some facets of domestic labour. That is where and when women's wages permit, usually when women work in professional occupations, they are likely to purchase childcare and housekeeping services.

The situation in Cape Breton reflected rather more the opposite of commoditization of household goods and services. Women's household labour and their management of household resources involved extensive commitments of time and labour which was less likely to be connected to the market for household goods and services and more likely to represent fluctuating levels of consumption; decommoditization rather than the opposite processes found in British and US 'middle-class' households (see Mingione (1983, 1985) for further clarification of this phenomena in working class household economy).

Moreover, the households in the Cape Breton study were extremely cautious about debt; few were carrying any debt and most shied away from using credit cards. Only two households had made recent major purchases with credit cards; the purchase of household appliances through a Sears account which was planned on the basis of the wife's seasonal income from the processing plant. Instead most women made use of layaway schemes in local stores or they made major purchases with extra non-wage cash payments to the household such as family allowance cheques, or the child tax credit. For the majority of households, there were not two reliable wage incomes, neither were there any significant savings being accumulated by individual family members. Most cash arriving in the household was spent on groceries, rent, utilities, clothing, and things required by children. In several households there were disagreements about the costs of entertainment, particularly cash for men to spend on beer at the weekends. I was told by the women that they resented this expense but they tolerated the beer budget as long as cash was coming into the household. The women themselves desired more cash to spend on clothes and personal items but their purchases would depend upon their fluctuating weekly pay cheques. I was told, "the basics come first, then the children".

Regarding the gender division of labour in industrial Cape Breton and Wales were Morris undertook her own research (see Morris 1985), here are similarities in the changing dynamics of political economy and local labour markets. Again, in both contexts we can observe new pressures being placed on gendered patterns of work and class-based gender dynamics in the face of the erosion of traditional male blue collar employment. However, in keeping with the general pattern, in Cape Breton and in Wales, there is little change in the domestic work patterns and in the ideologies which support these. Working class gender ideologies which hold that the male is the head of household, the breadwinner, and domestic labour is primarily a female responsibility continue to be resilient in the face of high rates of male unemployment and female employment. For example:

In the particular case of male unemployment there is little evidence of any renegotiation of gender roles in either the US or the UK, but rather both countries show a male defensiveness against any challenge to their

traditional gender identity. This reaction is not confined to the men alone, however, and whilst there is some sign of flexibility regarding participation in domestic tasks, the woman's conventional load remains largely intact. One effect of the woman's traditional role is that she carries the main burden of budgeting, which often involves struggling not only to meet the collective needs of the household but also to control her husband's personal spending requirements.(pp190-1)

One Canadian study of gender consciousness amongst Hamilton steelworkers and their families presents evidence to support this conclusion, although the Hamilton study does suggest some more complex dimensions of gender ideology are forthcoming from the employment of women in the steelplant (Livingstone and Luxton 1989). The Cape Breton data revealed little evidence of changing expectations of the gender division of labour and a great deal of evidence for resistance to change; both men and women see domestic labour as primarily women's work. And while women view their wage labour as critical for the economic resources of the household budget, men and women still see a man's main contribution to the household work load to lie in the breadwinner role. While economics are a general concern, male job loss is also a real threat to identity from the man's perspective. From a wife's point of view, this issue is more one of the loss of cash income and it raises new dimensions of women's work in "putting bread on the table".

Moreover, the necessity of "making ends meet" and "getting by" through skilful manipulation of the available material and social resources so dominates women's orientation to family life and to waged work that what are in effect discussions of their economic strategies, comprise the major foci of daily life. Discussions about what items are on sale in local grocery stores, how much money they can set aside for gifts for family members or workmates, how to get hold of some new curtains in exchange for some left-over household paint supplies, who knows someone who needs a boarder for the spare room, are there any cheap supplies of coal? Such planning and questions were central in daily conversations with one's kin, neighbours, and co-workers. Given the prominent role of these themes in daily life and the intense sociability which accompanied the constant efforts to locate necessary goods and services outside of the cash economy, I characterized the local culture as "the culture of making do". This feature of local culture, highlights the role of women's contributions to household economy and to the maintenance of close-knit ties based upon kinship and community. My research also pointed to the linkages between the formal economy and so-called informal economic activities as outlined in the next section.

In my project, therefore, targeting household dynamics as the link between political economy and labour markets on the one hand, and workplace and domestic relations on the other proved worthwhile. Gender and family ideologies which are part and parcel of the lived experience of family and gender are consistently found in all arenas of daily life. For example, ideologies of family commitments and gender, which I observed in family and household contexts, were also bound up in the organization of workplace relations and class politics. This finding confirmed the significance of feminist arguments about the need to address production and social reproduction in a coherent, continuous, and consistent framework where differences of class, gender, 'race', and locality are assessed. Put differently, the meanings attached to gender and family relations permeate all aspects of daily life and can be observed in class and communitybased cultural processes. Women workers do not stop thinking about their domestic responsibilities and their obligations to kin when they don their plant uniform, or participate in union meetings. Indeed, because of how these relationships are constructed in Cape Breton, plant workers are quite likely to bring family concerns to union meetings.

To summarize, a production, or resource-focused model of the household was applied in this project which enabled an assessment of cultural themes linked to gender and class politics. In designing the research process, the issue of the family component of household composition was treated as a question for empirical study. Accordingly, plant workers were approached in their household context with questions about household composition, who lived with whom, and where their various kin lived and work. Also, what kinds of relationships were maintained with their kin (relatives through ties of blood and marriage), neighbours, co-workers, and friends, a series of overlapping involvements in some cases.

Households, Work and Livelihood: The Cultural Reproduction of "Making Do:"

Livelihood is never just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting money, and preparing food to put on the table or exchange in the market place. It is equally a matter of the ownership and circulation of information, the management of relationships, the affirmation of personal significance and group identity, and the interrelation of each of those tasks to the other. All these productive tasks together constitute the work of livelihood. A similarly expanded concept of work is implicit in studies of unenumerated economic organization or the informal sector. (Wallman 1984:22)

Wallman's characterization of livelihood provides a very appropriate point of entry to the key theme of household and family dynamics in industrial Cape Breton. As has been noted above, the routines of daily life allow people ample scope to apply themselves to the work of livelihood as they maintain networks of kinship and friendship for social and economic purposes. Some examples are:

i) The Benefit Dance and Life Cycle Celebrations:

Benefits serve the dual purpose of socializing and fund-raising. An individual or a family with a legitimate requirement for extra cash could host a dance in a neighbourhood hall, raising money through a door fee, the sale of refreshments, and perhaps donations people would provide for the night's entertainment. One benefit I heard about involved a single mother who required additional cash for the trip to Halifax for specialised medical services for her child. In another case, there were plans to hold a benefit to assist a couple who's teenage son died in a tragic accident. The people attending benefits would often know the host/ess of the benefit but the raising of funds in this manner was not linked to individual contributions. There appeared to be no social stigma attached to the staging of a benefit. Indeed people were sympathetic to economic hardship, expecting that if they should require community support, then it would be forthcoming for them also.

Similarly, occasions such as weddings, anniversaries, births, children's educational progress, were all opportunities for family, friends, and co-workers to contribute gifts and cash to the persons being honoured. The exchanges were quite modest in the case of co-workers, but some presents to and from kin were quite generous involving considerable planning and saving on the part of the donor. In the case of engagement, bridal, and

baby showers, co-workers might invite each other to the shower they were arranging for a friend, even if the friend was not known to the co-workers. In such cases, it was appropriate to provide an excuse along with a card plus a small cash contribution. Often the gift exchanges would take place in the context of a social gathering or a party which would again require considerable planning and a round of further donations of food and supplies. Such occasion involved people in an extensive series of reciprocal obligations which allowed for the redistribution of resources and the cementing of social ties, both of which facilitated access to further resources in the short and longer term for all the participants.

ii) Household Occupancy:

Housing is a major resource in the economic strategies of Cape Breton families. During 1987, people moved between households giving and receiving aid in response to changes in their own or other's circumstances. Few households in the study remained stable throughout the research period. Residence patterns also emphasised the protracted dependency of children upon their parents for shelter as well as other kinds of resources. Requests to return to a parental home could arise from adult children in their middle years. Other kin also participated in shared residence arrangements. The rule of thumb in such arrangements appeared to be that people contributed what they could afford to the budget of the household where they resided. The transactions were couched in terms of "helping out" those who become tenants rather than providing economic benefit from the extra cash income for the owners of the house. "Taking care of one's own" was a key element in local culture. Clearly, there may well be some mutual benefits accorded by helping kin solve their accommodation problems.

Examples included:

- a woman, separating from her common-law partner, collected up her two children and moved in with her widowed mother. The grandmother then provided childcare to the youngest of the two children while the mother worked and the elder child was at school. Another female relative, a niece, also received childcare from the older woman. Modest amounts of cash were exchanged for childcare services and there were contributions to the household budget on a "pay what you can afford basis".
- a single parent with a toddler moved out of her parent's house and in with her aunt and her aunt's husband. The two women worked together and while the aunt had no children of her own she was prepared to provide some childcare assistance to her niece when time permitted. These arrangements were described to me as "helping each other out".

- a newly married couple took up residence in the basement of the groom's parent's house. The groom's two elder brothers had also started their married life in this accommodation. All parties view this arrangement as temporary but all appreciated that economic conditions might protract the arrangements for far longer than the initially projected "couple of years". The arrangement was explicitly stated to be a means to provide the young couple with an opportunity to save money for a "good start" to married life.
- one couple in their mid-forties lived in a very complex family nexus. The wife's father lived with them along with one male boarder, one teenaged daughter still in school, one out-of-work son in his twenties who had just returned home after failing to find work in Halifax which would pay sufficiently well to allow him to meet his expenses and save money. The parents were predicting that a second son who had just moved to Halifax with his "girl friend" would also be forced to return home because of his meagre earnings. Upon their return, the young couple might live with them also.
- an adult daughter lived with and supported her aged parents.
- an employed man and his wife and their 3 young children moved out of their apartment and in with the husband's parents. This couple planned to purchase a house rather than seek alternative rental accommodation.
- a retired man and his wife were "raising" a teenaged grand daughter without receiving any financial support from the girl's family or the "authorities".

iii) Informal Economy:

The concept of the informal sector has recently been critiqued for positing a realm of unrenumerated economic activities separate from the market place where officially recorded and regulated formal sector production and exchange take place (see Redclift and Mingione 1985, especially Redclift). Clearly, as Pahl (1984, 1985) argues, there are direct linkages between all forms of work, inside and outside the official market place. It is for this reason that Pahl suggests the concept of household work strategies, rather than the informal sector, is perhaps the most appropriate analytic unit (see also Warde et al. 1989). Similarly, feminist scholars, at pains to identify the

extensive forms of work that women contribute to their households and broader political and economic processes, have noted the inherent dualism which follows on from treating formal and informal sectors as discrete entities (Ward 1990). I use the concept of informal sector work here in a provisional way and I emphasise how formal and informal practices can coincide, intersect, and overlap.

Processes of informal economy in industrial Cape Breton can best be described as two-tiered. For working-class people, informal exchanges often took place without cash payments or with modest payments which allowed the service provider to be a service receiver (for example, in the case of women paying each other for hairdressing services). Middle class people, on the other hand, could purchase the services of skilled tradespeople who operated in the informal sector, sometimes in combination with their formal sector employment (see Spencer 1988). The lesser cost of having work done through informal arrangements suited the buyer and the tradespeople benefited from lower overheads and non-payment of taxes, unemployment insurance benefits and so on. Alternatively, informal sector work did not entitle workers to any state regulated benefits such as unemployment, pensions, worker's compensation, and other health and safety monitoring. Nonetheless, local experts (including Spencer 1988) claimed that the skilled trades informal sector was substantial in size, a form of shadow economy which some workers stuck to by choice because it offered greater economic security than their formal sector commitments. In other words, despite the lack of regulation and benefits, the shadow informal sector in Cape Breton appeared to be in competition with formal sector goods and services. This would be in accord with conventions of local culture that I observed, a reliance on kinship and neighbourhood networks and, in terms of job searches, upon patronage networks of kin and community. Such networks have historical resonance and are deeply rooted; they allow pragmatic approaches to economic and social needs when the market and cash nexus are less predictable.

iv) Class and Gender Patterns:

Most the households in my sample were working class. In this class context, when the skills of one's kin, co-workers, and neighbours were appropriate for the job, it was customary to request aid without a direct cash payment taking place. For example, in one neighbourhood, a man who had a reputation for being "good with his hands" was called upon by his neighbours to do small plumbing and carpentry repairs. In return, he would be given some money for gas for his truck and sometimes some baked goods. Men tended to help one another out trading skills for household repairs, but it was the realm of car repairs that seemed to claim most of their attention. Knowledge about car repairs and working on cars was a great source of male pride and I encountered several families with older model cars containing rebuilt engines. Through trading knowledge

and skills, the expenses associated with owning and operating cars were minimized. Again, working together on their cars also served to maintain male networks, as well as to produce and reproduce the cultural context of masculinity. Historically, coal mining has provided the basis for a strong masculine identity and pride associated with the dirty, difficult, dangerous labour process of the mines. This history may well have shaped the cultural framework shaping the current resistance by men and women to men's domestic labour contributions (see also Yarrow 1991).

Women's activities are much more continuous with their everyday domestic labour and called for a more diverse range of skills; as noted earlier women's work is critical to livelihood practices and "stretching the dollar to make ends meet". In addition to the domestic work women perform on behalf of their households, women's skills are also applied to informal sector activities such as home decorating, sewing, cooking and catering, child care, hairdressing, and major annual house cleaning projects. Indeed, all of these activities are so well integrated into everyday domestic routines that few women are forthcoming about the range of work activities they perform on behalf of others and about the benefits they contribute to the resources of their households from so applying their skills. Activities such as making new curtains and interior house painting were most likely to involve straight exchanges of labour, for example between mothers and daughters, or between sisters. Catering, on the other hand, is more likely to draw in labour resources from a wider pool of contributors. Women's catering skills are a source of identity and pride for individual women and a particularly capable cook can earn a modest cash return for catering larger gatherings upon request. More often than not, however, women's contributions of prepared food were made on the basis of reciprocal understandings of giving and receiving in your time of need.

Conclusions:

From the point of view of social policy frameworks, families rather than households are more likely to be the target of various policy assessments and interventions. As has been demonstrated here, these two analytic units do not always neatly coincide. As we have seen, one important dimension of household economy in industrial Cape Breton involves the mobilization of kinship relations for the purposes of gaining access to a wider variety of goods and services than would otherwise be attainable through the independent resources of individuals, families, and households.

In the development of social policy, official statistical measurements of household and family resources restricted to the formal economy will necessarily present a very limited picture of the economic needs and capabilities of families and households in

Cape Breton. It is important that policy makers appreciate that gendered, culturally confirmed processes of household economy are responses to the historically persistent economic insecurities which most families have struggled with for generations. Unemployment was officially measured around 25% in 1987; unofficially the rate was much higher. Wages from the sporadic, short-term, and seasonal employment received by households in the study were one component in a complex pattern of livelihood where transfer payments and informal economic practices are also critical external supplements to wage work. These strategies represent a finely balanced economic and social accommodation (and at times resistance) to the vagaries of political economy and they are so widespread that they have become cornerstones in local culture, defined here in a materialist sense.

Social policy frameworks would do well to acknowledge and support such complex livelihood processes. This currently happens to a certain extent through the provision of unemployment insurance and other forms of transfer payments; important sources of cash in a cash-poor set of livelihood practices. Again, Cape Bretoners regard these payments as earnings rather than special benefits stemming from the largesse of the state. Thus they are able to receive these payments and maintain a much valued sense of independence and personal dignity. On the other hand, social service benefits are associated with a loss of personal dignity. Therefore, any further erosion or withdrawal of the resources provided through transfer payments is likely to be disruptive to this creative adaptation in livelihood practices. The balance in current practices allows families to sustain themselves through family and community networks at less cost to the state than would be entailed if these practices were undermined, for example through cut-backs in transfer payments or further decline in the local economy compelling out-migration.

Historically, kinship networks have been extended to cover the needs of Cape Bretoners migrating out of the area in search of work (see de Roche 1985; de Roche and de Roche 1987). Economic conditions have now altered to the point where the erosion of unskilled labour markets combined with a decline in manufacturing jobs, plus the higher costs of living in external urban centres, make the benefits of migration more tenuous than ever. In the 1990s, Cape Bretoners may well be better off remaining in Cape Breton, despite the poor economic prospects of the region. Even in 1987, many families recognised that out-migration was becoming a less viable alternative for their children and relatives, particularly for male blue collar jobs.

Women's jobs, typically pay lower wage rates, thus out-migration for women is seldom an alternative which can benefit the family. Some young women do go to Halifax for periods of time, later returning home, perhaps after being laid off. In such

cases, U.I. benefits might supplement household cash resources. Many of adults interviewed spoke of their experiences, or those of their kin, with earlier periods of outmigration, and most knew someone who had successfully up-graded their skills to obtain secure, better paid employment in Cape Breton, Halifax, or Ontario. For many, however, Cape Breton was their preferred home community and they spoke with bitterness about economic and political forces which had forced them or their kin to migrate. Many identified relatives who were temporarily out of province but were eager for the opportunity to "return home". From my understanding of the patterns of household economy and how these are meshed into the broader political and economic frameworks at the regional, national, and international levels, I suggest that outmigration is no longer viable long term solution from the point of view of Cape Bretoners. Out-migration does not resolve the economic precariousness that most working class Cape Bretoners have experienced as part of their community's way of life.

In concluding, my research suggests that the concept of family in working class culture in industrial Cape Breton extends beyond residential units into the active kinship networks found in the close-knit communities of the region. This set of family practices fits well with the model of family viewed from the perspective of families as providing members with access to needed resources; particularly when power relations and questions of access to the family resources are incorporated into the model. In Cape Breton families continue both socially and economically, to be a vital and central component in local working class culture. Social policy planning would do well to protect rather than to undermine the capabilities of families to maintain these household and family social practices in the future.

Future policies must also be sensitive to the distinctive and different contributions of women and men to family livelihood practices. Women's economic roles are far greater than their wage labour participation indicates. As was seen from the examples of household occupancy, children have a protracted periods of dependency upon their parents, sometimes well into their adult years. The example of grandparents taking on the role of raising grandchildren is a case in point. Because of the gender division of labour, women contribute additional labour to this second stage of child rearing, one example among many economically significant goods and services provided by women to different family members through the stages of their life cycle.

In closing, this case study of household economy in Cape Breton has emphasized how features of family life such as the flexibility of household structure, reliance upon a multiplicity of sources of income, a broad range of informal economic practices, often geared towards kin, neighbours, and co-workers, combined with conservative attitudes towards spending and saving and consumer culture, produces a distinctive set of cultural

practices which are produced and socially reproduced through the social practices of household economy. One result of longer term economic insecurity has been the development of close-knit communities, and delicately balanced economic and social inter-dependencies. It is ironic that regional development strategies, first oriented to large scale capital projects and now smaller scale local business start-ups, are met with deep cynicism on the part of many working class people. Indeed, sceptical of prospects for future economic recovery, many working class Cape Bretoners maintain their commitment to the package of livelihood strategies briefly sketched above. Many parents feel that education is not really the key to future if it means young people will have to leave home to compete in job markets in external centres. Job-retraining is also viewed with suspicion; to what end should people train for jobs that are non-existent? As I was told on many occasions what people want is "real jobs", not seasonal, part-time, nor low wage jobs in economically precarious small businesses. I would also add that Cape Breton needs social policies which support livelihood and family practices that afford men and women dignity and self-respect through allowing forms of self-sufficiency; making do with the resources at ones disposal.

As is the case elsewhere in Canada, women in Cape Breton have urgent need of services for the unique set of problems they experience all too often in the routines of daily life; sexual harassment in the workplace, battering and abuse in their family contexts, and sexual and economic violence in their communities. Familial ideologies in close-knit communities can obscure the forms of violence women are subjected to and must face alone in the absence of support from extra-family community-based services (see Walker 1990). Women also need assistance in improving their employment readiness through employment training, counselling, educational upgrading, and other such programmes which might assist women to compensate for the disadvantages they face in sex-typed labour markets. Without such support services women, even more so than men, will live their lives and raise their children within households and family processes which perpetuate rather than resolve inequalities of gender and class. Within the commitment to family processes and community in Cape Breton communities there are contradictory tensions; the positive aspects involve families collaborating in their livelihood practices. By the same token, class and gender forms of control and inequality can be masked through the familial orientation.

Note:

1. I have in mind here the unique blend of over-ambition and theoretical preparedness which anthropologists must translate in the difficult, pressing daily struggle of data collection and interpersonal involvements which are the hallmark of the ethnographic fieldwork process. I was very fortunate in meeting many generous and knowledgeable women and men who willingly and with patience participated in interviews, provided

hospitality and extended friendship to an outsider who most surely appeared to them socially inept and clumsy in the finely-tuned social nuances of local culture. I remain grateful to all the Cape Bretoners who participated in this research and to anthropologists and sociologists in Toronto and Nova Scotia who contributed advice, ideas, and friendship. In particular I thank Stewart Philpott, Gavin Smith, and members of the feminist caucus at Toronto including Patricia Baker, Belinda Leach, and Winnie Lem, all of whom share my research interests. In Halifax, Richard Apostle, Tania Li, and Victor Thiessen provided welcome support during the tenure of my post-doctoral fellowship at Dalhousie University.

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INEQUALITY BETWEEN GENERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY

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Inequality Between Generations and the Role of the Family

OVERVIEW

Inequality between the different generations of a given society is determined by the number of people in each generation and the aggregate resources allocated to each generation. Of these aggregate resources of each generation, part may be received as private returns for their supply of productive labour or capital in product markets and part may be received as non-market transfers from other generations, or transfers which can come either through government or through the family.

The determinants of population growth and generation size are already the subject of a large literature (e.g. Romaniuc, 1989), which this essay does not attempt to replicate. Neither does this essay seek to reproduce the literature on the impacts of cohort size on relative earnings or the viability (or otherwise) of public pensions. This essay basically takes such issues to be given and concentrates instead on the much less often examined issue of the role played by the family in the intergenerational allocation of resources.

The essay begins with a discussion of the role of the family in economic theory, and in particular the inter-generational role of the family. The objective is to demonstrate the importance of the inter-generational allocation of resources within the family for issues as diverse as the socialization and training of labour force, the rate of population growth, the long run rate of capital accumulation and the efficacy of macroeconomic policy. Clearly, the determinants of the inter-generational allocation of resources within the family matter a good deal.

However, an outstanding defect of the economics literature is that although some economists (e.g., Becker, 1981) have been quite happy to project their models of inter-generational behaviour within the family forward by 20 generations (or more), the social institution of the "family" in Canada has undergone dramatic change, within a single generation. Section 3 attempts to trace some of the implications of the much greater heterogeneity of family types in modern society and the greater fluidity of the family unit for the inter-generational allocation of resources. Section 4 identifies three major policy issues -- child care, elder care, and the accumulation of productive capital -- and discusses the twin impacts of changing family structure and demographic unevenness. Unfortunately, despite the importance of the issues raised, this essay can provide few (if any) definitive answers.

THE FAMILY IN ECONOMIC THEORY

In his classic Treatise on the Family Gary Becker argues that "the traditional theory of consumer and household behavior developed by economists ignores cooperation and conflict among members (of households), in essence assuming that each household has only one member." (1981:4) In most branches of economics, the 'household' is still taken as the basic decision-making unit but in labour economics, discussions of the supply of labour have, for some time, considered the implications of family status for individual decision making (Killingsworth, 1983). A variety of models -- based on bargaining between husband and wife, sequential or joint decision making -- have analyzed the interdependence of male and female hours of paid employment, and the importance of the presence of children to labour force participation and hours of labour supply. Furthermore, although analysis of labour supply proceeds within the context of a given family, the literature on "matching" has discussed the "marriage market" and has used similar analytic tools to analyze the choice and retention of jobs, and the choice and retention of spouses (see Mortenson, 1988).

In both cases, however, labour economists are analyzing the behavior of adults -- i.e. the members of a single generation. To the extent that economic theory considers different generations within the family, the younger generation typically appears as the object of the decision making of the older generation. Although a major objective of the work of Gary Becker (and others) is to extend the economic model of individual utility maximizing behavior to encompass intra-family interactions, one must note that the model of altruistic behavior proposed still leaves a beneficent family head, in the final analysis, with the sole authority to allocate family resources.

(Becker's famous "rotten kid theorem" argues that the selfish recipients of altruistic transfers will, despite their selfishness, act so as to maximize family income, because they get a share of it due to the altruism of the family head, and the family head maximizes, given that known response).

In the standard neo-classical theoretical framework, children appear as a specific type of consumer durable, while parents are seen as exercising their exogenously determined preferences over the quality and quantity of their children. The "prices" of child quality and child quantity are determined by the relative costs, in time and in material goods, of child rearing (with publicly financed education offering an important subsidy to child quality). The economic environment may be characterized by uncertainty, and parents may have to anticipate the market luck and endowment luck of their children. However, given specific assumptions about adult preferences and the relative costs of child quality and child quantity, one can derive the implication that parents will substitute child "quality" for child "quantity" as incomes increase -- i.e. birth rates will tend to fall as economic development proceeds.

The idea of intergenerational inequality is thus subsumed, in this literature, into parental purchases of child quality (which imply higher earnings for subsequent generations) and the degree of parental altruism in bequest behavior. Since such parental choices are made within the constraint of the budget available to each family, affluent families can transfer more to their descendants than poor families can, hence the inequality of result of one generation determines the inequality of opportunity available to the next generation. This framework therefore offers a formalization of both intergenerational and intragenerational economic inequality.

However, in addition to depending on specific maintained hypotheses about the relative costs of child quality and child quantity, the predictions of such models depend crucially on presumptions about parental tastes. Since such tastes are not directly observable, parental preferences could equally well "explain" alternative empirical outcomes -- (i.e. if birth rates were rising, one could argue that this is explicable because parents prefer child quantity to child quality.) The major intergenerational implication of the 'new economics of the family' is, therefore, to reinterpret much child-rearing behaviour as parental investment in the human capital of their children, and to emphasize intra-family altruism as its motive.

By contrast, the original "life cycle savings model" of Modigliani (1957) argued that the aggregate capital stock was the result of individuals saving during their working lives in order to consume during their retirement, and the specificity of this model generated a number of refutable empirical predictions. In addition to predicting that average wealth would increase with age, the simple life cycle savings model also implied that plausible savings behaviour by individuals should be able to explain the total capital stock and the aggregate volume of private savings which is observed, and the degree of inequality in the aggregate distribution of wealth which is observed in the economy. As well, the simple life cycle savings model predicts that wealth inequality within age cohorts should be less than wealth inequality within the population as a whole and that most individuals should save during their working lives and dissave during retirement. Since all these predictions fare poorly when confronted with empirical evidence (see Osberg, 1984: pages 194-198) recent discussions of savings behaviour typically

augment the life cycle savings model to include the likelihood of bequests between generations.

In 1981, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981: 782) estimated that, at best, 19% of total U.S. wealth in 1974 could be explained by a simple life cycle savings model, leaving 81% of total U.S. wealth to be explained by intergenerational bequest. Modigliani (1988) defends the life cycle model, arguing that the bequest motive is relatively unimportant for most households. However, since wealth is so unequally distributed, this is entirely consistent with most of the wealth of a nation being passed on, generation to generation, by the top 10% of wealth holders, who hold a majority of marketable wealth.

Wolff has surveyed the literature on the distribution of household wealth and argues that "there is no unique concept or definition of wealth that is satisfactory for all purposes" (1991:94). He distinguishes between "life cycle wealth" in owner occupied housing, consumer durables, household inventories, bank accounts and life insurance and "capital wealth" in investment real estate, trust fund equity, corporate stock, business equity, bonds and securities, and argues that holdings of the former assets can be explained by a life cycle model while the latter "are held almost exclusively by the upper wealth classes and are often transmitted to the succeeding generations." (1991: 97)

Kotlikoff (1988) argues that one should ask "what would be the impact on U.S. wealth of eliminating all intergenerational transfers?" and answers that "totally eliminating intergenerational transfers would, in partial equilibrium, reduce U.S. wealth by at least 50%" (1988: 47). Kessler and Masson (1989) attempt to assess the importance of the differing conceptual assumptions underlying the controversy over the importance of bequests and

conclude "it is hard to reject Kotlikoff's view that bequests play a sizable role in saving, even if one believes that in the end bequests are not the predominant factor in accumulation." (1989: 151). Moreover, using a simulation model based on Canadian data, Davies (1980) concluded that inheritance played a dominant role in determining the inequality of wealth.

However, one also needs to distinguish between the wealth accumulation of individual families and the accumulation of a productive capital stock by society. For individuals, a useful definition of "wealth" is the net market value of all currently owned assets (less any liabilities) plus the present value of entitlements to future income (including public and private pensions). This idea of "wealth" does not correspond to productive capital since it includes unfunded pension and social security entitlements and the value of the housing stock. In Canada, a major public pension program (Canada Pension Plan) is only partially funded (and that by provincial government debentures) while old age security payments are made from the general tax revenue of the federal government -- hence no particular productive assets correspond to the this pension and transfer payment "wealth" of individuals. Furthermore, in terms of marketable wealth, the predominant form of accumulation of wealth for most individuals over the life cycle is the acquisition of home equity. Although the housing stock yields a flow of services (perhaps more than may be currently needed by the elderly) the housing stock is not "productive capital" in the same sense as the capital stock owned by firms.

Although there is some controversy in the literature regarding the exact share of inherited wealth in capital accumulation, it is clear that intergenerational bequests within the family are an important fraction of

total capital accumulation and, as a consequence, help to determine the income of <u>all</u> members of succeeding generations by determining the future capital stock with which future generations will work. Indeed, if individual families react to policy initiatives or other changes by adjusting their own consumption and savings patterns so as to maintain a desired balance between the consumption of the current generation and that of successive generations, then at the margin intergenerational bequest within families will determine the extent of capital accumulation over time (since a public policy initiative will simply provoke a counter-balancing private response).

The explanation for such intergenerational bequests within the family is generally said to be "altruism" but the sources of altruistic behaviour within the family are, in economic theory, not always clearly specified. Becker, for example, relies on the idea that "humans and other species are biologically selected to propagate their own genes" (1981: 98) to explain the general nonexistence of markets in children. However, in discussing the sources of altruism, he quotes approvingly Adam Smith, who argued "Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people ... after himself the members of his own family, those who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters, are naturally the objects of his warmest affections." (1981: 173) -- the implication being that it is social proximity to "those who usually live in the same house" which creates feelings of emotional interdependence and altruism. Clearly, if our society is characterized by families which typically do not divorce (or remarry), then the ties of blood and of social proximity will coincide, and it is not really necessary to distinguish between these alternative possible bases of altruism. Furthermore, in such a world

heirs are unambiguously identifiable. However, to anticipate the discussion of section 3, one must emphasize that this model of a continuously intact husband/wife family with children is increasingly atypical of Canadian family types.

Altruism towards one's children is used to explain the existence of intentional bequests to children¹ and, formally speaking, one can think of the maintenance of elderly parents by their children as a "negative bequest." Economists are, however, often uneasy (e.g., Shorrocks, 1981) with the assumption that parents can make negative bequests to their children, since that opens up the logical possibility that selfish parents will plan on incurring large debts while young, although there is no way that payment can be enforced on their children. Although utility maximizing parents can decide to give gifts to their children, they cannot decide that their children should give them gifts -- hence support of the elderly within the family has not received a very convincing discussion within economics.

One of the strong implications of the neo-classical economic approach to the family is the irrelevance of economic policy for intergenerational transfers and intergenerational inequality. Some of Becker's examples of parental behaviour to counteract government policy measures may seem, to some, a little hard -- for example when he argues "parents might reduce their own efforts to prevent child deaths when, say, a public health program is introduced" (1981: 12) or when he says "an induced parental compensatory

¹Following Davies (1981) there is a small literature on unintentional bequests, which argues that since the date of one's death is uncertain, individuals will want to retain some wealth to finance the possibility of a very long life but will leave a positive bequest to their heirs if death occurs earlier. However, this literature depends crucially on the non-existence of annuities markets. Non-intentional bequests are conceded by most to exist, but not to be a dominant motive in observed bequests.

program offsets public health programs and food supplements to pregnant women" (page 126). However, the general theme is that the transfer of goods or services to <u>any</u> individual within the family, in any form, is interpreted by the family head as equivalent to an increase in family income. If parents intend to spend some fraction β of their lifetime income on their children, it is predicted that parents will tax away a corresponding fraction $(1 - \beta)$ of the value of any transfer to children, by reducing their other expenditures on child maintenance.

In macroeconomics, Robert Barro (1974) has used the idea of intergenerational bequest within the family (where bequests are broadly construed to include both human and non-human capital) to argue that the financial deficits of governments do not matter. If one sees the present financial deficits of government as, essentially, the postponement of taxation, then parents who wish to ensure a particular standard of living for their descendants will recognize the future tax liabilities which a present deficit entails. Government deficits, in this view, only affect the timing of a family's future tax liabilities. As Barro puts it "the main idea is that a network of intergenerational transfers makes the typical person a part of an extended family that goes on indefinitely. In this setting, households capitalize the entire array of expected future taxes, and thereby plan effectively with an infinite horizon." (1989: 40). A decrease in public saving (i.e., a government deficit) is forecast to be exactly compensated by an increase in private saving as parents transfer to their children enough extra capital to pay the future tax liability entailed by current government deficits.

In some discussions of intergenerational issues, the social institution of the family receives relatively little attention (e.g., Hirshhorn, 1990). However, this brief discussion of bequest behaviour, capital accumulation and macroeconomics makes it clear that the assumption of intergenerational altruism within the family can have very strong potential implications. The issue to be discussed in section 3 is whether or not such implications can be expected to continue to hold true when the social institution of the family changes.

In recent years, the extent and rate of change in Canadian families has been dramatic. In 1961 the divorce rate, per 100,000 population, was 36.0, but by 1986 that had risen to 244.4. In 1961, 65% of Canadian families were husband/wife families where only the husband was employed but by 1986 such families comprised only 12% of Canadian families. Over the 1961-1986 period, single parent families increased from 6% to 13% of all families while two earner couples increased from 14% to 52% of all families. In these 25 years, the labour force participation rate of married women increased from 22% to 56.1%.

The speed of these changes forces us to recognize that the time scale for discussion of intergenerational issues is very much longer than that in use in most other discussions of economic issues. Canadians have experienced dramatic changes within a central social institution, and these changes have occurred within a <u>single</u> generation. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that changes in family structure will not continue to occur.

How long is a "generation" anyway? In discussions of pop sociology, reference is often made to the "baby boom" generation, and what is meant is the people born between 1946 and 1961. On this criterion, a "generation"

would be measured as equal to 15 years, but such an estimate would not correspond to the average difference in ages between biological generations, which Romaniuc (1984:12) estimates at 27 years. Webster's definition (Third International) notes that the average span of time between the birth of parents and that of their children may be "variously computed and vary according to cultural and other conditions" but implies that in modern societies a generation is about 25 years. The dating of "generations" is, therefore, somewhat arbitrary, but whether one thinks of a time scale of generations as being measured in 15 year or 25 year or 27 year intervals, the increase in the life expectancy of Canadians and the increase in the percentage of the population over 75 years of age will necessarily imply the increased prevalence of four or more co-existing generations within a single family line of descent.

Economic models of intergenerational inequality are, however, inevitably only two generation affairs. None of the available economic literature considers the problem of <u>simultaneous</u> interaction among dependent elderly, employed adult and dependent child generations.

²Since more women are delaying their child-bearing (e.g. the percentage of childless among ever-married women aged 20 to 24 rose from 26% in 1961 to 54% in 1981), one implication of recent trends is a lengthening of the time between generations.

THE CHANGING FAMILY

In the economics literature, the nature of, or changes in, the social institution of the "family" is rarely discussed. For the purposes of the analyses discussed in section 2, a family is simply considered to consist of two generations, parents and children. Parents are assumed to be able to unambiguously and uniquely identify their children and they are assumed to feel altruistic towards them (i.e. to draw pleasure from increases in the income, wealth or utility of their children). Beyond this, economists do not enquire. However, as we shall see, even these limited assumptions may be too restrictive to apply to much of the Canadian population.

In sociology, on the other hand, examination and analysis of social institutions is the central issue. Sociological writers on "the family" emphasize heavily the changes in family structures which have occurred in modern societies and the broader social implications of such changing family structures. Within sociology, feminist writers place particular stress on the inequality of the life experiences of men and women within families, and the changing nature of women's familial roles.

Eichler (1988: 7) has argued that families have a number of dimensions - procreation, the socialization of children, sexuality, co-residence,
economic dependence and emotional support. As she notes, there is a
particular (idealized) family form in which all these dimensions coincide -i.e. when a man and a woman marry, have children, and live happily (and
monogamously) together until parted by death in their own age. However, what
happens when these dimensions of family life no longer coincide? What happens
to wealth accumulation, the socialization of children and the care of the

elderly when the Canadian family becomes increasingly fluid and heterogenous as a social institution?

Nobody is questioning the fact that a significant fraction of Canadian families continue to live the idealized norm of nuclear family life. Furthermore, many of those who do not in fact live out this ideal remain influenced by it. The point, however, is that a majority of Canadian households do not actually live out the ideal of nuclear family life and the transition to a more disparate family structure (and the reasonable expectation of even more changes in the future) will have major impacts on intergenerational inequality.

As has already been noted, there has been a dramatic increase in the rate of divorce in Canada, within approximately one generation. Canada, of course, is not unique in this respect -- Eichler (1988: 57) demonstrates that high divorce rates are now characteristic of most developed industrial nations. As many have noted, rising divorce rates change the institution of marriage even for those married individuals who do not, themselves, divorce. The increasing prevalence, and general acceptance, of divorce has changed the meaning of the old words "till death do us part" from that of an irrevocable, divinely sanctioned, non-contingent oath to a pious wish that nothing will go wrong. Marriage is now, for most people, a volitional contract, which either party can consider terminating in the event of unsatisfactory outcomes. Since this new meaning of the marriage contract represents a substantial change from that prevalent even 30 years ago, and since the overall divorce rate still reflects partially the behaviour of that (decreasing) fraction of the population attached to the older meaning of marriage, one must expect the institutions of marriage and the family to continue to change.

Many of those who are divorced do try marriage again -- although not as many as in previous years. Romaniuc (1984:60) notes "In 1970, 48% of the divorces involving women aged 20-24 were "recovered" by the remarriage of divorced women in the same age group. But by 1980 this proportion had gone down to 36% and less than half of the women divorcing at ages under 35 eventually remarried. Furthermore remarriage appears to be as fragile, if not more so, than first marriage".

The social and emotional importance of life as a member of a family unit is evidenced by the rate of remarriage of previously divorced individuals. However, since the point of this essay is the connection between intergenerational inequality and the family, the issue to stress here is that the divorce and remarriage of adults creates pooled families, which contain adults and children from different marriages.

If divorce rates are low, or if divorce is limited to the childless, biologic parents will also be social parents and (to use Adam Smith's phrase) a man's children "will usually live in the same house with him". However, the majority of divorces (51.5% in 1985) involve marriages with children and in most cases (72.8% in 1985) the wife was awarded sole custody.³

Since many of those who are divorced eventually do remarry, remarriage families have become increasingly common in Canada. In 1985, 29.7% of all marriages involved at least one previously married individual. Children may end up living with either parent, since even if one parent is initially awarded custody, such an arrangement may not work out in the longer term. Divorced parents may or may not marry new spouses who may or may not already

³In 15.2% of divorces involving children the husband was awarded custody, whereas joint custody and no award of custody cases comprised 12.1% of divorces involving children.

have children of their own, who may or may not co-reside with them and the new marriage may or may not result in children. A bewildering variety of family types and linkages between households is possible -- Eichler (1988: 271) identifies 120 different types of families.

Furthermore, the emotional reaction of children to divorce and remarriage may be one of continuing to identify their "real parents" as being both their biological parents only (implicitly rejecting their new social parent), or reducing their identification with parents to only that biological parent with whom they co-reside, or substituting the new social parent for the absent biological parent, or augmenting their identification of parent to include both social parents and the absent biological parent. (Eichler: 268)

The importance of all this arises become discrepancies between marital and parental roles are increasingly common. Eichler (1988: 243) cites U.S. estimates which suggest that 60% of children born in 1990 in the U.S. will not live with both biological parents. Since the divorce rate in Canada is lower, her own "rough estimate" is that the proportion of households in Canada in which there is some form of marital/parental discrepancy due to divorce is about 37%. Clearly, an important, and growing, fraction of families in Canada are characterized by increasing ambiguity in parent/child relationships.

To use a specific (and common) example, suppose that a man has children with one wife, divorces, remarries and has more children with a second wife (who may already have children of her own, either as a single parent or from an earlier marriage). Who does he consider to be his heirs -- his biological children, the biological children with whom he now lives or all of the children with whom he now lives? Does the answer depend on whether the first wife remarries, or on where the children of the first marriage reside or on

visiting rights over the years? If the man predeceases his wife, he may leave his property to her -- who does <u>she</u> consider to be her heirs?

In the literature on life cycle wealth accumulation and bequest, individuals are seen as formulating a life time plan of earnings and expenditure, in order to finance retirement and any desired bequest to children -- hence consideration of one's heirs affects savings and consumption behavior at every point in the life cycle. In considering the bequest to be left to one's "children" how will parents react to the ambiguity of the parent/child relationship? Alternatively, if the bequest is "negative" and the individual requires support in old age, on whom can he or she call?

Since the adults in remarriage families can have parent/child links which cut across the boundaries of social families, such adults have, on average, more potential ties to members of the next generation than adults in continuously married families. However, such ties are likely to be weaker, since they involve fewer years of co-residence and are subject to the conflicting pressures created by new families and new spouses. The increase in the number of potential heirs in remarriage families may offer some hope that inheritances will be divided among more people, tending to equalize the distribution of inherited wealth, but the decrease in strength of parent/child ties may function to diminish the aggregate amount of bequests.

To be more precise, if remarriages were perfectly assortative, so that women marry the socio economic "brother" of their ex-spouse (and vice versa for men), then each heir in remarriage families would collect a smaller share, but from more estates, and the inequality of inheritances would be unchanged. The equalizing influence of divorce/remarriage on the inequality of inheritances is greater, the lower the correlation between new and old spouses in socio-economic status. Diminished inequality in inheritances decreases aggregate capital accumulation if the rich tend to save more than the poor -i.e., if the marginal propensity to consume out of inherited wealth is a negative function of the amount of inheritances received.

Furthermore, one must be aware that intergenerational transfers within the family come in two forms -- the services rendered by members of one generation to other generations while both are still alive and the transfers of material property between generations, both while living and on death. The form of intergenerational transfers matters, in part because the emotional content of family life means that the services which are provided in its context are often very poorly substitutable by market provided services.

In addition, the form of intergenerational transfers (and not just their equivalent dollar value) matters because different members within the family are very unequally affected by different types of transfers. After all, two of the major ways in which the family transfers resources between generations is by caring for the elderly and by caring for, and socializing, children -- but the "care-giver" role within families has primarily been assigned to women, and not to men.

The demands of the "care-giver" role are critically affected by changes in the birth rate, since a declining birth rate implies both that each individual child has to share parental time with fewer siblings and that, when middle aged, children will have fewer siblings with whom to share the responsibilities of care for the elderly. In the steady state, a lower birth rate implies some decrease in the time demands per person of the child care role, but an increase in the time demands of elder care. The transition from the high birth rate of the 1940's and 1950's to the much lower birth rate of more recent decades implies that individuals who are now in their 40's and 50's (whose parents are beginning, in 1991, to be elderly) tend to have more siblings with whom to share elder care responsibilities than will typically be the case in a decade or two.

However, a much more important phenomenon of the last 30 years is the wide spread rejection of "care-giver" as the life time role norm for women. The dramatic increase in female labour force participation rates, especially the increase in paid employment of married women with pre-school and infant children, indicates both a wide spread identification with other values and role norms and a very significant decrease in the time available to fill the demands of a care-giver role. Again, this transition from a norm of married women working primarily within the home to a norm of married women working in paid employment has only occurred within the last 30 years. The rapidity of this transition implies that although the conflicts of employment roles and child care demands are already known, the conflicts between employment and familial duties to elderly parents are only looming on the horizon, for most people.

If one thinks of a generation as being approximately 25 years in length, a typical family line of descent may contain four living generations: dependent children aged 1-25, young adults aged 26-50, older adults aged 51-75 and the elderly, aged 76 or more. Such wide age bands will obscure the differences between infant and university-age children, or between the established middle-aged of 45 to 50 and the post baby boom cohort (now 25 to 30) who experienced intermittent unemployment and depressed relative wages during the early 1980's (see Myles, 1988). Nevertheless, one can make some generalizations about the nature of transfers between generations. Transfers within the family are received by children in the form of both goods and caregiving services, and it is difficult to analyze the transfer of goods and services separately since market provided and family provided goods and services are often substituted (e.g., in childcare) and the co-residence of

parents and children implies that their consumption (e.g., of housing) is often difficult to disentangle. However, since young adults typically reside separately, intergenerational transfers to them are predominantly financial. Older adults, aged 51-75, are typically in their peak earning years and/or beginning retirement. As to those over 75, as Myles (1989: 1) has noted "in all post-war capitalist democracies, economic responsibility for the maintenance of the elderly has been assumed by the state" -- hence the elderly no longer typically depend upon financial transfers from younger cohorts. Nevertheless, care-giving services remain extremely important transfers to the retired generation.

In thinking about intergenerational inequality in cash income, and the transfers of property between generations, it is therefore appropriate to focus on two types of transfers: (1) the transfers of property "inter vivos" to young adults, from the elderly and older adults and (2) the transfers of property by bequest, on the death of the retired generation, which flow primarily to their own children, who by this time are usually over 40 themselves. As has already been noted, economic research over the last decade

⁵If one is willing to assume that a family's utility from consumption of adult goods and child goods is separable, than one can compare data on the consumption patterns of childless couples and families with children to assess the intrafamily allocation of goods (as in Gronau, 1991). However, this requires the assumption that there are no goods (such as a larger house) which are jointly consumed "public goods" to all family members. I consider this implausible [see also the caveats on self-selection, time use and intergenerational modelling in Gronau (1991: 238)]. For what it is worth, Gronau estimates that U.S. families spend 3/4 of income on adults and 1/4 on children.

⁶In addition, adult children may "return to the nest" for economic reasons and take up residence with (or never leave) their surprised parents.

⁷MacLean's magazine (August 8, 1991) cites an unnamed Ontario government study which found that more than 80% of elderly Canadians are cared for to some extent by a family member.

has stressed that the accumulation of property for the purpose of such intergenerational transfers is a major factor in the aggregate capital accumulation of society. How might one expect such intergenerational transfers of property within the family to be affected by the twin forces of changing family structure and demographic unevenness in Canadian society?

More broadly, intergenerational inequality in total command over goods and services also involves the provision of services within the family in the socialization of children and care for the elderly -- work which, one must note, has usually been performed by women. Consideration of both types of transfers within the family is highly relevant for public policy, since it is easily predictable that demographic unevenness and changing family structure will create new pressures for public involvement.

4. Policy Issues

It is common enough to observe that all societies have to solve the problem of how to socialize their young and what to do with their elderly. Furthermore, as the gestation period of many capital investments increases, and as awareness of the environmental impacts of economic activity mounts, it has become clear that many of our social decisions will affect the well being of generations far in the future. What sort of social institution can balance the conflicting claims of different generations?

With the growth of the modern "welfare state" governments have expanded their role in taxation and transfers but prior to that, in most societies,

⁸Eichler (1988: 272) argues that "judging on the basis of time budget studies the majority of fathers (with, of course, notable exceptions!) are not significantly involved in child rearing whether or not they are married to the mother of their children".

intra-family allocative "decisions" have determined the division of resources between generations. [However, one must qualify heavily the nature of the "decision" arrived at by each particular generation of adults with the observation that appropriate behavior towards one's children, or one's elders, has often been virtually dictated by strong social norms.] Although many different types of family structure have existed in different societies, within each society social norms as to family structure have had great continuity. The expectation of continued stability has meant that it has been possible for intra-family norms of behavior to embody the social contract between generations.

The social contract between generations is important, because each generation will be better off if it is well nurtured in childhood and if it receives a substantial capital stock from the previous generation. However, transition to such a growth path will not occur if an initial generation does not sacrifice consumption for the benefit of future generations and will terminate if a selfish generation maximizes its immediate utility by neglecting its children or consuming the capital stock. When family structure is stable, norms of intra-family behavior can embody the terms of the intergenerational contract, since although each particular generation will live and die, the "family" is, in a sense, immortal. However, the underlying theme of this essay is that the rapidity and extent of change in Canadian family structures implies that it is increasingly difficult for the family to embody the intergenerational social contract. Since the problems of child care, elder care and capital accumulation must still be solved, and since the only immortal "agent" now around is the state, there will be increasing pressure for public policy involvement. The increasing role of public policy

implies that (a) we need to know more about private intra-family decisions if we are to be sure that public policy is not simply negated by counter-balancing private decisions and (b) more of society's decisions on intergenerational inequality will be visible, conscious, political decisions rather than invisible, unconscious, familial adherence to traditional norms.

4.1 Child care

In thinking about the boundaries between public and private spheres of activity, authors such as Meyers et al (1988) have emphasized the increasing role of the state in the socialization of children. It is not too many generations ago that a family head could do essentially what he wanted with his children. Mandatory public schooling and the prohibition of child labour were very early interventions to limit the authority of parents and to create rights for children. However, formally defined "rights of the child" are a relatively recent phenomenon, as is widespread levels of public awareness and concern with the issue of child abuse. Within the last two decades the increase in labour force participation rate of mothers with young children has meant that, from the very earliest ages, most children now spend much of their waking hours outside the family environment. In a very real sense, raising of children is now, in practice, both a social and a private affair.

Since some of these trends (such as the increase in female labour force participation) have been underway for some time, there is a large literature on such topics as the impact of day care attendance on childhood IQ and personal development. Many issues in social policy remain -- for example, the role of the school in child care and the current limitations of the hours of formal schooling. The breadth of these issues precludes their effective

treatment in an essay of this sort, but the broader issue is the change that is occurring in the conceptualization of the child which is implicit in much of our social policy. In contrast to the earlier notion of a child as the purely private property of the parents (the conception that still underlies most of the neo-classical economics literature on the family) there is an emerging conception of the child as a "junior citizen", who has some claim against the broader society for the protection of his/her rights, and in whose development into a productive adult society as a whole has an interest.

4.2 Elder care

As has already been noted, although the modern welfare state has assumed residual financial responsibility for the elderly, a substantial caring role for the family remains. However, the impacts of the changes in Canadian family structure within the past two decades have not yet filtered through to the elderly. A 75 year old in 1991 is someone who was born in 1916, which implies that they were typically married in the 1940's (or before) and typically did <u>not</u> divorce then or in the 1950's. Lower divorce rates imply that they are more likely to still live with a spouse than will be the case with the elderly of the future -- which also implies that spouses are available to care for each other. Furthermore, it is also their children who comprise the "baby boom" of 1946-1961 -- i.e. there is now a relatively large middle-aged cohort of children to share the responsibilities of elder care. Finally, since many of the current cohort of elderly are the home buyers of the late 1940's and early 1950's, who have benefited disproportionately from the urbanization of Canada and the increasing relative price of urban real estate which it produced, a substantial proportion of the current elderly have significant assets. ⁹ Future cohorts of the elderly can not expect to have some of the advantages experienced by the elderly of today.

Since the focus of this essay is on the role of the family, it will lay aside any consideration of the future funding of the public and private pension systems. The focus here is on transfers within the family. In 20 years, it will be baby boomers who will be reaching normal retirement age, but since this generation were more prone to divorce and had fewer children than the current elderly, they will find fewer caregivers among the younger generations and will be less likely to be able to rely on services rendered within the extended family. Currently, one can see the formal systems of care for the elderly (i.e. senior citizens homes, meals on wheels, health care institutions, etc.) as being heavily "subsidized" by unpaid family labour -in particular the unpaid family labour of many women who are now in their 50's, whose own lifetime participation in paid employment has been much lower than that of younger cohorts of women. One can therefore expect an increasing demand for substitute services, and that demand will be focussed on the public sector. Since the services provided to the elderly are very labour intensive, and not particularly amenable to technological progress, their relative costs can also be expected to increase over time (see Baumol, 1967). As a result, governments can expect to be under increasing financial pressures as the family withdraws its subsidy from the cost of the care for the elderly.

 $^{^9}$ Davies (1991:285) notes that median net worth among married couples over 65 was \$79,426 in 1984, compared to \$45,150 for married couples under 65. The importance of family structure, and its correlates, are illustrated by the fact that unattached individuals are so <u>much</u> poorer than married couples - median wealth of over 65 unattached individuals was \$27,807 and only \$4,360 for the under 65.

4.3 Capital Accumulation.

If the degree of altruism within the family determines the amount of the bequest of property which one generation leaves for its successor and if, in practice, a substantial fraction of the capital stock is now acquired through intergenerational inheritance, then it must be expected that the dramatic changes recently observed in Canadian family structure will have significant implications for the process of capital accumulation. But what <u>are</u> these implications? Assessing the role of bequest behavior within the family in aggregate capital accumulation continues to raise some of the most important and unsettled issues in economics.

If leaving a bequest to one's children is an important reason for saving, and if the fraction of the population that is childless is increasing, then one would expect the aggregate rate of savings to decline. Eichler (1988) notes that the incidence of childlessness among married couples has increased from 14% to 17% between 1961 and 1984. Romaniuc (1984: 35) points out that in recent years there has also been a decline in the proportion of the population that is married (both because of higher divorce rates and a greater percentage who never marry) and argues that although only 5.8% of the cohort of women born in 1934/35 remained childless, 15.6% of women born in 1952/53 will ultimately remain childless. The trends in divorce and remarriage in families with children already discussed in Section 3 can be expected to weaken the parental will to bequeath assets, and the increasing proportion of adults without any children can also be expected to decrease the rate of capital accumulation.

However, the data also contains significant puzzles. A straightforward implication of the idea that people save partly in order to bequeath assets to

their children is that elderly people without children should consume more of their wealth than elderly people with children. However, restricting his attention to non-housing bequeathable wealth, Hurd (1990:613) notes that in the U.S. "those without children saved about 4% more than those with children". Moreover, such basic issues as whether or not the elderly typically dissave or save, in their later years remains subject to controversy (see Hurd, 1990). If we are to get beyond a vague statement that the changing family structure will have a significant impact on private savings rates, these issues need to be resolved.

Furthermore, since the incentives of the health care, public and private pension systems differ significantly between Canada and the U.S., one <u>cannot</u> necessarily assume that the behaviour of the U.S. elderly can be generalized to Canada. And even in the U.S., these basic issues remain unclear in part because the type of assets with which we are concerned are very narrowly held If one is worried about the impact of demographic unevenness and changes in Canadian family structure on the rate of accumulation of productive capital, then one must concentrate on non-housing marketable wealth, but this is very narrowly held in Canada. As a consequence, in order to provide useful evidence on the determinants of the acquisition and inheritance of productive capital, surveys must very heavily oversample the relatively affluent.

A significant minority of Canadians have very little property at any age, but the typical pattern by which most Canadians acquire property is to buy a home as a young adult and to pay off the mortgage over the course of their working life. Only a small minority of Canadians own part of the

¹⁰In 1977, two-thirds of all financial assets were owned by the richest 10% of Canadian family units -- see Osberg, 1981; 36).

productive capital stock indirectly through shares or directly through unincorporated enterprises. It follows that in order to analyze the impact of changing family structures on the accumulation of productive capital, the behaviour of the Canadian population as a whole is less important than the behaviour of the minority which actually owns productive capital. As regards capital accumulation, the issue is "inequality between generations and the role of the upper class family". Research on this issue is important if we want to understand the long-run implications of Canada's changing demography For capital accumulation and personal incomes.

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THE NATURE OF KINSHIP IN PERSONAL COMMUNITY NETWORKS

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INTRODUCTION1

"Am I my brother's keeper?" asked Cain about Abel. Millennia later, this is still an open question. People in all societies wonder about the extent to which their friends and relatives can help them to deal with the acute crises and chronic burdens of what they believe are alienating, lonely and stressful modern times. A large part of this fear comes from a selective perception of the present. Many observers think they are witnessing loneliness when they see people walking or driving alone. Paradoxically, few will confess that they, themselves, are lonely or unhappy (Bradburn 1969). They know that they, themselves, have supportive relationships, and their close friends, neighbours, kin and coworkers have them as well. Yet people often believe that they are the exceptions.

Concerns about the availability of "social support" usually mingle with nostalgia for the past. The pervasive fear is that communities have fallen apart, with loneliness and alienation leading to a war of all against all. People are sure that their preindustrial ancestors led charmed lives when they could bathe in the warmth of true solidary community. They worry that contemporary communities and kinship groups are not as ready and able to be supportive as were their legendary ancestors.

Ambivalence about the consequences of large-scale, post-industrial social changes has persisted well into the twentieth century. Analysts have kept asking if things have, in fact, fallen apart. Are interpersonal ties likely to be few in number, short in duration and specialized in content? Have friendship and kinship networks so withered away that the few remaining ties serve only as the basis for disconnected bilateral relationships rather than as the multilateral foundation for extensive and integrated communities?

In fact — if not in perception — researchers have shown such fears to be unfounded. We now know that community and kinship have stood up well to the large-scale social transformations of urbanization, industrialization, bureaucratization, technological change, capitalism and socialism². We have also learned that kith and

¹I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Milena Guia in preparing this report.

²For community, see the reviews in Fischer 1976; Wellman 1988; Wellman and Leighton 1979: For kinship, see the reviews in Sussman and Burchinal 1962; Mogey 1977; Lee 1980; Eichler 1983; Fischer 1982a; Goldthorpe 1987; Laslett 1988; Plakans and Wetherell 1988; Wellman 1990.

kin are not relics from a pastoral past but are active arrangements for helping individuals and households deal with stresses and opportunities.

Sociologists have found interpersonal networks to be socially diverse, spatially dispersed, and sparsely knit (Willmott 1987; Wellman 1988). Although friends comprise the largest segment of active relations, and neighbours and coworkers dominate daily meetings, many kin are important network members. It is clear that kinship ties continue to flourish in North America. Analysts are inquiring further into the number, proportion, role, and uniqueness of kinship ties in community networks. Do people have many kinship ties or a few? How central are these relations within a person's broader network of sociability and support? What sorts of support do kin give each other? Is this different from the support that friends give?

This study reports on the changed nature of kinship and community (friends, neighbours) relations and the kinds of supportive resources provided by kin and other community members. It examines the number of kin and other community members available for interaction and support, the structure of relationships among the members of such *personal community networks*, the residentially dispersed nature of kinship and friendship networks, the differentiated nature of support networks, the extent to which kin and friends play important roles in people's lives, and the key roles that women play in maintaining ties with family and friends.

THEORIES OF COMMUNITY: LOST, SAVED AND LIBERATED

Have Community and Family Ties Been Lost?

A fundamental issue, which has occupied much sociological thinking over the past century is the *Community Question*: the study of how large-scale divisions of labour in social systems affect the organization and content of interpersonal ties. Analysts have been particularly concerned with the impact of massive industrial bureaucratic transformations on ties in the home, the neighbourhood, and the workplace, with kin and friends, and among interest groups.

Until the 1960's, most social scientists shared the belief in the disappearance of supportive community ties and its negative consequences. Most of their attention

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went to the seemingly cataclysmic changes associated with the (post)Industrial revolution during the past two centuries. They feared that industrialization, urbanization, and accelerated technological change had eroded the broadly-based intimate ties that have traditionally formed the basis of supportive relations. It was believed that the development of bureaucratic institutions for production had taken over many family, neighbourhood and friendship activities. The great fear was that the specialized, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures of contemporary large-scale societies had been producing specialized, segmented, weakly-supportive communities and families (e.g., Stein 1960; Nisbet 1962; Slater 1970).

Supportive ties had not actually disappeared, but social scientists as well as policymakers and the public at large had lost track of them in their preoccupation with the individual in mass society. Much writing on the subject suffered from the pastoral syndrome: analysts nostalgically compared contemporary relationships to those in the good old days when villagers supposedly danced around maypoles, family groups huddled around hearths, and all cheerfully exchanged social support (for further reviews, see Tilly 1974; Fischer 1975; Wellman and Leighton 1979; Wellman 1988).

This work had a strongly normative tone, looking backwards to the good old days and decrying the decay of modern civilization. Until the 1960s sociologists announced the loss of community. They declared that the size, density and heterogeneity of contemporary (Western) cities had fostered superficial, transitory, specialized, disconnected and unsupportive ties (e.g., Wirth 1938; Stein 1960; Nisbet 1962). The primary ties that did exist were believed to be narrower in scope: The former wide range of content in neighbourhood, friendship and kinship ties had been reduced to sociability and emotional support, with formal institutions and the nuclear family taking over much of the former content of such relationships (e.g., Sennett 1970; Lasch 1977). Family sociology argued that high rates of social and geographical mobility — coupled with a capitalistic sensibility about "making it" on one's own — weakened kinship ties, throwing people back on the resources of their households and a few transitory, uncertain, occupationally-similar, friends (e.g., Parsons 1943; Sennett 1970; Lasch 1977).

Rediscovering Community and Kinship

In the 1960s and 1970s sociologists were preoccupied with demonstrating that community and kinship persisted — dare they say "flourished"? Scholars wanted to show that supportive communal bonds remained even in the supposedly most pernicious habitats: inner-city slums (e.g., Whyte 1943; Young and Willmott 1957; Gans 1962; Liebow 1967) and middle-class suburbs (e.g., Clark 1966; Gans 1967; Bell 1968). They argued that neighbourhood communities persisted in industrial bureaucratic social systems as important sources of support and sociability. Proponents of this view argued that the formal and centralizing tendencies of bureaucratic institutions had paradoxically encouraged the maintenance of interpersonal ties as more flexible sources of sociability and support. In opposition to the negative urban imagery of previous decades, people were seen as continuing to organize safe, communal havens, with neighbourhood, kinship, and work solidarities mediating and coping with bureaucratic institutions.

The rediscovery of community has been one of sociology's great post World War II triumphs. By the 1960s urban scholars were able to show that community had survived the major transformations of the (post) Industrial Revolution. Rapidly developing ethnographic and survey research techniques demonstrated that neighbourhood and kinship groups continue to be abundant and strong. Large institutions have neither smashed nor withered friendship and family ties. To the contrary: the larger and more inflexible the institutions, the more people seem to depend on their informal communal ties to deal with them. Communities may well have changed in response to the pressures, opportunities and constraints of large-scale forces. However, they have not withered away. They buffer households against large-scale forces, provide mutual aid, and serve as secure bases to engage with the outside world (see the reviews in Keller 1968; Fischer 1976; Gordon 1978; Warren 1978; Wellman and Leighton 1979; Smith 1979; Choldin 1985).

This transformation in thinking has become the current academic orthodoxy. Scholars no longer think of cities as evil, permeated with Original Sin. Their current celebrations of community have the lingering aroma of the 1960s, seeing people as permeated with Original Good and happily maintaining mutually supportive ties. The

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rest of the populace has been slower to catch on: policymakers, the media and the public at large are still quick to fear the urban and to yearn for the pastoral.

As sociologists were discovering the existence of contemporary communities, and kinship systems, more historically-minded analysts started similarly using systematic, empirical research techniques to study preindustrial villages, towns and cities. Until the work of historical scholars became known, analysts had contrasted the disorderly urban present with the pastoral ideal of bucolic, solidary villages (Poggioli 1975). They assumed that such communities were socially cohesive and stable, with little movement in or out. Yet the supposed communalism of preindustrial eras has turned out to be an artifact of how earlier scholars studied the past. By looking for community in localities and not in networks, they had focused on local phenomena and stability rather than on long distances and mobility.

Sociohistorical studies indicate that the average preindustrial household was quite small, and that many families were socially and spatially mobile (Laslett 1971; Anderson 1971; Aminzade and Hodson 1982; Thernstrom 1969; Katz 1975; Darroch and Ornstein 1983). People were not very local. When young, they often worked in the city but kept ties back to their rural villages. Artisans and soldiers were frequently on the road. Women married and moved, geographically and socially. Servants' ties to their distant families concurrently linked masters' families to the servants' rural homes. And, these complex connections linked far-flung networks of community ties.

Community as Network

The discovery of the complexities of past and present communities led analysts to move beyond seeking to prove or disprove that communities continued to exist. They began to realize that to demonstrate that community remains in neighbourhoods is not to show that community is confined to neighbourhoods. By the early 1970s several analysts had expanded the definition of community to take into account far-flung, sparsely-knit ties stretching beyond the boundaries of neighbourhood or kinship solidarities. They argued that the essence of community was its social structure and not its spatial structure. They suggested that only through such a revision in the ways in which scholars thought about community could they fully understand how people supported each other. This, they contended, is because large-scale

changes in the division and control of labour and resources had transformed the nature of community.

A variety of structural and technological developments have liberated communities from the confines of neighbourhoods and dispersed network ties from all-embracing solidary communities to more narrowly based ones: (a) cheap, effective transportation and communication facilities; (b) the separation of workplace and kinship ties into nonlocal, nonsolidary networks; (c) high rates of social and residential mobility. Distance and travel time are less important constraints. Instead of being full members of one solidary local or kinship group, people now juggled limited memberships in multiple, specialized, interest-based communities (see Wellman and Leighton 1979; Fischer 1982b; Wellman 1979).

Rather than focus on the neighbourhood, many sociologists have found a network analytic perspective to be more appropriate in community question research. A network perspective frees the study of community from spatial and normative bases, making possible the discovery of network-based communities which are neither linked to a particular neighbourhood nor to a set of solidary sentiments.

By redefining their definition of community from neighbourhood to network, researchers have been able to demonstrate the previous generation's fears about the loss of community were incorrect. Community has not disappeared, it has been transformed: New forms of community — spatially-dispersed, socially-heterogeneous, densely-knit and segmented networks — have come to be the norm. "The community" (or, for that matter, "the social network") in such cases is largely a matter of how analysts define ties, where they draw boundaries, and how high they raise the level of analytic magnification in order to take into account internal links within clusters (Laumann, Marsden and Prensky 1983; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988).

Social network analysis treats "community" as "personal community": a network of significant, informal "community ties" defined from the standpoint of a

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"focal person" (see Figure 1).³ Community is treated as a set of relationships stretching beyond the household — without a priori limitation on where network members live and how they are related to the person at the centre of the network. This approach has been used to show that community has neither withered away into a mass society under the impact of contemporary societies nor hung on in remnant urban villages as traditional local or kinship solidarities. In the past two decades, most of this effort has gone into making the case for the persistence and importance of personal community networks: documenting their composition, social structure and supportiveness. Analysts are finding that the support provided through these networks is a principal way by which people and households get resources, either directly through informal exchanges, or indirectly through the ways in which networks help people regulate and get access to markets or obtain access to the resources distributed by institutions.

> Figure 1 about here <

This transmutation of "community" into "social network" has been more than the repackaging of old intellectual goods. By liberating analysts from looking only at communities which resemble traditional solidarities of neighbours and kinfolk, it has helped document the strong persistence of communities even when neighbour-hood traces are faint. It has left open the extent to which such personal communities are socially homogeneous, spatially local, tightly bounded or densely knit. It has encouraged analysts to evaluate different types of ties — kin or friend, intimate or acquaintance, local or distant — in terms of the access to resources which they provide. It has provided a basis for understanding if kinship and friendship are substitutable, complementary or dispensable in contemporary social systems (Pitt-Rivers 1973; Fischer 1982c).

³See Webber 1964; Kadushin 1966; Tilly 1970; Wellman 1972; Craven and Wellman 1973; Wellman 1982; Burt 1984. For discussions of reliability see Bernard, Killworth and Sailer 1981; Hammer 1980; Romney and Weller 1984.

THE NETWORK ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY AND KINSHIP

Social network analysts have been centrally concerned with how the composition and structure of sets of social relationships affect the ways in which these relationships convey resources — including social support. The approach has facilitated an important shift in analytic perspective — away from seeing aggregated sets of individuals as the units of analysis and towards seeing the structures of linked relationships as central objects of study. It facilitates the study of relationships that are not organized into discrete groups — families, neighbourhoods, support groups, corporations — while permitting the discovery of networks that are bounded enough and densely-knit enough to be considered groups.

Network analysis focuses on the characteristics of the ties — and patterns of ties — in a social system rather than on the characteristics of the individual actors themselves. Analysts use their descriptions of these ties and patterns to study how they constrain network members' behaviour.

The key is the representation of a social structure as a *network* — a set of *network* members and a set of *ties* connecting these network members (see the reviews in Berkowitz 1982; Burt 1982; Wellman 1983; Erickson 1988; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988). The ties are defined by the flow of resources — e.g. emotional aid, material aid, information, companionship — between network members. These (supportive) resources can vary in *quality* (whether the tie provides emotional aid or companionship), *quantity* (whether it provides much emotional aid, frequent companionship), *multiplexity* (whether it narrowly provides only one kind of support or broadly provides a range of assistance), and *symmetry* (whether both parties to a tie exchange roughly equivalent amounts of resources or whether support tends to flow predominantly in only one direction).

Personal Networks

In many cases, analysts study whole networks: all the ties containing one or a few kinds of relations linking all of the members of a population. Whole network analysis permits a simultaneous view of both the social system as a whole and the parts that make up the system. This helps analysts to trace lateral and vertical flows

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of resources, identify sources and destinations, and to detect structural constraints operating on the flow of resources.

However, the open, mobile nature of North American societies preclude the study of communities and kinship systems as if they were whole networks, such as tribal villages. Hence, in North America, community and kinship analysts study personal networks, whose composition, structure and contents are defined from a standpoint of a (usually) large sample of focal persons. They take a sample of people and treat each person as an Ego: the focal centre of a network consisting of the ties radiating out from this Ego to other network members plus the ties connecting these network members with one another. Such information not only provides data about dyadic ties (the two-person relationship between a focal person and a network member, treated in isolation) but also about the networks in which these ties are embedded:

- composition, aggregate information about network composition (e.g., percent kin; mean frequency of contact);
- structure, information about the arrangements of ties (e.g., density, clustering);
- contents, information about the quality and quantity of resources (e.g., volume of supportive services; prevalence of companionship).

When applied to the study of social support, the social network approach engenders a more fine-grained attention to how the composition of ties, the nature of the relationships, and the ways in which these relationships are structured affect the quantity and quality of support available through the networks. For example, community network studies have shown that the kinds of ties people have with kith and kin affect the kinds of social support they obtain.

Wherever studied, personal community networks usually:

- contain about a half-dozen intimate ties and perhaps a dozen active, if not quite intimate, ties out of the total of about 1,500 relationships that tentative evidence suggests people maintain (Boissevain 1974; Kochen 1989).

- -- contain a mixture of both kin and nonkin. Many samples contain about half kin and half friends, neighbours and workmates. Few people maintain active ties with all or most of their kinfolk.
- have only one or two intimate neighbouring or workmate relationships, but a half-dozen to a dozen weaker community ties with neighbours and workmates.
- are moderately knit, with less than half of the members of a person's network being actively linked with each other. Because these relationships are rarely tightly bounded to a single network, they act as "local bridges" which indirectly connect members of one community with another. The interweaving of these ties connects networks and integrates social systems (Granovetter 1973, 1982).
- provide a variety of socially supportive resources crucial to the household and the operation of larger social systems. Such support is efficient, low-cost, flexible and more controllable than aid from bureaucracies. While people gain a wide range of support from their networks, most ties specialize in the kinds of aid they provide. For example, some relationships provide emotional support while others help with household needs. This means that individuals and households must work to maintain an array of potentially supportive relationships. When they have problems, they must shop for assistance at specialized boutiques of relationships rather than being able to count on finding help at relational general stores.

Social network analysis helps researchers to compare kin with kith by allowing analysts to compare the characteristics of different kinds of community ties. The network approach provides a useful means for seeing how kin fit into personal community networks:

- How prominent are kin in personal community networks in terms of numbers and proportions?
- -- Do kin form separate clusters within personal community networks? Are their relations densely-knit and tightly-bounded? Or have kin become just a convenient recruiting area for friendships?

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Do kin differ from kith in the roles they play in such networks? Is kinship and friendship fungible in the economists' sense of substitutable resources? In particular, does the companionship and social support they provide differ in quality, quantity and reliability?

How do kinship relations fit into the ways in which personal community networks help people and households deal with problems and opportunities of reproduction and production? Do they provide collective relations that support and control kinfolk, or do they provide resources upon which kin can draw selectively and voluntarily?

COMPOSITION OF PERSONAL COMMUNITY NETWORKS

Network Size

Social networks have fuzzy boundaries. Because there are no gates (or gatekeepers) to divide members from non-members, analysts must develop a sharp picture from fuzzy reality. Friends, neighbours and workmates come and go, their definition and importance varying by the hour, day and year. Even kinship, apparently better defined, offers dilemmas about including affines, relations continuing after divorces and deaths, and unrecognized kin. Ties to a married couple can function as one relation or two. Indeed, there is no such thing as the network: analysts must specify inclusion criteria.

Available and Actual Ties: The broadest possible personal network of direct relations contains all those whom a person can currently deal with on an informal basis. Yet one rarely acquires relations through random encounters in cafes or on the streets. Rather, social and physical *foci* such as kinship groups or neighbourhood streetcorners bring people together under auspices conducive for interaction (Feld 1982).

Weak ties of acquaintanceship far outnumber stronger ties of intimacy, support, companionship or routine contact. North Americans have an average of about 20 stronger, active ties, and nearly 1,500 weaker ties. These weak ties integrate social systems and speed the diffusion of information. Indeed, a person's many weak ties

are more useful for this purpose than his/her smaller number of strong ties. Strong ties link people who travel in the same social circles and hence, learn similar things. Weak ties not only access more people, they tend to be structurally more complex. Instead of being bound up in one densely-knit core cluster (as strong ties often are), weak ties complexly link people to networks whose members travel in different social circles and hence, hear new things (Granovetter 1973, 1982). Indeed, the larger the network, the more structurally complex (McPherson 1983).

Kin: Kinfolk, although few in number, usually form densely-knit, coordinated social systems (Wellman et al. 1992). People usually are acquainted with an average of 35 kin; about 63% of those available for interaction (Adams 1968; Firth, Hubert and Forge 1969; Lüschen 1972). This number excludes household members but includes in-laws and spouses of consanguines. Most also have at least one tie with a parent (or adult child) and with a sibling (Rosenthal 1987).

Thus kin make up about 2% of all ties directly available for membership in a personal community network and about 4% of all ties actually present in such a network. Should we lament the irrelevance of kinship because kin make up only 10% of these networks? Or should we celebrate that kin make up as much as 10% of these networks? The second, more positive attitude is in better keeping with the increasing importance of kinship as definitions of network members tighten from all ties to intimate ties.

Active Ties: Community network studies, like social support studies, have not looked at a large fraction of a person's 1,500 or so informal ties. Rather, they have looked only at small subsets of personal networks.⁴ Researchers have identified a

⁴My own community study of Toronto's East York has information based on interviews (lasting 10 to 15 hours) conducted in 1977-1978 with a subsample of 29 of the 845 randomly-sampled respondents in the first East York study (Wellman 1979). The respondents, (mostly British-Canadian, married—with children—holding regular blue, pink- and white-collar jobs), told us about their relationships with the 344 active members of their personal community networks.

range of 14 - 23 persons who are significant in one's life because of repeated sociable contact, supportiveness, or feelings of connectedness.⁵ This score of active ties provides people with most of their interpersonal support and companionship (Erickson, Radkewycz and Nosanchuk 1988).

Kin are substantially represented in most active networks, making up at least 30% of the active ties compared with less than 10% of all ties and 2% of all potentially-available ties. Thus a much higher percentage of kin than kith are actively involved in network relations. However, preferences for active involvement are bimodal, with most networks containing either few or many kin (Reiss and Oliveri 1983; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988).

Not all types of kin are equally represented. Most active kin relations come from the small number of available *immediate kin* (parents, adult children, siblings, including in-laws). By contrast, only a small minority of available *extended kin* (aunts, cousins, grandparents, etc.) are active network members.

^{4(...}continued)

Although we analyze fewer networks than most community network surveys, we analyze a greater number and variety of ties in each network than most such studies. The respondents' active ties are with 137 socially-close intimates and with 207 somewhat less-intimate significant persons with whom they also are actively in contact. The median active network has 4 intimate ties and 7 significant ties. Most ties extend beyond the neighborhood to other parts of the metropolitan Toronto area. Most networks are a lowdensity mixture of friends and relatives (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988). The active members of a network only include a small fraction of the respondents' 1,000 or so informal ties (Kochen 1989), although they usually include most living kin through first cousins (Wellman 1990). Thus our study provides information about the moderately to very strong ties that supply Canadians with most social support (Erickson, Radkewycz and Nosanchuk 1988) and ignores the many weaker ties important for obtaining information and integrating social systems. The 1978 interviews are more fully described in Wellman (1982, 1985, 1990, 1992), Wellman, Carrington and Hall (1988), and Wellman and Wortley (1989, 1990). The 1968 survey is described in Wellman (1979) and Wellman et al. (1973).

⁵Studies include: Fischer 1982b; Reilly and Cochran 1985; Willmott 1986, 1987; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; Wellman and Wortley 1989, 1990; Milardo 1989; Bernard and Killworth 1990.

Some studies suggest that certain social characteristics foster networks that contain a higher number and proportion of kin:

- -- Married people who acquire a set of in-laws along with their spouse (Heiskanen 1969; Wellman et al. 1992).
- Women actively involved in maintaining networks who bear a triple load of paid work, domestic work and community networking (Adams 1968; Firth, Hubert and Forge 1969; Lee 1980; Hammer, Gutwirth and Phillips 1982; Wellman 1985; Rosenthal 1985).
- Residents of rural areas, perhaps lacking the opportunities of urbanites to make friendships based on shared interests (Mirande 1970; Fischer 1982b).
- Members of the working-class more reliant on kin for domestic support and less involved with workmates after hours (Adams 1968; Bell 1968;
 Fried 1973; Willmott 1987).

Interactors, Intimates and Confidants: Most network studies have looked at even smaller subsets of network members: either frequently-seen interactors or socially-close intimates. Only to some extent are the same persons both intimates and frequent interactors (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; Milardo 1989). Many of the 10 or so frequent interactors are neighbours or workmates who rarely are intimates (Walker 1977; Kazak and Wilcox 1984). However, the few immediate kin who frequently interact usually are intimate.

Most network studies identify about 25% of the active ties – 4-7 ties – as distinctively close and supportive *intimates*. Intimate networks tend to contain equal numbers of kin and friends. Most intimate kin are *immediate kin*: usually equal numbers of parents (or adult children, depending on age) and siblings. There is conflicting evidence about whether immediate kin tend to be a person's closest intimate. Several studies report that an immediate kin is usually the socially-closest

member of a network.⁶ Extended kin rarely are intimates, making up only 6% of all intimates in the second Toronto study (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988).

A few studies have looked only at the tiny set of socially-close *confidants*: the 1-3 network members to whom people pour out their hearts. While most intimate and active network members provide only specialized kinds of support, confidants help in many ways. The largest and most reliable study of confidants, the 1985 U.S. General Social Survey, found that less than half of all confidants outside of households are kin.

NETWORK STRUCTURE - DIFFERENT CLUSTERS, LOW DENSITY

A set of kin form both a distinct social network and a part of a broader personal community network. The nature of this kinship system affects the structure and operations of personal community networks. Because kinship is an inherently-connected system, the kin who are active or intimate members of personal community networks are usually linked with each other (Firth, Hubert and Forge 1969; Johnson and Bond 1974). At least one kinkeeping person — usually a mother or daughter — converts normative obligation into high centrality by taking upon herself the task of maintaining ties among kin. The result of this kinkeeping is that two-thirds of active kin in the Toronto study — compared with only one-quarter of active non-kin — usually get together in group contexts such as dinners, holidays or picnics. By contrast to kinship, most friendship ties meet more privately as relations between individuals or couples.

The interconnections of kinship both constrain and promote interactions. The constraints come from the limited number of kin available to be network members. Yet normative feelings of obligations encourage people to interact with kin, especially with immediate kin (Farber 1981). At the same time, kinship connectivity fosters contact — and even frequent contact — with many persons whom they otherwise would not meet. The upshot is that kin predominate in high-density networks while

⁶Shulman 1972; Wellman 1979; Johnson and Leslie 1982; Hoyt and Babchuk 1983; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; see Burt 1986; Oliver 1986 for conflicting results.

friends predominate in low-density networks (see also Shulman 1972; Kazak and Wilcox 1984; Oliver 1984).

The most commonly-used structural measure is *network density*: the ratio of the number of ties actually present in a network to the number that theoretically could be present. Marriage brings more kin into networks but lowers the density of connections in these networks (Lüschen 1972; Gordon and Downing 1978; Wellman et al. 1992). Because marriage increases network size, the number of additional ties would have to increase geometrically to maintain an equivalent density. Yet except for parents-in-law, there is little contact between in-laws (Farber 1981). Similarly, although many of one spouse's friends become friends of the other spouse, only some of one spouse's friends become friends of the other spouse's friends (Kazak and Wilcox 1984; Willmott 1987). Furthermore, the number of friends may actually shrink after marriage, as spouses withdraw inwards to contemplate each other and their children (Johnson and Leslie 1982).

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Kin (and in-laws) form one or two distinct clusters in personal community networks. One consequence is that those people who have networks heavily composed of kin — such as homemakers without paid work — may have more densely-knit networks than other people. Kin rarely have direct ties with their kinfolk's friends. (They are indirectly connected through their mutual ties to the focal person at the centre of the network.)

The networks of widows and (to a lesser extent, divorcées) are intermediate in clustering between those of married people and ever-single people. Many relationships with parents and siblings in-law continue, especially when a single mother is raising children. Such relationships are available for emotional, instrumental and financial support.

RESIDENTIAL DISPERSION

Networks are not local residential groups. It takes a drive or a telephone call to keep in touch with most network members. The variety of residential distances may help to explain why networks tend to interact in small groups rather than as wholes. It is difficult to get individuals together at the same time and — except for

families gathering at "mother's house" — there is not a tradition of meeting in public or ceremonial spaces (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988). Hence, distance is strongly related to the amount of contact between network members. Network members use whichever means is handiest to contact one another.

Active ties are dispersed ties. About three-quarters of active ties in Toronto extend beyond the metropolitan area, and one-fifth stretch over 100 miles (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; see also Fischer 1982b). Strong, intimate ties are even less likely to be local. Because of this dispersion and scant public transit, North Americans must rely on cars, planes and phones to maintain active and intimate ties.

A key message of post-World War II research has been that kinship ties endure over long distances. Densely-knit structures and normative obligations encourage active kinship ties to maintain contact despite separation. Moreover, kinship ties — even formerly latent ones — often help migrants to obtain jobs, houses, spouses and local lore (e.g., Tilly and Brown 1967; Anderson 1974; Grieco 1987). Community analysts have generalized this message from kinship relations to all community ties. They contend that phones, cars and planes enable relationships to be active and intimate over long distances (Wellman and Leighton 1979).

Kinship relations reflect these broad tendencies. Most active and intimate kinship ties extend beyond the neighbourhood but remain in the same metropolitan area. However, kinship ties withstand separation better than friendship ties. The norms and structures that link kin — especially immediate kin — help them to be active and intimate network members even at a distance.

To be sure, distance reduces contact. Few kin now live near enough to make daily visits. The biggest decline in contact occurs when the tie extends beyond the metropolitan area, more than about one hour's drive, or 30 miles (Wellman 1979; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988). However, relations with kin are less sensitive to long distances than are relations with friends.

Despite the dispersion of kin, most people have an important minority of active and intimate kin living nearby. About one-quarter of active kin — including one or two intimate relatives — tend to live in the same neighbourhood. As these are usually

immediate kin, they are often quite supportive (cf. Fischer 1982a, 1982b; Willmott 1986, 1987; Gaunt 1988). However, most local ties are with neighbours and not kin, and it is neighbours and friends who provide most support and companionship.

The other pattern is one in which many kin — extended as well as immediate — live nearby, visit often, and rely heavily on each other for support. Such clusters of kin occur among those who have poor linguistic or financial resources for dealing with bureaucratic institutions.⁷ Willmott (1986) suggests that this pattern is more apt to occur in neighbourhoods with a stable population, room for kin to settle nearby, and jobs available locally. It is especially likely to occur in neighbourhoods with many poor residents who speak a different language or who are less-mobile manual workers.

Contact

Some analysts argue that the more contact between network members, the more supportive the relationship. They suggest that frequent contact encourages the provision of support by fostering shared values, increasing mutual awareness of needs and resources, mitigating feelings of loneliness, encouraging reciprocal rounds of support, and facilitating the delivery of aid (Homans 1961; Hammer 1983; Galaskiewicz 1985).

Despite planes and cars, it is not surprising that proximity and frequent face-to-face contact are still positively correlated.⁸ One important kind of social support—the provision of goods and services—is positively related to physical access, either through frequent contact or residential proximity (Wellman and Wortley 1990). Physical access makes it easier for network members to deliver services even when their relationship is not strong. However, physical access is not related to other dimensions of support. Network members are better able to provide companionship,

⁷American Blacks (Oliver 1986); poor white Londoners (Young and Willmott 1957); Italian-Americans (Whyte 1943; Gans 1962; Fried 1973; Johnson 1982); Italian-Canadians (Calzavara 1983), and Portuguese-Canadians (Anderson 1974).

⁸See the reviews in Keller 1968; Olson 1982; Unger and Wandersman 1985; Bulmer 1986; Hunter and Riger 1986; Silverman 1986.

emotional aid and financial aid over greater distances as giving such help less often requires that the network member deliver such aid through face-to-face contact.

The frequency of telephone contact is not significantly associated with the provision of any kind of social support. Rather, telephone contact is a universal backcloth, enabling network members to keep connected — and supportive — even over large distances (Wellman and Tindall 1992). Telephone contact is usually more of a voluntary act than is face-to-face contact, at least on the part of the caller. Thus frequent telephone contact is significantly correlated with the strength of a relationship as well as with the frequency of face to face contact.

Frequent contact interacts complexly with the residential distance that separates network members from focal persons (see also Cox 1969). While no relationship has been found between residential distance and telephone contact, the frequency of face-to-face contact does decrease with increasing distance (Wellman and Tindall 1992). Within local calling areas, the greater the distance separating the two parties, the higher their proportional reliance on the telephone for contact. They are more apt to drop in on those living near-by but are more likely to call those living at the other side of the metropolitan area.

The situation is reversed for long-distance calls. People in the Toronto study are more likely to make long distance calls to those living relatively near-by than to those living far away (Wellman and Tindall 1992). The interviews suggest that long distance calls are made more frequently to network members living closer to the respondents, because it is easier and cheaper to get together with such network members.

Telephone contact serves as a complement to face-to-face contact. The phone is used frequently to make arrangements for visits and the delivery of supportive resources. By contrast, some infrequent calls to distant relations are substitutes for

⁹Studies of the use of electronic mail systems whose costs do not vary by distance may resolve the question of whether it is the cost of the communication or the difficulty of complementary face-to-face contact over long distances that retards electronic communication (see Mantei, et al. 1991).

face-to-face contact. Despite direct dialling, long distance remains a barrier to frequent telephone contact.

Telephone contact does not replace face-to-face contact. Only when it is easy for people to get together often, do they speak often by telephone. To be sure, the telephone has helped transcend the constraints of spatial separation but only in conjunction with the automobile. It has enabled the dimensions of community to expand from the neighbourhood to the metropolitan area and outlying areas reachable by car trips. Indeed, our research (Wellman and Wortley 1990) suggests that this is true for the delivery of support as well as it is for the frequency of telephone (and face-to-face) contact.

Kinship scholars have been more interested in documenting the abundance of contact with kin than in comparing contact with kin to contact with friends. They have shown that almost all people are in at least weekly contact — in person or by telephone — with one intimate, immediate kin, and that most people also have weekly contact with one other intimate or active kin. At the other extreme, people are in contact less than once per month with about one-third of their active kin. Such contact is usually only for ritual occasions arranged by kinkeepers, such as birthdays, Christmas, and family get-togethers.

Frequency of contact with kin is a function of kinship closeness (immediate vs. extended kin), social closeness (intimate, active, latent), and spatial closeness (same neighbourhood, metropolitan area, long distance). Immediate kin have more contact than extended kin. In part, this is because immediate kin are more apt to have active or intimate relations. However, at each level of intimacy, immediate kin are in more contact than extended kin (Pitrou 1977; Fischer 1982b; Leigh 1982; Wellman and Wortley 1989; Wellman and Tindall 1992). The same normative and structural factors which help most ties with immediate kin to be active despite distance fosters frequent contact among these kin. Hence contact with immediate kin diminishes less with increasing distance than does contact with extended kin (Adams 1968; Klatzky 1971; Leigh 1982; Gaunt 1988).

Many geographically distant ties are latent. They become briefly active during rare visits, but they only become really active when migration brings proximity and

transient dependency. Hence migrants are likely to activate a few of their many weaker ties with extended kin, but they do not otherwise retain such people in their active networks.

An active kinship tie is apt to be in more frequent contact than an active friend-ship tie. Contact patterns are also different for immediate and extended kin. *Intimate* immediate kin also are more apt to have more weekly in-person contact. Despite the frequency of contact with immediate kin, most people have more friendship ties than kinship ties. Such routinely-seen ties often are not intimate or voluntary (Wellman 1990).

Few kin or friends live in the same neighbourhood, but many live elsewhere in the same metropolitan area. Kinship ties are better able to remain active and intimate over greater distances than friendship ties. One result is that a higher proportion of kin than friends do not live in the same metropolitan area. Although network members who live far apart usually have lower rates of contact, contact with kin diminishes less over distance than does contact with friends.

There is much more contact with immediate kin than with extended kin at the same levels of activity or intimacy. Although immediate kin usually are in more contact than friends, extended kin usually have the least contact. Contact between immediate kin is the least affected by distance. Kinship structures keep kin in contact even at a distance, but only immediate kin usually maintain frequent contact.

To be sure, some people — usually from ethnic minorities or low socioeconomic circumstances — have large clusters of kin near at hand for companionship and support. Yet the more common pattern is to maintain intensive relations with a small set of immediate kin: densely-connected, but residentially-dispersed. Together with approximately equal numbers of friends — also residentially dispersed but less densely-connected than immediate kin — these ties make up the core of personal community networks. More latent relations with extended kin remain in place, to be activated for specialized needs family get-togethers, or on migration (Wellman 1990).

Since telephone contact is more of a complement to face-to-face contact than a substitute for it, a relationship's frequency of face-to-face contact is the strongest

correlate of its frequency of telephone contact. The significance of this association is true for network members living in the local calling area (which may be up to 30 miles away), elsewhere in North America, or in Europe. When we hold constant the strength of the tie, the residential distance, and the role type, we find that people often see those they call often but rarely call those they rarely see. Thus 23% of the network members talk both by telephone and face-to-face at least once every two weeks, while 22% talk with each other less than once per month (Wellman and Tindall 1992).

Kin use the telephone more than do friends to keep in contact. This is true both for immediate kin and extended kin. Thus immediate kin tend to speak on the telephone a little more than once per week (an average of 60 times per year) while friends tend to speak about every other week (an average of 27 times per year; Wellman and Tindall 1992).

Locally, extended kin are much more likely than immediate kin to be telephoned rather than to be seen. By contrast, immediate kin living elsewhere in North America are much more likely than extended kin to be telephoned than to be seen. However, the frequency with which long distance calls are made to immediate kin is twice as high as the frequency with which they make such calls to extended kin. It is even higher than the frequency with which they make no-cost local calls to extended kin (Wellman and Tindall 1992).

There is a hierarchy of kinship contact here. When immediate kin live in the same local area, they are frequently seen face-to-face. The telephone serves as an adjunct. Contact with immediate kin who live elsewhere in North America also is frequent. The predominant mode of contact also is the telephone. But, unlike immediate kin who live locally, telephone calls serve much more as visits in their own right rather than as adjuncts to face-to-face meetings.

Extended kin who live in the local calling area are in less frequent contact than immediate kin, either face-to-face or by telephone. Despite their local proximity, when these extended kin tend to keep in touch by telephone. Extended kin who live a long distance away are rarely called. If they are in touch, it is likely to be face-to-face contact by means of infrequent visits or at family get-togethers.

Immediate kin are in much more contact than are extended kin. The contrast is even greater for face-to-face contact than it is for telephone contact. Immediate kin are seen frequently if they live locally; if they live far away, they are called frequently. Extended kin are called less often if they live locally; if they are live far away, they are only seen on rare occasions and hardly ever called. The telephone has now become a key means of maintaining ties with offspring that disperse (Wellman and Tindall 1992).

Telephones are not simple means of maintaining dispersed, unbounded communities. They help keep kin connected even more than friends and neighbours. But the personal community networks in which these kin fit are not the traditional densely-knit solidarities of neighbours. The telephone has allowed kin and friends to be strongly connected even when living apart. It has allowed them to select which kin with whom they will maintain ties — principally immediate kin. Hence the dispersed, often-dyadic nature of telephone-based relationships has given people manoeuvreing room to deal with their relationships — even when they chose to continue dealing with traditional ties to kin and neighbours.

SUPPORT FROM KIN AND FRIENDS

The Specialized Nature of Social Support

Social scientists originally treated social support as a generalized resource available from network members to deal with routine problems, acute crises, and chronic burdens. Working in health care research, they concentrated on showing that social support helps people to be happier, healthier, and longer-lived. Originally, many analysts believed that there was one generalized resource, social support, supplied by all network members: they confused network ties with supportive ties.

As theory and research developed in the 1980s, analysts have come to realize that not all network members are supportive, and that even those network members who are supportive may provide only certain kinds of assistance. For example, different network members often provide a focal person with emotional aid, material

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aid, information, and companionship.¹⁰ Figure 2 shows the results of a cluster analysis of the supportive relationships provided by Torontonians: It shows that different relationships are apt to provide sociable companionship, emotional aid, job/housing information, services, and financial aid (Wellman with Hiscott 1985). Moreover, there is a coherent social pattern to the kinds of support that different types of network members provide. Figure 3 shows that there are clear differences in the kinds of support provided to the Torontonians by friends, siblings, organizational ties, extended ties, adult children and parents (Wellman and Wortley 1989). One consequence of this differentiation in the nature and source of the support that different network members provide is that people must work hard to maintain diverse, supportive relations with a variety of network members: They cannot rely on more than one or two network members to provide a wide range of support.

>Figures 2 and 3 about here<

Network Size

Larger networks are more supportive (Burt 1987; Wellman, et al. 1987; Seeman and Berkman 1988; Fischer, et al. 1989), especially so for women (Stokes and Wilson 1984; Sarason, Sarason and Shearin 1986). The greater supportiveness of larger networks might be thought to be obvious in that the sheer weight of numbers in larger networks should produce more people willing and able to be supportive. However, a well-documented psychological research tradition in "bystander intervention" has shown that strangers are less apt to intervene when they are in larger crowds. The difference, though, is that networks are *not* composed of strangers. However weak the direct connection, all persons are indirectly connected at one remove because of their mutual tie to the person at the centre of the network. Presumably, larger networks are more gregarious, more communicative and, hence, more supportive.

¹⁰See the reviews in Wellman 1981; Hall and Wellman 1985; Lin, Dean and Lusel 1986; Israel and Rounds 1987; House, Umberson and Landis 1988.

¹¹Latané and Darley 1970, 1976; Darley and Batson 1973; Hacker, Ho and Urquhart-Ross 1974; Schwartz and Gottlieb 1980; Gillis and Hagan 1982.

Most kin who are potentially available to become members of personal community networks actually are network members. The stronger the relationship used to define a network, the higher the proportion of network members who are kin. Indeed, most immediate kin — and some extended kin — have strong ties in these networks as active and even intimate members. Immediate kin tend to be intimates and even confidants. Extended kin tend to be (non-intimate) active network members or have even weaker ties.

Network Structure

Social support researchers have looked more at the number and characteristics of relationships than at the structure of the networks in which these ties are embedded. Hence, there is little evidence about the relationship between network density and social support.¹² The usual, untested, assumption is that the greater connectivity of densely-knit networks would lead to greater internal communication and coordination, and that this in turn would lead to the provision of more — and more nuanced — social support. Low density eases normative pressure and enables people to have access to aid from more — and more diverse — social circles.

The effects of density are contingent on the kinds of support provided. Large services — such as emergency or chronic health care — tend to be more widely provided in high-density (and predominantly kin) networks. However, there is no significant relationship between network density and the provision of emotional aid and small services. Low density tends to be associated with a great deal of companionship in the network (Hirsch 1980). This is in keeping with the fact that friends tend to have few links with other network members (hence, networks containing a high proportion of friends tend to be low density) and that friends are more likely than kin to be companions (Wellman et al. 1987).

Perhaps it is not density that is conducive to support, but connectivity: some sort of linkage among network members. Kin are usually the only densely-connected

¹²For example, one influential study (Berkman and Syme 1979; Berkman and Breslow 1983) infers the existence of social integration from rather weak indicators (i.e., marriage, belonging to groups, vague reports of many social contacts).

members of active and intimate networks. This connectivity means that kin have the densely-knit relations useful for coordinating and controlling action. At the same time, high density often leads to *inbreeding* of information and opinions.

Kin are usually the most densely-connected members of active and intimate networks. Thus they have a unique structural basis for coordinated action: be it supportive, sociable or controlling. The relative lack of ties between in-laws makes the networks of married persons more sparsely-knit than the networks of most unmarried persons. Kinship ties, while densely-knit, do not have tight boundaries. Their connectivity provides a more coordinated basis to connect network members to other social circles.

Networks with the same density may vary markedly in the structural arrangement of their ties — and hence, in how supportive resources may flow through the system. They may have different patterns of integration and fragmentation within them. For example, one network might contain a cluster of densely-connected kin plus several disconnected *isolates*, while the connectivity of the other network might be evenly distributed with all members having one-third of all possible ties (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988).

Tie Strength

Personal relationship analysts have argued that the strength, or social closeness, of a tie is very much associated with the support that network members give one another (e.g., Wiseman 1986; Duck 1986; Perlman and Fehr 1987). Socially-close network members may feel an urge, obligation or pressure to help each other. Reciprocally, those network members who do help out routinely may become regarded as intimates by the recipients of their aid (Kadushin 1981). As solidary communities wither away, it is reasonable to wonder if contemporary people rely predominantly for support on their strong intimate ties rather than on aid from weaker relationships which are more subject to mobilization through network pressure.

Most studies of social support have looked only at strong, intimate ties, trying to discriminate among degrees of intimacy within a person's half-dozen or so most

intimate ties (see the reviews in Marsden and Campbell 1984; Hobfoll and Stokes 1988; Reis and Shaver 1988). Intimacy (perceived social closeness) has been the most studied dimension of tie strength. There has been comparative little work assessing the supportiveness of intimate ties with the other 1,500 or so ties in a person's network (but see Erickson, Radkewycz and Nosanchuk 1988).

Several North American studies show that among intimates, stronger, more intimate ties provided more support than somewhat less intimate ones (Wellman 1979; Fischer 1982b; Burt 1986). Wellman and Wortley's (1990) analysis of the second Toronto study looked at the effects of tie strength on different types of social support. It was found that most strong ties (i.e., those that had at least two of the characteristics of intimacy, voluntariness and multiplexity) provided either small services or emotional aid, or both. This was true, regardless of whether the strong tie was with friends or immediate kin. However, only strong friendship ties — but not strong kinship ties — were the most important sources of companionship.

Kinship and Support

There are both cultural and structural pressures for kin to be supportive. The densely-knit structure of most kinship ties intersects with North American norms encouraging supportive relations among kin. Cultural norms of amity encourage the provision of support to kin without an expectation of strict reciprocity.¹³

Such views of kinship contrast with the personal relationship analysts' depiction of strong, intimate ties as sparsely-knit, voluntary relations requiring constant maintenance (Litwak and Szelenyi 1969; Pitt-Rivers 1973). They also contrast with contemporary concerns about the decline of kinship in Western societies (Popenoe 1988). Not all possible kinship bonds are active. Do kinship relations depend on intimacy to be supportive, or does the supportiveness of kin operate independently of tie strength or other relational factors?

In arguing that kinship ties remain important sources of companionship and support, some analysts have sometimes reduced their conception of kinship to a form

¹³Farber 1966, 1981; Willmott 1987; Nye 1976; Mogey 1977; Grieco 1987; Cheal 1988.

of friendship (see the discussions in Craven and Wellman 1973; Fischer 1982a). In their view, kinship has become more of a voluntary act with individuals choosing to maintain active (as distinguished from latent) relationships with selected kinfolk. Unsupportive kin should be as rare as unsupportive friends in such voluntaristic networks, and kin should be indistinguishable from friends in the kinds of support they provide.

Yet most North Americans distinguish sharply between kith and kin, and they also distinguish among types of kin (Allan 1979; Farber 1966, 1981; Argyle and Henderson 1985; Willmott 1987). Making important distinctions, they feel they should have stronger ties with their *immediate kin* (parents, siblings and adult children) than with their other *extended kin*. Among immediate kin, they further distinguish between mutual *concern* between parents and adult children and mutual *interest* between siblings (Adams 1968; Fischer 1982a, 1982b). They have lesser expectations for supportive relations with extended kin: grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins (Leyton 1975; Coombs 1980; Farber 1981; Cheal 1988).

Unfortunately, there have been few comparisons of support from different types of kin and friends. Most existing studies have focused on informal care for the aged, a matter of great concern to policymakers and budgetmakers but limited in generalizability to other populations (see reviews in Antonucci 1990; Dykstra 1990). People are more apt to be dissatisfied with unsupportive friends than with unsupportive kin (Crohan and Antonucci 1989).

Several studies have argued the continuing importance of kinship by showing that most (immediate) kin are supportive. Although these studies do not present detailed comparisons of kin and friends, they do suggest that kin and kith differ in the quality and quantity of support they provide.¹⁵ Moreover, several studies (albeit of undergraduate students and the elderly) suggest that North Americans prefer to

¹⁴Firth, Hubert and Forge 1969; Mogey 1977, 1991; Farber 1981; Antonucci 1985; Fischer 1986; Mangen, Bengston and Landry 1988; Steinmetz 1988; Stone 1988.

¹⁵Ball, et al. 1980; Warren 1981; Young, Giles and Plantz 1982; O'Connell 1984; Dressler 1985; Essock-Vitale and McGuire 1985; Wagner 1987; Gerstel 1988; Chatters, Taylor and Neighbors 1989.

get emotional and instrumental help from parents and adult children in preference to friends, siblings, neighbours, extended kin, agencies, and acquaintances — in that order.¹⁶

Kin differ from kith in the kinds of support they provide and the circumstances in which they provide it (Wellman and Wortley 1989). Moreover, there are three distinct types of kinship roles: parent-adult child, sibling and extended kin, as well as roles of friendship, neighbour and workmate (Figure 3). Affines (in-laws) behave like consanguines. Because much support effectively goes to the household rather than to the focal person, kin often feel they are supporting their own blood relatives.

Although some people have large clusters of kin near at hand for companionship and support, the more common pattern is to maintain intensive relations with a small set of immediate kin: densely-connected, but residentially-dispersed. Together with approximately equal numbers of friends — also residentially dispersed but less densely-connected than immediate kin — these ties make up the core of personal community networks. More latent relations with extended kin remain in place, to be activated for specialized needs, family get-togethers, or on migration.

Immediate Kin: Relationships between parents and adult children have been celebrated for their combined supportiveness and destructiveness. Although these ties often have strains, most also convey much support. The bond between parent and adult child is the most supportive of all intimate and active ties, providing high levels of both material and emotional support. Such ties are so broadly supportive that weaker — but still active — relations are usually almost as supportive as intimate relations (Hoyt and Babchuk 1983; Arsenault 1986; Cheal 1988; Connidis 1989; Wellman and Wortley 1989).

¹⁶Mancini and Simon 1984; Stephens and Norris-Baker 1984; Peters, et al. 1987; Tausig and Michello 1988.

Mother-daughter ties are especially supportive, building upon shared concerns about (grand)children and domestic tranquillity.¹⁷ The coming of grandchildren may well transform lifetime mother-daughter conflicts to cooperative efforts by domestic coworkers. Indeed, these strong bonds are the foundation of informal care for the elderly (Connidis 1989; Crohan and Antonucci 1989).

Parents and adult children are each others' pre-eminent sources of informal financial aid to buy a house, take a trip, or provide care for illness and infirmity (Sussman and Burchinal 1962; Fischer 1982a, 1982b; Cheal 1988; Wellman and Wortley 1989). Moreover, parents do not reduce their support when many adult children compete for their attention (Aldous and Klein 1983).

Parents and children are the most likely of all network members to give each other gifts, emotional support, child care, care for family illness, and help with major home maintenance.¹⁸ Parents are the pre-eminent sources of financial aid for buying a house or dealing with crises and opportunities.

Despite the support that parents and adult children provide, most are not convivial companions with each other (Wellman and Wortley 1989). Thus loneliness among North American elderly is reduced through interaction with friends and neighbours but not with children (Taylor and Chatters 1986; Lee and Ishii-Kuntz 1987). Mothers and daughters often expect much support from each other, take its provision for granted, and complain when it is not given. Fathers and sons, who expect less, have fewer strains in their relationships.¹⁹

¹⁷Wood, Traupmann and Hay 1984; De Anda 1984; De Anda and Becerra 1984; Belsky and Rovine 1984; Binns and Mars 1984; Fischer 1986; Brown, et al. 1986; Willmott 1987.

¹⁸Johnson 1977; Mogey 1977; Pitrou 1977; Horwitz 1978; Unge. and Powell 1980; Riley and Cochran 1985; Taylor 1985, 1986; Willmott 1987; Cheal 1988; Radoeva 1988; Retherford, Hildreth and Goldsmith 1988; Wellman and Wortley 1989.

¹⁹Rosenblatt, Johnson and Anderson 1981; Marshall, Rosenthal and Daciuk 1987.

Sisters and brothers give each other much emotional and material aid, although the average sibling bond is not as supportive as the average parent and child bond. Unlike parent/child relations, there is much variation in the supportiveness of siblings: Intimate siblings exchange much more support than do siblings with weaker ties. When there are more than two brothers and sisters, only some may support each other.²⁰

Siblings, usually of similar ages, have shared histories and similar concerns. The similarity of their current situations resemble those of friends, but their ties are overlain by longer histories, commitment to norms of amity, and densely-knit kinship clusters. Indeed, the sibling role is more similar to friendship than to the parent, adult child or extended kin roles. In particular, sociability between siblings resembles friendship much more than do relations between other kin. Siblings are as likely as friends to do things together and to provide emotional support, more likely to provide large services and help around the household, but less likely to discuss ideas or help each other outside of their households (Wellman and Wortley 1989).

The extent to which people maintain active ties with *immediate kin* does not depend on the strength or accessibility of the ties as much as other relationships do. Some combination of normative obligations, structural connections, and genetic forces promotes the supportiveness of parents, children and, to a lesser extent, siblings. Although immediate kin make up a small portion of most networks, they are an important and reliable portion of supportive ties. Unlike friends, the availability of their support is not conditional on the strength of the relationship. Although support from siblings is linked more to the strength of the tie, the larger number of siblings means that they make up a sizable fraction of the supportive bonds.

Extended Kin: Extended kin have roles that are distinct from other kin and friends. Extended kin who have active relationships are less likely than other active network members to exchange social support. They are about one-half as likely as active immediate kin to provide each kind of support. The combination of low numbers of active ties, weaker relations, and low likelihood of support means that

²⁰Johnson 1982; Cheal 1988; O'Bryant 1988; Wellman and Wortley 1989; Bedford 1990.

extended kin are a negligible source of aid for most routine, chronic or acute problems.

The exception to the customary non-supportiveness of extended kin are in those situations such as migration or finding jobs where weak ties have a comparative advantage because of social and spatial dispersion. Kinship ties often help migrants to obtain jobs, houses, spouses and local lore.²¹ Extended kinship ties — even when not usually active or supportive — are strong enough and connected enough to convey news. Hence they are useful conduits of information, although the small number of kinship ties provides less news than do the larger number of acquaintances (Lin and Dumin 1986).

Friends and Neighbours

Friends: The current situation of friendships is linked to transformations in the nature of community. Work and community have separated, and cars, phones and planes have liberated community ties from being bound up in neighbourhood, kinship and work groups. One result has been that friendships now operate out of households rather than in public places.

The reorganization of work in the Industrial Revolution helped move friendships from shops (and near-by pubs) to homes. Because zoning segregates big plants and offices from residential neighbourhoods, coworkers commute from many different neighbourhoods and no longer return home together after work. The nature of work also discourages many workers from forming friendly ties. Some workers are isolated from others and supervisors do not become friends with subordinates. Although coworkers continue to use informal ties to accomplish their work and get through the day (Halle 1984), few relationships with coworkers continue after hours. Work has become one world, and community another.

²¹The literature on kinship aid for migration is vast, for both the Western and the Third worlds. See, for example, Mitchell 1956, 1961; Tilly and Brown 1967; Mayer with Mayer 1974; Anderson 1974; Roberts 1978; Graves and Graves 1980; Williams 1981; Segalen 1985 and Grieco 1987. The classic article on the maintenance of kinship ties over long distances is Litwak 1960.

Since World War II, telephones and cars have enabled people to maintain active community ties over long distances. Communities have been liberated from the constraints of space and the claims of neighbourhood, work and kinship groups. Each person (and each household) is at the centre of a unique personal community, usually consisting of kin, friends, neighbours and workmates; local, regional and long-distance ties. It is fairly easy for people to manoeuvre through their networks, interacting more with compatible people and avoiding disagreeable neighbours, kinfolk, coworkers and acquaintances (Wellman and Leighton 1979; Wellman 1988).

Rather than gathering in public places where they may have to deal with all comers, Torontonians now have selective encounters with dispersed network members who live an average of 9 miles away. Indeed, our Toronto community research shows that 73% of the men's ties are to people living outside of their neighbourhoods as are 50% of the women's ties. Friendships depend more on accessibility than do kinship ties. Friends comprise only one-quarter of the men's active ties with network members living more than 150 miles away. The other three-quarters of these long-distance ties are with kin whose normative obligations and network density help them to stay together.

The preponderance of non-local relationships have changed the ways in which network members are contacted. Rather than casual public encounters, they now meet in purposeful engagements. Torontonians telephone active network members almost as often as they see them and have some sort of contact with most network members at least once per week (Fischer 1982a; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; Wellman 1990; Wellman and Tindall 1992). Nor are long-distance connections only sustained by telephone.

The domestication of community means that friendship does not often come in communal groups. Couples stay home together most evenings and weekends. They go out together to see friends and relatives. Indeed, another Toronto study (Michelson 1985) shows that if one spouse socializes a lot, so does the other – probably together.

As friendships have moved into the home, homes have become less private. Where previous generations had confined friends to ground-floor parlors and dining

rooms, friends now roam all floors and rooms (Roncière 1985; Lawrence 1987). The norm is domestic sociability, a few friends gathering in private homes.

Most of the Torontonians' friendships operate on their own or in small groups of three or four couples (85%). Intimate friendships are often more private than other friendships. Friends do not form large, densely-knit groups. For example, only 18% of the possible active ties among the friends of married Torontonians actually exist, and there are even fewer active ties between friends and kin (Wellman, et al. 1992). Although marriage enlarges networks, the friends of husbands and wives do not become fully connected with each other. This low density means that friends rarely have the structural capacity to get together and communicate, coordinate or control the flow of resources to each other.

Most of the active and intimate network members with whom people socialize are friends and not kin (Havs 1988). Friends and neighbours make up nearly half of most active and intimate networks and usually form nearly half of the ties providing each kind of support. Friends themselves (not counting those network members regarded only as neighbours or sociable coworkers) make up about 25% of the active ties in networks and about 40% of the intimate ties (Wellman 1979; Fischer 1982b, 1982c; Willmott 1987; Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988; Wellman and Wortley 1990). Although most friends provide somewhat less variety and quantity of support than do parents and adult children, they are as likely as siblings to provide support and much more likely to do so than extended kin. Moreover, many of those people who do not have active kinship ties have one or two intimate friends who act like immediate kin by reliably providing a wide range of social support. Because friends tend to be the most similar of network members in personal characteristics and values, they tend to be effective in handling nontechnical tasks that require precise matching of norms and roles. They are the preeminent sources of conviviality and companionship in the networks, both because of their large numbers and because of their propensity to be sociable. Moreover, intimate friends (but not weaker acquaintances) are important sources of emotional and instrumental aid.22

²²Chappell 1983; Argyle and Henderson 1984; Duck and Miell 1986; Hays 1988; Litwak and Messeri 1989; Litwak Messeri and Silverstein 1990; Adams 1990.

Many friendship ties are discrete, voluntary relationships that function outside of groups. There is some evidence that the voluntariness of the relationship appeals to the recipients of support from friends because these recipients feel they have a bit more control over the relationship than comparatively involuntary kinship ties and because they perceive the support as more freely offered (Hobfoll, Nadler and Leiberman 1986; Wright 1989).

For better or worse, friendship is more problematic than kinship. It is a sparsely-knit relationship — often without committed group support — whose voluntary nature means that it must be constantly maintained and in which support must be in some way reciprocated.²³ Hence when friends are not helpful, the relationship often ends for lack of group support. It is not that friends are unsupportive when asked, but that people often do not feel confident that they can ask their friends for aid. Moreover, the amount and kind of support that friends give varies substantially. However, to say that kin are supportive and friends are sociable is as much an oversimplification as to say that there is no difference in the content of relations between kin and friends. Friendship significantly affects the nature of ties, but it does so interactively with the strength of a tie, the shared interests of the network members, and their physical access to each other.

Neighbours: Despite the extent to which contemporary relationships have overcome the friction of space, proximity still has some importance. Although most active ties are non-local, it is noteworthy that typically 10-25% are locally based even though people can potentially find active ties in the metropolitan area, region or beyond. While some of these local ties are to kin (usually immediate kin) and intimate friends who — not coincidentally happen to live near-by — most local ties are with network members regarded as "neighbours."

Most neighbouring ties are rather weak; they are neither intimate nor active. North Americans typically know approximately a dozen neighbours well enough to speak with (usually on the street), but they typically have only zero or one intimates

²³E.g., Litwak and Szelenyi 1969; Paine 1969, 1974; Allan 1979, 1989; Leyton 1974; Kadushin 1981; Perlman and Fehr 1987; Duck 1983; Argyle and Henderson 1984; Blumstein and Kollock 1988; Hays 1988; Berscheid, Snyder and Omoto 1989.

who are neighbours, and one other who is an active, but not intimate, tie (Keller 1968; Gates, Stevens and Wellman 1973; Hunter and Riger 1986). Whereas less than 20% of all active ties are with neighbours, the proximate availability of neighbours enables them to loom large in interactions (Wellman, Carrington and Hall 1988).

Community analysts traditionally believe that the accessibility of neighbours makes them good sources of support. Their residential proximity fosters frequent contact, densely-knit connections, mutual awareness of problems, and easy delivery of aid (Ericksen and Yancey 1976). They have shown that neighbours often provide child minding and help with domestic chores. The supportiveness of neighbours is especially linked to the delivery of tangible goods and services — from the proverbial cup of sugar to looking after a neighbour's child in the case of serious illness. The delivery of other forms of support — companionship, emotional support, financial aid — can often be provided over the telephone or through get-togethers, and neighbours are not especially relied on for such purposes.²⁴

By contrast with friendships, neighbouring ties are often less voluntary, especially when they are between women staying at home to raise children and husbands (Wellman 1985). Proximity makes active neighbours a principal source of routine companionship and aid for children, homes and spouses. Several less-mobile groups rely especially on local ties: children, the elderly, the ill and disabled, people staying home to raise children, immigrants not speaking the region's

²⁴Gans 1962, 1967; Stack 1974; Gates, Stevens and Wellman 1973; Fischer 1979; Merry 1981; Luxton 1980; Wellman and Wortley 1990.

²⁵Keller 1968; Gans 1962; Litwak and Szelenyi 1969; Gates, Stevens and Wellman 1973; Gans 1967; Wekerle 1976; Martineau 1977; Evans and Northwood 1979; Hunter and Riger 1986; Warren 1981; Ahlbrandt 1984; Gullestad 1984; Schuster 1985; Unger and Wandersman 1985; Willmott 1987; Campbell and Lee 1989; Wellman and Wortley 1990.

language.²⁶ Women, with their primary responsibility for homemaking, tend to be more involved than men with their neighbours.²⁷

An indirect function of many socially supportive ties is to provide a sense of identification, self-worth and of social belonging (Weiss 1974, 1987). Neighbours provide an important variant: a sense of belonging to a place. Neighbours, often more socially diverse than intimate friends or kin, can also link people to diverse social circles.

WOMEN AS KEEPERS OF COMMUNITY AND KINSHIP

Home as Base for Community

The separation of work and leisure has increased the time men spend at home while the development of smaller families and advanced household appliances has reduced the time women spend in domestic work. Men and women are more available to each other at home — to do domestic work and to play together (Young and Willmott 1973).

Just as urbanization once fostered public community among men, suburbanization now draws them away from public community. The neo-conservative privatization of Western societies — the withering of collective, public services for general well-being — is being reflected in the movement indoors of community life. North American homes stand detached from their neighbours and have become guarded fortresses (Sennett 1991). The empty streets and long distances of suburbia has made walking to public spaces difficult and unrewarding. Yet using cars affords fewer opportunities for casual contact en route than does walking through lively neighbourhoods (Jacobs 1961).

²⁶Gans 1962; Warren 1981; Gullestad 1984; Litwak 1985, Taylor 1986; Campbell and Lee 1989.

²⁷Young and Willmott 1957; Stack 1974; Fischer 1982b; Gullestad 1984; Greenbaum and Greenbaum 1985; Wellman 1985.

Public spaces have become residual places to pass through, to shop in, or to loiter in isolation (Sennett 1977; Whyte 1980; Hitt, et al. 1990). With the decline of public community, suburban shopping malls have become residual agoras, but for consumption purposes only. Unlike the public spaces of previous centuries, these privately-owned, profit-oriented spaces sell goods primarily for private, domestic use. Indeed, former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has warned the nation that it was on its way to being "a loose confederation of shopping centres" (Turner 1990).

The separation of homes from public community has helped bring husbands and wives together. They are in no mood to go out after they wearily commute long distances from work. In any event, zoning regulations requiring the separation of residential and commercial areas ensure that there are no near-by public places to go to. Domestic pursuits dominate and joint marriages flourish (Young and Willmott 1973). Husbands and wives spend nights and weekends with each other instead of men going off to pubs. Men spend more time in house work and child minding, even if they still spend much less time than their wives (Michelson 1985).

Community has become domestic, moving from accessible public spaces to private homes. Rather than being accessible to others in public places, Torontonians overcome their isolation by getting together with friends and relatives in private homes and by telephone. Yet cars leave garages as sealed units, opened only on reaching the other's home, and telephones stay indoors, sustaining only closed duets between two persons. The ties so easily reached remain out of view. As Torontonian Marshall McLuhan observed, North Americans go out to be private — in streets where no one greets one other — but stay in to be public — to meet their friends and relatives (1973, p. 16).

Women, whether or not they also do paid work, retain the key responsibility in most North American homes for keeping households going. Women have historically been the "kinkeepers" of Western society, with mothers and sisters keeping relatives connected (Rosenthal 1985; di Leonardo 1987). This has been a domestic activity, operated from the household (Adams 1968; Stack 1974; Luxton 1983). Men stay in touch with parents, siblings and children because kinship systems usually are actively maintained by a mother or sister (Rosenthal 1985; Piché 1988; Moore 1990). Analysts argue that women are socialized to a nurturing role in childhood and occupy

such roles in adulthood. By contrast, men are socialized to repress vulnerable feelings and openness, and to deal with others instrumentally and competitively (Lewis 1978; Fischer and Oliker 1983; Farrell 1986; Gouldner and Strong 1987; Sherrod 1989).

One result of the privatization and domestication of community is that community-keeping has become an extension of kinkeeping, with both linked to domestic management. Women now define the nature of friendship and keep much of it going for their husbands as well as for themselves. With the greater participation of men in household activities, informal ties among women friends, neighbours and relatives form the basis for many of the men's friendship relations between couples. Wives recruit most new friends and neighbours and arrange most get-togethers between couples and family members (including in-laws; Wellman 1992).

Women rely on their ties for important domestic work. While women who remain at home may not be paid for their labour, they also have a full time job: to take care of their husbands and children at home. As a result, their networks are structured by daily domestic demands. Women who stay at home regularly report that relations with kin are not nearly as numerous or as close as are relations with neighbours and friends (Wellman 1985). Network members help with daily hassles and crises; neighbours mind each other's children; sisters and friends provide emotional support and advice on caring for children, husbands and elderly parents. Most kinship ties are with immediate kin: mothers, daughters, sisters and (more rarely) brothers and fathers.

While women are taking on the burden of maintaining friendships for their husbands as well as for themselves, most of them also do paid labour. Like their peers who stay at home, working women function as social hubs, making and maintaining their households' community ties. But unlike working men, they are less apt to socialize after hours with coworkers or to use ties with friends, kin and neighbours to help them to do paid work. To cope with overwhelming demands (Luxton 1987, 1990; Cochran et al. 1990), working women cut back on friendship relations, one of the few discretionary uses of their time (Sharpe 1984; Michelson 1985; Wellman 1985; Hochschild 1989; Cochran et al. 1990). Instead, these women devote much of their ties and time to kin. Advantageously, kinship ties are easy to maintain,

organized into a social system with individuals to make social arrangements and maintain role obligations.

The result of this domestication of community is that men have companionship and social support but they — and especially their wives — must work at it. They must invite people over or deliberately call them on the telephone. There is little possibility for casual contact or the expansion of networks. There is little group support. Each friendship tie must be maintained separately and reinforced directly.

CONCLUSION

The Usefulness of Kinfolk

Contemporary Westerners wander freeways and shopping malls surrounded by strangers. The few known faces they encounter rarely are kin. The people whose company they keep rarely are kin — in the neighbourhood, at work, or at play.

No wonder that scholars have had to work so hard to assert the persistence and importance of kinship. Yet the closer one looks at personal community networks, the more prominent are kin. Out of their hundreds of relations, people form active ties with almost all of their immediate kin and some of their extended kin. These ties, often dispersed and invisible, make up a large minority of active ties and about half of intimate ties. They loom even larger as reliable, flexible, longterm sources of support.

The prominence of kin in these networks is greater than current size and contact figures suggest. Because kin usually have known each other at least twice as long as friends, they have had many more person-years of contact. Because kin are densely-connected with each other, conversations between two kin often refer to other kin. By contrast, friends are more often apt to engage in separate duets.

The importance of kinship suggests its uniqueness. Why would active and intimate networks have so many kin if they were just like friends? To be sure, quasilegal norms maintain kinship as systems. Rules and customs emphasize kinship

rights to share housing, obtain inheritances, sponsor immigrants and receive confidential information from bureaucracies. Yet the differences separating kin from kith are neither neat nor simple. Not only do kin differ from friends and neighbours in structure and deed, different types of kin differ from each other. There are no inclusive rules of amity requiring all kin to be supportive, and there are many friends whose ties transcend marketplace reciprocity. Parents and adult children are remarkably supportive but often do not enjoy each other's company. Extended kin have little content to their relations even when active; they are bound together only by structure. Sibling ties are almost as supportive as parent/child relations and almost as sociable as friendships. Friendship ties are the most variable — the term is a residual grab-bag for relations which are non-kin, non-neighbour, and non-workmate — yet intimate friends often provide the broad, reliable support characteristic of immediate kin.

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Underlying this diversity is the structural connectivity and normative amity of the kinship system. They are what keeps extended kin in personal communities, and what keeps parents and children supportive even when they do not enjoy each other's company. Kinship ties are relatively reliable without needing direct, one-on-one reciprocity. Immediate kin are reliably there for support, and extended kin are reliably available for acquaintanceship, news and adaptive life-changes. Kin are not necessarily expected to reciprocate directly as long as they remain members in good standing of the kinship network. In their distinctive ways, both immediate and extended kin help people and households to reduce interpersonal uncertainties in making their way through stressful, problematic worlds. By contrast, friends must reaffirm their ties continually, while neighbours are apt to move away or break relations over petty disputes. Although Canadians may live in a world of strangers, it is just such circumstances that makes so outstanding the contact, connectivity and supportive reliability of immediate kin.

The combination of abundance and tie strength means that strong ties with friends, neighbours and siblings make up about half of all supportive relationships. Because friends make up a large portion of these networks, their supportiveness is crucial. However, the aid that friends exchange depends on the strength of their relationships. Yet friends who are rarely seen or who live far apart tend to have weaker, less supportive ties. Hence people also maintain a few accessible ties with

neighbours and workmates who provide them with services. Such relationships usually operate dyadically or between couples; only full-time homemakers tend to be in densely-knit networks of neighbours.

Gender is the personal characteristic that is most directly associated with support. Yet gender is in many ways relational: both reflecting and determining social relationships. The involvement of women in providing emotional support to women friends and kin of both sexes is a product of their work as domestic relations specialists. Moreover, gender-linked employment statuses affect the kinds of services that network members exchange. Men fix things; women fix relationships and keep households and networks going. Men often repair others' cars and homes and help them to deal with bureaucracies. Women often help with homemaking, child care and health care. The recent attention paid to the lack of male emotional expressiveness has led to the downplaying of male contributions to domestic affairs. Yet the services men and women exchange contribute significant resources to their households' economies, with a value in the tens of thousands of dollars over a decade.

It is the nature of the relationships themselves that principally affects the provision of support in personal community networks. There is no significant evidence of group dynamics: interaction in group contexts does not substantially foster support, and the dearth of aid from the few active extended kin suggests that the supportive power of the kinship system rarely extends beyond a small number of immediate kin. Moreover, the personal characteristics of network members are not directly related to their likelihood of providing support. Most relationships are based on the mutual exchange of intangible or mundane resources, and differences in socioeconomic resources do not play a significant part in their supportiveness. The egalitarian nature of personal community ties — and the scarcity of patron-client relations — reflects North American material affluence and dependence on large institutions for material well-being.

Many of the Torontonians we studied realize that the quality of their relationships considerably affects the support that they will get through them. The networks' diversity and moderate density means that they must manage and mobilize many specialized ties separately. They are acutely aware of whom they can ask for

what kinds of help. Because so much support is related to social closeness, people must put much effort into maintaining strong ties with friends and active ties with immediate kin. At the same time, they set limits. Few want their mother-in-law living next door even though this strong, accessible tie with an immediate female kin meets all statistical criteria for supportiveness (Wellman and Wortley 1990).

The Future of Community

For a time, community analysts thought that all communities were densely-knit, broadly-supportive, local solidarities helping people to endure the ravages of the (post)industrial Revolution. Such a belief in the persistence of urban villages celebrated the vitality of kinship (and neighbouring) (Young and Willmott 1957; Gans 1962). As a counterpoise, network analysts have emphasized the diverse, ramified, sparsely-knit nature of most personal communities (e.g., Wellman and Leighton 1979; Fischer 1982b). In their view, communities are not merely havens from large-scale social forces but active arrangements by which people and households reproduce. They emphasize the virtues of emphasizing the social (and not spatial) basis of community and of showing how networks actively help people to engage with the outside world.

Yet communities are more apt to have mixed compositions and structures than to be purely local villages or dispersed networks. Within personal community networks, kin form a key core cluster efficiently structured for communicating needs and coordinating support. Their densely-knit cluster of relationships provide a haven from the demands of the outside world and many of the interpersonal bandages for domestic sores. Complementing this involuted group are strong and weak ties with friends, stretching outwards to connect a focal person to the diverse resources of other groups. These dispersed, ramified ties provide companionship in many arenas as well as entry points to new arenas (see also Parsons 1951; Wolf 1966; Litwak and Szelenyi 1969). To the extent to which both types of ties and structures are useful and complementary, then both are integral parts of a single personal community network.

Although the diverse networks provide diversified support, the networks' segmentation and moderate density hinders the widespread communication of needs and mobilization of activity. Reflecting modern trends in marketing and community,

the Torontonians we studied shop for support at specialized interpersonal boutiques rather than at general stores. While they get a wide variety of support from somewhere in their networks, they usually get different types of support from different network members. Not only different relationships — but different types of relationships — often provide companionship, emotional aid, services, and financial aid.

Supportive relations in comfortable First World milieus differ substantially from those in other circumstances. The low importance of the economic and political aspects of social support differs from those networks in First, Second and Third World social systems which are less economically or politically secure. Most North Americans are not coping with either shortages in consumer goods or with extensive bureaucratic regulation of their domestic affairs. They rely on market exchanges for almost all of their production and much of their consumption. Despite some variation, their institutional benefits such as schooling and medical care are abundantly available as citizenship rights. Hence they do not pay as much attention as do members of central-bureaucratic societies to having network ties with persons skilled in making and fixing things (such as home building) or with strong connections to strategic bureaucratic circles (cf. Sik 1986; Walder 1986). Having no urgent cares about daily survival, North Americans can manage domestic resources with less apprehension than, for example, Latin Americans living on the margins (cf. Lomnitz 1977; Roberts 1978).

The networks of North Americans are built around companionship, soothing domestic stresses, and reliable, flexible, low-cost domestic services. These are not trivial pursuits as few people want to place themselves at the mercy of markets and institutions to deal with such needs. Although analysts are just starting to calculate the costs and benefits of community network relations, these networks clearly contribute important and central resources that enable people to go about their daily lives, handle chronic stresses, and cope with acute crises.

These networks support reproduction, not production. They centre primarily on the household, secondarily on the community, and rarely have to do with earning a living. (Just as few personal community ties are with coworkers, few work ties extend outside of the job.) Many provide havens: a sense of belonging and being

helped. Many provide bandages: routine emotional aid and small services that help people to cope with the stresses and strains of their situations. A sizable minority provides safety nets that lessen the impact of acute crises and chronic difficulties. Several provide social capital to change situations — houses, jobs, spouses — or to change the world through interest group activity. Thus these networks are important to the routine operations of households, crucial to the management of crises, and instrumental in helping people to change their situations.

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FIGURE 1 : TYPICAL PERSONAL NETWORK




Figure 2: Cluster Structure of Support





FIGURE 3: CLUSTERING OF ROLE TYPES BY SOCIAL SUPPORT PROFILES



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> LE PARTAGE DES DÉCISIONS A L'INTÉRIEUR DU COUPLE ET LE STATUT DE SOUTIEN DU MÉNAGE

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Rapport soumis à Santé et Bien-être social Canada, dans le cadre du programme de la recherche sur la famille de l'Étude démographique



PARTIE I: BILAN SOMMAIRE DES RECHERCHES SUR LE PARTAGE DU POUVOIR À L'INTÉRIEUR DU COUPLE

Avec la révolution industrielle, les changements dans l'organisation du travail (de la fabrication en atelier à la production de masse) ont nécessité la séparation entre lieu de résidence et lieu de travail. La famille a cessé d'être une unité de production économique. Comme l'éducation des enfants faisait partie des tâches de la femme, c'est l'homme de préférence qui est allé travailler à l'extérieur. Cette division sexuelle du travail aurait donné à l'homme plus de pouvoir et d'indépendance: c'est lui le pourvoyeur de la famille. L'entrée massive des femmes mariées sur le marché du travail vient bousculer cet état de chose: l'homme n'est plus le seul pourvoyeur économique de la famille, potentiellement ou en réalité. A la division pourvoyeur-ménagère aurait succédé le système égalitaire, où les tâches ménagères et le pouvoir sont partagés (Davis, 1984). Beaucoup d'études ont montré que les travaux ménagers sont encore l'apanage quasi-exclusif des femmes, même quand elles travaillent à plein temps. Tout au plus les hommes "aident" plus qu'avant, sans toutefois prendre la responsabilité complète de secteurs traditionnellement dévolus aux femmes. Quant au pouvoir, il est plus difficile à mesurer, et c'est probablement pourquoi il y a tant d'études sur le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur de la famille.

L'ÉTUDE QUI A LAISSÉ SA MARQUE: CELLE DE BLOOD ET WOLFE

L'ouvrage qui a donné le coup d'envoi à la myriade d'études sur le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur de la famille est *Husbands and Wifes* (Blood et Wolfe, 1960). La théorie avancée par ces deux auteurs et la méthode qu'ils ont utilisée ont toutes deux été à la fois abondamment critiquées et utilisées, et c'est pourquoi cet ouvrage sera présenté avec plus de détail que ceux qui l'ont suivi, malgré qu'il ait été publié il y a plus de trente ans.

Blood et Wolfe expliquent le partage du pouvoir familial au moyen de la théorie des ressources: le pouvoir dépend des ressources relatives que chaque partenaire apporte dans la relation. Le membre de la famille qui a le plus de ressources a donc aussi le plus de pouvoir. Ils ont ensuite testé leur théorie auprès d'un échantillon d'épouses de la région de Détroit. Pour mesurer le pouvoir, ils leur ont demandé qui avait le dernier mot quand il fallait prendre

chacune des huit décisions suivantes: choisir l'emploi du mari, la marque de la voiture, le lieu des vacances, le médecin, le logement, décider de prendre de l'assurance-vie, de l'opportunité pour la femme d'entrer sur le marché du travail ou de quitter son emploi, de combien la famille peut débourser par semaine en nourriture. Ils ont constaté que certaines décisions sont prises unilatéralement, soit par le mari soit par la femme, et que d'autres sont prises à deux. Ils en ont conclu que le pouvoir familial était partagé entre les deux conjoints.

Pour retracer l'importance des ressources dans la prise de décision finale, ils ont accordé le même poids à chacune des huit décisions et les ont combinées dans un indice. Les ressources qu'ils ont définies comme pouvant déterminer le pouvoir sont les ressources du mari (profession, revenu, statut social, race, type de résidence) et les ressources comparées des deux époux (instruction, participation dans des organisations, activité de l'épouse). Selon leurs résultats, les cols blancs ont plus de pouvoir au sein de la famille que les cols bleus et le pouvoir du mari augmente avec son revenu et son statut social. Les maris de race noire ont moins de pouvoir que ceux de race blanche, et ceux qui habitent en banlieue en ont plus que ceux qui habitent en ville ou sur une ferme. Pour l'épouse, avoir plus d'instruction que son mari, faire partie d'organisations et travailler à l'extérieur du foyer lui donnent du pouvoir. Le pouvoir de la femme est plus élevé avant la naissance du premier enfant; il est à son minimum quand les enfants sont jeunes et augmente à mesure qu'ils vieillissent et partent du foyer parental.

Sensiblement les mêmes résultats ont été obtenus par beaucoup d'études similaires à celle de Blood et Wolfe, notamment celles de Heer (1964) pour les États-Unis, de Turk et Bell (1972) pour Toronto et de Michel (1967) pour la France, cette dernière étude ayant même été reprise avec des données plus récente par Glaude et De Singly (1986).

Deux revues de la littérature effectuées à dix ans d'intervalle, celle de Safilios-Rothschild (1970), qui couvre la période 1960-1969, et celle de McDonald (1980), qui couvre la période 1970-1979, arrivent à la conclusion que malgré ses failles, la méthode de Blood et Wolfe est encore abondamment utilisée. Beaucoup des problèmes identifiés par Safilios-Rothschild ont été reconnus par les chercheurs, mais peu de solution ont été trouvées.

Si Blood et Wolfe et leurs successeurs ont été abondamment critiqués, ce n'est pas tant à cause de leur théorie des ressources qu'à cause de leur mesure opérationnelle du pouvoir et à cause de l'interprétation qu'ils font de leurs résultats.

Problèmes méthodologiques

Si Blood et Wolfe en arrivent à conclure qu'il y a un partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple avec leurs données, c'est qu'ils ont accordé un poids égal à chaque type de décision qu'ils ont retenu. Or, toutes les décisions n'ont pas la même importance, comme elles n'interviennent pas à la même fréquence. Bien souvent, les épouses ne prennent les décisions que dans les domaines qui sont de moindre importance (Brinkerhoff et Lupri, 1978:17; Moisan, 1990).

On a aussi reproché à Blood et Wolfe de n'avoir interrogé que les épouses. Or certaines recherches ont montré des différences importantes entre les réponses des conjoints (voir Safilios-Rothschild, 1970, pour des exemples).

Définition opérationnelle du pouvoir

Par ailleurs, on peut se demander si prendre la décision finale confère toujours du pouvoir. On a constaté que dans les familles de classe ouvrière, les femmes prennent plus de décisions que dans les familles de classe moyenne. Mais quand il s'agit de "joindre les deux bouts", la femme ne retire pas de bénéfice personnel à prendre les décisions (Kocheis-Stangl, 1983; Pahl, 1983). Quand la femme a le contrôle total des décisions dans certains domaines, cela peu surtout signifier qu'elle ne peut compter sur aucune aide de son mari pour partager les tâches reliées à ce domaine (Kockeis-Strangl, 1983).

De plus, le pouvoir n'est pas unidimensionnel. La décision finale n'est qu'un aspect du pouvoir: son résultat. McDonald (1980), suivant Cromwell et Olson (1975), suggère de diviser le pouvoir en trois dimensions: les bases, le processus et le résultat. Le processus est fait de négociations: même dans le cas où la décision finale est prise par l'un des deux conjoints, elle a peut-être été influencée par l'autre conjoint. Cette dimension n'est pas touchée par l'étude de Blood et Wolfe et toutes les autres qui ont mesuré le pouvoir par le fait de prendre la décision finale. Les ressources retenues par Blood et Wolfe, telles que le revenu, la profession, la scolarité, formeraient les bases du pouvoir, mais elles ne seraient pas seules. En particulier, il faudrait ajouter le contexte normatif ((Rodman, 1972;

Dandurand, 1990), c'est-à-dire les attentes culturelles en matière d'autorité conjugale, le degré d'implication affective dans la relation (Safilios-Rothschild, 1976), les ressources non tangibles comme l'estime de soi (Pahl, 1983), la compétence dans les domaines de décision (Bahr, 1976). Tous ces facteurs, en particulier le processus de la prise de décision, ne sont toutefois pas faciles à mesurer.

Les récents travaux de l'équipe de Scanzoni (Hill et Scanzoni, 1982; Godwin et Scanzoni, 1989, Scanzoni et Godwin, 1990) visent à intégrer ces trois dimensions du pouvoir: le contexte (ou les bases), le processus et le résultat. Pour eux, le résultat est le degré d'acceptabilité de la décision, et il varie en fonction de l'efficacité de la négociation. La négociation sera efficace dans la mesure où les deux conjoints modifieront leurs demandes initiales. Ils ont testé leur théorie au moyen d'interviews de couples dans lesquelles l'interviewer procédait à l'aide de reconstitutions de discussions passées, méthode qui a elle aussi ses défauts. En effet, elle oblige à se fier à la mémoire des individus. Leurs données confirment cependant leur théorie: une plus grande participation dans la négotiation augmente l'acceptabilité du résultat. Parmi les variables qui servent à mesurer le contexte, la disparité de revenu entre les conjoints est celle qui a le plus d'impact sur le processus et son résultat.

FACTEURS RELIÉS AU POUVOIR

En somme, les auteurs qui ont étudié le pouvoir relatif des deux conjoints dans les décisions familiales ne s'entendent pas sur ce qu'est ce pouvoir et, en conséquence, comment le mesurer. C'est peut-être la raison pour laquelle beaucoup de facteurs ont été identifiés comme étant reliés au pouvoir familial dans les recherches théoriques et empiriques: les caractéristiques de l'époux et de l'épouse (âge, revenu, profession, instruction, statut social, attitude par rapport à l'attribution des rôles selon le sexe, implication dans la relation, sentiments par rapport au conjoint), leurs caractéristiques comparées (différence d'âge, de revenu, de profession, d'instruction, de compétence dans les domaines qui font l'objet de décisions à l'intérieur du couple, d'accès aux ressources), la participation de l'épouse sur le marché du travail, les caractéristiques de la famille (revenu, âge au mariage, présence d'enfants et leur âge), l'organisation domestique (division du travail) et les normes culturelles. Aussi étonnant que cela puisse paraître, même les plus récentes études sont muettes au sujet de l'impact

de la prolifération des familles reconstituées sur le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple.

Facteurs socio-économiques: revenu, scolarité, travail de l'épouse et profession

Ce sont de loin les variables qui influencent le plus le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple. Plus le revenu et la scolarité des conjointes sont élevés, plus elles occupent des professions prestigieuses, plus elles ont du pouvoir.

Le revenu apporterait avec lui le pouvoir de décider comment sera dépensé l'argent du couple. La différence de revenu entre époux est tellement reliée au partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple que Grindstaff et Trovato (1987) ont utilisé la proportion du revenu familial apporté par la femme comme un indicateur de pouvoir au sein de la famille. Si travailler à l'extérieur apporte du pouvoir à l'épouse au sein du couple, c'est grâce à la capacité de gagner de l'argent qu'il procure (Pahl, 1983; Wilson, 1990). Comme les épouses, quand elles travaillent, gagnent généralement beaucoup moins cher que leur mari, occupent surtout des emplois non prestigieux, elles ajoutent plus à leurs charges qu'à leur statut (Walum, 1981), et ont moins de pouvoir que leur mari (Gillespie, 1971; Pahl, 1983; Hertz, 1986); cette tendance est renforcée par la norme encore très répandue selon laquelle l'épouse doit rester au foyer pour élever ses enfants. Même si la femme gagne aussi cher que son mari, c'est souvent le mari qui reste le pourvoyeur officiel de la famille. Ainsi, l'épouse a plus de pouvoir quand elle gagne plus cher que son mari que lorsqu'elle gagne un revenu équivalent ou moindre (Moore et Sawhill, 1978; Michel, 1967), mais les couples n'aiment pas contempler cette éventualité (Bird, 1979; Pahl, 1983) qui les placeraient dans l'«anormalité».

La réussite professionnelle de l'épouse, quant à elle, lui donne du pouvoir dans la sphère publique. Si elle en donne à l'intérieur du couple, c'est que les rapports entre les sexes dans la sphère privée sont intimement reliés à ceux de la sphère publique (Dandurand, 1990:20). Dans le même ordre d'idée, la scolarité est aussi un indicateur de la compétence apportée à la famille en provenance de l'extérieur (McDonald, 1980).

Le manque de ressources économiques de l'épouse qui ne travaille pas accentue sa dépendance (Blood et Wolfe, 1960; Michel, 1967; Gilad, 1984; Therrien et

Coulombe-Joly, 1984), car elle tire son pouvoir largement de son rôle familial, auquel est accordé très peu d'estime (Lupri, 1983).

Plusieurs auteurs ont trouvé que les variables socio-économiques ne jouaient pas de la même façon selon la classe sociale: les épouses des classes ouvrières gagnent plus de pouvoir en allant sur le marché du travail que celles des classes moyennes (Heer, 1964; Lupri, 1983). Quant au revenu, Bird (1979) a observé que même si le pouvoir de l'épouse augmente avec la proportion que représente le sien par rapport au revenu familial, le pouvoir de l'époux reste plus grand quand son revenu est élevé. Quand le revenu de la femme est considéré comme un revenu d'appoint, les femmes restent dans un statut secondaire au sein de la famille (Bird, 1979; Grindstaff et Trovato, 1987; Dandurand, 1988). C'est souvent le cas dans les classes moyenne et aisée. On a aussi observé que la scolarité de l'époux augmente son pouvoir, mais pas dans les classes ouvrières (Walum, 1981).

Age et cycle de vie

"Les femmes plus âgées sont plus soumises et s'engagent moins volontiers dans des oppositions ouvertes" (Therrien et Coulombe-Joly, 1984:82-83). Peut-être ont-elles peur d'être délaissées pour une femme plus jeune. En effet, la jeunesse est, avec le physique féminin, l'une des ressources que la femme peut échanger contre le statut social et les revenus masculins, du moins dans le marché matrimonial (Bozon, 1990:328).

Dans les premières années du mariage, la femme travaille, n'a pas d'enfants et les décisions se prennent à deux. Quand les enfants arrivent, un modèle plus traditionnel de domination du mari s'installe, et le pouvoir de la femme diminue à mesure qu'augmente le nombre d'enfants (Long Laws, 1981). Le pouvoir de l'homme est à son maximum entre l'année suivant la naissance du premier enfant et les années préscolaires, parce que la femme arrête habituellement de travailler, donc devient plus dépendante (Blood et Wolfe, 1960; Michel, 1967; Pahl, 1983).

Organisation domestique

Blood et Wolfe (1960:53) avaient observé que les décisions étaient plus partagées que les tâches. Bahr (1976) a pour sa part constaté que la balance du pouvoir penchait du côté du conjoint qui avait le plus de compétence dans la tâche, mais seulement pour certaines tâches: éducation et soins des enfants, organisation des loisirs. Il a été incapable de tester si la relation entre

compétence et pouvoir variait avec l'importance de la tâche, car il n'y a pas de mesure qui comparerait l'importance des tâches familiales les unes par rapport aux autres. Est-ce qu'un plus grand partage des tâches assurerait un plus grand partage du pouvoir au sein du couple ? Beaucoup de théoriciens ont fait cette hypothèse, mais une recherche récente (Sexton et Perlman, 1989) a montré qu'il n'en est rien.

Attitudes

Jusqu'à présent, les tentatives de mesure de l'influence des attitudes sur le partage du pouvoir n'ont pas donné de résultats probants. Sexton et Perlam (1989) n'ont pas trouvé de relation entre l'attitude par rapport à l'attribution des rôles selon le sexe et le pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple. Scanzoni et Godwin (1990) ont pour leur part trouvé que les sentiments à l'égard du conjoint après la négociation étaient plus reliés aux sentiments avant la négociation qu'au résultat de cette négociation.

Accès aux ressources

Les femmes n'ont pas un accès égal à celui des hommes aux ressources qui donnent du pouvoir (Walum, 1981). Même si elles sont de plus en plus présentes sur le marché du travail, elles continuent d'occuper majoritairement des emplois peu prestigieux, moins payants. Selon Eichler (1987), l'égalité d'accès au marché du travail est une condition nécessaire au mariage égalitaire, qui reste un mythe pour le moment (Walum, 1981).

Au recensement de 1981, Statistique Canada a introduit un nouveau concept, celui de soutien de ménage, à partir de la réponse à la question: «Inscrivez le nom de la personne (ou de l'une des personnes) qui vit ici et qui est responsable du paiement du loyer, ou de l'hypothèque, ou des taxes, ou de l'électricité, etc., pour ce logement» (formulaire du recensement de 1981, p.4). On ne mentionne pas le terme «soutien» dans le questionnaire, peut-être pour ne pas raviver les protestations qui avaient entouré le recours au terme «chef de ménage» dans les recensements précédents (Wargon, 1977; Armstrong et Armstrong, 1987), et même en susciter d'autres. En effet, pourquoi la personne qui paie les dépenses de logement (ce que sont loyer, hypothèque, taxes, électricité, etc.) serait-elle plus le soutien du ménage que la personne qui paie les autres dépenses, comme la nourriture et les dépenses reliées au soin des enfants? Et comment ont répondu les ménages qui partagent effectivement les dépenses de logement, alors qu'on ne pouvait donner le nom que d'une seule personne au recensement?

En 1981, selon la bande-échantillon à grande diffusion (fichier des ménages/familles), dans 368 500 ménages unifamiliaux de famille principale époux-épouse (de droit ou de fait), c'est le nom de l'épouse qui a été inscrit comme responsable des paiements de logement (soit dans 6,8 % des cas). Vraisemblablement, certaines épouses sont effectivement responsables de ces paiements, mais d'autres partagent cette responsabilité avec d'autres membres du ménage, ou ont voulu, selon Wargon (1989:358), «signaler de cette manière un partage effectif des responsabilités», qu'elles paient ou non elles-mêmes les dépenses reliées au logement. Les épouses qui sont soutien de leur ménage partagent-elles les caractéristiques de celles qui ont habituellement plus de pouvoir ? Sont-elles, par exemple, plus scolarisée, plus jeunes, etc. ? Les femmes de la classe ouvrière sont-elles plus souvent soutien que celles des classe moyenne et aisée ?

L'univers étudié est celui des 5 405 500 ménages de familles principales épouxépouse (de droit ou de fait) dans lesquels soit le nom de l'époux soit celui de l'épouse a été inscrit comme responsable du paiement des dépenses de logement. Les quelques ménages où c'est un autre nom qui a été inscrit, en l'occurence celui d'un enfant, ont été exclus de l'analyse (10 500)¹.

Pour payer le loyer, il faut avoir un revenu. Les ménages ont donc été divisés en trois catégories, selon le revenu comparé des deux époux en 1980, année pour laquelle les revenus sont déclarés au recensement de 1981: le revenu de l'époux est plus élevé que celui de l'épouse (l'époux gagne plus cher, quelle que soit la source de son revenu), le revenu de l'épouse est plus élevé que celui de l'époux (l'épouse gagne plus cher) et les deux époux ont des revenus équivalents. Cette dernière catégorie comprend tous les couples dont les revenus annuels ne s'écartent pas de plus de 2 000. S'il n'y avait pas le poids de la tradition qui veut que le mari soit le pourvoyeur économique du ménage, on pourrait s'attendre à ce que les femmes qui ont un revenu total plus élevé que leur mari et les maris qui gagnent plus cher que leur femme se déclarent soutien du ménage. Quant aux couples dont les deux époux ont des revenus équivalents, ils devraient se répartir également entre époux soutien et épouse soutien, puisque selon le recensement canadien, il ne peut y avoir plus d'un soutien par ménage. Comme le montre le tableau 1, la réalité ne se conforme pas aux attentes: bien que la proportion d'épouses soutien soit plus élevée chez les épouses qui ont des revenus plus substantiels que leur mari, les différences de revenu entre les époux n'expliquent pas entièrement la proportion d'épouses qui se déclarent soutien de leur ménage, et il faut chercher d'autres facteurs.

Tableau 1: Proportion (%) d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

	% d'épouses soutien	N
L'épouse gagne plus que l'époux	24,5	4 403
Les deux conjoints ont des revenus équivalents	11.0	5 955
L'époux gagne plus que l'épouse	4,5	43 697
Total	6,8	54 055

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981

Pour distinguer l'influence des autres facteurs de celle de la différence de revenu, la catégorisation en trois types de ménage selon les revenus totaux comparés

¹1100 autres ménages "époux/épouse (11 enregistrements, puisqu'il s'agit d'un échantillon de 1 % des ménages) ont été exclus, parce qu'il s'agissait en fait de ménages d'une personne.

sera conservée pour le reste de l'analyse. L'accent sera mis sur les caractéristiques comparées des deux époux, parce que McDonald (1980), dans sa revue de la littérature, signale que les ressources comparatives ont plus d'influence sur le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple que les ressources de chacun des époux. Signalons au passage qu'en 1980, 8 % des épouses avaient un revenu total supérieur à celui de leur époux, et 11 % avaient un revenu équivalent.

Tout d'abord, un commentaire général sur les tableaux qui suivent s'impose: l'influence prépondérante du revenu comparé des deux époux se manifeste dans le fait que systématiquement, quelle que soit la catégorie de la variable considérée (profession, scolarité, catégorie de revenu, âge de l'épouse, nombre d'enfants, statut migratoire), la proportion d'épouses soutien est la plus élevée quand l'épouse gagne plus cher, et la moins élevée quand elle gagne moins cher. Jamais toutefois ne dépasse-t-elle 50 %: les époux continuent majoritairement de payer les dépenses de logement, même quand ils gagnent moins cher que leur épouse. Cette tendance varie cependant en fonction des caractéristiques du couple, comme nous le verrons au fur et à mesure de l'examen de chaque tableau.

VARIABLES SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUES

Le tableau 2 présente la profession comparée des époux. Seuls ont été retenus les couples dans lesquels les deux conjoints étaient sur le marché du travail. La division entre poursuivre une carrière et avoir un emploi a été faite en s'inspirant des travaux de l'équipe de Villeneuve (Villeneuve et Morency, 1990; Villeneuve et Viaud, 1987 et Viaud, 1988). C'est la profession qui leur a servi de base pour cette division: les personnes qui poursuivent une carrière ou bien sont propriétaires des moyens de production ou bien ils en ont un certain contrôle; les autres occupent un emploi. L'équipe de Villeneuve avait bénéficié de compilations spéciales du recensement, qui leur avaient permis de classer eux-mêmes les professions. Ici, seule une approximation très grossière de leur classification a pu être faite, à partir des 16 professions codées sur la bande-échantillon².

²Poursuivent une carrière: les directeurs, gérants et administrateurs; les travailleurs des sciences naturelles, du génie et des mathématiques; les travailleurs spécialisés des sciences sociales et domaines connexes; les enseignants; les professionnels en médecine et santé; les professionnels des domaines artistique et littéraire. Les autres occupent un emploi.

Tableau 2: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon la profession et le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

Profession comparée	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
les deux pousuivent				
une carrière	30,5 (505)	17,9 (419)	8,6 (2828)	12,6 (3752)
l'époux poursuit				
une carrière, l'épouse				
a un emploi	25,2	16,6	5,6	7,5
	(318)	(319)	(4449)	(5086)
l'époux a un emploi, l'épouse poursuit				
une carrière	23,9	14,7	8,4	12,7
	(972)	(517)	(2745)	(4234)
les deux ont un				
emploi	23,0	12,5	5,3	7,7
	(1705)	(1932)	(14239)	(17876)
Total	24,5	14,0	6,1	9,0
	(3500)	(3187)	(24261)	(30948)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

L'épouse est plus souvent soutien quand elle poursuit une carrière, que son conjoint poursuive lui-même une carrière (12,6 %) ou non (12,7 %). C'est la profession de la femme qui compte, non celle du mari, du moins quand l'époux gagne plus cher que l'épouse. Quand les revenus de l'épouse sont supérieurs ou équivalents à ceux de l'époux, la proportion d'épouses soutien est plus élevée quand les deux conjoints poursuivent une carrière (respectivement 30,5 et 17,9 %), et moins élevée quand les deux ont un emploi (respectivement 23,0 et 12,5 %).

Comme pour la profession, c'est le fait pour l'épouse d'avoir fréquenté l'université (tableau 3) qui augmente la proportion de soutiens féminins, alors que la scolarité plus élevée de l'époux n'a aucun impact sur la proportion. Quand les revenus de l'épouse sont plus élevés ou équivalents à celui de l'époux, la proportion des femmes soutien est nettement plus élevée si les deux conjoints ont fréquenté l'université (33,4 %, contre 27,9 % quand seule l'épouse a fréquenté l'université, et environ 22 % dans les autres cas).

Tableau 3: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon la scolarité et le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

scolarité comparée	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total	
époux avec université,					
épouse sans université	21,4	11,3	4,0	5,6	
·	(374)	(381)	(5235)	(5990)	
les deux sans université	22,6	9,4	3,8	5,8	
	(2899)	(4824)	(33056)	(40779)	
les deux avec université	33,4	22,3	8,8	13,2	
	(556)	(448)	(3506)	(4510)	
époux sans université,					
épouse avec université	27,9	18,2	8,5	13,6	
	(574)	(302)	(1900)	(2776)	
Total	24,5	11,0	4,5	6,8	
	(4403)	(5955)	(43697)	(54055)	

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

La proportion d'épouses soutien ne varie pas beaucoup en fonction du revenu du ménage (entre 6,3 et 8,1 %; tableau 4), quand on ne contrôle pas pour le revenu comparé des époux: à peine est-elle un peu plus élevée aux deux extrémités de l'échelle de revenu. Quand les revenus sont équivalents entre les deux conjoints, elle augmente avec le revenu, et quand l'épouse gagne plus cher que l'époux, elle est à son maximum entre 10 000 et 30 000 (28,0 % entre 10 000 et 20 000 \$, et 25,2 % entre 20 000 et 30 000). La difficulté d'interprétation de ces résultats indique que, des trois variables socio-économiques retenues ici, la profession et

la scolarité sont de meilleurs indicateurs de qui se déclare soutien que le revenu total du ménage.

Tableau 4: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon le revenu du ménage et le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

revenu du ménage	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
moins de 10 000	20,4	8,4	4,0	7,4
	(543)	(2238)	(2675)	(5456)
10-19 999	28,0	10,3	3,6	6,7
	(1222)	(1385)	(9783)	(12390)
20-29 999	25,2	13,3	4,2	6,3
	(1117)	(1083)	(13047)	(15247)
30-39 999	24,3	13,1	4 ,5	6,5
	(752)	(650)	(9199)	(10601)
40-49 999	21,4	16,5	5,3	7,3
	(397)	(340)	(4491)	(5228)
50 000 +	21,0	14,7	6,6	8,1
	(371)	(259)	(4501)	(5131)
Total	2 4,5	11,0	4,5	6,8
	(4402)	(5955)	(43696)	(54053)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

Selon la littérature sur le partage du pouvoir à l'intérieur du couple, le travail de la femme à l'extérieur du foyer lui procurerait du pouvoir dans la mesure où il lui permet de contribuer aux revenus du ménage. Pour distinguer l'effet du revenu de celui du travail, le tableau 5 compare les époux et les épouses qui n'ont pas travaillé en 1980, l'année pour laquelle les données sur le revenu s'appliquent, et les époux et les épouses qui ont travaillé pendant toute l'année 1980 (plus de 48 semaines), et surtout à plein temps. Même lorsque l'épouse gagne plus cher que l'époux, elle est nettement moins souvent soutien quand elle est inactive mais que son époux travaille (proportion de 7,3) que lorsque qu'elle travaille (28,8 % quand l'époux est inactif et 21,1 % quand les deux conjoints travaillent) ou que les deux conjoints sont inactifs (22,5 %). L'activité aurait un effect distinct du revenu sur la proportion d'épouses soutien.

Tableau 5: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon l'activité et le revenu comparés des deux conjoints en 1980

activité comparée	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
époux inactif, épouse occupée toute l'année,				
surtout à plein temps	28,5	4,0	9,7	23,6
	(288)	(50)	(31)	(369)
les deux occupés toute l'année, surtout à				
plein temps	21,1	14,6	7,6	10,4
	(1166)	1326)	(6527)	(9019)
époux occupé toute l'année, surtout à plein temps, épouse				
inactive ~	7,3	3,4	1,8	1,9
	(68)	(149)	(10237)	(10454)
les deux inactifs	22,5	6,8	3,4	5,5
	(222)	(2059)	(3165)	(5446)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

AGE ET CYCLE DE VIE

La proportion d'épouses soutien diminue à mesure que l'âge de l'épouse augmente (tableau 6), pour atteindre son minimum à 45-54 ans ou à 55-64 ans. Elle remonte ensuite, mais très légèrement, sauf dans les familles où les revenus des deux époux sont équivalents. En même temps, la proportion diminue avec le nombre d'enfants à la maison (tableau 7). Les jeunes couples et ceux qui n'ont pas d'enfant ont plus tendance à indiquer l'épouse comme soutien du ménage: par exemple, quand l'épouse gagne plus cher que l'époux, presque le tiers des épouses de 15-24 ans sont soutien, et 29,0 % de celles qui n'ont pas d'enfant. Ces résultats s'accorderaient avec ceux de la littérature sur le partage du pouvoir en relation avec le cycle de vie.

Tableau 6: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon l'âge de l'épouse et le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

Age de l'épouse	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
15-24	32,8	15,7	7,5	11,1
	(548)	(752)	(4306)	(5606)
25-34	27,0	15,5	5,1	7,9
	(1357)	(1294)	(12858)	(15509)
35-44	22,0	10,7	4,1	5,8
	(871)	(735)	(9964)	(11570)
45-54	21,0	8,9	3,1	4,9
	(753)	(650)	(7911)	(9314)
55-64	20,5	8,7	3,5	5,4
	(596)	(773)	(6088)	(7457)
65 +	21,9	7,4	4,4	6.6
	(278)	(1751)	(2570)	(4 599)
Total	24,5	11,0	4 ,5	6,8
	(4403)	(5955)	(43697)	(54055)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

Tableau 7: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon le nombre d'enfants à la maison et le revenu comparé des deux conjoints en 1980

Nombre d'enfants	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
aucun	29,0	12,1	6,7	10,3
	(2187)	(3606)	(13427)	(19220)
1 enfant	23,5 (868)	11,9 (1084)	4.1 (9493)	6,3 (11445)
2 enfants	18,5	7,0	3,4	4,5
	(857)	(800)	(12345)	(14002)
3 enfants	17,2	7,0	2,7	3,6
	(308)	(316)	(5710)	(6334)
4 enfants +	16,4	6,0	3,3	4,2
	(183)	(149)	(2722)	(3054)
Total	24,5	11,0	4 ,5	6,8
	(4403)	(5955)	(43697)	(54055)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

Jusqu'à présent, les recherches sur le partage du pouvoir conjugal n'ont pas exploré les différences qui pouvaient exister entre les immigrants et les natifs d'un pays. Etant donné la part de plus en plus grande que prend la population immigrée dans l'ensemble de la population, et que cette part augmentera au cours du temps à cause de la volonté du Canada de recevoir plus d'immigrants, il est intéressant d'examiner si le fait d'être immigré change la proportion d'épouses soutien. L'épouse est moins souvent soutien quand les deux époux sont immigrés (tableau 8) que lorsqu'ils sont nés au Canada, quel que soit son revenu par rapport à son conjoint: ainsi, dans 5,3 % des couples dont les deux conjoints sont immigrés, c'est l'épouse qui est le soutien, alors que ce pourcentage est de 6,8 quand les deux conjoints sont nés au Canada. Cependant, quand seul l'époux est immigré ou que l'épouse a immigré depuis plus longtemps que l'époux, l'épouse est plus souvent soutien que dans les couples nés au Canada. Peut-être que ces épouses sont plus présentes sur le marché du travail (au recensement de 1986, les épouses des familles immigrées étaient plus actives que les épouses de l'ensemble du Québec; voir Mongeau, 1990:25) et ont plus de stabilité d'emploi que celles qui ont immigré plus récemment, ce qui leur donne le «droit» de payer les dépenses relatives au logement.

Tableau 8: Proportion d'épouses soutien en 1981 selon le statut d'immigration et le revenu comparés des deux conjoints en 1980

Statut d'immigration	épouse gagne plus	revenus équivalents	époux gagne plus	Total
les deux nés au				
Canada	24,5	11,4	4,4	6,8
	(3172)	(4135)	(32190)	(39497)
seul l'époux est				
immigré	32,0	15,4	6,3	10,1
	(369)	(435)	(2705)	(3509)
seule l'épouse				
est immigrée	27,0	10,7	5,4	7,8
	(226)	(299)	(2182)	(2707)
es deux ont immigré	19,5	7,6	3,5	5,3
	(635)	(1086)	(6620)	(8341)
les deux ont immigré				, ,
à la même période	18,0	7,2	3,5	5,1
	(505)	(959)	(5489)	(6953)
l'époux a immigré				
depuis plus longtemps	14,5	6,8	2,5	3,6
	(62)	(74)	(805)	(941)
'épouse a immigré				
depuis plus longtemps	35,3	17,0	5,8	11,6
	(68)	(53)	(326)	(447)
Total	24,5	11,0	4,5	6,8
Total	(4402)	(5955)	(43697)	(54054)

Source: Bande-échantillon ménages/familles du recensement de 1981.

CONCLUSION

En résumé, dans les familles principales époux-épouse, typiquement l'épouse qui est soutien de ménage gagne plus que son conjoint et poursuit une carrière. Elle a fréquenté l'université, son conjoint aussi. Elle a moins de 35 ans et n'a pas d'enfant. Cependant, dans les familles qui ont exactement ces caractéristiques (166 familles de la bande-échantillon, donc 16 600 familles pour l'ensemble du Canada), c'est encore l'époux qui est le soutien du ménage dans 41 % des cas. La tradition qui veut que l'époux prenne en charge les dépenses fixes du ménage est encore très vivante, même si les plus jeunes s'y conforment moins que leurs

aînés. Toutefois, toutes les variables mises ici en liaison avec la proportion d'épouses soutien étant corrélées, il faudrait procéder à une analyse multivariée pour départager l'influence de chacune, ce qui n'a pu être entrepris ici, faute de temps.

Par ailleurs, les femmes soutien partagent certaines des caractéristiques des femmes qui exercent plus de pouvoir dans leur couple: elles sont en moyenne plus instruites et plus actives sur le marché du travail, elles sont plus jeunes et ont moins d'enfants. Cependant, on ne peut affirmer que le fait d'être le soutien du ménage soit un bon indicateur d'un pouvoir plus étendu que celui de l'autre conjoint. En effet, comme nous l'avons vu précédemment, la recherche sur le partage du pouvoir conjugal, quoiqu'abondante, n'a pas réussi à définir de façon non équivoque ce qu'était le pouvoir conjugal.

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LES EFFETS DES IMPÔTS ET DES TRANSFERTS SUR LES COMPORTEMENTS RÉCENTS DE FÉCONDITÉ ET DE TRAVAIL DES QUÉBÉCOISES: SIMULATIONS RÉALISÉES À L'AIDE D'UN MODÈLE DE CHOIX DISCRETS!

par

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LES EFFETS DES IMPÔTS ET DES TRANSFERTS SUR LES COMPORTEMENTS RÉCENTS DE FÉCONDITÉ ET DE TRAVAIL DES QUÉBÉCOISES: SIMULATIONS RÉALISÉES À L'AIDE D'UN MODÈLE EMPIRIQUE DE CHOIX DISCRETS

RESUMÉ

Nous utilisons un modèle qualitatif de choix (un modèle logistique conditionnel et séquentiel de choix discrets) afin d'évaluer la sensibilité des comportements des femmes «mariées» du Québec à des changements dans les flux attendus de revenu liés à des modifications de la politique fiscale et de la politique de transferts en faveur des familles avec enfant(s) à charge. On suppose que les femmes (couples) mariées ou vivant en union consensuelle, ayant moins de 40 ans, font face à trois types de décisions séquentielles: la décision de fécondité, la décision quant au nombre d'enfants et la décision de travailler ou de pas travailler. Ce processus hiérarchique de prise de décision définit huit options où chacune est caractérisé par sa valeur. Nous estimons la sensibilité des choix entre ces options compte tenu des flux de revenu attendus associés à chacune des options et ainsi, à des changements des paramètres de la fiscalité personnelle et du niveau des aides monétaires publiques en faveur des enfants. Le modèle est estimé, à l'aide de micro-données portant sur les années 1984 à 1988, par maximum de vraisemblance à information complète, en tenant compte du problème d'autosélection des échantillons. En prenant en considérations les estimations empiriques de la sensibilité des comportements des femmes, on obtient un cadre empirique permettant de simuler les effets de changements apportés aux politiques fiscales et de transferts en faveur des familles avec des enfants à charge sur le bien-être des familles, la fécondité et l'ampleur des déboursés pour l'État.

THE EFFECTS OF TAXES AND TRANFERS ON FERTILITY AND WORK BEHAVIOR OF WOMEN IN QUÉBEC: SIMULATIONS FROM A SEQUENTIAL POLYCHOTOMOUS DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL

ABSTRACT

We use a qualitative model of choice (a nested polychotomous discrete choice model) to evaluate the responsiveness of the behaviour of «married» women in Québec to changes in the expected flow of revenue resulting from modifications to the fiscal and transfer policies towards families with dependent children. We suppose that married women or living common law, who are less than 40 years old, are faced with three types of sequential decisions: the fertility decision, the decision relative to the number of children to have and the decision concerning labour force participation. The hierarchical process of decision defines eight situations that have an option value. We estimate the responsiveness of these choices to variations in the expected flow of revenue resulting from changes in the parameters of the personal income tax and in the level of public monetary transfers conditional on the number of children. The model is estimated with micro-data for the years 1984 to 1988 with a full information maximum likelihood method. Our estimation of female wage equations conditional on the number of children takes into account the problem of sample selectivity. Finally this empirical setting is used to simulate the effects of changes made to the fiscal and transfer policies in favor of families on fertility, women labour force participation and the importance of spending costs for the State (governments).

1. INTRODUCTION

La littérature scientifique en démographie économique portant sur les déterminants de la fécondité accorde une large place au coût d'opportunité des enfants en montrant qu'il est lié aux caractéristiques socio-économiques des couples ainsi qu'aux variables de l'environnement économique. En outre, elle insiste fortement tant sur l'endogénéité des décisions parentales de fécondité et de travail que sur leur interdépendance et leur caractère dynamique (voir par exemple Ermisch, 1989).


Notre analyse adopte cette approche économique et la complète en y introduisant certaines «innovations». La décision de fécondité des couples, la décision quant au nombre d'enfants et la décision de participation au marché du travail sont modélisées comme des décisions discrètes différentes mais interdépendantes. On spécifie un modèle de choix discrets qui permet d'analyser les décisions parentales des familles d'aujourd'hui, dans lesquelles les femmes n'ont pas, pour la plupart, complété leur cycle de fécondité et sur lesquelles portent les micro-données disponibles les plus récentes. L'estimation empirique prend en considération les paramètres de la fiscalité personnelle spécifique aux familles ainsi que les paramètres des programmes de transferts conditionnels à la présence et au nombre d'enfants à charge. Enfin, sur le plan économétrique, le modèle est estimé de façon efficiente. Comme on suppose que les choix se font rationnellement sur la base de la valeur attendue (en termes d'utilité ou de revenu) des situations particulières de fécondité et de participation au marché du travail des femmes, on obtient alors une estimation de la sensibilité des comportements à des changements dans la valeur attendue de chacune des options. Cette approche procure un cadre statistique formel permettant d'analyser les effets possibles sur la fécondité et la participation au marché du travail de modifications apportées aux paramètres des politiques fiscale et de transferts relatives aux familles.

La section 2 présente un modèle polytomique de choix discrets et les résultats de son estimation réalisée à l'aide de données sur un échantillon de femmes québécoises colligées au cours de la période 1984-1987. La section 3 rappelle les principaux paramètres des politiques publiques de soutien économique aux familles. Elle soulève alors certaines questions auxquelles doit répondre une politique qui se veut nataliste. Enfin, elle contient des scénarios de modifications apportées aux politiques fiscales et de transferts ainsi que leurs

effets sur la natalité. Une courte conclusion souligne les principaux enseignements des simulations au plan de la politique démographique ainsi que les limites de l'exercice.

2. UN MODÈLE EMPIRIQUE DE CHOIX DISCRETS DE FÉCONDITÉ ET DE TRAVAIL: SPÉCIFICATION ET ESTIMATION

La structure de notre modèle peut se représenter par le schéma suivant qui identifie les niveaux de décisions ainsi que les options auxquelles sont confrontées les femmes (les couples):



où F = 0,1 représente les choix associés à la décision de fécondité; K = 1,2,3 les choix associés à la décision du nombre d'enfants (K = 0 si F = 0); et L = 0,1 ceux associés à la décision de participation au marché du travail, pour chacune des valeurs de K. Cet arbre de décision définit un ensemble de choix avec 8 options caractérisées par leur «valeur».

2.1 Un modèle polytomique séquentiel²

Formellement, on suppose que le niveau d'utilité d'une personne i (la valeur de chaque option) est donné par la fonction suivante³:

$$V_{ifkl} = V_{ifkl} (W_{ifkl}, Y_{ifkl}, X_{ifkl})$$
 (1)

où les indices f (enfant(s)/pas d'enfant), k (nombre d'enfants) et l (travaille/ne travaille pas) identifient les différents niveaux du modèle; W_{ifkl} est une mesure du salaire net de l'épouse; Y_{ifkl} est une mesure de son revenu hors travail et X_{ifkl} est un vecteur de variables socio-économiques exogènes qui représentent l'hétérogénéité des préférences des femmes et de leur famille mais dont les valeurs restent constantes quelle que soit l'option choisie. C'est sur la base des valeurs prises par les arguments de cette fonction d'utilité que repose l'explication des choix observés dans l'échantillon utilisé.

À chacun des niveaux de l'arbre de décision correspond une <u>forme structurelle</u> et une <u>forme réduite</u>. La forme structurelle comprend des variables dont la valeur change selon l'option choisie (salaire, revenu disponible) et des variables socio-économiques dont la valeur reste fixe (éducation, âge, etc.) quelle que soit l'option. La forme réduite ne contient que des variables dont la valeur est indépendante de l'option choisie. Elle est obtenue en remplaçant les variables dont la valeur change avec l'option par des <u>variables</u> instrumentales permettant de les prédire⁴.

Les spécifications de la forme structurelle du modèle peuvent être présentées séparément pour chaque niveau de décision. Les fonctions de probabilités de participation au marché du travail (L=1 ou L=0) conditionnelles, à la fécondité et au nombre d'enfant(s), sont les suivantes:

Prob {L=1|F,K} =
$$\frac{\exp \{(\alpha_{fk} W_{fkl} + \delta_{fk} Y_{fkl} + X_{fk} \beta_{fkl})/(1 - \mu_{fk})\}}{\frac{1}{\sum \exp \{(\alpha_{fk} W_{fkm} + \delta_{fk} Y_{fkm} + X_{fk} \beta_{fkm})/(1 - \mu_{fk})\}}},$$

$$m=0$$
(2)

où les variables explicatives (pour L=0,1 et K=0,1,2,3) W_{fkl} , Y_{fkl} , Y_{fk0} , et X_{fk} représentent respectivement le taux de salaire net de l'épouse; son revenu hors travail virtuel (l'intersection de l'axe du revenu disponible et de la contrainte budgétaire linéarisée à un nombre de semaines donné); son revenu hors travail dans la situation où elle ne travaille pas; et un vecteur de variables socio-économiques qui tient compte de la diversité des préférences des femmes relativement au loisir et à la consommation, dont les

valeurs sont invariantes selon l'option choisie; alors que les α , δ , β sont des coefficients estimés attachés à ces variables et μ est un indice de similarité des choix de ce niveau⁵.

Les probabilités d'avoir un nombre donné d'enfants, conditionnelles à la décision de fécondité, sont les suivantes:

Prob {K=k|F} =
$$\frac{\exp \{(\alpha_{f} W_{fk} + \delta_{f} D_{fk} + X_{f} B_{fk} + \Theta_{f} I_{fk})/(1 - \mu_{f})\}}{3},$$

$$\Sigma \exp \{(\alpha_{f} W_{fm} + \delta_{f} D_{fm} + X_{f} B_{fm} + \Theta_{f} I_{fm})/(1 - \mu_{f})\}}$$

$$m=1$$
(3)

où W_{fk}, D_{fk}, X_f et I_{fk} (pour F = 1 et K = 1,2,3) sont les variables explicatives qui représentent respectivement le taux de salaire net des femmes associé à chaque valeur de K; le revenu disponible des couples qui varie pour chaque valeur de K; un vecteur de variables socio-économiques, exogènes et indépendantes des salaires et du revenu disponible, qui identifient l'hétérogénéité des préférences familiales relativement au nombre d'enfants; et la valeur des variables d'inclusion obtenues du niveau inférieur L. Les taux de salaire nets associés à chacune des options permettent de mesurer le coût d'opportunité d'avoir 1, 2, 3 enfants ou plus. Les variations du revenu disponible (qui exclut le revenu de travail net de l'épouse) du couple reflétent la variation du nombre d'enfants et les effets différenciés des transferts publics et des mesures fiscales conditionnelles à la présence d'enfants.

Enfin, au niveau supérieur de l'arbre de décision, la fonction de probabilité (non-conditionnelle) d'observer une femme dans ces options (F=0 ou F=1) est donnée par:

Prob {F=f} =
$$\frac{\exp \{(\alpha W_{f} + \delta D_{f} + X \beta_{f} + \tau I_{f}\}}{1}$$

$$\frac{\sum \exp \{(\alpha W_{m} + \delta D_{m} + X \beta_{f} + \tau I_{f}\}}{m=0}$$
(4)

Les variables indépendantes sont les taux de salaire nets (W_f) , les revenus disponibles (D_f) différenciés selon la valeur prise par f, un vecteur de variables socio-économiques (X_f) tenant compte des préférences relatives des couples vis-à-vis la décision d'avoir ou non des enfants, et les valeurs d'inclusion calculées au niveau K. Pour les femmes ayant des enfants (cas où f=1), on suppose que leur salaire net et leur revenu disponible sont une moyenne pondérée des variables correspondantes utilisées lors de l'estimation de la forme structurelle de niveau K (=1,2,3). La pondération provient des probabilités prédites d'observer ces femmes avec K (=1,2,3) enfants. Pour les femmes n'ayant pas d'enfant, on suit la même démarche pour leur calculer un salaire net et un revenu disponible, de façon à tenir compte des valeurs que prendraient ces variables dans l'éventualité où elles auraient 1, 2 ou 3 enfants ou plus.

Finalement, les probabilités non conditionnelles relatives permettant d'évaluer, à l'aide des coefficients estimés, les huit options de l'arbre de décision que chaque femme observée dans l'échantillon pourrait choisiré, sont données par la relation fonctionnelle suivante:

Prob
$$\{F,K,L\}$$
 = Prob $\{L|F,K\}$ * Prob $\{K|F\}$ * Prob $\{F\}$, (5)
(pour $F=0,1$; $K=1,2,3$ si $F=1$; $K=0$ si $F=0$; $L=0,1$).

2.2 Données et échantillon

L'échantillon est construit à l'aide de quatre bandes de micro-données de l'Enquête sur les finances des consommateurs de Statistique Canada réalisée en 1985, 1986, 1987 et 1988 et portant sur le revenu (de l'année antérieure) des familles économiques. Dans un premier temps on a retenu seulement les familles qui répondaient aux critères suivants: les couples mariés avec ou sans enfant(s) célibataire(s)⁷ dont l'épouse était âgée de 23 à 40° ans et qui vivaient au Québec au moment de l'enquête. Par la suite, on a éliminé de l'échantillon les familles qui présentaient certaines caractéristiques très spécifiques: celles dont l'épouse était «en permanence incapable de travailler»; celles dont les revenus de placement étaient négatifs ou très élevés (supérieurs à 50 000\$) et celles dont le chef (habituellement le mari) avait travaillé moins d'une semaine, avait un revenu de travail inférieur à 1\$ ou était en permanence incapable de travailler.

L'estimation des coefficients de la forme structurelle du modèle implique l'utilisation de taux de salaire et de revenus disponibles qui soient nets d'impôts pour tous les couples de l'échantillon. La procédure pour obtenir ces variables fut d'abord de prédire des taux de salaire bruts pour les épouses dans chacune des situations pertinentes (K=0,1,2,3) à l'aide d'équations de salaire spécifiques, estimées en tenant compte explicitement du problème d'autosélection et enfin, de calculer des taux de salaire et des revenus disponibles nets d'impôt à l'aide d'un programme permettant de calculer les impôts payés. Ce dernier reproduit l'ensemble des paramètres de la fiscalité des particuliers en vigueur au palier fédéral et au palier du Québec pour chacune des années. C'est-à-dire les dispositions fiscales relatives aux revenus assujettis aux impôts personnels, aux déductions, aux exemptions personnelles, aux allocations familiales, au crédit d'impôt remboursable pour enfants à charge ainsi qu'aux barèmes d'imposition. Le programme permet donc de calculer les impôts et les taux marginaux d'imposition de l'épouse et de l'époux¹⁰. En outre, il est conçu de façon à pouvoir calculer le revenu hors travail (virtuel) net de l'épouse lorsque le nombre de semaines de travail est nul (dans le cas des non-travailleuses)¹¹ et égal au nombre minimal de semaines requis pour que l'époux ne puisse plus bénéficier même partiellement de l'exemption de personne mariée (dans le cas des travailleuses)¹².

2.3 Résultats de l'estimation de la forme structurelle du modèle

Le tableau 1 présente les résultats de l'estimation des coefficients de la forme structurelle du modèle.

[Tableau 1 ici]

Comme les options de référence selon les niveaux de décision sont le fait de <u>ne pas participer</u> au marché du travail (niveau L), le fait d'avoir un seul enfant (niveau K) et le fait de <u>ne pas avoir d'enfant</u> (niveau F), le signe des coefficients indique dans quel sens (positif ou négatif) varient la probabilité <u>de participer au marché du travail.</u> d'avoir deux ou trois enfants (ou plus) et d'avoir au moins un enfant.

Les variables explicatives se divisent en deux groupes, soit les variables socio-économiques dont les valeurs restent inchangées selon les niveaux de décision et les variables économiques dont la valeur change selon l'option¹³. L'examen de l'effet des variables du premier groupe sur la probabilité de participer au marché du travail indique que la participation à la période précédente (PPT), dont le coefficient est très significatif, exerce une influence non ambigue: les femmes qui ont participé au marché du travail comme travailleuses à temps plein ou à temps partiel l'année précédente ont une probabilité élevée de travailler durant l'année en cours. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, lorsque le plus jeune enfant est âgé de 7 à 24 ans plutôt que de 0 à 6 ans (la catégorie de référence), la probabilité de participer au marché du travail s'accroît. Les variables de scolarité ont toujours l'effet auguel on peut s'attendre: plus les femmes sont scolarisées plus leur probabilité de participation au marché du travail s'en trouve accrue. La probabilité de participer au marché du travail croît avec l'âge des femmes lorsqu'elles ont deux enfants ou plus et diminue pour les femmes sans enfant ou avec un seul enfant¹⁴. Au niveau de décision K, les variables d'âge (âge et âge au carré) captent l'évolution du nombre d'enfants dans les familles au cours du cycle vital. Leurs coefficients, respectivement positifs et négatifs et statistiquement significatifs (dans trois cas sur quatre), reflètent l'augmentation de la probabilité d'avoir plus d'un enfant suivant l'âge de l'épouse. Puisque les coefficients des variables de génération (COHT)¹⁵ sont positifs et fortement significatifs, la probabilité d'observer une femme avec un enfant de parité supérieure à un croît au fur et à mesure que l'année de naissance de cette femme s'éloigne dans le temps. Le fait de détenir un diplôme universitaire (ED 8) réduit significativement la probabilité d'avoir deux ou trois enfants (ou plus) plutôt qu'un seul¹⁶. Les coefficients des variables liées à la taille de la population dans la région de résidence (REG 2-4; REG 5) montrent que la probabilité d'avoir plus d'un enfant augmente significativement lorsque la famille vit dans une région autre que celle de la catégorie de référence (500 000 habitants ou plus). Les variables dichotomiques qui tiennent compte de l'année de l'enquête (YR) montrent que la probabilité d'avoir plus d'un enfant est systématiquement plus faible pour les années antérieures à celle utilisée comme catégorie de référence (1987). En d'autres mots, le modèle montre un glissement du taux de fécondité lorsque les autres variables sont gardées constantes. Ce résultat peut paraître étonnant compte tenu que sur la période 1984-1987 l'indice synthétique agrégé a régulièrement diminué. On peut avancer l'explication que la baisse de ce taux s'explique par l'évolution au cours de cette période des variables incluses dans le modèle. Enfin, au niveau de décision F, les variables mentionnées plus haut ont un effet analogue sur la probabilité d'avoir au moins un enfant plutôt que de ne pas en avoir.

Le groupe des variables économiques en comprend six. Deux d'entre elles apparaissent à tous les niveaux de l'«arbre de décision» et présentent des valeurs identiques à chacun des niveaux. Ce sont le salaire net prédit de l'épouse (NWW1) et le revenu disponible net de la famille excluant le salaire de l'épouse (NUEI1) dans le cas où le couple n'aurait qu'un seul enfant. Ce sont des mesures <u>interfamiliales</u> du coût de l'enfant (représenté par le prix implicite du temps de l'épouse) et des ressources disponibles au sein de la famille dans pareille situation. La théorie économique suggère que les coefficients de ces variables devraient être respectivement positifs et négatifs au niveau L et négatifs et positifs aux niveaux K et F. Tous les coefficients estimés sont statistiquement non significatifs sauf trois qui ont un signe contraire à celui attendu. Nos estimations indiquent qu'en général, une hausse du taux de salaire de l'épouse augmente sa probabilité de participation au marché du travail et réduit la probabilité d'avoir au moins un enfant ou d'en avoir deux. De même, une hausse du revenu disponible¹⁷ de la famille entraîne une diminution de la probabilité que l'épouse travaille et qu'elle ait deux ou trois enfants.

Les valeurs prises par deux des autres variables économiques du modèle dépendent des options (de travail et de fécondité) choisies. Ces variables sont le taux de salaire net prédit de l'épouse (NWWK et NWWF) dans la situation où elle aurait 0, 1, 2 ou 3 enfants et le revenu disponible correspondant de la famille¹⁸ (NUIK et NUIF). Ces variables (non conventionnelles) permettent de mesurer sur une base <u>intrafamiliale</u> la variation du coût d'opportunité et la variation des ressources disponibles de la famille résultant de la décision d'avoir deux ou trois enfants plutôt qu'un (niveau K) et de la décision d'avoir au moins un enfant (niveau F) plutôt que de ne pas en avoir. Au niveau K, on s'attendra à ce qu'une hausse du salaire net prédit de l'épouse dans les options K=2,3 relativement au salaire net prédit dans l'option K=1 représente une diminution du coût d'opportunité (rémunération sacrifiée en restant hors marché du travail un certain temps) associé au fait d'avoir deux ou trois enfants plutôt qu'un seul. Dans ce cas, une hausse du salaire

net de l'épouse serait associée à une propension plus grande à avoir deux ou trois enfants plutôt qu'un. Un modèle conventionnel suggèrerait un effet négatif du salaire réel sur la propension à avoir plusieurs enfants parce qu'aucun contrôle statistique n'est exercé sur la rémunération que se verrait offrir une femme dans chacune des options possibles. En outre, une hausse du revenu disponible dans les options K=2,3 relativement à l'option K=1 reflète l'augmentation des transferts nets et la baisse des impôts personnels conditionnels au nombre d'enfants et devrait donc accroître la probabilité d'avoir deux ou trois enfants plutôt qu'un seul. Ces prédictions restent valides, mutatis mutandis, lorsqu'appliquées au niveau F.

Finalement, on introduit dans le modèle deux autres variables permettant de mesurer le revenu hors travail¹⁹ (virtuel) de l'épouse au niveau L dans les options de la participation et de la non-participation au marché du travail (NUEIL). À ce niveau, les coefficients associés aux variables de salaire net et de revenu hors travail devraient tous être positifs.

Au niveau L, les coefficients estimés des variables de revenu hors travail sont en général positifs (tel que prédit), bien qu'un seul soit statistiquement significatif. Au niveau K, les coefficients des variables de salaire net et de revenu disponible sont statistiquement significatifs et conduisent aux effets attendus: plus ces variables prennent des valeurs élevées dans les options correspondant à deux et trois enfants, plus la probabilité d'observer une famille de cette taille augmente. Ces résultats, par ailleurs statistiquement significatifs, soutiennent au plan empirique l'idée qu'un accroissement des aides monétaires (fiscales et directes) conditionnelles au nombre d'enfants a un effet potentiellement non négligeable sur la fécondité.

Au niveau de décision F, on s'attendrait à ce qu'une augmentation du salaire net de l'épouse et du revenu disponible de la famille exercent une influence analogue sur la probabilité d'avoir au moins un enfant plutôt que de ne pas en avoir. Les coefficients associés à ces variables, quoique non significatifs, sont négatifs plutôt que positifs. Deux attitudes peuvent être adoptées dans l'interprétation des implications de ces coefficients. La première, optimiste, consiste à ignorer ces résultats en se basant sur le fait que les coefficients en question sont mesurés avec peu de précision. La seconde nous suggère de considérer avec circonspection les résultats obtenus au niveau K. En principe, une augmentation de la probabilité qu'un couple ait deux ou trois enfants plutôt qu'un seul à la suite d'une hausse des paiements de transferts n'est

pas incompatible avec une incapacité de ce type de politique à convaincre des couples sans enfant d'en avoir. Néanmoins, on comprend mal comment une hausse des paiements de transfert pourrait entraîner une diminution de la probabilité que des couples sans enfant en aient au moins un. Ce résultat apparaît difficilement explicable mais il suggère que la décision d'avoir des enfants plutôt que de ne pas en avoir ne répond pas de la même façon aux aides monétaires conditionnelles à la présence et au nombre d'enfants que la décision portant sur le nombre d'enfants pour les couples qui ont choisi d'en avoir au moins un.

3. SIMULATION DES EFFETS DE MODIFICATIONS APPORTÉES AUX POLITIQUES DE SOUTIEN À LA FAMILLE

3.1 Principaux paramètres des politiques publiques et tendances démographiques de 1984 à 1987

Aux deux paliers de gouvernement, les politiques fiscale et de transferts à l'égard des familles ont été modifiées de façon importante au cours de la période 1984-1987. En 1984, le gouvernement fédéral décidait de ne plus indexer, selon la disposition relative à l'augmentation du «coût de la vie», l'exemption fiscale pour enfant à charge de moins de 18 ans. En 1986, il appliquait un traitement identique à l'exemption fiscale pour «enfants» de 18 ans et plus. Au cours de la période 1983-1986, le seuil de revenu à partir duquel le crédit d'impôt pour enfant devient remboursable cessait d'être indexé. En 1985, le gouvernement fédéral décidait qu'à partir de 1987, le crédit d'impôt remboursable serait augmenté, que le seuil de revenu nécessaire pour conserver intact ce crédit serait abaissé et finalement, que l'exemption fiscale pour enfant à charge serait réduite pour atteindre en 1989 le niveau des allocations familiales de cette même année. Ces dernières n'étaient indexées que pour la partie de la hausse du coût de la vie qui dépassait 3%. Les mesures concernant l'exemption fiscale et les allocations familiales les auraient rendues à terme équivalentes à un crédit d'impôt remboursable mais forfaitaire. La réforme fiscale de 1º88 a modifié ces mesures avec pour résultat de réduire le crédit forfaitaire au fur et à mesure que croît le revenu du contribuable.

Au Québec, le budget de 1984-1985 annonçait l'instauration, à partir de l'année 1986, d'exemptions fiscales substantielles pour enfants à charge (exemptions qui avaient été éliminées pour les enfants de moins

de 16 ans lors de la restructuration des allocations familiales en 1967). Cependant, les allocations familiales fédérales devenaient imposables et les allocations provinciales étaient soumises à une récupération totale par l'impôt du Québec (sauf pour les familles à très faible revenu). Les allocations familiales du Québec sont indexées au coût de la vie de façon discrétionnaire par le ministre des Finances (par exemple, il n'y a pas eu d'indexation en 1985). Les allocations de disponibilité, qui n'ont jamais été indexées depuis leur création en 1982, étaient modifiées en 1987 pour devenir progressives en fonction du rang de l'enfant plutôt que dégressives. Le budget 1987-1988, associé à la réforme fiscale de 1988, ainsi que les budgets qui devaient suivre ont modifié la plupart des dispositions à l'égard des familles tout en introduisant de nouvelles mesures. Les principaux paramètres des politiques qui prévalaient entre 1984 et 1987 sont présentés au tableau 2²⁰.

[Tableau 2 ici]

Les changements dans les comportements procréateurs des Québécois et des Québécoises au cours des trente dernières années sont bien connus. L'indice synthétique de fécondité, qui est un indicateur parmi d'autres, devait tomber en «chute libre» pendant les années soixante pour se stabiliser à 2,1 en 1970, soit approximativement le seuil de remplacement des générations. Cet indice devait diminuer légèrement durant les années soixante-dix, baisser rapidement à la fin de la décennie, stagner à 1,44 de 1983 à 1986, pour atteindre son niveau le plus bas en 1987 à 1,35 et remonter quelque peu depuis (1,65 en 1990). En outre, depuis vingt ans, on observe que l'âge auquel les femmes donnent naissance à un premier enfant augmente systématiquement et que le taux d'infécondité «permanente» croît. Ces tendances ne peuvent que conduire à une diminution de l'indice synthétique de fécondité sur un horizon plus long²¹.

3.2 Principales questions posées par une politique nataliste

Certains démographes et économistes soutiennent que les politiques publiques peuvent renverser ces tendances de fond ou du moins encourager suffisamment les comportements de fécondité pour que

collectivement la fécondité se rapproche du seuil de remplacement des générations. Pour créditer la politique familiale d'une présomption d'efficacité sur le plan démographique, il faut s'interroger sur ses effets. Ceci soulève deux types de questions.

En premier lieu, sans objectif affiché il apparaîtrait difficile de mesurer si l'effet recherché s'est effectivement produit. Quel est le but visé en termes de naissances, de taux de natalité ou de fécondité? Il est possible de baliser cet objectif en estimant, à l'aide des indices synthétiques de fécondité et du nombre de naissances observées pour les années 1984 à 1989, le «déficit» des naissances observées par rapport au nombre de naissances qui assurerait ou tendrait vers le remplacement des générations (soit un indice synthétique de fécondité de 1,8 ou de 2,1). Les résultats de ce calcul apparaissent au tableau 3, dans lequel les écarts du nombre de naissances sont obtenus à l'aide des taux spécifiques de fécondité par âge des femmes de 23 à 40 ans pour chacune des années. Cette simplification peut être justifiée par le fait que, pour ces années, environ 85% des naissances au Québec étaient attribuables à des femmes appartenant à ce groupe d'âge. La proportion des naissances totales chez les femmes âgées de moins de 23 ans (environ 13%) ou de plus de 40 ans (environ 2%) diminue chaque année. Il est donc raisonnable de supposer que leur taux de fécondité n'augmentera pas dans les années à venir.

[Tableau 3 ici]

En deuxième lieu, il faut être en mesure d'évaluer l'efficacité des moyens spécifiques qui peuvent être mis en oeuvre en tenant compte des efforts financiers que la société devrait alors consentir. Sur le seul terrain des mesures fiscales et de transferts - qui n'épuisent pas évidemment l'«arsenal» des stratégies d'action pronatalistes - on peut penser qu'il suffit de les bonifier afin de réduire le «coût des enfants». Cependant, il y a plusieurs façons de le faire qui s'inspirent toutes du principe de la compensation des charges familiales induites par la présence d'enfants.

Il s'agit de compenser le coût induit au niveau familial par la présence d'un enfant supplémentaire. La notion fondamentale est ici celle du <u>niveau de vie par personne</u>. Logiquement le coût d'un enfant

supplémentaire équivaut au supplément de revenu dont la famille devrait disposer pour que son niveau de vie et celui de chacun de ses membres demeurent constants. Or les diverses études existantes montrent que les coûts associés à la présence d'un enfant varient sensiblement en fonction de son rang, de son âge et du revenu familial². Par voie de conséquence, l'application du principe du coût de l'enfant conduit à donner une orientation à la composante démographique de la politique familiale: celle-ci devrait accorder une aide d'autant plus élevée que le revenu familial est important et être davantage favorable aux enfants de rang 1 et 2. En effet, une politique démographique globalement nataliste mais véritablement neutre quant à l'«origine sociale» (ou la classe de revenu des parents) des nouveaux nés et au rang de l'enfant exigerait une compensation proportionnée aux coûts effectifs²³. Une telle politique ne serait pas biaisée puisqu'une stricte compensation horizontale aiderait toutes les familles dans des proportions semblables. En fait, il faut reconnaître que le niveau de vie ne peut être assimilé à la notion étroitement définie de bien-être matériel. L'enfant est une source de bonheur pour sa famille, même si sa présence abaisse le niveau de vie mesuré par les quantités consommées de différents biens. Une politique nataliste pourrait alors ne viser qu'à limiter l'inégalité des niveaux de vie entre familles ayant un même revenu primaire et un nombre différent d'enfants. Un tel compromis pourrait être justifié par le fait que le coût associé à la recherche de l'égalité stricte est prohibitif et par l'objectif de ne pas favoriser, par des aides très substantielles attribuées aux familles nombreuses, la constitution de familles dont la taille excéderait la capacité des parents à prendre réellement en charge tous les aspects de l'éducation de chacun des enfants.

Une interprétation moins stricte du principe du coût de l'enfant consiste à soutenir que tout enfant a droit aux mêmes avantages, peu importe son rang à la naissance, les revenus de ses parents ou leur statut matrimonial. Cette approche est fondée sur la notion de besoins normatifs à satisfaire. Ces besoins normatifs sont supposés être indépendants des caractéristiques sociales de la famille. Dans cette optique, on aboutit à un niveau d'aide fixe, sans condition de ressources et non imposée, pour toutes les familles ayant un même nombre d'enfants. Pour les raisons données plus haut, la compensation qui en découle est faussement égalitaire, car elle conduit à compenser les charges familiales de façon en fait très inégalitaire, compte tenu des coûts mesurés associés à la présence d'un enfant.

Cette interprétation normative du principe de compensation peut être appliquée dans une optique de redistribution verticale, puisqu'en allouant autant à chaque enfant on referme l'éventail des revenus, pour des familles ayant un nombre donné d'enfants. Il peut s'agir alors non plus seulement d'estimer quelle devrait être la compensation forfaitaire du coût de l'enfant, mais de décider des seuils de ressources et de revenu à partir desquels la compensation diminue. Cette dernière peut éventuellement se transformer en une contribution nette dans la mesure où certaines familles avec enfants ne reçoivent aucun paiement de transfert mais doivent contribuer au financement des compensations²⁴. En apparence, les avantages attribués aux familles seront aussi inégaux, mais ils correspondent alors au cas opposé des écarts de coûts: quand les niveaux de vie de départ sont trop inégaux, donner davantage aux plus défavorisés semble normal. La justice exige l'inégalité des prestations. C'est le fondement du caractère sélectif de la politique familiale telle que pratiquée au Canada depuis les quinze dernières années. La compensation verticale va conduire à favoriser plus fortement la natalité des familles les plus aidées, en l'occurrence les familles les plus défavorisées.

À cet égard, il n'y a pas à proprement parler de véritable politique nataliste. Puisque selon cette logique, la politique familiale se borne à compenser des situations que la société juge anormales. Comme principe orientant une politique nataliste, celle-ci est d'autant plus biaisée ou non neutre que s'y greffe la préoccupation de redistribution verticale et que son poids est important. Ce sujet est plutôt tabou: autant on accepte de discuter de l'efficacité des incitations démographiques globales que comporte la politique familiale, autant on refuse de se poser la question des effets différentiels que les aides familiales peuvent éventuellement avoir sur la natalité, selon les milieux sociaux ou selon le niveau de revenu des parents²⁵.

Pour qu'on puisse véritablement parler de politique nataliste, il faut qu'il y ait incitation: que la natalité devienne un élément endogène de la politique familiale. La logique de l'incitation est différente de la logique de la compensation et à la limite les mesures de l'une peuvent entièrement s'opposer aux mesures de l'autre.

L'analyse précédente permet de qualifier les différentes propositions pronatalistes avancées, qui peuvent se résumer par les trois points suivants.

1. Aide positive versus aide normative: exemption fiscale ou allocation familiale

Il devrait être clair qu'une exemption fiscale emprunte à la conception de la compensation horizontale: la valeur de l'aide varie avec le revenu puisqu'elle dépend du niveau de revenu lorsque la taxation est progressive²⁶. Cependant, en proportion du revenu, la valeur fiscale de l'exemption décroît sauf si la taxation est à taux proportionnel. En revanche, une allocation familiale non imposée emprunte à la logique de la compensation horizontale mais normative: l'aide ne varie pas avec le revenu²⁷. On s'attend donc à ce qu'à dépense égale une exemption fiscale devrait mieux correspondre au coût de l'enfant et être plus incitative au plan de la natalité, toutes choses égales par ailleurs.

2. Progressivité versus dégressivité en fonction du rang de l'enfant: la problématique du 3e enfant et la logique de l'incitation

Il y a tout lieu de penser, malgré certaines nuances en ce qui touche le troisième enfant, que le coût d'un enfant diminue au fur et à mesure que le nombre d'enfants de la famille augmente en raison des économies d'échelle. Ce qui conduirait à adopter une aide dégressive en fonction de la taille de la famille. Cependant, deux ou trois enfants impliquent des perturbations relativement au marché du travail beaucoup plus importantes qu'un seul enfant, sans considérer que la congestion des tâches parentales s'accroît. La sociologue française Evelyne Sullerot (1984) soutient que les femmes ne refusent pas l'enfant mais les enfants. En outre, pour que des parents décident d'un deuxième ou d'un troisième enfant il faut qu'ils aient pris la décision d'en avoir un premier et cela, suffisamment tôt pour que se pose à nouveau la décision des autres. Est-il préférable de «partager la besogne», selon l'expression du démographe Henripin (1989) ou doit-on admettre que l'aide au troisième enfant demeure tout à fait pertinente et essentielle comme le soutient le démographe-économiste Mathews (1990), parce que dans le fond il n'y a qu'une «minorité» de parents qui ont des préférences fortes pour les enfants et donc que la relance de la fécondité passe nécessairement par l'encouragement de ces comportements procréateurs? Quoi qu'il en soit, on s'attendrait à ce que les aides à la naissance du troisième enfant soient plus incitatives, lorsqu'elles sont particulièrement importantes relativement au coût de l'enfant (qui est plus faible que le coût des deux précédents) et lorsque que les aides attribuées aux deux premiers se rapprochent de leur coût, toutes choses égales par ailleurs.

3. Progressivité versus dégressivité en fonction de l'âge: l'aide aux «jeunes» familles

Certains (Henripin et Mathews) soutiennent que la concentration des aides familiales au cours des premières années devrait être plus efficace et plus utile pour les parents que leur étalement23. Mathews (1990) avance même que le soutien pour des enfants adolescents ne repose sur aucune base sérieuse puisque le revenu des parents augmente selon leur cycle vital. Cependant, notons en ce qui concerne l'influence de l'âge des enfants que la réalité des coûts mesurés indique une augmentation du coût de l'enfant selon son âge; que plus de 73% des jeunes de 15 à 19 ans étaient aux études à plein temps en 1984, pour la très grande majorité au niveau secondaire ou collégial (BSQ, 1984) et on peut le présumer, dépendaient financièrement de leurs parents (13% étaient des travailleurs à temps plein et 10% dépendaient de programmes sociaux). D'autre part l'âge des enfants n'est pas nécessairement un indicateur fidèle de «l'âge» des familles: l'augmentation tendancielle de l'âge de la femme à la naissance du premier enfant indique que les décisions de fécondité sont reportées pour compléter des études et entamer une carrière sans se préoccuper de responsabilités familiales. Les couples sont donc plus âgés. Le coût d'un enfant ne s'en trouve pas nécessairement réduit. Même si on peut penser que les femmes ayant un enfant plus tardivement ont des salaires plus élevés et de meilleurs emplois qui leur permettent d'acheter plus facilement des services de garde et ainsi de minimiser l'effet négatif de la présence d'un enfant sur les heures de travail et la valeur de leur capital humain. Puisque les aspirations matérielles pour les enfants augmentent avec le revenu des parents et donc leur coût, penser que des aides plus substantielles aux jeunes enfants sont plus susceptibles d'inciter à la procréation, c'est supposer que les familles se comportent avec une certaine forme d'illusion sur le coût des enfants. Les calculs de rationalité reposent il va de soi sur le long terme. On doit donc admettre que les parents peuvent évaluer les aides publiques pour les enfants et les allouer comme bon leur semble dans le temps. Enfin, il est vrai que le coût de l'enfant en bas âge varie beaucoup selon qu'il y a recours ou non à un système de garde payante. Des aides importantes pour les jeunes enfants permettent aux parents de prendre en compte cet aspect lorsqu'il n'existe pas d'aide spécifique pour la garde des enfants et cela, dans la mesure où les femmes désirent maintenir leur participation au marché du travail.

On s'attendrait donc à ce que la modulation inversée en fonction de l'âge n'ait que peu d'effet incitatif en termes de natalité.

Enfin, les différentes stratégies d'intervention ne peuvent pas faire abstraction du fait que l'environnement économique continuera de se modifier²⁹. En particulier, deux tendances de fond peuvent être prises en considération, soit la tendance des femmes à accumuler plus de capital humain ainsi que la poursuite du «rattrapage» salarial des femmes par rapport aux hommes. Ces évolutions reflètent de nouvelles normes sociales sur le rôle des femmes et leurs attitudes vis-à-vis le mariage et la famille. On peut donc tenter de simuler l'effet des liens existant entre les salaires anticipés, la participation au marché du travail et la fécondité, en examinant ce qui se produirait si les femmes d'aujourd'hui étaient plus scolarisées et si leur taux de salaire était plus élevé. Ce qui nous amène à prendre en considération les points suivant: la hausse tendancielle de la scolarisation et l'augmentation des taux de salaire réels des femmes.

3.3 Simulations et résultats

Aucune des simulations présentées dans ce texte ne permet de comparer l'effet des différentes propositions pronatalistes décrites plus haut sur les comportements de fécondité, à ponction budgétaire constante. Cependant, elles présentent un certain intérêt dans la mesure où elles correspondent à des modifications relativement simples des paramètres des politiques existantes et parce qu'elles permettent de comparer les prédictions du modèle en présence de politiques qui bonifient les aides monétaires indépendamment du rang de l'enfant à la naissance ou introduisent une structure d'incitations qui tienne compte explicitement de ce rang.

On trouvera dans le tableau 4 les valeurs moyennes des principales variables du modèle correspondant à la solution de référence (benchmark). Les estimations des coefficients du modèle sont alors utilisés pour réaliser les simulations dont la description apparaît à la fin du tableau 5. Dans ce même tableau, on présente les résultats de ces simulations ainsi que les probabilités conditionnelles et non conditionnelles moyennes associées à la solution de référence. Les critères utilisés pour la comparaison des différentes politiques sont 1) l'effet sur le nombre d'enfants «supplémentaires» engendrés sur une période de quatre ans

et 2) les coûts budgétaires associés à chacune des mesures. Ces mesures sont obtenues respectivement à partir des changements des probabilités non conditionnelles moyennes d'états de la population totale (pondérée) de l'échantillon et de la variation de leur revenu disponible associé à un changement d'état.

[Tableau 4 et 5 ici]

Bien que les résultats obtenus aux niveaux K et F s'expliquent par l'interaction de plusieurs variables (salaires nets de l'épouse et revenus disponibles de la famille dans les différentes options), ils reflètent particulièrement l'influence de trois d'entre elles: la variable NUEIK (avec coefficient positif) qui permet d'évaluer l'impact d'aides monétaires différenciés suivant le rang de l'enfant; la variable NUEIF (avec coefficient négatif) dont la fonction est identique à NUEIK mais au niveau F et finalement la variable NUEI1 (avec coefficient négatif) qui permet d'évaluer l'impact sur la fécondité de mesures budgétaires qui sont indépendantes du rang de l'enfant. Par conséquent, on devrait s'attendre à ce qu'une politique qui bonifierait les aides monétaires associées au troisième enfant relativement au premier ou au deuxième enfant, ait un effet positif sur la natalité (via l'effet de la variable NUEIK) et à ce qu'une politique neutre relativement au rang de l'enfant ait un effet mitigé ou même négatif (via l'effet de la variable NUEI1 particulièrement) sur la fécondité.

Les probabilités moyennes du modèle estimé (tableau 5, solution de référence colonne deux) caractérisent les comportements moyens de travail et de fécondité de la population échantillonnée pour les années 1984-1987, soit 1 976 000 couples où sont présents 2 885 000 enfants (voir le tableau 4 pour la répartition observée selon les états). La solution de référence indique que les probabilités conditionnelles (F=0; K=1,2,3) de travail diminuent systématiquement selon le nombre d'enfants présents (88% de participation au marché du travail lorsque K=0 et 47% lorsque les couples ont trois enfants ou plus); une fois la décision de fécondité prise (F=1), la probabilité de fécondité de rang 2 est la plus élevée (48% contre 30% pour le rang 1 et 20% pour la rang 3); la probabilité générale de fécondité est de 75% et donc la probabilité d'infécondité de 25%. Les probabilités non conditionnelles associées aux huit états montrent que les trois

premiers choix les plus probables (60 fois sur 100) sont dans l'ordre: pas d'enfant (22%), deux enfants (22%) et un enfant (16%) avec dans tous ces cas participation au marché du travail; les trois choix d'états les moins probables sont dans l'ordre: sans enfant et sans participation au marché du travail (3%), un enfant et sans participation au marché du travail (7%) et trois enfants ou plus avec participation au marché du travail (7%). Enfin, la probabilité non conditionnelle de participation au marché du travail est égale à 67% alors que les probabilités non conditionnelles d'avoir un, deux ou trois enfants ou plus sont respectivement de 23%, 36% et 16%.

Les autres colonnes du tableau 5 montrent les taux de variations de ces probabilités et leurs effets en termes du nombre d'enfants présents dans les familles et des variations de revenu disponible (qui correspondent au coût des mesures) lorsque les paramètres des politiques sont modifiés. Dans les deux premières simulations les paramètres des politiques en place de 1984 à 1987 sont inchangés sauf en ce qui touche aux exemptions fiscales et aux allocations fiscales dont les niveaux sont doublés (respectivement S1 et S2). Comme ces simulations et les autres modifient peu les probabilités de participation au marché du travail et de fécondité de rang un ainsi que la probabilité générale de fécondité l'analyse s'en tiendra pour l'essentiel aux autres probabilités. Une bonification de ces mesures de soutien auraient augmenté les probabilités conditionnelles de fécondité de rang deux et trois en contrepartie d'une baisse de la fécondité de rang. À la lecture des probabilités non conditionnelles d'états, on aurait donc observé une légère augmentation du nombre de familles dans l'état sans enfant et une hausse importante du nombre dans l'état avec trois enfants ou plus, indépendamment du statut de travail de l'épouse. Enfin, l'effet de doubler les allocations familiales se démarque de celui associé à des exemptions fiscales elles aussi plus importantes de deux façons. Selon les probabilités non conditionnelles le nombre d'enfants présents dans les familles aurait été beaucoup plus important, soit 54 049 sur un période de quatre ans contre 13 808 lorsque la simulation porte sur les exemptions fiscales. En revanche, le coût de cette mesure aurait été beaucoup plus lourd, soit 1 206 millions de dollars plutôt que 751 millions de dollars pour les exemptions, ce qui représente respectivement une variation moyenne du revenu disponible de 509\$ et 816\$ par famille ayant des enfants³⁰. Ces résultats ne sont pas étonnants compte tenu des coefficients estimés du modèle et du

«biais» existant des allocations familiales qui sont fortement différenciées selon le rang de l'enfant par rapport aux exemptions fiscales qui elles ne le sont pas.

La troisième simulation (S3), à la différence des deux premières, modifie la structure existante des exemptions fiscales: leurs valeurs pour les années 1984-1987 sont posées égales à celles qui prévalaient pour les années 1986 à 1989 au Québec, alors que dans la fiscalité fédérale les niveaux en 1984 des exemptions fiscales de base sont doublés en supposant que le même facteur de revalorisation qu'au Québec s'applique pour les autres années. En d'autres mots, la simulation reproduit la réforme québécoise des exemptions fiscales pour les enfants à charge mise en place au cours des années 1986 à 1989 et fait comme si le gouvernement fédéral avait adopté les mêmes dispositions. Les résultats de la simulation vont dans la même direction que les deux premières avec les nuances suivantes: pour un coût budgétaire un peu plus élevé que pour la première simulation, le nombre d'enfants présents aurait été beaucoup plus élevé; l'effet sur les probabilités non conditionnelles de rang semble être proportionnellement plus près de la solution de référence et donc moins incitative à la fécondité de rang trois ou plus comme dans le cas de la deuxième simulation.

La quatrième simulation examine l'effet de doubler le niveau des allocations familiales du Québec en supposant que les allocations familiales des deux paliers de gouvernement ne sont plus assujetties à l'impôt personnel. Les résultats simulés de telles mesures montrent selon les probabilités non conditionnelles qu'il y aurait eu une augmentation importante du nombre d'enfants présents au cours de ces années. En outre, il apparaît que la proportion des familles qui auraient choisies les états associés à la fécondité de rang un et de rang deux est supérieure à celle de la simulation deux. En principe ces mesures seraient plus «neutres» par rapport à l'échelle des revenus (mais non par rapport au rang) que dans le cas de la simulation deux.

La <u>cinquième simulation</u> reproduit, mutatis mutandis, les mesures qui ont été adoptées en faveur des familles au Québec depuis 1986 (augmentation de la valeur des exemptions fiscales, allocations familiales supplémentaires aux jeunes enfants, allocations à la naissance³¹ et non assujettissement à l'impôt des allocations québécoises). Elle intègre donc simultanément plusieurs mesures et comporte des modifications

importantes à la structure des paramètres. Les résultats simulés sont sensiblement différents de ceux obtenus dans les autres simulations. Le nombre d'enfants supplémentaires associées à cette «réforme» dépasse toutes les autres pour un coût budgétaire moins élevé, qui incidemment est sous la responsabilité du Québec. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre compte tenu des résultats du modèle et de la différenciation plus accentuée des aides selon le rang des enfants présents (bien que les aides monétaires du type allocation deviennent forfaitaires par rapport à l'échelle des revenus), la fécondité de rang trois ou plus croît beaucoup. Par contre, la simulation indique que les probabilités non conditionnelles d'infécondité resteraient à toute fin pratique les mêmes que dans la solution de référence, ce qui la différencie encore des autres simulations.

La <u>sixième simulation</u> est construite comme la précédente avec une bonification des montants au titre de l'«allocation de disponibilité» qui joue le rôle d'une allocation familiale supplémentaire pour les jeunes enfants. On observe que le nombre d'enfants s'en trouverait augmenté mais pour un coût budgétaire non négligeable par rapport à la simulation précédente. L'augmentation se produirait pour les rangs de naissance égal ou supérieur à deux avec corrélativement une diminution du nombre de familles dans les états associés à un enfant et à la non fécondité.

Enfin, la <u>dernière simulation</u> reprend les modifications de la simulation cinq en supposant de plus que les taux de salaires nominaux des épouses ont augmenté de 10%³². Par rapport à l'effet sur le nombre d'enfants supplémentaires associé à la simulation, une hausse des taux de salaire hebdomadaire se serait traduit par un nombre encore légèrement plus élevé d'enfants. Ce résultat ne devrait pas surprendre. Une hausse des salaires entraîne une augmentation de la probabilité de participer au marché du travail (au niveau L) ainsi qu'une hausse de la probabilité d'avoir deux et trois enfants ou plus (effet de la variable NWWK)³³. La simulation montre aussi que le coût budgétaire des mesures simulés (par rapport à S5) en présence d'une hausse exogène des taux de salaire des femmes diminuerait. Cette diminution doit être attribuée au fait que toute hausse du revenu de travail des épouses réduit ou annule l'exemption fiscale de personne mariée pour l'époux; cette réduction se répercute sur le niveau des impôts payés par le conjoint et les transferts nets reçus, en particulier les allocations familiales fédérales qui sont imposables aux deux

paliers de gouvernement et le crédit fédéral d'impôt remboursable pour enfant qui dépend du revenu familial.

4. CONCLUSION

Les résultats de ces premières simulations indicatives ont avant tout un caractère plus qualitatif que quantitatif. De plus, ils doivent être interprétés avec prudence compte tenu des résultats du modèle estimé, en particulier de sa «tendance structurelle» à produire un effet négatif sur la fécondité générale, de ses hypothèses et de ses limites³⁴.

Deux conclusions peuvent être dégagées de cet exercice de modélisation appliquée. La première concerne l'effet général des politiques publiques sur les comportements de travail et de fécondité des Québécoises vivant en couple. Dans la mesure où les familles des années 1984-1987 auraient bien anticipé (en se comportant selon le modèle estimé) les aides monétaires conditionnelles à la présence des enfants simulés, ces mesures de soutien économique plus importantes auraient influencé positivement la fécondité dans un sens nataliste. Le coût budgétaire de mesures supplémentaires de soutien économique aux familles simulées apparait non négligeable. Bien que, de telles mesures n'auraient pas pour seul effet «d'inciter» les couples à avoir plus enfants, la grande majorité des familles n'aurait pas eu plus d'enfants mais aurait vu son niveau de bien-être économique augmenter. Il est délicat de mettre en relation le «déficit» des naissances au cours des années 1984-1987 (voir le tableau 3) avec le nombre des enfants supplémentaires qui auraient été présents si les mesures simulées avaient été adoptées. Puisque le modèle ne prédit pas strictement des naissances mais plutôt la présence d'enfants selon le rang et selon la structure d'âge observée pour ces années³⁵. Néanmoins, en termes probabilistes ces mesures auraient rapproché ex post les taux synthétiques de fécondité des taux les plus susceptibles de correspondre au seuil de remplacement des générations.

La deuxième conclusion moins évidente est que toutes les mesures n'ont pas le même effet, bien qu'elles conduisent toutes à réduire le coût économique associé à la décision d'avoir un ou plusieurs enfants. La structure et la nature des «incitations» mises en place influencent évidemment leur coût collectif mais aussi les résultats en termes de fécondité.

ANNEXE: DÉFINITIONS DES VARIABLES DU MODÈLE ESTIMÉ

ÂGE: Âge de l'épouse.

ÂGEC: Âge de l'épouse au carré.

COHT: Indice de génération de l'épouse défini par: l'âge de l'épouse moins l'année de revenu plus 1985.

C xx-xx: Catégorie d'âge de l'enfant le plus jeune: <7: moins de 7 ans (catégorie de référence); 7-15: 7 ans 15 ans; 6-24: 16 ans à 24 ans.

ÉD x-x: Nombre d'années de scolarité de l'épouse: 1-2: moins de 11 années d'études primaires et secondaires (catégorie de référence); 3-5: 11 à 13 année d'études primaires et secondaires; 6-7: études post-secondaires partielles ou diplôme d'études post-secondaires; 8: diplôme universitaire.

MTx: Langue maternelle de l'épouse: 1: anglais; 2: français (catégorie de référence); 3: autres.

NUEIL: Revenu hors travail virtuel de l'épouse: ordonnée à l'origine de la contrainte budgétaire de l'épouse linéarisée selon: a) loisir à temps plein (non-travail) (NUEIL0); b) le nombre de semaines de travail tel que l'époux ne bénéficie plus de l'exemption fiscale de personne mariée (NUEIL1).

NUEIK: Revenu disponible net de la famille excluant le revenu de travail net de l'épouse (égal au revenu de travail net de l'époux plus les revenus nets de placement de la famille plus les paiements de transferts conditionnels au nombre et à l'âge des enfants). Au niveau de décision K, il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée à l'exception de K (K=1,2,3) enfants dont les âges correspondent aux âges moyens des enfants présents dans les familles en 1987, conditionnellement à leur parité et à l'âge de la mère.

NUEIF: Revenu disponible net de la famille excluant le revenu de travail net de l'épouse (égal au revenu de travail net de l'époux plus les revenus nets de placement de la famille plus les paiements de transferts conditionnels au nombre et à l'âge des enfants). Pour F=0, il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée mais sans enfant. Pour F=1, la variable est une moyenne pondérée des trois niveaux de revenu disponible net défini au niveau K (voir NUEIK). Les poids sont les probabilités (prédites à l'aide de la forme réduite du modèle) que l'épouse soit observée avec un, deux ou trois enfants normalisés sur 1.

NUEI1: Revenu disponible net de la famille excluant le revenu de travail net de l'épouse (égal au revenu de travail net de l'épous plus les revenus nets de placement de la famille plus les paiements de transferts conditionnels au nombre et à l'âge des enfants). Il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée avec un enfant dont l'âge correspond à l'âge moyen des enfants présents dans les familles avec un enfant en 1987 conditionnellement à l'âge de la mère. Le niveau de cette variable ne change pas selon les options aux niveaux K et F.

NWWK: Taux de salaire hebdomadaire net prédit de l'épouse. Au niveau de décision K, il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée sauf pour K (K=1,2,3) enfants dont les âges correspondent aux âges moyens des enfants présents dans les familles en 1987 conditionnellement à leur parité et à l'âge de la mère.

NWWF: Taux de salaire hebdomadaire net prédit de l'épouse. Pour F=0, il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée mais sans enfant. Pour F=1, cette variable est une moyenne pondérée des trois niveaux de salaire hebdomadaire net défini au niveau K (voir NWWK). Les poids sont

les probabilités (prédites à l'aide de la forme réduite du modèle) que l'épouse soit observée avec un, deux ou trois enfants normalisés sur 1.

NWW1: Taux de salaire hebdomadaire net prédit de l'épouse. Il est défini pour une famille hypothétique ayant les caractéristiques de la famille observée avec un enfant dont l'âge correspond à l'âge moyen des enfants présents dans les familles avec un enfant en 1987 conditionnellement à l'âge de la mère. Le niveau de cette variable ne change pas avec les options aux niveaux K et F.

PPT: Variable dichotomique =1 si l'épouse a travaillé à temps plein ou à temps partiel durant l'année de référence (de revenu) dans un emploi rémunéré ou comme travailleuse autonome; =0 autrement.

RÉGXX: Taille de la population dans la région de résidence: 1: grands centres urbains de 500 000 habitants ou plus (catégorie de résidence); 2-4: centres urbains de 30 000 à 499 999 habitants; 5: régions rurales.

TCHÔ: Taux de chômage au Québec des femmes selon l'année et la catégorie d'âge (moins de 25 ans, 25 à 34 ans, plus de 35 ans).

VINCx: Valeurs d'inclusion.

YRxx: Variables dichotomiques indiquant l'année (de revenu) de l'échantillon (1987 est la catégorie de référence).

y₁: Variable dichotomique = 1 si l'épouse a travaillé à temps plein ou à temps partiel ou si elle cherchait du travail au moment de l'Enquête et si son statut professionnel est travailleuse rémunérée ou travailleuse autonome dans son emploi actuel ou son dernier emploi; = 0 autrement.

NOTES

- 1. On trouvera dans Brouillette, Felteau et Lefebvre (1991) une présentation plus extensive de la modélisation et de ses résultats.
- 2. On a recours à une modélisation polytomique séquentielle afin d'introduire un certain degré de dépendance entre les choix à un même niveau de décision et d'éviter ainsi les implications de l'hypothèse dite de l'indépendance des choix non pertinents (McFadden, 1981).
- 3. On omettra par la suite l'indice i afin de ne pas alourdir la notation.
- 4. En fait, la forme réduite du modèle ne sert qu'à évaluer les probabilités que chaque observation de l'échantillon se retrouve à l'une ou l'autre des extrémités de l'arbre de décision. Ces probabilités permettent de dériver des termes de correction dont l'utilisation s'avère nécessaire lors de l'estimation d'équations de salaire à l'aide des seules observations sur les femmes qui travaillent et qui ont un nombre donné d'enfants (0,1,2 ou 3 ou plus). On doit en effet estimer des équations de salaire des femmes dont les coefficients diffèrent suivant le nombre d'enfants parce que l'approche adoptée requiert une prévision du salaire qu'aurait eu une femme si elle avait choisi d'avoir un nombre d'enfants différent de celui qu'elle a effectivement eu. On peut soutenir que les femmes qui ont eu plusieurs enfants (comparativement à celles qui n'en ont pas eu ou qui n'en ont qu'un) ont dû passer un certain temps hors du marché du travail. Cette absence plus ou moins prolongée aura affecté, du moins temporairement, leur productivité et on peut admettre que le rendement associé à certaines caractéristiques socio-économiques (p.e. l'éducation) différera suivant la longueur de cette absence. L'estimation d'une forme «réduite» permet donc de dériver des termes de correction (inverses du ratio de Mill) pour tenir compte du problème d'autosélection dans les équations de prédiction des salaires des femmes.
- 5. Un modèle séquentiel de choix discrets comprend des valeurs d'inclusion. Voir (McFadden, 1984) pour une explication du rôle joué par ces variables dans le modèle.
- 6. Pour chaque femme on n'observe évidemment qu'un seul choix, celui qui correspond par hypothèse à la valeur de l'option est la plus élevée.
- 7. L'Enquête considère aussi comme mariés les couples qui vivent en union consensuelle, ce qui peut introduire un biais dans l'estimation des revenus nets de l'époux dans la mesure où on reconnaît dans le calcul de ses impôts la présence d'une exemption de personne mariée à laquelle il n'a pas droit légalement.
- 8. L'espace des choix pour quelques familles devait être restreint dans la mesure où on n'observe pas dans l'échantillon de très jeunes femmes «mariées» de 16 à 22 ans ayant eu 3 enfants ou plus. Afin de ne pas compliquer la programmation du modèle par des restrictions supplémentaires, on a choisi d'éliminer les familles dont l'épouse avait moins de 23 ans.
- 9. Après ces exclusions, il reste 6085 familles constituant l'échantillon (1573, 1524, 1361 et 1627 pour les années de revenu 1984 à 1987). Lors de l'estimation, trois dossiers sur quatre ont été retenus de façon aléatoire, pour limiter le temps de calcul sur ordinateur central.
- 10. On a fait l'hypothèse que l'époux bénéficiait des exemptions personnelles pour personnes à charge quand son revenu était plus élevé que celui de l'épouse.

- 11. Le revenu hors travail virtuel de l'épouse est donné par l'intersection de sa contrainte budgétaire linéarisée à un nombre donné de semaines de travail et l'axe du revenu disponible. C'est un concept technique utilisé dans la mesure de l'impact du revenu de propriété (qui ne dépend pas des heures de travail) sur la propension à travailler.
- 12. L'Enquête ne rapporte pas le nombre d'heures habituellement travaillées durant la semaine mais seulement le nombre de semaines travaillées durant l'année de référence. Dans ce cas, seuls des taux de salaire hebdomadaires peuvent être calculés pour l'époux et l'épouse.
- 13. La définition empirique des variables est présentée en annexe.
- 14. D'autres variables de contrôle (la génération à laquelle appartient l'épouse, sa langue maternelle, la taille de la région de résidence et les variables dichotomiques d'année) furent ignorées au niveau L, par parsimonie et parce que leurs coefficients n'étaient jamais significatifs lors des premières estimations.
- 15. Le terme «génération» est un peu abusif puisqu'on le définit comme un groupe de femmes dont l'année de naissance est identique.
- 16. Selon les estimations préliminaires, les coefficients des autres variables de niveau d'éducation étaient non significatifs, tout comme les variables de la langue maternelle de l'épouse qui auraient pu capter des différences culturelles entre les personnes parlant français, anglais ou d'autres langues.
- 17. Voir Brouillette, Felteau et Lefebvre (1991) pour une analyse plus détaillée de l'effet des variables économiques sur la probabilité de participation au marché du travail et la fécondité.
- 18. Rappelons que la rémunération de l'épouse est exclue de la mesure du revenu disponible net de la famille.
- 19. Pour une définition de ce concept, voir la note 11.
- 20. Outre ces dispositions des politiques fiscale et de transferts, la modélisation prend en considération les frais de garde.
- 21. Voir Karam et Lefebvre (1991).
- 22. En fait, il apparaît que la «vraie valeur» du coût d'un enfant, <u>abstraction faite du coût en temps</u>, est proportionnelle au revenu d'un couple sans enfant, sauf pour les couples qui ont de très hauts revenus. Typiquement, le coût du premier enfant représente entre 20% et 30% du revenu du couple sans enfant (ou entre 18% et 32% avec un taux d'accroissement de 2-3% par année d'âge). Le deuxième enfant est moins coûteux que le premier (la moitié cependant le consensus est plus fragile à cet égard), sauf s'il est très jeune (il serait alors aussi coûteux que le premier). Le troisième est approximativement aussi coûteux que le second, alors que les coûts diminuent rapidement pour les suivants. Voir van der Gaag (1982) pour une revue des études empiriques en langue anglaise.
- 23. Voir Brouillette, Felteau et Lefebvre (1991) et Lefebvre et Perrot (1987) pour une discussion des principes de compensation des charges familiales.

- 24. C'est la situation des familles, dont le «revenu net» le plus élevé du parent est supérieur à 50 000\$, qui doivent remettre une partie ou la totalité des allocations familiales reçues au palier fédéral, selon la disposition de récupération en vigueur depuis 1989.
- 25. Certains contestent la politique nataliste parce qu'ils y voient une intrusion de l'État dans la sphère des décisions privées. D'autres s'interrogent sur le bien-fondé d'une politique globalement nataliste: les objectifs mis de l'avant pour justifier une telle politique (dynamisme économique et social, maintien de la société distincte, financement des retraites, etc.) seront-ils atteints si les enfants mis au monde grâce aux incitations financières publiques sont peu éduqués, chômeurs, drogués, délinquants, faute d'un contexte familial et social favorable? Dans cette perspective, la politique familiale et éventuellement la politique nataliste doivent être cohérentes avec la politique d'éducation et d'emploi.
- 26. Le même effet peut être obtenu à l'aide d'un crédit d'impôt convenablement choisi: lorsque le niveau du crédit correspond à la valeur de l'exemption au taux maximum d'imposition.
- 27. La combinaison exemption fiscale et allocation familiale imposable conduit au même résultat: l'aide devient forfaitaire, abstraction faite du financement général des allocations.
- 28. Il est sans doute juste de penser que seules de jeunes familles peuvent être assez audacieuses ou aventureuses pour entreprendre cette promenade exotique qui est d'avoir trois enfants.
- 29. On fait abstraction d'évolution plus conjoncturelles qui peuvent aussi influencer les comportements de fécondité.
- 30. Il faut souligner ici qu'il s'agit d'un coût net puisqu'on tient compte de toutes les dispositions fiscales, y compris le fait que les allocations familiales peuvent être imposables. Par ailleurs, soulignons qu'il est possible calculer le coût par palier de gouvernement et d'identifier les familles particulières qui auraient probablement changées d'états selon leurs caractéristiques socio-économiques et économiques puisque le modèle est estimé avec des données individuelles. La présentation des résultats sous une forme agrégée a l'avantage de la concision.
- 31. Soulignons que celles-ci sont modélisées comme si elles étaient des allocations familiales supplémentaires escomptées sur un horizon de 18 ans.
- 32. Cette augmentation est évidemment arbitraire. Elle pourrait être en partie justifiée en supposant qu'il y a un «rattrapage» salarial en faveur des femmes ou que le marché du travail des femmes s'est resserré. Si la hausse des salaires était liée à une accumulation plus prononcée du capital humain des femmes, il faudrait alors supposer que le niveau général d'éducation est plus élevé. Or dans le modèle estimé les coefficients des variables d'éducation ont en général un effet négatif sur les probabilité de fécondité selon le rang et de fécondité.
- 33. La section 2 explique cet effet non conventionnel.

- 34. Il serait préférable de modéliser les comportements de fécondité et de travail en termes dynamiques. Bien que ce modèle de choix discrets peut être estimé sur une plus longue période, il ne permettrait pas d'identifier explicitement les effets fixes de génération. Par ailleurs, l'indisponibilité de données longitudinales ne permet pas la construction des modèles dynamiques analogues à ceux développés par certains chercheurs américains. Une stratégie alternative consiste à utiliser des coupes transversales répétées sur une longue période pour mettre en place une modélisation dynamique de type markovien. Brouillette, Felteau et Lefebvre (1991a) ont exploré cette approche.
- 35. Comme le modèle tient compte de l'âge observé des femmes et de l'âge observé des enfants lorsque les familles en ont, les naissances supplémentaires associées aux mesures simulées ne se seraient pas nécessairement produites au cours des années 1984 à 1987.

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Tableau

niveau L, variable dépendante y=0,1; niveau K, variable dépendante $y_k=1,2,3$; niveau F, variable dépendante $y_i=0,1$ Estimation par maximum de vraisemblance de la forme structurelle du modèle:

CONST.	NIVEAU L				NIVEAU K			NIVEAU F	
NST.	0 Enfant	1 enfant	2 enfants	3 Enfants +	1 Enfant	2 Enfants	3 Enfants +	0 Enfant	Enfants
DITCE	-1,228 (1,14)	-2,518 (2,35)b	-3,191 (3,06)	-3,850 (2,47)b		0,280 (0,30)	-0,035 (0,04)		0,720 (0,78)
ÂGE	-0,388 (1,66)c	-0,203 (0,96)	0,153 (0,77)	0,508 (1,76)c		1,101 (1,95)c	1,037 (1,59)		2,592 (4,17)a -1,429 (6,12)a
ED 3-5 ED 6-7 ED 8	0,852 (4,47)a 1,533 (6,80)a 1,065 (2,83)a 4,315(12,57)a	0,831 (5,04)a 1,442 (7,68)a 1,682 (4,65)a 3,689(17,62)a	0,743 (4,97)a 1.122 (6,31)a 1,898 (5,47)a 4,651(27,69)a	0,001 (0,00) 0,427 (1,82)c 1,524 (3,66)a 4,666(18,57)a		-0,706 (1,84)c -0,766 (5,14)a	-0,818 (2,08)b -1,061 (6,23)a 0.749 (5,21)a		-1,058 (2,61)a -0,519 (2,61)a 0,668 (5,89)a
COHT NWWK NWWF	0.175 (1.52)	0,031 (0,35)	0,080 (0,92)	-0,058 (0,40)	0,351 (1,90)c	0,351 (1,90)c	0,351 (1,90)c	-0,409 (1,19)	0,409 (1,19)
FAMILLE RÉG 2-4	0,077 (1,56)	0,012 (0,23)	-0,078 (1,55)	-0,086 (1,15)		0,282 (2,84)a 0,288 (2,42)a	0,354 (2,72)a 0,926 (6,39)a		0,277 (2,48)b 0,468 (3,39)a
REG S C 7-15 C 16-24 NUEIL NUEIK	0,263 (0,42)	1,703(11,24)a 3,248 (8,12)a -0,175 (0,46)	1,4.14(11,00)a 1,657 (4,04)a 1,300 (3,77)a	0,618 (3,24)a -0,967 (1,04) 0,247 (1,13)	1,353 (4,24)a	1,353 (4,24)a	1,353 (4,24)a	-1,402 (1,40)	-1,402 (1,40)
NUEIF NUEII YR84 YR85 YR86 VINCK	0,219 (1,97)b	-0,098 (1,20)	-0,106 (1,62)	-0,044 (0,53)		-1,321 (1,86)a -1,174 (3,32)a -0,586 (2,32)a -0,484 (2,96)a 0,999 (3,46)a	-0,380 (0,64) -2,350 (5,07)a -1,414 (4,29)a -0,837 (4,02)a 1,000 (2,89)a	0,999 (4,01).	0,639 (1,84)c -2,013 (5,23)a -0,772 (4,29)a -0,771 (4,07)a

F: sans enfant. Catégories de référence: ED 1-2 (moins de 10 années d'études primaires et secondaires); n'a pas travaillé l'année précédente comme travailleuse rémunérée ou autonome; RÉG 1 (vivant Les 98 coefficients des variables explicatives schon les niveaux sont estimés simultanément. Options de référence: au niveau L: ne travaille pas et ne cherche pas un emplot, au niveau K: un enfant; au niveau dans un grand centre urbain de 500 000 habitants ou plus); C 0-7 (catégorie d'âge de l'enfant de plus jeune moins de 7 ans); YR87 (année 1987). Lu L. logarithme naturel de la fonction de vraiss-arblance Statistiques 1: coefficient significativement différent de zéro (a) au niveau de confiance de 1% si 1)2,576; (b) de 5% si 1)1,900 et (c) de 10% si 1)1,645

Tableau 2

Principaux paramètres des politiques fiscales et de transferts relatives aux familles avec enfants, Canada et Québec, 1984-1987

MESURES	1094 (\$)	1005 (5)	1986 (\$)	1987 (\$)
	1984 (\$)	1985 (\$)	1980 (3)	1907 (3)
1. Exemption fiscale pour enfant				
moins de 16 ans:Québec	710	710	710	560
moins de 16 ans:Canada 16 et 17 ans :Québec	710 810	710 810	710	560
16 et 17 ans : Canada	710	710	710	560
18 ans et plus :Québec	1 320	1 320	-	-
18 ans et plus :Canada	1 360	1 420	1 420	1 200
moins de 21 ans:Québec				
premier enfant	-	-	1 870	1 930
enfants suivants	-	•	1 370	1 420
2. Exemption fiscale supplémentaire				
enfants aux études				
post-secondaires: Québec	-	-	2 690	2 900
3. Allocation de disponibilité: Québec				
ler enfant-	300	300	300	100
2ième enfant	200	200	200	200
3ième enfant et suivants	100	100	100	300
4. Allocations familiales annuelles				
0 à 18 ans: Québec	95	95	99	103
ler enfant	127	127	132	137
2ième enfant	158	158	165	171
3ième enfant	190	190	197	205
4ième enfant et suivants 0 à 11 ans + supplément 12 à				
18 ans: Canada				
ler enfant	216 + 85	225 + 85	242 + 85	245 + 85
2ième enfant	343 + 85	358 + 85	361 + 85	355 + 85
3ième enfant et suivants	834 + 85	871 + 85	879 + 85	898 + 85
5. Crédit fédéral d'impôt remboursable				
pour enfant				
crédit par enfant	367	384	454	489
seuil de revenu	26 330	26 330	23 500	23 760

Source: The National Finances, Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, différentes années.

Tableau 3

Naissances observées et naissances hypothétiques selon différents taux synthétiques de fécondité des femmes âgées de 23 ans à 40 ans, Québec, 1984-1989

	Naissances observées: 23 ans à 40 ans	Taux synthétique de fécondité observé: 23 ans à 40 ans (Total)	Naissances hypothétiqu si taux synt fécondité et 1,800	hétique de	Différences entre les naissances hypothétiques et les naissances observé		
	(1)	(2)	(3)			(6) = (4)-(1)	
1984	69 969 (87 610)	1,200 (1,447)	91 313 (108 954)			39 500	
1985	71 824 (86 008)	1,174 (1,418)	95 098 (109 282)	113 402 (127 586)	23 274	41 578	
1986	70 976 (84 579)	1,149 (1,395)	95 335 (108 938)	113 398 (127 001)	24359	42422	
1987	70 591 (83 600)	1,104 (1,349)	99 316 (112 325)	118 441 (131 450)	28725	47850	
1988	73 456 (86 358)	1,152 (1,409)	98 327 (111 229)	115 831 (128 733)	24 871	42 375	
1989	78 297 (91 751)	1,236 (1,515)	96 267 (109 721)	115 197 (128 651)	17970	36900	

Sources: La situation démographique au Québec, différentes éditions, Bureau de la statistique du Québec, pour les naissances et les taux synthétiques observés; et calculs des auteurs.

Tableau 4

Valeurs moyennes (proportion en pourcentage et dollars de 1987) pondérées de l'échantillon, selon la population totale de l'échantillon et les choix observés, Québec, 1984-1987

VARIABLES SOCIO- ÉCONOMIQUES ET FINANCIÈRES	POP	F=0 K=0 L=0	F=0 K=0 L=1	F=1 K=1 L=0	F=1 K=1 L=1	F=1 K=2 L=0	F=1 K=2 L=1	F=1 K=3 L=0	F=1 K=3 L=1
ÂGE ED 3-5 (%) ED 6-7 (%) ED 8 (%) LM 1 (%) LM 3 (%) PPT (%) COHT TCHÔ (%) RÉG 2-4 (%) RÉG 5 (%) C 7-15 (%) C 16-24 (%) YR84 (%) YR85 (%)	31,7 0,42 0,26 0,11 0,08 0,06 0,72 11,2 11,4 0,30 0,19 0,24 0,02 0,25 0,25 0,26	28,9 0,37 0,18 0,14 0,05 0,07 0,43 8,6 12,3 0,30 0,16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,21 0,27	28,8 0,37 0,34 0,20 0,09 0,04 0,98 8,2 12,1 0,26 0,11 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,25 0,28	30,2 0,45 0,22 0,06 0,09 0,08 0,33 9,7 11,8 0,32 0,21 0,23 0,02 0,26 0,25 0,25	31,0 0,43 0,31 0,11 0,08 0,06 0,94 10,5 11,6 0,28 0,16 0,26 0,05 0,26 0,24 0,26	32,4 0,50 0,17 0,04 0,09 0,06 0,18 12,0 11,2 0,33 0,21 0,29 0,02 0,26 0,25 0,26	33,7 0,43 0,27 0,10 0,08 0,07 0,95 13,1 10,9 0,33 0,18 0,41 0,03 0,23 0,25 0,26	33,7 0,40 0,13 0.03 0,07 0,08 0,15 13,3 11,0 0,29 0,35 0,30 0,01 0,28 0,27 0,22	34,8 0,33 0,21 0,13 0,08 0,09 0,94 14,2 10,6 0,29 0,26 0,39 0,01 0,23 0,21 0,30
NIVEAU L ¹ NWW1(k,l=01) NUI1(k,l=01) x 1000 NWW1(k,l=11) NUI1(k,l=11) x 1000 NWW1(k,l=21) NUI1(k,l=21) x 1000 NWW1(k,l=31) NUI1(k,l=31) x 1000	211\$ 21,8\$ 151\$ 22,8\$ 122\$ 23,9\$ 95\$ 25,3\$	188\$ 18,5\$ 134\$ 19,5\$ 100\$ 20,7\$ 80\$ 22,1\$	208\$ 20,5\$ 157\$ 21,5\$ 116\$ 22,6\$ 88\$ 24,1\$	193\$ 21,5\$ 138\$ 22,5\$ 106\$ 23,6\$ 83\$ 25,0\$	216\$ 21,3\$ 155\$ 22,3\$ 123\$ 23,4 93\$ 24,8\$	204\$ 23,2\$ 142\$ 24,2\$ 118\$ 25,2\$ 93\$ 26,6\$	225\$ 22,9\$ 159\$ 23,8\$ 135\$ 24,9\$ 105\$ 26,2\$	199\$ 22,0\$ 136\$ 23,0\$ 115\$ 24,1\$ 93\$ 25,4\$	219\$ 22,0\$ 157\$ 22,9\$ 135\$ 23,9\$ 108\$ 25,4\$
NIVEAU K ¹ NWW1 (k=0) NUI1 (k=0) x 1000 NWW1 (k=1) NUI1 (k=1) x 1000 NWW1 (k=2) NUI1 (k=2) x 1000 NWW1 (k=3) NUI1 (k=3) x 1000 NIVEAU F ¹	182\$ 20,1\$ 135\$ 21,6\$ 111\$ 22,8\$ 89\$1 24,5\$ 118\$ 22,6\$	162\$ 17,1\$ 121\$ 18,6\$ 92\$ 19,9\$ 77\$ 21,5\$	179\$ 18,8\$ 139\$ 20,3\$ 105\$ 21,7\$ 82\$ 23,4\$	171\$ 19,9\$ 126\$ 21,3\$ 99\$ 22,6 80\$ 24,3\$ 126\$ 21,3\$	185\$ 19,5\$ 137\$ 21,1\$ 111\$ 22,3\$ 87\$ 24\$ 137\$ 21,1\$	179\$ 21,5\$ 129\$ 23,1\$ 109\$ 24,2\$ 89\$ 25,8\$	193\$ 21,0\$ 140\$ 22,6\$ 121\$ 23,7\$ 97\$ 25,3\$	174\$ 20,4\$ 124\$ 21,9\$ 107\$ 23,0\$ 90\$ 24,6\$	189\$ 20,2\$ 137\$ 21,7\$ 121\$ 22,8\$ 101\$ 24,4\$
NWW1 (f=1) NUI1 (f=1) x 1000 NOMBRE (000)	1 976	51	439	142	320	294	438	156	138
N. ENFANTS (000)	2 885	0	0	142	320	584	876	521	442

^{1.} Salaire hebdomadaire prédit et revenu disponible calculé dans le cas où les épouses travaillent 52 semaines selon les différentes options du modèle.

Tableau 5

Probabilités moyennes conditionnelles et non conditionnelles de choix des états en solution de base, taux de variation en pourcentage des probabilités et du nombre des enfants présents et coût net (en dollars de 1987) des mesures selon les simulations, Québec, 1984-1987

Probabilités	Solution			SIMUL	ATIONS ¹			
moyennes	de base	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7
Probabilités conditionnelles de travail: L=0 F=0,K=0 L=1 F=0,K=0 L=0 F=1,K=1 L=0 F=1,K=1 L=0 F=1,K=2 L=1 F=1,K=2 L=0 F=1,K=3 L=1 F=1,K=3	0,1189 0,8811 0,3114 0,6886 0,3982 0,6018 0,5240 0,4760	0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1%	0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% -0,1% 0,1%	0,0% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1% 0,0% -0,1% 0,1%	0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% -0,1% -0,1%	0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% -0,1% 0,1%	0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,2% -0,1% 0,1%	-1,4% 0,2% -0,2% 0,1% -0,1% 0,0% 0,2% -0,2%
Probabilités conditionnelles de fécondité selon le rang: K=1 F=1 K=2 F=1 K=3 F=1	0,3092 0,4845 0,2063	-2,9% 0,8% 2,5%	-6,8% 0,9% 8,1%	-4,2% 1,2% 8,7%	-5,3% 0,0% 7,2%	-5,6% -0,1% 8,6%	-7,7% 0,9% 9,5%	-6,0% 0,0% 9,0%
Probabilités de fécondité: F=0 F=1	0,2490 0,7510	0,9 % -0,3 %	1,0% -0,3%	1,2% -0,4%	0,8% -0,3%	0,3% -0,1%	0,8% -0,2%	0,4% -0,1%
Probabilités non conditionnelles: F=0, K=0, L=0 F=1, K=0, L=1 F=1, K=1, L=0 F=1, K=1, L=1 F=1, K=2, L=0 F=1, K=2, L=1 F=1, K=3, L=0 F=1, K=3, L=1	0,0300 0,2190 0,0724 0,1582 0,1449 0,2178 0,0835 0,0741	1,0% 0,9% -3,3% -3,2% 0,3% 0,5% 2,0% 2,4%	1,0% 0,8% -8,1% -6,8% 0,0% 1,1% 7,4% 8,2%	1,3% 1,1% -5,1% -4,5% 0,8% 1,1% 3,0% 3,2%	0,6% 0,7% -6,4% -5,7% -0,4% 0,4% 6,6% 7,2%	0,3% 0,2% -6,6% -5,1% -0,9% 0,1% 8,1% 8,9%	0,7% 0,7% -9,4% -7,3% 0,0% 0,9% 8,9% 9,6%	-1,7% 0,6% -7,4% -5,7% -1,2% 0,5% 9,0% 8,8%
Var. Nb. Enfants Var. en % Couples 0 enfant Couples 1 enfant Couples 2 enfants Couples 3 enfants Part. au travail % Coût (millions \$) Coût/famille \$	0 0% 24,9% 23,1% 36,3% 15,8% 76,6% 0	13 808 0,5% 0,9% -3,3% 1,2% 2,2% 0,0% 752m\$ 509\$	54 049 1,9% 0,8% -7,2% 0,6% 7,8% 2,3% 1206m\$ 816\$	21 813 0,7% 1,0% -4,7% 0,9% 3,1% 0,0% 985m\$ 667\$	43 051 1,5% 0,7% -5,7% 0,0% 6,9% -0,1% 945m\$ 651\$	54 334 1,9% 0,2% -5,6% 0,3% 8,4% -0,1% 866m\$ 585\$	63 228 2,2% 0,7% -7,9% 0,6% 9,2% -0,1% 1310m\$ 886\$	57 450 2,0% 0,4% -6,2% -0,2% 8,9% 0,0% 644m\$ 441\$

Source: selon les coefficients du modèle estimé (voir tableau 1 et texte).

Tableau 5 suite

- 1. Les résultats des simulations sont présentés en termes de taux de variations des probabilités (en solution de référence et après simulation) en pourcentage, arrondies à l'unité près. Les modifications de la vaieur des variables exogènes du modèle sont les suivantes:
 - S1: paramètres existants 1984-1987, sauf pour les exemptions fiscales existantes qui sont doublées.
 - S2: paramètres existants 1984-1987, sauf pour les allocations familiales existantes qui sont doublées.
 - S3: paramètres existants 1984-1987, sauf pour les exemptions fiscales du Québec qui sont fixées à leur niveau de 1986-1989 et pour les exemptions fiscales fédérales de base en 1984 qui sont doublées alors que l'exemption fiscale pour enfant aux études post-secondaires est posée égale à celle du Québec; pour les autres années les exemptions fiscales fédérales augmentent selon les taux de valorisation des exemptions fiscales du Québec au cours de la période 1986-1989.
 - S4: paramètres existants 1984-1987, sauf pour les allocations familiales du Québec qui sont doublées alors que les allocations familiales des deux paliers de gouvernement ne sont plus assujetties à l'impôt (ne sont plus imposées ou récupérées).
 - S5: paramètres existants 1984-1987 au palier fédéral. Les paramètres au Québec sont modifiés comme suit: les exemptions fiscales sont posées égales à celles des années 1986-1989; les allocations familiales restent inchangé mais ne sont pas récupérées par l'impôt; l'allocation de disponibilité est transformée en allocation familiale jeune enfant selon la structure existante en 1989, c'est-à-dire: en 1984 (1985, 1986, 1987) elle est respectivement égale à 95\$ (100\$, 105\$, 110\$), 190\$ (200\$, 210\$, 220\$) et 285\$ (300\$, 525\$, 550\$) par année pour le premier enfant, le deuxième enfant et le troisième enfant et les suivants; les allocations de naissance mises en place entre les années 1988 à 1991 sont transformations en allocations familiales, sur la base d'annuités selon un taux d'escompte de 8% et un horizon de 18 ans, c'est-à-dire: en 1984 (1985, 1986, 1987) elles correspondent à des allocations familiales supplémentaires (non imposables) respectivement de 53\$ (53\$, 53\$, 53\$), 53\$ (103\$, 103\$, 103\$) et 309\$ (445\$, 573\$, 690\$) par année pour le premier enfant, le deuxième enfant et le troisième enfant et les suivants.
 - S6: paramètres de la simulation S5, sauf pour les montants des allocations de jeune enfant qui sont triplés.
 - S7: paramètres de la simulation S5, sauf pour le taux de salaire brut prédit des femmes qui augmente de 10%.

ADDENDUM

LES COMPORTEMENTS RECENTS DE FECONDITE ET DE TRAVAIL DES CANADIENNES

Liliane Brouillette, Claude Felteau et Pierre Lefebvre

LES EFFETS DES IMPÔTS ET DES TRANSFERTS SUR LES COMPORTEMENTS RÉCENTS DE FÉCONDITÉ ET DE TRAVAIL DES CANADIENNES

Il est tout à fait naturel, à la suite des résultats obtenus relativement au Québec, de se demander si une modélisation analogue portant sur l'ensemble du Canada conduirait à une caractérisation des comportements de fécondité et de travail ainsi qu'à des réponses de simulations qualitativement semblables. À cet égard, nous avons mis en place les microdonnées de l'EFC nécessaires à un tel exercice et construit les algorithmes de calcul des impôts personnels et des transferts pour toutes les provinces canadiennes. Cependant en cours de route, il nous est apparu plus intéressant de modifier notre stratégie d'estimation de façon à faire porter la modélisation sur un horizon plus long, soit sur les années 1975 à 1987 (9 années plutôt que 4 années). Un des avantages d'adopter un horizon plus long est de pouvoir indentifier partiellement des effets «fixes» ou de génération. Le travail d'estimation du modèle est en cours et devrait se terminer avant la fin de l'année 1991. Néanmoins, nous avons réalisé une première estimation canadienne préliminaire sur la base des années 1984-1987¹. Les résultats de cette estimation sont présentés au tableau 1. Bien que la spécification ne soit pas la même que celle retenue pour le Québec et sous la réserve de la note 1, les coefficients estimés montrent que: 1, les effets des variables socio-économiques sur les différentes probabilités du modèle vont dans la même direction qu'au Québec; 2. les variables économiques semblent exercer des effets généralement positifs sur la fécondité; 3. en particulier au niveau K, une hausse des taux de salaires (NWWK et NWW1) et du revenu disponible (NUEIK) augmenteraient la probabilité d'avoir deux ou trois enfants; 4. au niveau F, les signes des coefficients des variables économiques sont plutôt ambigus, comme au Québec.

¹. Malheureusement, cette estimation comporte quelques «coquilles» qui, bien que sans conséquences importantes sur les résultats globaux, la rende inutilisable pour des fins de simulation: la variable de chômage est mesuré pour le Québec et non pour chaque province; la variable d'éducation est entachée d'une erreur pour un des niveaux d'étude. Il n'y a pas une cohérence parfaite entre les variables apparaissant dans la forme réduite et la forme structurelle du modèle. Les coefficients estimés des variables d'inclusion ne sont pas entre 0 et 1 comme ils devraient l'être ou contraints à prendre exaleurs (comme dans l'estimation du modèle québécois) pour respecter une des conditions de cohérence des modèles de choix discrets séquentiels.

Tableau 1

Estimation par maximum de vraisemblance de la forme structurelle du modèle canadien: niveau L, variable dépendante $y_i=0,1$; niveau F, variable dépendante $y_i=0,1$, Canada, 1984-1987

Variables	COEFFICIENTS	COEFFICIENTS (STATISTIQUES T)	(T)						
	NIVEAU L				NIVEAU K			NIVEAU F	
	0 Enfant	1 enfant	2 enfants	3 Enfants +	1 Enfant	2 Enfants	3 Enfants +	0 Enfant	Enfants
CONST.	0,792 (0,77)	-8,773 (7,85)a	-4,793 (4,92)a	-6,395 (6,37)a		0,445 (0,48)	0,192 (0,21)		1,821 (1,97)b
ÉPOUSE ÂGE	-1,959 (4,03)a	1,414 (2,85)a	-0,341 (0,76)	0,054 (1,16)		1,871 (2,72)a	1,616 (2,25)b		5,389 (7,55)a -2,463 (8,34)a
AGEC	0,184 (3,63)a	0,119 (2,95)a	0,158 (5,60)a	0,168 (6,17) _a		-0,007 (2,56)b	-0,007 (2,38)b		-0,018 (4,70)a
PPT COHT	4,478(13,03)a 0,157 (2,66)a	4,028 (9,44)a -0,081 (1,44)a	4,556(23,09)a 0,028 (5,37)a	3,966(19,09)a -0,084 (1,46)		0,622 (4,88)a	0,758 (4,71) ^a 0.132 (0.34)		1,149 (8,04)a -0,039 (0.09)
LM3						-0,387 (0,91)	0,147 (0,29)		0,063 (0,11)
NWWL NWWK	0,156 (2,09)b	-0,061 (0,95)	0,049 (0,64)	0,087 (1,13)	0,440 (6,44)a	0,440 (6,44)а	0,440 (6,44)a	08 07 810 0	-0 214 (0 80)
NWWF						0,225 (2,87)a	0,324 (3,17)a	(00,0) +17,0	0,416 (1,56)
ТСНОМ	-0,047 (0,76)	0,118 (2,09)b	0,025 (0,46)	0,067 (0,96)					
FAMILLE RÉG 2-4 RÉG 5						0,118 (0,46) 0,472 (1,68)c	0,520 (1,63) 0,949 (2,57)b		0,278 (1,57) 1,077 (4,57)a
C 7-15		1,181 (3,87)a	1,121 (5,80)a	1,675 (7,33)a					
PROVI PROV3		(24.1)				-0,486 (1,72)c -0,787 (1,98)b -0,132 (0,48)	-0,290 (0,68) -1,177 (2,17)b 0,308 (0,80)		-0,351 (1,04) -1,083 (1,39) -0,049 (1,51)
PROV4						0,619 (1,48)	-0,072 (1,58)		-0,731 (1,47)
NUEIL	-2,932(21,48)	-0,693 (0,98)	-1,234(23,25)a	-1,143(22,16)a	1,551(10,83)a	1,551(10,83)a	1,551(10,83)a	0,043 (0,19)	0,043 (0,19)
NUEII VR84						-0,115 (2,08)b -1,743 (4,05)a -1,229 (3.98)a	-0,257 (4,04)a -2,386 (4,37)a -1,584 (4,01)a		-2,668 (3,28)a -1,835 (5,33)a -0,035 (5,19)a
YR85 YR86 VINCK					-1,406(20,07)a	-0,637 (3,01)a -1,758(22,81)a	-0,882 (3,10)a -1,973(23,01)a	1,435(21,58)#	0,999 (4,72)a -0,990(17,52)a


Tableau 1 suite

Les 105 coefficients des variables explicatives selon les niveaux sont estimés simultanément. Options de référence: au niveau L: ne travaille pas et ne cherche pas un emploi; au niveau K: un enfant; au niveau F: sans enfant. Catégories de référence: LM2 (langue maternelle anglaise); n'a pas travaillé l'année précédente comme travailleuse rémunérée ou autonome; RÉG 1 (vivant dans un grand centre urbain de 500 000 habitants ou plus); C 0-7 (catégorie d'âge de l'enfant de plus jeune moins de 7 ans); PROV2 (Ontario); YR87 (année 1987). Statistiques t: coefficient significativement différent de zéro (a) au niveau de confiance de 1% si t)2,576; (b) de 5% si t)1,960 et (c) de 10% si t)1,645.

1.Les variables sont définies en annexe de l'étude de Brouillette, Felteau et Lefebvre (1991), sauf les variables suivantes: PROV1: provinces maritimes; PROV3: Québec; PROV4: provinces de l'ouest; PROV5: Colombie-Britannique; ED: variable d'éducation continue et égale à 1 si aucune scolarité ou 8ième année ou moins pour d'autres études, 2 si 9-10 années d'études, 3 si 11-13 années d'études secondaires sans diplôme, 4 si 11-13 années d'études secondaires avec diplôme, 5 si études postsecondaires partielles, 6 si diplôme d'études postsecondaires et 7 si diplôme universitaire.

Référence

Brouillette, L., Felteau, C. et Lefebvre, P. (1991) «Les effets des impôts et des transferts sur les comportements récents de fécondité et de travail des Québécoises: simulations réalisées à l'aide d'un modèle de choix discrets», Document de recherche, Département des sciences économiques, UQAM.



ETHNICITY, THE FAMILY AND
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN CANADA

An Annotated Bibliography and Review of the Literature

A report submitted to the Review of Demography and its Implications for Social and Economic Change

by

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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA (1992) as represented by the Minister of National Health and Welfare

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INTRODUCTION

This bibliography covers research on the family, ethnicity and demographic change in Canada, with a focus on work completed during the 1980s. It identifies major theoretical and empirical issues related to ethnicity that face social scientists who address the changing family in Canadian society.

It seems axiomatic to observe that 'ethnicity', however we may define ethnicity, has a fundamental relationship with the personal sphere of human life called the 'family'. It is similarly axiomatic that the intimate human acts that take place within the family translate into the impersonal data that provide the content of 'demography'. The "basic plus and minus factors" of demographic change (Halli, Trovato and Driedger 1990, 1) come about in large part through the activities that occur within the family sphere. The values, beliefs and practices that guide dating and mating, marriage, household formation, having children and the major events that mark the course of the life cycle, are the result of cultural nurturing within a wider sphere of historical tradition defined, to a large but variable degree, by ethnocultural criteria.

There has been a burgeoning of academic interest in both ethnicity and demography in the very recent past, and it seems as though the decade of the 1990s will see the neglect of family and ethnicity of the last several decades redressed. We attempt here to identify emerging trends in a critical light, and to point out some of the directions that will lead to better understanding on

the part of social scientists and better judgement on the part of policy makers.

For the time being, however, an examination of the social science literature that addresses the connections among ethnicity, demography and the family yields remarkably little of direct interest. At its worst, social science research factors ethnicity out of the picture, presenting Canadian families as Mr. and Mrs. Average conforming to an often uncritically accepted norm based on anglo-saxon values. At its best, ethnicity is often simply factored in, as one of many variables that might explain variation in family patterns. Only a few studies, and these are highlighted in the bibliography that follows, take ethnicity seriously as a social phenomenon that needs to be understood, rather than simply described or modelled, if we are to understand how families work and how populations change.

Those who study ethnicity have tended to treat the family implicitly as the basic unit of the ethnic group, but seldom go beyond this assumption to address issues of demographic change. The vast and growing literature on ethnicity, as a result, is of surprisingly little help in trying to understand demographic change. Those who address the family, on the other hand, tend to focus either on micro-level studies of psychological relations, or on macro-level studies of social trends (fertility, marriage, divorce) where ethnicity is sometimes considered as an explanatory factor but too seldom specifically addressed or investigated. Similarly, policy makers tend to formulate policies on the basis that 'families' and 'ethnic groups' are distinct

social categories that require distinctive policies (and, of course, come under different ministerial jurisdiction within the bureaucratic structure!).

There is a need to create linkages between the quantitative work of demographers that establishes trends but provides little in-depth understanding, and the qualitative work produced with an 'ethnic studies' framework that provides sensitive and detailed analysis of ethnocultural practices, but fails to relate those practices to demographic trends. The problems of linking quantitative and qualitative work, or macro-scale and small-scale investigation, are complex and represent one of the most important challenges to social scientists.

An ironic aspect of family research in Canada, and of demographic research in general, is that the literature abounds with macro-scale studies that identify general trends, and end with exhortations to conduct further, more detailed work which is seldom undertaken. There are a number of dimensions to this problem. Lack of resources, both economic and human, is an obvious problem. To conduct sufficient micro-scale research to back up even one macro-scale project is a formidable task.

Methodologically, macro-scale trends are identified using sophisticated quantitative models which are usually not sensitive to micro-level conditions. Those researchers who are trained to run such models are often not equipped to undertake the qualitative research that requires in-depth interviews and a range of research skills to deal with face-to-face social situations. Furthermore, data matching is a serious problem since

the qualitative differences in types of information make this more than a question of sharpening the focus of investigation from the national to the local level.

With respect to resources, special mention should be made of the problem of data availability. Most quantitative analyses of demographic trends in Canada are based on publicly available census data, most commonly the Public Use Sample Tape. These data are generally reliable for understanding overall trends, and can even be considered acceptable for one or two of the largest ethnic groups. They are simply inadequate, however, for analysis of groups that are smaller than about one-half million people, or groups that are widely dispersed geographically. The problem is often compounded by 'lumping' groups together in order to produce a large enough sample size. A case in point is the common practice of analyzing data on Chinese Canadians and Japanese Canadians under a single category of 'Asian', when there are probably no two groups in Canada that are more dis-similar demographically. Such problems will remain until researchers become more sensitive to cultural nuances within the population, and until government policy makes statistical data more easily available at a more reasonable cost.

These research problems are easily occluded by general public opinion about topics such as ethnicity and the family, which inevitably stir strong emotions and opinions, and are intricately bound up with ideology and political practice. There is widespread belief, for example, that the family is changing, losing its 'traditional values', and there is a range of

popularly held explanations for this alleged phenomenon, including the decline of patriarchy (read 'women entering the work force', secularization, and the loss of family unity. For some, ethnicity acts as a brake on changes by imposing traditional, pro-family beliefs. For others, ethnicity, and its official manifestation as 'multiculturalism', is a disruptive force because it encourages deviation from normative values.

Social scientists in recent years have become much less preoccupied with standardizing and measuring popular opinion and values, and more concerned with understanding how trends in popular notions develop. They need to understand both the experience of social change at the level of individual lives, and the expression of change that can be measured using demographic techniques. This challenge occurs against a need to develop public policy that addresses both dimensions.

All of these issues notwithstanding, the question of just how ethnicity affects family structure and demographic change is still open. Despite widespread subjective belief that ethnicity does matter, we do not as yet have sufficient research to make strong pronouncements on the subject. Perhaps more accurately, the right questions have not yet been asked, using the right kinds of data, and making the right links to other studies. The position taken by this report, therefore, is not simply that demographers have been insensitive to questions of ethnicity (although most have), or that those undertaking ethnic studies have neglected empirical studies of demographic change (although most have). The issue before us, however, is whether and what

extent the rich tapestry of human experience within the family sphere, where ethnocultural background is an important dimension, translates into trends that be measured as "plus and minus factors". Does it matter that people of dissimilar backgrounds have different values about having children, if they both end up with 1.7 babies? Does it matter that people resort to different culturally established means of dealing with marital discord if overall divorce rates remain constant across groups? Of what significance are cultural patterns of caring for the elderly if life expectancy is more strongly related to diet and life style than to kinship networks? On the other hand do we know enough about lifestyle and diet, two of the most significant ways in which ethnicity expresses itself in Canadian society?

The answers to these questions are based on two contentions. The first is that if workable policies are to be developed, they need to be based on detailed knowledge of how people take actions that result in changes at the level of the family or the community (ethnocultural or otherwise). Such knowledge leads to an understanding not only of how population change occurs in measurable ways, but of how particular experiences of change affect the quality of life. The second contention is that if we do not yet have that kind of knowledge, and the bibliography that follows illustrates that it is limited indeed, then some sort of strategic planning is necessary to bring about the cooperation among researchers that will lead not just to more studies, but to more studies that will provide, collectively, a broad base and a comparative framework.

If an overall assessment were to be made of the trends expressed in this collection of literature, it would be that in the past Canadian demographers and ethnic studies scholars have approached their work in fundamentally different ways, the former centring their analysis on the individual and asking questions that can be answered in strict quantitative terms, the latter taking a qualitative approach to the group, with little interest in individuals or in quantification. The result is that there are tremendous lacunae in our understanding of issues that need to be addressed at the intersection of these two important areas of study. The gap becomes especially evident when questions of the family arise since the family, as a social unit, does not quite fit the analytical framework of either individually or group oriented researchers. Other related issues, such as kinship, for example, are poorly understood because it is simply not possible to treat such issues from one perspective or the other. A methodological integration is required. Hopefully, the thematic organization of literature on ethnicity, the family and demographic change will make some contribution to such integration.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

This literature review is largely confined to work completed in Canada during the 1980s and, where available, during the early 1990s. Except for a few unusual or groundbreaking works, literature prior to the 1980s is not included. In addressing the most recent literature we have attempted both to outline what exists and to provide a critical interpretation of where the challenges for further research are most demanding. While recognizing that much of the Canadian work has been influenced by scholars from other countries, particularly the United States, to do justice to that work is far beyond the scope and resources of this project. Nonetheless, since much of the theoretical influence on demographic studies comes from other countries, and because of the undeniable importance of comparative work, we have tried to indicate the most appropriate places to find literature reviews of work done in other countries.

This work is not exhaustive. We have made almost no attempt, for example, to collect the scores of student theses written on this topic, or to find all the material on individual ethnic groups. Our aim has been to identify research trends, and to provide a critical analysis of the most important work in the field and, perhaps even more important, of gaps in current knowledge. We have included a list of work on specific ethnic groups, organized geographically into broad ethnic-origin categories, but this list is highly selective.

A particularly frustrating problem that derives from the subject matter is that it is very difficult to treat the issues

of the family, demography and ethnicity in isolation. It is almost impossible to discuss the family without reference, for example, to how families support themselves economically, and this consideration opens up an entire realm of literature on industry, work and related economic issues. The temptation to follow up these cognate lines has been resisted, however, and an attempt made to relate the issues to questions that relate directly to changes in the size, structure and characteristics of the population.

Terms and Concepts

The literature included in this survey contains a great range of interpretations of fundamental terms, including the terms 'family', 'ethnicity', 'race', 'class' and many others.

Variations represent more than simply an annoying problem of definition, since the usage of these words represents specific theoretical, as well as ideological, approaches to the problems being addressed. We have attempted in the annotated bibliography to state briefly, where possible, the orientation taken by the various authors. For our own purposes, it is necessary to clarify some of the meanings attached to these terms, and some of the assumptions we have made in using them.

No term should be considered neutral. When an individual refers to "my family", however the term may be defined, he or she is invoking a complex set of values, meanings, emotions, beliefs and practices that extend beyond the immediate kinship relationship to include the meaning of that family within a

social milieu that is often ethnocultural in nature. Each family has meaning in relation to other families with whom it has formal or informal relations, and upon which it often models its behaviour. In the process, the norms by which family life is ordered are negotiated, mediated and accepted. The researcher who ignores the complexity of the family, or the ideological framework in which use of the term occurs, does so at the peril of failing to understand the family as more than a disembodied set of variables.

We start with the assumption that all of the classifications according to which social scientists understand their subject matter are historical, social constructions: empirical constructions to the extent that people organize themselves according to "families", "ethnic groups" or "classes"; and analytical constructions to the extent that social scientists use these classifications as a means of organizing populations into units that can be analyses. The task of achieving congruence between these two is one of the most difficult challenges to social science, especially when social groups persist in rearranging their spheres of action and re-defining their terms of reference through the mundane but often ineffable acts of quotidian existence. The task is made more difficult by the perverse academic need to objectify.

The concept of 'family' and the concept of ethnicity

As an initial premise, all human categories are social

constructions. That is, they are categories used to distinguish

one group or individual from another on the basis of socially recognized sets of actions that invoke normative values, beliefs, traditions, structural organizations to maintain and sustain the distinction in a meaningful way. The meaning of the family as a demographic unit has shifted considerably over the past several decades, as it becomes more and more evident to social scientists that a high proportion of Canadian families do not now--if they ever did--conform to the format of the "nuclear" family.

The problem is not so simple, however, as re-defining the family to make our understanding fit more closely with empirical reality. Such re-definition is important, of course, but begs the question of the moral, ideological meaning of the family, and of the tendency within Canadian and other western societies to make the nuclear family a normative one and to define all deviations from the norm in negative moral terms. Many researchers adopt a normative notion of the family, even if they do so implicitly by assuming the validity of dominant structures and statistical norms. Conversely, research that attempts to objectify the family as a neutral demographic category, ignoring the moral implications of every aspect of family life, will surely fail to understand the family, no matter how finely honed their analytical skills.

The concept of 'ethnicity' is central to an understanding of social processes, yet one of the most difficult and controversial analytical categories. There is an enormous literature on the issue. This report takes the position that ethnicity, like 'race' and gender, is a social construction. Its meaning is forged

through the cultural practices of human beings who over time, sort themselves into groups according to both inclusive, self-definitional criteria and exclusive criteria that allow one group to distance itself from another. Ethnicity is therefore one of the primary means by which members of groups identify themselves and are identified by others.

As such, it is also a very changeable concept, that reflects fundamental changes as well as subtle shifts in social patterns and practice. This changeability creates challenges to the researcher. Changing categories are not easily captured by standard statistical measures such as the census, especially when the need for time series analysis requires comparability of data from census year to census year. An even more difficult challenge is the need for constant revision of our analytical categories, at the same time that we scramble to complete the empirical research and devise the theoretical schema that explain and account for social changes, inevitably after they have already occurred.

The problems of defining ethnicity fall into two broad categories, that of finding a more or less objective means of categorizing members of a society into 'ethnic groups' on some consistent basis for the purposes of counting, comparison and an array of statistical analyses, and that of specifying from a theoretical perspective how ethnic groups can be identified on the basis of the social processes involved in ethnic group formation. The two problems are inter-related, since both involve taking a theoretical—and therefore often ideological—position

on the subject. Within the social sciences literature, there is a vast and growing amount of theoretical discussion of ethnicity.

On the question of classification, which is of special concern to demographers, there is now a range of good technical papers, some of which are included in the bibliography. On the question of links between the two, especially with respect to the ways in which theoretical positions influence classification procedures, there is to date rather little work.

On the issue of technical definition, Kralt (1990) provides the most recent overview, in addition to reviewing much of the earlier literature on the topic. Kralt's work is clarified if read in conjunction with the Centre for Ethnic Measurement's recent (n.d.) survey of "Canadian Census ethno-cultural questions, 1871-1991). It is striking to note the extent to which official definitions of ethnicity reflect both dominant social norms and prevailing academic theories of how individuals should be classified, as well as variations in the ways in which people define themselves, itself an ethno-cultural variable.

Researchers interested in ethnicity face the additional challenge that while recognizing the socially constructed, and therefore dynamic and culturally relative nature of ethnicity, the need for 'hard' data forces us to accept an objectified definition. The problems of objectification are compounded by the fact that the Census, as the primary source of demographic data, confines 'ethnicity' to a somewhat narrow interpretation that has varied over time. Indeed, census definitions are themselves social constructions but, clothed in the language of objectivity,

they tend to force a limited view that not only restricts interpretation but tends also to colour the theoretical lens through which ethnicity is re-constructed by researchers, the general public, special interest groups and policy makers.¹

Partly in recognition of this political dimension, there has been growing interest very recently among researchers in ethnicity to understand the role of self-identification in understanding and theorizing ethnicity. The concept of 'affective ethnicity' (Wienfeld) allows us to go beyond simple assumptions about the existence of ethnic groups based on census counts, in an attempt to understand relative variations in the importance of ethnicity for both individuals and social groups. Ethnic identify is not only chosen, however, it is also contested. The problem of objective identification is confounded by the lack of consensus within many groups about how to express their collective concerns.

While it is important to understand the construction of ethnicity from the perspective of the individual or group, it is equally important to recognize that ethnic identities are imposed upon communities through a variety of social mechanisms tied to political and economic power, social status and the complex forms of discrimination, including racism, by which social relations are worked out.

Statistics Canada, in cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of the Census, is sponsoring a "Joint Canada-United States Conference on the Measurement of Ethnicity" to take place in Ottawa, April 1-3, 1992. The proceedings of the conference were not yet available for this report.

The Gender Issue

There is no special section on gender issues in this bibliography, on the grounds that every family issue is a gender issue. Unfortunately, the vast and growing literature that deals specifically with gender issues in Canada pays too little attention to ethnocultural questions, and that lack should be seen, through its omission, as one of the most significant findings of this study. Much work remains to be done on questions of how ethnocultural values affect the formation of gender roles and family ideology, of how family structure is related to variations in workforce participation by different groups, of how socioeconomic differences affect demographic change, and of how ethnocultural aspects of motherhood affect family patterns. Recently, there has been increasing, but again inadequate, attention to immigrant and visible minority women, who face multiple handicaps as participants in Canadian society. Their concerns are incorporated within the bibliography under the appropriate headings.

ORGANIZATION OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is organized under a number of broad headings that represent, for the most part, established areas of demographic research. A few items are annotated under more than one category; in such cases, the annotations will be different to reflect the different topics. Most of the annotations are original. In a small number of cases, however, the published abstracts have been so appropriate that they have been reproduced as quotations. In all such cases, the source is acknowledged.

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ethnic Demography - General

The literature on ethnicity in Canada is huge and theoretically and methodologically diverse. No attempt is made here to reflect either the scope or diversity of the literature. The following works have been chosen because they represent basic texts on the nature of Canadian ethnicity or because they address issues of population change directly. On the whole, the collection is disappointing. It shows the lack of rigorous attention to issues of population change among those in ethnic studies; and it shows the relative lack of attention to questions of ethnicity among demographers. Much of the demographic work either focuses on immigrants (which is not in itself a problem but ignores the question of ethnicity in the population in general), or treats ethnocultural groups under such broad categories that only the most general conclusions can be drawn. Nonetheless, recent

interest in these topics is evident, an promises a burgeoning of research over the next relatively short time period.

Anderson, Alan B. and James S. Frideres 1981. Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives. Toronto: Butterworths.

Despite the publication of several excellent collections and monographs since 1981, this book remains the most comprehensive and the most often-quoted treatment of ethnicity in Canada. It contains a thorough review of the literature on ethnicity, perhaps the most useful bibliography up to 1981. It is especially strong on theoretical discussions of racism and inequality, and on policy aspects of multiculturalism. A chapter on immigration provides a "socio-demographic profile", including detailed historical immigration statistics. There is no specific demographic or family focus, however, and little systematic treatment of issues of relevance to this topic.

Beaujot, Roderic 1991. Population Change in Canada: The Challenges of Policy Adaptation. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

The is a recent and comprehensive overview treatment of the subject of population change in Canada, with a specific focus on policy. Both the family and ethnicity are given fairly extensive treatment in the book, although in each case as separate, rather than integrated, issues. The bulk of the book is concerned with demographic analysis centred on the individual. A chapter on immigration provides a good review of the general literature, although it does not address particular immigrant groups. The bibliography is comprehensive.

Burnet, Jean with Howard Palmer 1988. "Coming Canadians": An Introduction to a History of Canada's Peoples. Toronto:

McClelland and Stewart.

This is the most comprehensive general introduction to a history of Canada's ethnocultural groups, and includes a discussion of the development of multiculturalism policy. The bibliography is extensive.

Driedger, Leo 1987. Ethnic Canada: Identities and Inequalities.
Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman.

This reader brings together a collection of essays on ethnicity in Canada, most of which have previously been

published elsewhere. Five sections cover "Perspectives on ethnic persistence and change", "ethnic demography and ecology", "ethnic identity and solidarity", "ethnic stratification and conflict" and "human rights and social inequalities." There is no direct treatment and little of peripheral interest with respect to the family. The demographic section includes a good general overview by Warren Kalbach on the "Growth and distribution of Canada's ethnic populations, 1871-1981" as well as papers on urban ethnicity and segregation of visible minorities (annotated separately) by Darroch and Marston, and Balakrishnan and Kralt.

- Elliott, Jean Leonard 1979. Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.
- Elliott, Jean Leonard 1983. Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada 2nd ed. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada.

These two books, the second a substantially new volume, provide a fundamental collection of essays on a variety of Canadian ethnic groups. The central theme is that of "nations within", and most of the essays address the question of the cultural, economic and political difficulties of minority groups attempting to maintain cultural distinctiveness in Canada. Most of the essays are written from an ethnocentric perspective, and a few attempt a more general understanding of ethnicity. Demographic questions are addressed only in the loosest terms (how many and when), and the family is not a focus of discussion. Nevertheless, the essays provide an important complement to these questions because they provide a great deal of information of a contextual nature, and because the issues, basic survival of the group for example, are fundamental to demographic change. This book is therefore more useful than other general texts on Canada's ethnic groups. The second volume contains full sections on native people and French Canadians.

Halli, Shiva S., Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds 1990. Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

(Note: All of the relevant papers from this book are reviewed separately).

This is the most recent and most important book on the topic of ethnicity and demography. It provides an overview of issues, from a social demography orientation. The papers are organized in three sections. Part One addresses fertility, mortality and migration, the "plus and minus factors" of demography. The focus is on immigration (Simmons, Beaujot

and Rappak, Trovato), with papers on geographic mobility (Trovato and Halli), fertility (Halli) and Aboriginal people (Norris). Part Two, entitled "demographic processes and ethnic cohesion", addresses language maintenance (De Vries), religion (Kalbach and Richard), family structure (Burch), intermarriage (Ram) and aging (Driedger and Chappell; Choinière and Robitaille). Section Three focuses on immigrant socioeconomic status, with papers on immigrant women (Boyd; Basavarajappa and Verma; Grindstaff; Seward) and Caribbean immigrants (Richmond). A final section comprises three chapters on challenges for demographers, including third world immigration (Samuels), residential segregation (Balakrishnan and Selvanathan) and multiethnicity (Krotki and Odynak). The overall tone of the book emphasises immigrants over other Canadians. Despite the importance of immigration in this country, and despite the particular importance of immigration in changing the composition of the Canadian population, the emphasis in this book results in an implicit reinforcement of the commonly held notion that discussions of ethnicity pertain a minority of the population.

Herberg, Edward N. 1989. Ethnic Groups in Canada: Adaptations and Transitions. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.

This book provides a general overview of the subject of ethnicity. It is based on a loose definition of ethnicity as a form of social organization established by birth, practice and perception, recognizing the variety of factors, including religion and race, that make up and influence 'ethnicity'. Topics addressed include theories of ethnicity, ethnic diversity, immigration, culture and linguistic maintenance, residential segregation, religion and adaptation. It is probably the most comprehensive effort yet published to bring together the questions of family, ethnicity and demographic change.

Chapter 8, entitled "Ethnic family aspects - endogamy and fertility", begins with the obvious but important premise (p.183) that "Ethnic-group cohesion can be considered to both begin and end in ethnic families. Most of the people that make up the membership of an ethnic community entered that community via the family in Canada." This chapter provides a discussion of the issues of ethnic endogamy and fertility, including a historical survey of the literature, and an analysis of data availability and limitations up to and including the 1981 census. The study of endogamy is limited by several factors including the variability of data over time, the unavailability of data for smaller groups, the limitations of census questions and the fact that Canadian vital statistics refer only to endogamy at time of marriage, without allowing an analysis of those who marry more than once.

A brief longitudinal survey of endogamy rates by ethnic group shows that endogamy rates were high—averaging between 70 and 90 per cent—for nearly all groups prior to World War II. By 1981, Chinese, French, Italian and British Canadians, plus Native peoples, maintained endogamy rates about 70%, while others had dropped to below 55%. The drop is most significant for groups of north, east, and west European origin. Data for endogamy by "racial" group are unavailable.

Gender differences in endogamy can be related to both cultural and demographic factors. For immigrants especially, the ratio of females to males has varied by group and time period. Marriage patterns are strongly influenced by cultural practices, including the strength of parents in influencing choice of mate and the whether descent occurs through the male or female line.

Fertility among ethnic groups has been little studied in Canada. One reason is the lack of reliable data between 1941 and 1971. Fertility is important because it points to intergroup differentials in their potential to maintain culture through natural increment. Changes in fertility rates for a variety of groups are compared for 1931 to 1981. There is some evidence that fertility differentials are related to degrees of assimilation. The presumption that generation in Canada inversely influences the level of fertility is examined to show that although there is a diverse association, the theory of "assimilation" transition generally holds. The article concludes (p. 205):

Endogamy...is the glue that binds other ethnic-cohesion mechanisms together; ethnic culture becomes a family affair, a collective practice and celebration of cultural heritage...ethnic-group fertility can be seen as the progenitor of the ethnic group itself, a sine qua non of ethnic-group cultural maintenance...Endogamy marks the initiation of the family, and fertility represents its fulfilment as, in part, the agent of cultural adherence.

Kalbach, Warren E. 1970. The Impact of Immigration on Canada's Population. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

This is the most comprehensive demographic study of immigrants ever undertaken in Canada. The information, based primarily on census data up to 1962, is now dated, but it provides a model for contemporary studies. It includes a history of immigration policy, and statistical analyses of changing immigrant composition, population growth and distribution, socio-economic characteristics, and economic adjustment and characteristics of post-war immigrant

families, as well as a lengthy section on immigration and citizenship.

Kalbach, Warren E. 1990. A demographic overview of racial and ethnic groups in Canada. In Peter S. Li ed. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada, 18-50. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

This article represents the best general introduction to the topic of ethnic demography in Canada, and is suitable for a general or undergraduate audience. It covers demographic change up to the 1986 census, using clear tables and graphics. A section on methodological problems of identifying populations is followed by discussions of: the changing composition of the population, set in context, between 1971 and 1986; population distribution; urbanization; ethnic diversity and residential segregation; and variations in socio-demographic characteristics. A weakness of the paper is that data are grouped so that differences among groups may be masked. There is a limited review of previous literature.

Kalbach, Warren E. and Wayne W McVey 1979. The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society 2nd ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

The is the single most comprehensive text on demographic change in Canada up to the mid-1970s. A chapter on "Ethnicity and Race" is based on a notion of "two founding peoples" and "other ethnic and racial groups". Like Statistics Canada at the time, the language of the book is quite insensitive to issues of self-reference, or to the negative images and stereotyping involved in language use. Canadians of Asian origin are referred to as "Asiatics" and aboriginal Canadians are relegated to a "residual category". There is no attempt to provide a comprehensive account of Canada's ethnic groups, but data for selected groups are used effectively to illustrate several key points: increasing diversity in new immigrant streams is changing the cultural complexity of the Canadian population, and challenging the notion of biculturalism; ethnocultural groups vary in their proportions of immigrants, in their age/sex compositions and in their cultural homogeneity (as measured by religious characteristics); there are significant regional variations in concentrations of different ethnocultural groups, and in rural-urban distributions. Overall, the chapter shows how little research on ethnic demography had taken place in Canada by the late 1970s (the bibliography illustrates just how poorly developed was the field), explains well some of the technical difficulty of studying ethnicity as defined by the census, and makes a case for more complex studies of ethnicity that reflect the cultural complexity of Canada.

In the balance of the book, a full range of demographic questions is addressed. Unfortunately, while many of the questions address aspects of family composition, the variables are considered independently of ethnicity, with the result that the question of ethnicity is not addressed in any dimension except that of ethnic diversity.

Li, Peter S. ed. 1990. Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

(Note: relevant articles are annotated separately)_.

This is a general introduction to issues surrounding 'race' and ethnicity. An introductory section contains Kalbach's overview of ethnic demography. A section on "Race, ethnicity and the state" contains several articles with demographic implications, including Jean Elliott's and Augie Fleras' "Immigration and the Canadian ethnic mosaic". A third section entitled "Perspectives on race and ethnicity" provides a review of several theoretical issues. The book does not contain works on specific ethnic groups. Although the book overall does not address issues of family or demographic change, it is essential background reading in order to understand Canada's plural society.

Rietz, Jeffrey G. 1980. The Survival of Ethnic Groups. Toronto: McGraw Hill.

The emphasis of this book is on the ethnocultural community, with only incidental discussion of the family or demographic issues. Ten groups form a sample for analysis and discussion of issues of ethnic group cohesion, life cycles and economic positions. There is an extensive theoretical discussion of ideologies of ethnic survival and of sociological theories of ethnic cohesion. The book ends by calling for social policy that will not only prevent official discrimination, but will allow groups the resources to mobilize themselves in order to address covert discrimination, leading to a cultural policy that will both maintain commitment to ethnic cohesion and promote social justice.

Tepper, Elliot L. 1987. Demographic change and pluralism. Canadian Studies in Population 14, 2, 223-35.

Canada is becoming increasingly demographically diverse, mainly as a result of changing trends in source countries for new immigrants. Immigrant numbers are too small and their differences in social variables too short-lived to make a difference to overall demographic trends. Research is needed, however, to demonstrate the effects of immigration on labour market participation, on the population

composition of cities, and on the demands on public services as a result of changing patterns of ethnicity. Emerging public issues will reflect efforts to achieve a new social equilibrium, and will require protections against discrimination as Canadians deal with a more diverse population. Research is needed to understand desired change and how to achieve it, and to dispel fears of the unknown.

Waxler-Morrison, Nancy, Joan Anderson and Elizabeth Richardson eds 1990. Cross-cultural Caring: A Handbook for Health Professionals in Western Canada. Vancouver: University of B.C. Press.

This book consists of short essays on a cross-section of ethnic groups. The essays are very general, and not thoroughly documented, but written with sensitivity. The information is useful, therefore, for providing a sense of cultural practices that is often lacking in rigorous but detached demographic studies.

The Canadian Family - General

Literature on the Canadian family is also huge and growing. The lack of attention to ethnicity within this literature as a whole is mind-boggling, especially for such obviously cultural topics as kinship. The following collection makes no attempt, therefore, to include the vast number of works that pay no attention to ethnicity, but a few are included to provide a sense of the major issues.

Bumpass, Larry L. 1990. What's happening to the family?
Interactions between demographic and institutional change.

Demography 27, 4, 483-98.

This is the 1990 Presidential Address to the Population Association of America. It makes no reference to the Canadian population, or to specific issues of ethnicity, but it is an excellent synopsis of the current state of research on the family in advanced industrial nations. The bibliography is extensive and international. It summarizes trends in cohabitation and marriage, childbearing and parenting, marital and intergenerational relationships, and links these to cultural and economic values of individualization.

Eichler, Margrit 1988. Families in Canada Today 2nd ed. Toronto: Gage.

This is one of the most important and comprehensive texts on the family produced in Canada. It is especially strong on gender relations and work, and advances theoretical understanding of the relation between production and reproduction. It also contains an excellent review and critique of the theoretical literature on the family. A thoughtful chapter on reproductive technology is an excellent resource for understanding this new field. The focus of the book is on government policy, and "The Family" as a political issue, although the problems addressed in this are almost entirely of an economic nature. Despite its strengths, however, the work is seriously flawed by its failure to address ethnicity, with not even passing mention of the importance of ethnocultural factors in structuring family relations. The book contains an excellent bibliography on the family.

Ishwaran, K. 1976. The Canadian Family rev. ed. Toronto and Montreal: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada.

This is a large and diverse collection of materials on the family. Although much of the information is dated, especially in those papers which are theory- or policy-oriented, articles on families from specific ethnic groups provide a basis for understanding how those groups have developed within Canadian society, and how such factors as cultural values have affected choices that have demographic outcomes. Specific family groups addressed include those of 'Eskimo', Jewish, Japanese, Sikh, Lebanese, aboriginal, Italian, Dutch, Hutterite, Mennonite and French ethnic background.

Larson, Lyle E. 1976. The Canadian Family in Comparative Perspective. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada.

(Note: relevant articles are annotated separately).

This is one of very few attempts to provide cross-cultural, comparative analyses of Canadian families from different ethnocultural backgrounds, as well as of Canadian families and those in other parts of the world. The collection includes several theoretical pieces (now dated), articles on parents, children and kinship relationships, and a section on changes in industrial and post-industrial society. Of most relevance for issues of demography and ethnicity are an overview by Kalbach and McVey (using 1971 Census data), comparative articles on English and French Canadian sexual permissiveness (Hobart) and marriage practices (Carisse), and articles focused on French-Canadian kinship (Garigue), Hutterite family and community (Peter) and Ukrainian-Canadian family patterns (Hobart).

Légaré, Jacques, T.R. Balakrishna and Roderic P. Beaujot eds 1989. The Family in Crisis: A Population Crisis? Crise de la Famille: Crise Démographique? Ottawa: The Royal Society.

This bilingual collection represents the proceedings of a colloquium organized by the Federation of Canadian Demographers and the Royal Society of Canada. Part I contains four papers on methodological issues of the 1984 Canadian Fertility Survey and Family History Survey. Part II focuses on "Evolution of the family: behaviour and mentalities". One article (see separate annotation of Kalbach and Richard 1989) addresses ethnic intermarriage. Part III addresses "Demographic consequences of the transformations in the formation and dissolution of the families", while part IV turns to the question of "The family in the western world: where does Canada stand?". The collection is one of the best available sources of recent,

in-depth analysis of demographic trends and the family. With the exception of the Kalbach and Richard paper, ethnicity is considered tangentially if at all.

Ramu, G.N. ed. 1980. Courtship, Marriage and the Family in Canada. Toronto: Gage.

This is a very general text, suitable (although now outdated) for introducing undergraduates to ethnographic approaches to the family. There are eleven chapters on various aspects of courtship, sexuality, sex roles, kinship networks and marriage practices. There is little reference to demography or ethnicity, except in the chapter by Tavuchis (annotated separately), entitled "Ethnic perspectives". It provides a general description of ethnic differences in marriage patterns, and a fairly good review of the literature in 1980.

Wakil, S. Parvez 1975. Marriage, Family and Society. Toronto: Butterworths.

This book, while dated, remains one of the most significant collections of articles on marriage, the family and ethnicity. The quality of the work, however, is highly variable. The objective set by the editor was to provide comparative studies. Special effort is made to include demographic data, and an appendix provides a variety of statistical data up to 1973.

Most of the articles fail to link ethnicity and marriage, and are limited to groups identified by a single criterion, for example, students and dating behaviour (Wakil 1975). Some papers are superficially indifferent to ethnicity, but present an Anglo-conformist norm. Turk (1975), for example, describes a case study of a "typical" Canadian family, the Robinsons.

Several papers, however, deal quite explicitly with issues of family and ethnicity, and represent a foundational collection in this area of study. They are all reviewed separately (Kalbach, Heer and Hubay, Calisse, Garigue, Boissevain, McElroy, Hobart, and Whitehurst 1975).

Ethnicity, Measurement and the Census

Problems involving the measurement of ethnicity fall into three general categories. The first is the problems that arise from methodological deficiencies on the part of researchers. An example cited above is the lumping of more than one ethnocultural category together for statistical purposes, on the basis of the researcher's perception of their similar characteristics. The second set of problems concerns the availability of data. Availability is constrained financially because the detailed information on ethnicity that is possible using the census is extremely expensive to produce. It is also constrained by the fact that those instruments that are available for use by social scientists, most notably the Public Use Sample Tape and the General Social Survey, are not constructed to facilitate analysis of ethnicity. The third set of problems concerns the technical difficulties of defining ethnicity, when what is required is objectification of a fluid, changing and highly variable social construction, subject to a range of social and theoretical controversies.

As the collection below shows, the problems of technical definition have been extensively discussed, in particular by statisticians employed by Statistics Canada to gather, compile and interpret the data. The works cited below are intended to cover both those that discuss technical difficulties and those that provide access to information on ethnicity.

- Beaujot, R., K.G. Basavarajappa and R.B.P. Verma 1988. Income of Immigrants in Canada. Catalogue 91-527E. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- Boxhill, Walton O. 1985. Limitations to Ethnic Origin Data. Statistics Canada, non-catalogued publication.
- Boxhill, Wally 1988. Making the tough choice in using census data to count visible minorities in Canada. Unpublished paper, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.
- Boxhill, Walton O. 1986. Users' Guide to the 1981 Census Ethnic Origin Data. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- Boxhill, Wally and Josephine Stanic 1989. Approaches to the collection of data on visible minorities in Canada: a review and commentary. Unpublished paper produced for the Employment Equity Programme, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.
- Boyd, Monica 1990. Ethno-cultural Questions on the General Social Survey: An Assessment. Report submitted to the General Social Survey Project, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.
- Canada, Employment and Immigration Canada 1989. Immigration to Canada: A Statistical Overview. Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada, Public Affairs and Immigration Policy Branch.
- Canada, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada 1986. Socioeconomic Profiles of Selected Ethnic/Visible Minority Groups, 1981 Census. Ottawa: Multiculturalism Canada.
- Canada, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada 1990.

 Multicultural Canada: A Graphic Overview. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada, Statistics Canada, Demography Division 1988. Intercensal estimates of Families, Canada and Provinces. Ottawa:
 Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada, Statistics Canada, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division 1990. Women In Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada, Statistics Canada 1989. Profiles of Ethnic Groups. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Canada, Statistics Canada 1989. Profile of the Immigrant Population. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

- Canada, Statistics Canada, Centre for Ethnic Measurement 1991.

 Canadian Census Ethno-cultural Questions 1871-1991. Noncatalogued publication.
- Centre for Ethnic Measurement n.d. Canadian Census Ethno-cultural Questions 1871-1991. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- Harrison, Brian with Réjean Lachapelle 1990. Measures of Mother Tongue Vitality for Non-Official Languages in Canada (1986).
 Ottawa: Policy and Research, Multiculturalism Sector,
 Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.
- Kralt, John 1990. Ethnic origins in the Canadian Census, 1871-1986. In Shiva S. Halli, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 13-30. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
- Kralt, John and Ravi Pendakur 1991. Ethnicity, Immigration and Language Transfer. Ottawa: Policy and Research, Multiculturalism Sector, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.
- Larivée, D. 1989. Projections of Households and Families for Canada, Provinces and Territories. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Statistics Canada Catalogue 91-522.
- Loh, Shirley 1990. Population Projections of Registered Indians, 2986-2011. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada.
- Pendakur, Ravi 1990. Speaking in Tongues: Heritage Language Maintenance and Transfer in Canada. Ottawa: Policy and Research, Multiculturalism Sector, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.
- Pendakur, Ravi and Michel Ledoux 1991. Immigrants Unable to Speak English or French: A Graphic Overview. Ottawa: Policy and Research, Multiculturalism Sector, Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada.
- Pryor, Edward T., Gustave J. Goldmann, Michael J. Sheridan and Pamela M. White 1992. Is 'Canadian' an evolving indigenous ethnic group? Ethnic and Racial Studies (forthcoming).
- White, Pamela M. 1988. Testing the 1991 census ethnic ancestry, ethnic identity and race questions: results of two surveys. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Population Society, Windsor.
- White, Pamela 1989. Ethnic Diversity in Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada 92-183.
- White, Pamela M. 1991. 'Why isn't my group shown?': Ethnic groups and categories in Canada's census. Unpublished paper

presented to the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Cincinnati.

Wright, Wendy 1989. Comparison of 1981 and 1986 census counts on visible minorities in Canada. Unpublished paper produced for the Employment Equity Programme, Housing, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada.

Marriage

A huge literature on recent marriage patterns in Canada was reviewed, including issues of courtship and mate selection, different forms of cohabitation, first marriages and remarriages, marital stability and divorce. Most of this literature has not been included in this bibliography, because it ignores the question of ethnicity as a factor in marriage patterns. Furthermore, the issue is in general poorly developed. Despite a recent increase in research on intermarriage, emphasis has been upon documenting trends statistically. There exist several broad overviews which for reasons of cost and logistics take a macro approach to defining ethnic categories (eg. Kalbach, Richard and Ram below), and a few studies of individual ethnic groups (Boissevain and Kobayashi below). A number of other studies include ethnicity by implication, or in relation to another variable such as religion. On the whole, however, the failure to place more attention on ethnicity is surprising given the fact that about three quarters of Canadian marriages are ethnically endogamous. This is surely one of the most important issues on the demographic agenda in Canada.

There remains a great deal of research to be done on the implications of intermarriage for future families. We know little for example, of the kinds of problems faced by intermarried couples over decisions concerning number of children, childrening practices or care of the elderly. And we have little information on the relative stability of intermarriages.

Understanding intermarriage among immigrants presents special challenges. There are methodological difficulties because available data do not allow a disaggregation of immigrants who were already married upon arrival in Canada and those who married after arrival. For some groups, however, (for example, Japanese immigrants), there are not only significant recent trends, but also specific characteristics that allow gender distinctions in the ways in which intermarriages take place.

Abernathy, Thomas J. 1983. Status integration and ethnic intramarriage in Canada. In Peter S. Li and B. Singh Bolaria eds, Racial Minorities in Multicultural Canada, 97-102.

Toronto: Garamond Press.

This is a short research note that addresses the issue of why people marry the persons they do. It provides a brief but useful review of literature, and discusses methods of measuring ethnic endogamy. Using 1971 census data, it is shown that nearly 76% of Canadian marriages in that year were endogamous, but that variations occur by group and between members of the same group in different provinces. Taking into account an index of ethnic integration increases by as much as 30% the overall explained variation.

Boissevain, Jeremy 1975. "Family, kinship and marriage among Italians of Montreal." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 287-94. Toronto: Butterworth.

In this article, and a longer version in monograph form (1970) values and attitudes are explored within an ethnic group that has one of the highest rates of endogamy in Canada. Based on interview data, the study found that while rates of endogamy were decreasing (from 94% in 1951 to 87% in 1962) they remained one of the highest for any ethnic group in Canada. Endogamy is strongly correlated with residential segregation and kinship ties. The majority of those sampled lived with close relatives in the same building, and the vast majority lived within five minutes of close relatives. Despite the increasing rate of intermarriage, especially for Canadian-born men, kinship ties and contact with kin remained very high.

Carisse, Colette 1975. "Cultural orientations in marriages between French and English Canadians." In S.P. Wakil ed.

Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 97-112.

Toronto: Butterworth.

Carisse's (1975) study of marriages between French and English Canadians represents one of the most in-depth treatments of the issue. Since numbers of such marriages are small, there is little concern with demographic factors in the narrow sense. It asks , "in a situation known to require compromise, which cultural elements will be given up or retained by each ethnic group?, and analyses the orientation of spouses in making choices between two cultural options. Data are based on interviews 32 respondents whose age registers in ordinal scale in the names were drawn from the 1 Montreal. Behaviour is rank gion, social networks areas of neighbourhood, lan and use of mass media. The scalar is that where a situation poses a choice between Fishch and English culture, the English ethnic group tends to preserve its culture more than the French. This finding is qualified by the observation that the French cling to their culture in areas of home, kin, religion, school and friends, while the English adhere more strongly to the mass media and language in the home. The higher the social class, there is a marked stronger orientation towards English culture. "...the English cultural orientation predominates in modern areas centred around power. A French cultural orientation remains strong in the area of community life" (p. 110-11).

Castonguay, Charles 1982. Intermarriage and language shift in Canada, 1971-1976. Canadian Journal of Sociology 7, 3, 263-77.

This paper argues that the practice of intermarriage between French and English-speaking Canadians has resulted in an erosion of the French language.

Grenier, Gilles, David E. Bloom and D. Juliet Howland 1987. An analysis of the first marriage patterns of Canadian women. Canadian Studies in Population 14, 1, 47-68.

(abstract) The Coale-McNeil marriage model is applied to study the evolution and determinants of female first marriage patterns in Canada with data from the 1971 and 1981 censuses. The results indicate a tendency toward a stabilization of the mean age at first marriage and toward a decline in the proportion ever-marrying for younger cohorts; however, the changes reported are not as large as those shown in recent marriage vital statistics data. A major reason for that difference is that the 1981 census data include some common law marriages. An analysis of the

determinants of marriage patterns shows that French mother tongue, birth in Quebec and in foreign countries, Catholic religion, education and urban residence affect positively the mean age at first marriage; while birth in Quebec, Catholic religion, education and urban residence affect negatively the probability of ever marrying.

Heer, David M. and Charles A. Hubay, Jr. 1975. "The trend of interfaith marriages in Canada: 1922-1972." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 85-96. Toronto: Butterworth.

This study used the annual series of vital statistics (Statistics Canada) on bride and bridegroom religion, dating from 1921, to obtain a sample for a comparative analysis of interfaith marriage and marriage composition. It is postulated that when members of an ethnic group are predominantly members of a particular religious group they tend to marry endogamously but, except in the case of Jewish marriages, extensive analysis of this factor based on comparative national data cannot be supported.

Johnson, Colleen Leahy 1988. Ex Familia: Grandparents, Parents, and Children Adjust to Divorce. New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press.

This study is focused upon a small group of white, middle-class families in California. It provides an in-depth study of adjustment to divorce among these families, based on interviews. It addresses bonds among family members, changes that occurred through the process of divorce, the role of grandparents, the effect of negotiation, from an emotional and an economic perspective. The value of this book for Canadian studies of divorce is in providing a specific case study against which other studies, with more cultural variety, could be measured.

Kalbach, Warren E. 1975. "The demography of marriage." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 59-84. Toron.o: Butterworth.

Kalbach addresses a number of demographic aspects of marriage and family, but limits discussion of ethnicity to two sections on interethnic and interreligious marriage. While data on interreligious marriages allow a fairly reliable assessment, interethnic marriages are more difficult to study, both because specific marriage data are not available, and have to be inferred from ethnic origin of husbands and wives in the census, and because for immigrants, little can be said about intermarriage without being able to disaggregate those who were married before

coming to Canada and those who married in Canada. Rates of intermarriage, based on 1971 census data, vary significantly across groups and to some degree regionally. There is some relationship between low rates of intermarriage and residential segregation (a topic taken up elsewhere by Kalbach). The article concludes that "variations in marriage and divorce rates that coincide with changing socio-economic and political conditions suggest the extent to which choice and freedom to act regarding one's marital status can be abrogated by conditions beyond the individual's control", and "the consequences of interaction between demographic variables and social behaviour can only be hypothesized," but that continuing research needs to be able to link the changing demographic nature of society with changing attitudes and behaviours.

Kalbach, Warren E. and Madeline A. Richard 1989. Ethnic intermarriage and the changing Canadian family. In Jacques Légaré, T.R. Balakrishnan and Roderic P. Beaujot eds The Family in Crisis: A Population Crisis? Crise de la famille: crise démographique?, 213-26. Ottawa: The Royal Society. (abstract) This paper focuses on ethnic intermarriage as one of the processes facilitating change in the post-industrial family in a multicultural society. A comparative analysis, based on data from the 1981 Family and Housing Public Use Sample Tape, provides evidence that ethnically exogamous husband-wife families were more assimilated than endogamous families in terms of their language behaviour, marriage, fertility and labour force participation patterns. They were also shown to be more successfully integrated by virtue of their generally higher educational achievement levels and occupational status. The results are also generally consistent with the convergence hypothesis of assimilation theory.

This is a preliminary work, based on data for single origin ethnicity for nine ethnic groups. Review of the theoretical literature on questions of assimilation and integration is extremely limited.

Kobayashi, Audrey 1989. A Demographic Profile of Japanese
Canadians, and Social Implications for the Future. Ottawa:
Department of the Secretary of State, Canada.

This overview study examines rates of intermarriage among Japanese Canadians according to age group, to find that in the under-37 age group 90.2 percent of women and 88.4 percent of men are married to partners of another ethnicity. The rate decreases with age, reversing in the 45-54 age group, with less than 10 percent intermarriage among those over 55. This pattern indicates that those Japanese Canadians born after the community was uprooted during the

1940s have almost entirely intermarried, leading to questions of the effect of the dispersal, and of the community institutions that were destroyed in the process. The effect may also be related to educational levels. This pattern is completely different, however, from other visible minority groups in Canada, all of whom have high rates of exogamy. Among Japanese immigrants to Canada, the majority who immigrate prior to marriage subsequently undertake exogamous marriages. This is a striking trend among Japanese immigrant women, who outnumber single male immigrants several fold. Their tendency to exogamous marriage indicates a rejection of the patriarchal form of traditional Japanese marriage.

Larson, Lyle and Brenda Munro 1990. Religious intermarriage in Canada in the 1980s. Journal of Comparative Family Studies 2, 239-50.

This paper reviews the theoretical literature on interfaith marriage, and addresses the growing tendency for religious exogamy in Canada. Data are presented up to 1987, updating an earlier paper (Larson and Munro 1985) based on 1982 data. The recent data show a continuation of patterns established in recent decades: religious intermarriage is highest among Jews, followed by non-Christians, Pentecostals and Mennonites. Lutherans, Presbyterians and Anglicans are the most secular. When intermarriage occurs, the 'second choice' is typically Catholic, regardless of religious background. Questions are raised about the quality of marriage data provided by Statistics Canada. Although ethnicity is not directly linked to religion, it is identified as a factor that is as important. The paper concludes with the observation that "all marriages are intermarriages", but that similarities (age, ethnicity, social class, education, religion) exceed differences. Differences are, however, profoundly important and can only be understood by addressing the relative role of the family as the major socialization agent of religious and other values.

Ram, Bali 1990. Intermarriage among ethnic groups. In Shiva S. Halli, frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 75-90. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Contrary to what is suggested in the title, this article addresses the propensity for intermarriage among *immigrants* from 40 countries, based on data tabulated from the census to rank husbands and wives who had the same or different countries of birth. Intermarriage is most prevalent among those of U.S., Australian and Western and Northern European origin, least prevalent among those of Asian (with the exception of Japan), Caribbean and South European origin.

Several explanatory hypotheses are suggested, including that: a) group size and rate of intermarriage are inversely related; b) intermarriage increases with length of group residence; c) an unbalanced sex ratio is associated with high rates of intermarriage; d) imbalance between the sexes of socioeconomic characteristics leads to outmarriage. Tentative findings suggest that: a) population size is a relatively weak predictor; b) duration of residence is strongly associated; c) occupational heterogeneity is a powerful predictor; d) foreign-born women are less likely than foreign-born men to intermarry. These findings are constrained, however, by problems of conceptualizing intermarriage, and by technical data problems. The most important finding of the paper is its suggestion of the need for further research.

Ramu, G.N. ed. 1980. Courtship, Marriage and the Family in Canada. Toronto: Gage.

This book contains 11 chapters on various aspects of courtship and marriage, with one chapter by Nicholas Tavuchis (annotated separately) on "Ethnic Perspectives", and a related chapter on "Kinship Networks" by B.N. Ramu. Most of the other articles do not make direct reference to ethnicity. There is a combined bibliography which, although dated, contains most of the literature on the topic of ethnicity and marriage in Canada prior to 1980.

Richard, Madeline A. 1991. Ethnic Groups and Marital Choices: Ethnic History and Marital Assimilation in Canada, 1871-1971. Vancouver: UBC Press.

The practice of intermarriage is studied for ten ethnic groups - English, Irish, Scottish, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Scandinavian, Ukrainian - at the time of the 1871 and 1971 censuses. A brief review of the literature on intermarriage and assimilation provides a context for using intermarriage as an indicator of assimilation. The literature through the 1970s is reviewed comprehensively. Two chapters review the history of immigration and the development of the ten ethnic communities, to stress ways in which Canada has developed through immigration, fertility differences, changes in marital behaviour and the distribution of the population across the country. Ethnic differentials in rates of intermarriage are shown in a range of studies. The findings are general and descriptive, but document patterns, rates and correlates of "marital assimilation" (for husbands), showing differential rates of intermarriage. For 1971, ethno-religious intermarriage has progressed, but individuals are still strongly affected by ethnocultural origins.

Trovato, Frank 1986. The relationship between marital dissolution and suicide: the Canadian case. Journal of Marriage and the Family 48, 341-48.

This short article examines the hypothesis that provinces in Canada with high levels of divorce experience increased rates of suicide. Aggregate data for 1971 and 1978 support the hypothesis. Controlling for provincial differences in education, migration, percentage Roman Catholic and the marriage rate does not eliminate the observed association between family dissolution and suicide. The article does not address the issue of ethnicity directly, but provides the basis for further study that would take into account both ethnicity directly and religion more comprehensively. (Note: two additional articles on divorce by the same author, a 1987 article on divorce and suicide, do not address ethnicity as a variable).

White, James M. 1987. Premarital cohabitation and marital stability in Canada. Journal of Marriage and the Family 49, 641-47.

(abstract) Increases in the number of people premaritally cohabiting raise questions regarding the effect of premarital cohabitation on marriage. One question that has not been adequately addressed is the effect of premarital cohabitation on later marital stability. This effect is investigated with data from a probability sample of 10,472 ever-married Canadians. Results suggest that premarital cohabitation has a positive effect on staying married. This positive effect remains when length of marriage and age at marriage are controlled. The difference between previous studies and the present study are discussed.

(Note: This paper is critiqued in an article by Trussell and Rao (1989), but their comments concern only the limitations of the methodology; they do not address the question of cultural variation in marital stability).

Vaidyanathan, Prabha and Josephine Naidoo 1991. Changing values: the arranged marriage among South Asians in Canada. In K. Victor Ujimoto and Josephine C. Naidoo eds Asian Canadians: Research on Current Issues. Guelph, Ont.: University of Guelph Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

This paper provides an example of an in-depth study within one ethnic group of changing values with respect to marriage. General findings confirm the hypothesis that those of South Asian background born in Canada tend to a more 'liberalized' view of marriage, desiring more freedom in choice of mate and believing that love, rather than parental choice, should precede a marriage. Certain ancestral values

that are being maintained include a disapproval of premarital sexual relations, belief in the importance of marriage as a family alliance and in the importance of maintaining tradition through visits to India, and a desire for a traditional wedding.

Whitehurst, R.N. 1975. "Alternate life styles and Canadian pluralism." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 433-46. Toronto: Butterworth.

This piece is dated, but provides an interesting insight on the period of time in which some of the structures of family life in Canada were changing. The basic premise is that the institution of marriage is not in immediate danger of radical alteration, but that important changes are taking place in the ways in which men and women relate to one another in marriages. There is no direct reference to ethnicity, but the notion that families were closer in the past, in both proximity and emotion, is accepted. Marriage "alternatives", such as communes, triads, open marriages, group marriages and postmarital singleness are examined, and it is suggested that there are real limits to alternative life styles. Questionnaire data on students attitudes to marriage are of rather little value, since the questionnaire design leads to a great deal of ambiguity in interpreting the responses. Basically, this is a rambling opinion piece, with little substantiation, but some interesting comments.

Fertility and Children

The question of fertility is more easily addressed from the point of view of what has not been done, rather than what has. Unlike the United States, where the literature linking fertility to ethnicity and, even more so, to race, is extensive, Canadian researchers seem to have been reluctant to approach the issues. The few excellent works that have been done, described below, provide clear indications that ethnicity is an important factor, at least for some ethnic groups, in understanding fertility patterns, but there has been to date too little work to provide a solid basis for comparison or theorising. A number of important areas that remain to be researched include the examination of ethnicity and fertility in light of other variables (such as income, class, residential location, education), and the question of how changing immigration rates affect fertility patterns.

A number of studies claim a relationship between the strength to which "traditional" values are held and family size Hobart (1975), for example, shows that for Ukrainian Canadians, family sizes initially go up in the second generation, but decrease substantially with the third generation, along with increases in levels of education, more openness toward birth control and more equality between husbands and wives. Despite the correlative evidence for a relationship between family size and adherence to tradition, however, the assumptions upon which such conclusions are drawn need to be questioned.

Cutright, Philips and Herbert L. Smith 1986. "Trends in illegitimacy among five English-speaking populations." Demography 23, 4: 563-78. This article provides a good example of bad scholarship. Five "English-speaking" populations with similar overall fertility rates -- Canada, England and Wales, Australia, and the U.S., disaggregated into 'white' and 'black' -- are compared to test whether illegitimacy rates move in tandem with marital fertility. First, in order to provide comparisons, the populations being compared have to be squeezed into analytically similar but inaccurate typologies. Canada comes out as a culturally homogeneous and English-speaking country. While the other countries are treated as single entities, the U.S. is disaggregated into 'white' and 'black', implying that the other countries are 'white'. It is also assumed that illegitimacy is something that public policy should seek to reduce, but no argument is given to justify this position. Furthermore, almost nothing is said, other than in vague references to their possible explanatory power, about the conditions that might help to explain why fertility rates vary.

Findings support period- rather than cohort-specific fertility illegitimacy rates, with rising rates across age cohorts for all five groups, suggesting forces common to all of these societies. The argument that illegitimacy rates are inversely related to marriage rates is not supported. Nor is there a direct pattern of variance among age cohorts. Explanations for differences between populations in the characteristic age curves of illegitimacy rates should be sought in between-population variation in age patterns of the intermediate variables affecting illegitimacy: exposure to intercourse, use of contraception and practice of abortion (but none of these is explored as an explanatory factor). The belief that legalization of abortion would act to depress illegitimacy permanently is not supported. Social policies directed to reducing illegitimacy are largely limited to decreasing costs of effective fertility control to the woman. If social policy is to have added impact in decreasing illegitimacy rates, new social policies will be needed.

Gfellnew, Barbara M. 1990. Culture and consistency in ideal and actual child-rearing practices: a study of Canadian Indian and white parents. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* XXI, 3, 413-23.

This is a rare example of work on the topic of comparative childraising from a psychological point of view. The study asked parents of the two groups to rate ideal and actual parenting behaviours on a differential scale. The results show more consistency than differences between the two groups, with little difference in actual parenting practices.

Grindstaff, Carl F., T.R. Balakrishnan and G. Edward Ebanks 1981. Socio-demographic correlates of childlessness: an analysis of the 1971 Canadian census. Canadian Journal of Sociology 6, 3, 337-51.

(abstract) The purpose of this paper is to examine childless women and the different socio-demographic characteristics associated with this demographic pattern. The study focuses on the proportion of ever-married and currently married women 15 years of age and over who were childless in 1971. The data source is the 1971 Canadian census 1 percent sample tape based on individual files, which yields a total sample of 46,376 women from all across Canada. The major correlations with childlessness among these women are age and marriage duration. The longer (and earlier) a woman is married, the lower the levels of childlessness when obvious demographic factors are controlled. Ascribed characteristics of ever-married women provide no meaningful associations to childlessness, and this description is applicable to the variables of religion, ethnicity, mother tongue, home language, and place of birth. Achieved characteristics, especially among the younger cohorts of women, are more revealing, and women who have higher family incomes, higher levels of education, who are living in large urban places and are involved in the labour force (among themselves highly correlated variables) generally have higher rates of childlessness. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Halli, Shivalingappa S. 1987. How Minority Status Affects Fertility: Asian Groups in Canada. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

This book addresses the 'minority status' hypothesis (that the experience of minority status accounts for fertility differences among ethnic groups, over an above other social and demographic characteristics). The first half of the book provides a history of the immigration and demographic development of Chinese and Japanese Canadians, with some reference to South Asian Canadians. Several measures are applied to 1971 census data to document fertility differences among the groups, and multivariate techniques (utilizing ethnic cohesion, residential and occupational segregation, social integration) are used to test the minority status fertility hypothesis. The results show strong support for Chinese Canadians and weak support for Japanese Canadians. Reviews of this book by Heaton (1990) and Goldscheider (1988) praise the empirical contribution, but point out the weakness of Halli's conclusions concerning the validity of the hypothesis.

Halli, Shiva S. 1990. The fertility of ethnic groups. In Halli, Shiva S., Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds 1990. Ethnic

Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 61-74. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

This project examines variations in fertility levels for six ethnic groups—British, French, German, Italian, Jewish and Ukrainian—based on the Public Use Sample Tape of the 1981 census, and asks whether ethnic family size differences are a function of variations in social—characteristics levels, and whether fertility differences persist after appropriate controls are introduced.

This paper has a number of methodological limitations. The most important is that, although the intention is to study variations in fertility by ethnicity, only six groups are considered (although this limitation is also a function of data availability). The balance are lumped together as 'other', a meaningless residual category given the variety of ethnic groups in Canada. The paper does not address ethnic difference in general, therefore, but difference among six ethnic groups. Since all six are groups of European origin, it is not possible to extrapolate from this analysis for Canadians in general. Nonetheless, given the degree of difference that exists for these six groups, it is reasonable to speculate that differences of a similar or greater degree occur for other groups.

- Hurd, W.B. 1942. Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People. 1931 Census of Canada monographs, Vol. 13, pp. 535-828. Ottawa: King's Printer.
- Jayachandran, J. 1986. Determinants of fertility in two Canadian populations: a causal modelling approach. Canadian Studies in Population 13, 1, 57-82.

This paper examines two independent populations, in Cold Lake and Fort McMurray, to show that, subject to certain socio-economic constraints, the demand for children is primarily a function of social psychological processes within the family. There is a comprehensive review of the literature on fertility theory. The problem of selection of variables is discussed, since "what should be the dependent variable is not always obvious" (p. 62), although ethnicity is not considered as a option. The conclusion is that the hypothesis holds to a greater extent for Cold Lake than for Fort McMurray, although in both populations socio-economic factors play a major role.. Socio-psychological factors do not seem to be effective in capturing the realm of socialpsychological processes. It is suggested that cultural factors need to be given more attention. Because the two populations are geographically defined, and because there is no analysis of the contextual differences between these two

places, it is difficult to see how the rationale for comparison adds anything to understanding this issue.

Marr, William L. 1986. Nuptiality, total fertility and marital fertility in Upper Canada, 1951: a study of land availability, urbanization and birthplace. Canadian Studies in Population 13, 1, 1-18.

(abstract) This paper relates fertility ratios and nuptiality of the counties in Upper Canada in 1851-52 to the amount of land available for farming and birthplace, respectively. These factors have been suggested as important causal influences in a rural society, which Upper Canada was in the mid-nineteenth century. As well, the explanatory powers of urbanization and schooling are investigated. land availability and birthplace turn out to be able to explain a significant amount of the variation in fertility ratios and, to a lesser extent, nuptiality. The study highlights the importance of dividing total fertility into its components of marital fertility and nuptiality.

Data are provided for five ethnocultural groups, Irish, French, English, Scottish and German, to show the importance of both birth-cultural factors and economic variables in explaining fertility. This historical work provides a model for similar types of study of today's population.

Ramu, G.N. and Nicholas Tavuchis 1986. The valuation of children and parenthood among the voluntarily childless and parental couples in Canada. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* XVII, 1, 99-116.

This study addresses the cultural context of fertility decisions, with respect to values affecting decisions about parenthood and childlessness. With a declining birthrate, coincident with an increase in female participation in the labour force, feminist efforts to bring about greater equality at work and home and an increase in voluntary childlessness, declines in fertility would be expected. Literature on values of children and the desirability of parenthood is reviewed. A telephone survey was conducted in Winnipeg, followed up by a mailed questionnaire and in-depth interviews. Reported reasons for parenthood are affectivity (children as a source of happiness), generativity, maturity, expression of sex role competence, societal continuity, religion and security in old age. Reasons for non-parenthood are self-actualization, freedom, maintenance of conjugal ties, economic costs, personality factors, life style and ecological concerns. There is no analysis, however, of the factors that differentiate the two groups, and no reference to ethnocultural factors or to relative differences in childlessness among different ethnic groups.

This article has a comprehensive bibliography on the relative values of parenthood/childlessness, including some international work that takes cultural factors into account in a limited manner.

Rao, K. Vaninadha 1987. Childlessness in Ontario and Quebec: results from 1971 and 1981 data. Canadian Studies in Population 14, 1, 27-46.

(abstract) The purpose of this paper is to analyze trends and correlates of childlessness among ever-married women in Ontario and Quebec, drawing data from 1971 and 1981 Public Use Sample Tapes. Logistic regression is used for a detailed multivariate analysis of parity status as a dichotomous dependent variable. Results from the analysis indicate an increase in the proportion childless among ever-married women in the reproductive ages. Age at marriage, marriage duration, income, other income, labour force participation, religiously non-Catholic or no-religious affiliation, and large urban residence are found to be the major associates of childlessness in Ontario and Quebec. Comparisons among cohorts of women who were present in 1971 and 1981 are discussed.

The author makes a number of concluding cautions about the limitations of the data, about the fact that statistical significance does not provide causal proof, that there is a need to consider husbands' characteristics, and that there is a range of additional variables that should be taken into account.

Romaniuc, A. 1984. Fertility in Canada: From Baby-Boom to Baby-Bust. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Minister of Supply and Services Canada.

This publication provides base-line data and overview analysis of fertility in Canada based on the 1981 census. Some reference is made to ethnic differences in fertility, particularly with respect to Quebecers and aboriginal people.

Romaniuc, A. 1987. Transition from traditional high to modern low fertility: Canadian aboriginals. Canadian Studies in Population 14, 1, 69-88.

Since the 1960s, aboriginal people in Canada have undergone a rapid fertility transition, with an abrupt downturn from 47 births per 1,000 to 28 in a decade. This paper speculates both on the causes of the rapid downturn and on the reasons for the continued gap between aboriginal fertility and that of the population as a whole. Some theoretical issues that

need to be addressed include strategies for birth timing and spacing, the social processes of decline, the question of whether this is a process of adjustment or innovation. Although the argument is not developed, this is one of very few works that advocate the study of cultural, ethnographic factors in tandem with traditional demographic measures.

Trovato, Frank and T.K. Burch 1980. Minority group status and fertility in Canada. Canadian Ethnic Studies XII, 3, 1-18.

(abstract) This paper initially reviews the literature pertaining minority status and fertility. It provides a restatement of the various orientations in this area of demographic inquiry. An empirically observed ethnic effect may often involve the minority status-insecurity and/or subcultural-normative effects. These two hypotheses have generally been regarded as mutually exclusive. However, either effect, or both in conjunction, may be reflected in an independent influence of ethnicity on family size. The latter part of the study attempts to evaluate the efficacy of the ethnic effect and characteristics-assimilation explanations within the context of Canada. Few studies have sought to explore the mentioned theses among this country's ethnic populations. Eight groups are studied, the French, German, Italian, Jewish, Native Indians, Dutch, Polish and Ukrainian. The British is used as the standard group upon which we base our comparisons. Data are taken from the Public Use Sample Tapes of the 1971 Census of Canada. The results derived from this analysis provide partial support for the characteristics-assimilation thesis (i.e. French, German and Italian groups), and for the ethnic effect hypothesis (i.e., Jewish, Native Indians, Dutch, Polish and Ukrainians).

The literature up to 1980 is thoroughly reviewed, showing the small amount done in Canada to that date. Several cautionary notes are made about the interpretation of findings given the data limitations. The importance of comparative, time-series analysis is stressed.

Family Structure (including kinship and gender roles) Because it has become increasingly difficult to draw distinctions between nuclear and extended families, and because it is often more appropriate to speak of 'blended' families, this section of the bibliography incorporates the various definitions of 'family'. This area, perhaps more than any other, indicates the vast amount of work yet to be done. A huge literature on kinship was reviewed in the preparation of this bibliography, for example, and it was found that the majority did not consider ethnicity as a variable, even to the extent of attempting to show that it is insignificant, a fact that can probably be accounted for by the fact that most demographers have treated kinship from the point of view of the individual, rather than as a social phenomenon that involves the active participation of groups. Similarly, the rapidly growing field of gender relations is as yet almost untouched by questions of ethnic variation, although there is developing within social work a body of literature that deals with cultural manifestations of such problems as spousal abuse. There is also a rapidly developing body of work on immigrant women, some of which is directly related to questions The concept of of ethnicity, family and demography. 'tradition' with respect to family structure is a difficult one. If we assume tradition to be a static phenomenon, then variation from the norm is by definition 'non-traditional'. Such a view, while extremely unrealistic, has the appeal of simplicity; any attempt to provide a more realistic assessment of tradition in constant flux faces the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of defining what is more or less 'traditional'. It is perhaps more helpful to speak of rates of change than of tradition. There is room for an extensive theoretical debate on this issue. Our concern here, however, is simply to point out the difficulties of making assumptions of about tradition in any analysis of demographic change.

This work found no study which makes a careful attempt to disaggregate generational changes in family structure from those of the population as a whole. Such research would provide an very valuable component to the understanding of family structure.

Burch, Thomas K. 1987. Age-sex roles and demographic change: an overview. Canadian Studies in Population 14, 2, 129-146.

The mutual interrelationships of demographic change and changes in sex-roles are discussed in terms of 'possible or plausible' generalizations regarding implications for agesex roles of recent trends in fertility, union formation/dissolution, migration and household formation; and implications for demographic change of changes in age and sex patterns of education and labour force participation, and of a general increase in the homogeneity of age-sex roles. A research agenda calls for more detailed description of Canadian age-sex roles; examination of the Preston-Davis thesis (that a disproportionate share of societal goods are flowing to the elderly); study of the effects of extended child-care services; and research into the forces leading to the increase in separate living, role homogenization and the supply of housing. Ethnicity is not mentioned as a specific factor in these demographic processes.

Burch, Thomas K. Family structure and ethnicity. In Shiva S. Halli, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 199-212. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

This paper points out that while ethnic differentials in demographic behaviour have been documented, it is difficult to assign a causal role to ethnicity. Theoretical and methodological issues are reviewed, and exploratory results presented from the 1985 General Social Survey. Based on

recent theoretical work on family structure by Todd (1985), it is hypothesized that one would expect distinctive differences in family structure among Canadian groups of different national backgrounds. Statistical analysis of data for seven ethnic groups is used to demonstrate the need for more than single-equation models. There is a need for theoretical work to develop more complex models that will account for specific historical experience and social and ecological circumstances of particular groups. Ethnicity will then be neither dismissed as a causal factor nor treated as a source of statistically, but not theoretically, explained variance.

(Note: for a recent unpublished study that tests Todd's theories in reference to French-Canadian families, Burch refers to Kerr 1988).

Garigue, Philippe 1975. "French Canadian kinship and urban life." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 263-74. Toronto: Butterworth.

This study was conducted among 43 Montreal households in 1954 and 1955, to assess the effect of urbanization on kinship ties. Respondents were asked the extent of their genealogical knowledge. Knowledge was extensive for all respondents, increased with age and tended to be more extensive for married respondents. Kinship ties are widely scattered geographically. Men and women give different stress to kinship and have different roles, women having greater awareness of the kin group as comprising both sexes, and greater knowledge of their husbands' kin than vice versa. Despite individual differences, the sex differentiation was a formalized expectation. Frequency of contact is related to a number of factors, including geographical remoteness, personal preference and frequency of personal services such as babysitting. The evidence shows no trend towards transformation of the urban system into the restricted system as reported in the U.S. Difficulties encountered in maintaining kinship ties are not related to primarily to urban living, and the system has a great deal of elasticity. It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between size of sibling groups and kinship behaviour, related to early family socialization, and that kinship ties are not incompatible with urban life. Relative influence of urbanization and cultural values on kinship should be seen as distinct.

Gee, Ellen M. Demographic change and intergenerational relations in Canadian families: findings and social policy implications.

This paper estimates demographic parameters of parent-child relations in Canada for four birth cohorts (1860, 1910, 1930 and 1960), examined as children and as adults, to show that demographic change influences the intergenerational context of family life. Various indicators of parenthood reveal that parenthood (ie. length of time as a parent) is becoming demographically less important, while childhood (length of time as a child) is increasing. Raising dependent children has thus come to occupy a smaller portion of people's lives. Dependent parents, however, are becoming demographically more important as the population ages. Social policy implications include: the need to be cognizant of demographic change; the need for adaptive strategies for family care-giving for the elderly; and a need to question the ideological basis for family policy, for example, the assumption of "familism" which place responsibility on the family for many aspects of social life. In the long run, demographic change will dictate that social policy based on the primacy of the family for elder care would be unwise. There is specific need for: assistance to children for care of their parents; revision in pension policy to allow for 'drop-out' provision; tax deductions or family allowances for elder care; requiring increased government expenditure. There will also be a need for changing gender relations, so that men take more responsibility for elder care. The need for change extends to a new role relationship between children and parents as dependency is re-evaluated. Unfortunately, the article does not address the question of ethnicity, but it provides the basis from which a study of different family contexts among ethnic groups could be evaluated.

Gilad, Lisa 1990. Refugees in Newfoundland: Families after Flight. Journal of Comparative Family Studies XXI, 3, 379-96.

This work examines the circumstances of East Europeans, Cubans, Central Americans, Iranian Baha'i and Vietnamese refugees in Newfoundland. Its comparative perspective sheds light upon the difficult circumstances of family life faced by all of these groups, and on the specific demographic effects of the refugee experience. The common ordeal of clandestine exit means that families are split apart in ways that are not common to other types of immigration, and emotional ties to those left behind are complex. Varying degrees of 'guilt' about leaving the home country, and relatives there, result in a diversity of problems of adaptation in Canada. Breaking apart and coming together of families results in particular circumstances of family formation, structure and living arrangements. A paucity of familial or ethnic resources results in new forms of dependency. The extent of community networks, as well as strategies for maintaining networks, vary among the groups.

Hinada, Wayne 1982. "An indepth historical examination of the Polish family unity in Canada, as well as an analysis of an actual case study done in Toronto (1967) and the contrasting views which are brought in. " In P.L. Wagner ed. Ethnic Vancouver: Essays on Cultural Geography. Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Discussion Paper No. (quote from page 9): New patterns of family interaction and new attitudes and beliefs are plainly discernible not only among the post-war immigrants but also among the whole Polish groups (sic) in Canada. There is generally a greater permissiveness and very little authoritarianism on the part of the father; equably noticeable is the abandonment of previously rigidly held attitudes and values. From my point of view, the Polish family in Canada is fast becoming indistinguishable from the Anglo-Saxon urban Canadian family, sharing many of its values and attitudes in parent-child and husband-wife relationships.... All this does not suggest that the Polish family is facing exceptional problems or difficulties or is on the verge of fragmentation and dissolution. To me, the Polish family has successfully adjusted to the new situations, conditions and demands following migration and will be able to face other situations and problematic conditions in future without too many problems.

Hobart, Charles W. 1975. "Changing family patterns among Ukrainian Canadians in Alberta." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 401-16. Toronto: Butterworth.

This study is one of few undertaken with the specific purpose of understanding the relationship between family patterns and ethnicity. It provides a critical assessment of the literature to 1975, showing the dearth of non-hortatory studies to that date. The study sampled 809 adults of Ukrainian ethnic origin in Alberta between June 1963 and October 1964. The process of acculturation is addressed, based on measures of family size, residential patterns, intermarriage, employment of wives, division of labour and authority, the role of the husband, familism and family solidarity and child rearing. The study finds characteristic differences between two groups: one younger, third generation, with high levels of education and occupation, oriented toward integration and little interested in Ukrainian tradition; the other older, first generation, less educated farmers or labourers, more isolated from other ethnic groups and strongly traditional. The first group had smaller families, wanted fewer children, favoured intermarriage, were encouraging of wives' working and more egalitarian in childraising, and identified more strongly with success value. The influence of the urban environment

was less strong than had been expected. The study concludes that acculturation has led to a tendency for smaller, more mobile and more egalitarian families, related primarily to generation, education and a "pro-Canadian" cultural orientation.

Keyfitz, Nathan 1986. Canadian kinship patterns based on 1971 and 1981 data. Canadian Studies in Population 13, 2, 123-50.

This work makes no reference to ethnicity as a factor in kinship patterns. It claims that modern low fertility results both in fewer children in the nuclear family and fewer kin of all degree. Small numbers of kin make it difficult for the family to fulfil its traditional functions. A quantitative analysis, based on a female-sex model, develops a trajectory for kinship structure.

McElroy, Ann 1975. "Arctic modernization and change in Inuit family organization." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 379-400. Toronto: Butterworth.

This paper examines changes in the organization of the family and in the socio-economic roles of men and women in marriage, in light of economic and political changes associated with greater involvement in the waged economy and the influence of modernization and technology. A review of the traditional Inuit family and band organization concludes that adaptation to harsh environmental conditions

Munzer, Rose Pereira 1981. Immigration, familism and in-group competition: a study of the Portuguese in the Southern Okanagan. Canadian Ethnic Studies XIII, 2, 98-111

A study of 55 Portuguese immigrant families in the Oliver-Osoyoos area of British Columbia results in a rejection of claims that Portuguese immigrants exhibit strong familism or kinship ties and actively seek to reunite the extended family in Canada. Those studied acted as facilitators, not instigators of immigration, and their degree of familism (measured using the Bardis Familism Scale) was found to be less strong that found by other studies in Portugal. Decreased familism is attributed to economic competition, status rivalry and jealousy.

Peters, John 1984. Cultural variations in family structure. In Maureen Baker ed *The Family: Changing Trends in Canada*, 63-84. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This is a very general article which, while providing one of the most comprehensive reviews of the topic of family, ethnicity and demographic change, reproduces a series of stereotypes and assumptions about the role of ethnicity in society. It is based on the norm of two founding peoples, regards native other ethnic communities as alien to Canada, and assumes a fairly static model of ethnocultural tradition:

Changes in the ethnic composition of Canadian society, from the native peoples to the French, English and later immigrant groups, have created changes and variation in family patterns. Examples include the travels of fur traders and their intermarriage with Indians, the influx of Loyalists, policies to encourage Eastern European immigration to develop agricultural land in the west, the arrival of 48,000 war brides after World War II, and more recent immigrant arrivals as a result of political or economic stress in different parts of the world.

The article is founded on "French-Canadian" and "British" families as normative. Among French Canadians major cultural factors that affect demographic change are average of marriage (somewhat younger than in France), the legal banning of celibacy in the 17th Century (Garigue 1967, 337), the high rate of illegitimacy during the 18th Century, the high fertility rate, encouraged by French colonial policy, and the lack of freedom of French-Canadian women. More recently, urbanization has weakened kinship structures and resulted in a decrease in family size. There has been some increase in exogamous marriage (Carisse 1975) with higher rates of exogamy related to higher social class. Since 1967 a dramatic decrease in birth rates and marriage rates and increase in divorce rates, all accompanied by secularization, have reduced Quebec's rate of natural increase to below the Canadian average.

The British family has resulted from several waves of immigration, including the Loyalist influx (1775-80), a large wave of unemployed in the second half of the 19th Century and subsequent waves in 1906, 1913, 1957 and 1969. The "Barnardo Children" resulted in an addition of 25,000 between 1882 and 1915.

Inuit families are described as "cultural aliens, like immigrants". The difficult environment has resulted in small families, and in adaptive practices such as female infanticide (Balikci 1970, 161) and a high rate of adoption (Balikci 1970; McElroy 1974, 391).

Other families, reviewed briefly, are the Amerindian, Portuguese, Italian, Greek, Arab, Chinese and Hutterites. While most ethnic groups today are "tending toward the nuclear family", cultural assimilation is discouraged, and ethnic uniqueness reinforced, by religion, geographical concentration, methods of birth control, relations between husbands and wives, traditions of child care and care for the elderly. Many ethnic families have been impervious to the trend toward frequent marriage dissolution.

Peters, John 1984. Cultural variations in family structure. In Maureen Baker ed. The Family: Changing Trends in Canada. Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson.

This is a very sweeping, general discussion, more speculative than analytical. Through a useful review of the literature, several important issues are raised, to show that family structure is influenced by a variety of cultural circumstances. Immigration issues include type of immigration, ie. whether of single labourers or of family groups, or unusual circumstances such as the influx of 48,000 British war brides after World War II. After a superficial review of family structures for a variety of ethnic groups, it is broadly contended that children today experience less control by their parents, that there are fewer restrictions on dating and courtship, that birth control is common except for Hutterites, Old Order Mennonites and some Catholics, that husbands and wives are tending toward equal partnership, that women are more involved in the labour force, that the modern urban family has less contact with kin members, and that certain ethnic groups -- of Chinese, Hungarian, Indian, Portuguese, Amish and Hutterite background -- are almost impervious to the general trend towards higher divorce rates.

Tavuchis, Nicholas 1980. Ethnic perspectives. In G.N. Ramu ed. Courtship, Marriage and the Family in Canada, 115-33. Toronto: Gage.

This article describes the family as the "first line of defense against potentially erosive and competing assimilative pressures", the institution charged with preserving cultural identity through effective socialization practices. It briefly describes ethnic family patterns of groups of English, French, German, Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Jewish and Polish background, with a contemporary review of the literature on each group. It concludes that the thesis of convergence (the loss of 'ethnic' traits over time) is applicable, with qualifications, to a large if unknown proportion of Canadian families.

This article is interesting for its comments on family and ethnicity prior to the major development of the topic that has occurred during the 1980s. The article sets out to examine how far studies of ethnicity and family have come since Elkin's (1964) enjoinder:

...it is apparent that valid information on ethnic and immigrant groups is meagre. For most groups, the authors have been primarily interested in historical studies and secondarily in folklore and demography. Relatively little has been written on family patterns or family problems. Undoubtedly, considerable changes have taken place, but what they are and how they have affected family relations, we do not know. This is an important neglected area in Canadian ethnic group research. (Elkin 1964, 64)

The strategic importance of the family is discussed as a means of preserving ethnicity, against "potentially erosive and competing assimilative pressures", especially industrialization and urbanization. Geographic distribution of ethnic groups is reviewed very briefly. Seeley's Crestwood Heights (1967) is cited as a classic insight on Canadian family life and a rare example of studies of Anglo-Canadian families. French-Canadian work is much more extensive, beginning with the foundational work by Garigue (1962, 1968, 1976). Distinctive family ideals, which stress pre-marital female chastity, maternity, a marked division of marital roles and authority and the structural importance of females in maintaining and managing relations with kin, seem to remain distinctly French Canadian, and to shape and dominate the lives of this group. Recent work stresses the role of women in changing longstanding family traditions among French Canadians. The German-Canadian population is large and heterogeneous, concentrated in non-urban southern Ontario. It has been poorly studied, except for the Hutterites and Mennonites, who show family patterns linked to fundamentalism that differ from wider Canadian norms on nearly every point. Brief sketches of Italian, Ukrainian, Dutch, Jewish and Polish Canadians lead to the conclusions that researchers have given low priority to the topic, that the thesis convergence applicable with certain qualifications, stemming from the inadequacy of relevant material.

Woon, Yuen-Fong 1986. Some adjustment aspects of Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese families in Victoria, Canada. Journal of Comparative Family Studies XVII, 3, 349-70.

This article stresses individual "willingness" of Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese immigrants to interact with the "public domain" (host society), and the repercussions of such willingness and ability within the family structure. A very thorough review of the literature on Vietnamese immigrant adjustment to 1986 reveals contradictions in the way that family reconstitution is viewed and analyses. A number of hypotheses are advanced concerning the background factors of immigrant adjustment, based on interviews with 50 families

from different regions and backgrounds. The paper concludes that there is a high degree of cooperation among close relatives, often living in different households; that a sharp line is drawn between relatives and non-relatives, and that those without close kin tend to lack the urge to achieve in Canadian society; that heavy emphasis is placed upon lineal descent, with correspondent respect for elders and concern that children retain traditional values; that this respect fuels a high desire for achievement in Canadian society; and that conditions in the "host" society that mitigate against achievement are overcome by mutual help and emotional support of kin. It is predicted that the extended family as an ideology and as a residential unit will decline, but the "dispersed extended" family will hang on in horizontal relationships. (Note: a further development of this work, based on 19 in-depth interviews, is published as a chapter in Chan and Indra 1987).

Ethnicity and Aging

Recently there has been increasing interest both in studies of aging and the elderly population and, particularly, in the study of ethnicity as it affects the experience of aging. This area is of relevance for a number of issues including the role of the elderly in maintaining traditional values, residential patterns and housing needs of the elderly, kinship networks and extended families and the more general issue of the relationship between ethnicity and life expectancy. Of particular importance are the questions of how the role of the family varies in elderly care and, given that the majority of Canada's elderly are women, of how women of different ethnocultural backgrounds experience aging and widowhood. The literature presented here contains contradictory views, especially on the role of kinship for the elderly, indicating a need for further research on aging and family structure. Discussion of these issues informs current debate over whether the expenditure of social resources is shifting disproportionately to the elderly as the population ages.

Chan, Kwok B. 1983. Coping with aging and managing self-identity: the social world of the elderly Chinese women. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 36-50.

This is an in-depth study of a small sample of 26 women and their social world, who face 'double jeopardy' and the physical, social and psychological costs of old age and widowhood. The paper is critical both of negative stereotypes and of assumptions that Asian are self-supporting and free of problems. Ethnicity and culture can facilitate adjustment to old age, facilitating increased involvement in the social world.

Choinière, Robert and Norbert Robitaille 1990. The aging of ethnic groups in Quebec. In Shiva S. Hall, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

This study addresses in some detail the evolving aging patterns of twelve ethnic groups in Quebec, to ascertain whether the aging process is the same for all of them, and whether the declining fertility rate is the main cause for aging of the population as a whole. Based on census data, an index is first constructed to show relative proportions of people aged 65 and over compared to the population as a whole. Variations occur by group and over time, with those of Ukrainian, Jewish and Polish ethnicity being the oldest and those of Inuit, Haitian, Portuguese and Greek ethnicity the youngest. Evolving fertility rates do not explain ethnic group aging, although fertility has decreased for some of the older groups. Period of immigration provides an explanatory basis for understanding some groups, including established English-speaking groups that are aging as a result of emigration, but has little impact upon individuals of French origin. Ethnic mobility (entry into another ethnic group) is significant only for those of English background. All of these factors which are attendant upon aging need to be understood in relation to the social, economic and hygienic conditions of the groups, in order to ascertain (through further research) whether the most evidence of aging will be found among those groups with the most favourable social and economic conditions.

Driedger, Leo and Neena Chappell 1987. Aging and Ethnicity: Toward an Interface. Toronto: Butterworths.

This is the most comprehensive treatment of this topic available. Written with a view to integrating the perspectives of gerontology and ethnic studies, the book provides a comparative analysis of aging among Canada's ethnic groups, citing such factors as timing of arrival in Canada, degree of assimilation (language use), and relation to the processes of modernization (urbanization, occupational status). The relationship between modernization and assimilation is addressed theoretically. A typology of "eth-elders" is constructed, along a traditional-modern continuum, based on geographic location, income, education, occupational status and identity. A final chapter discusses policy implications, and the need for continuity with the past for the ethnic elderly. There is a thorough review of the literatures of both fields of gerontology and ethnic studies. A review of this book by Milada Disman (Canadian Journal of Sociology 13, 449-51) claims that it is superficial in its sweeping, deductive claims, that it fails to recognize the heterogeneity among ethnic groups (such as

the Jews), and that it does not provide an adequate theoretical discussion of ethnicity.

Driedger, Leo and Neena Chappell 1990. Variations in aging and ethnicity. In Shiva S. Halli, Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 229-52. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

This article provides a demographic review of the "ethelder" phenomenon in Canada based primarily on census data. The first section addresses the demographic range of ethelders, showing provincial, regional, cultural and linguistic variations in tabular form. Section two deals with modernization and aging, including effects of health technology, educational training, occupational status and urbanization. Variations in ethnic identity are then addressed, showing that most eth-elders still speak their mother tongues, and that religion is a factor in the lives of many. Finally, eth-elder social patterns are examined, according to three models. A traditional-modern continuum summarizes the discussion of modernization and claims differences among groups according to their relationship with technology and urban living. The eth-elderly are then classified into five Canadian regions (traditional aboriginals of the Northlands; European agriculturalists of. the Prairies; the Multi-British Plurality; the French Quebecois; the urban Jewish). Some implications for social policy are discussed.

Fry, C. and J. Keith eds 1986. New Methods for Old-Age Research: Strategies for Studying Diversity. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey.

There is no specifically Canadian material in this collection, but it is a useful collection of comparative work and provides a review of methodologies and extant literature on the general topic of ethnicity and aging.

Gerber, Linda M. 1983. Ethnicity still matters: socio-demographic profiles of the ethnic elderly in Ontario. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 60-80.

The 1971 Canadian Census Public User Tapes are analyses to develop profiles of 19 elderly ethnic groups, comparing age composition, residence, marital status, fertility, household composition, religion, immigration and internal migration, language, education and income. This general survey concludes that although advancing age may be a leveller in some respects, ethnicity continues to influence life satisfaction and quality of life.

MacLean, Michael J. and Rita Bonar 1983. The ethnic elderly in a dominant culture long-term care facility. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 51-59.

This paper suggests that there are added difficulties of institutionalisation for members of the "ethnic elderly population" placed in long-term care facilities organized by the "dominant culture". Although the terms "ethnic" and "dominant" are not defined, it is implied that these refer to "minority" (excluding French and aboriginal) and "British". Loss of family is given as a particularly significant issue. Brief case studies are presented for three individuals in an English-language facility in Montreal.

Havens, Betty and Neena L. Chappell 1983. Triple jeopardy: age, sex and ethnicity. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 119-132.

A triple jeopardy hypothesis argues that "the combined affects of occupying three stigmatized statuses are greater than occupying any one status or even two such statuses" (double jeopardy). This research compares "young-old" and "old-old" women of six ethnic groupings using objective (health and economic) data and subjective (perception of health, life satisfaction) data. "Triple jeopardy is confirmed at the objective level, but not at the subjective level. This conclusion supports the earlier testing of the double-jeopardy hypothesis.... Very elderly women of more disadvantaged groups (Polish, Russian, Ukrainian) exhibited significantly worse mental health than did any of the comparison groups examined, but this situation was not translated to their subjective well-being. The reasons for refutation of the hypothesis at the subjective level need more research. Nevertheless, the data on the subjective factors demonstrate the existence of age, sex and ethnic differences which combine in unique ways..." (p. 129).

Marshall, Victor W. ed. 1980. Aging in Canada: Social Perspectives. Vancouver: Fitzhenry Whiteside Publishers.

This book consists of 26 chapters, of which several deal with ethnicity and the family. Although now dated, a great deal of theoretical groundwork is laid, and references to specific ethnic groups stand the test of time.

McDaniel, Susan A. 1986. Canada's Aging Population. Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths.

This book does not deal explicitly with the question of ethnicity and aging, but provides the most comprehensive

coverage available on the general topic of Canada's elderly. The chapters are well written, concise and empirically oriented, with excellent use of tabular and graphic material and a thorough literature review. The relationships between aging and economic, political and demographic factors are explored, and the notion of the "dependency burden" is challenged. Long term, integrated planning for the elderly is advocated.

Penning, Margaret J. 1983. Multiple jeopardy: age, sex and ethnic variations. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 81-105.

This theoretical paper goes beyond class as a means of social stratification, to address the interrelation of age, ethnicity and sex, and the debate concerning whether the combined negative effects of these categories creates 'multiple jeopardy', or whether age acts as a leveller of prior social and economic distinctions. The study uses multivariate analysis to analyze objective economic security and perceived wellbeing. Multiple jeopardy proved an accurate characterization of the former, but was less evident for the latter. The multiple jeopardy thesis is tentatively accepted.

Rosenthal, Carolyn J. 1983. Aging, ethnicity and the family: beyond the modernization thesis. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 1-16.

This is the lead-off piece in a special issue of the journal Canadian Ethnic Studies, devoted to ethnicity and aging. It provides an excellent review of the theoretical literature on the topic, including many international references. Its major theme is that the study of aging, ethnicity and the family has been impeded by the use of a conceptual model based on modernization theory, where families are equated with traditional or less modern families, depending on the degree of 'ethnicity'. Anglo families are equated with modern families. It is argued that this model, which imposes a static definition of culture tied to role theory, is of limited use, and that the study of variability in family life with respect to attitudes and behaviour requires comparative research on Anglo as well as other groups. An interpretive view of culture is favoured over a structuralist-functionalist approach.

Snider, Earle L. 1981. The role of kin in meeting health care needs of the elderly. Canadian Journal of Sociology 6, 3, 325-36.

This paper finds that "kin involvement, on the basis of number of available kin, in providing health-care advice to

the elderly has been overestimated". A probability study was conducted in Edmonton, Alberta, to show that kin involvement is more likely to occur in emergencies than in non-emergency health situations. Number of kin available was secondary to demographic variables, including health-seeking behaviour. No account is taken of ethnic differences among the elderly, or in their family structures.

Sugiman, Pamela and H.K. Nishio 1983. Socialization and cultural duality among aging Japanese Canadians. Canadian Ethnic Studies XV, 3, 17-35.

This study, using a sample of Japanese Canadians in Toronto, aged 51-67, examines attitudes toward old age and dependency. Two contrasting models of age norms are constructed, one based on Confucian filial piety and developed in Japan for the first generation (Issei), the other based on 'North American individualism for the second generation (Nisei). Through socialization, a complex relationship between individual and environment, the Nisei have blended two mutually exclusive norms and expectations, exhibiting cultural ambivalence, but developing a workable synthesis of independence/dependence.

Ujimoto, K. Victor 1988. Sociodemographic factors and variations in the allocation of time in later life. In K. Altergott ed. Daily Life in Later Life: Comparative Perspectives. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

This paper examines weekly mean amount of time for obligatory, discretionary and discretionary social activities for three groups of elderly Japanese Canadians (immigrants, Canadian-born, and Canadian born but educated in Japan). The findings support the claim that the presence of close kin is important in the daily activities of elderly people.

Historical Factors

It is axiomatic that the demographic patterns of today are the result of decisions and actions taken in the past. Nonetheless, from both a quantitative and a qualitative point of view, research on cultural family practices that affect demographic trends needs to be undertaken. The group of papers assembled here is far from exhausted, but represents some of the best work which allows an understanding not only of how past demographic patterns emerged, but also of how these might affect composition and characteristics of the population today.

Harney, Robert ed. 1985. Gathering Place: Peoples and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834-1945. Toronto: The Multicultural History Society of Toronto.

This collection brings together eleven historians of various ethnic groups in Toronto. As a whole, it provides an excellent background for understanding how the multicultural character of Toronto developed. Most of the essays play some attention to family life and to demographic issues. Some (eg. Nicolson below) make careful use of data for population analysis. The strength of the collection is in providing qualitative interpretations of the norms, values and traditions that set precedents for family practice today.

(Note: the individual essays are listed under the appropriate geographical divisions below).

- Henripin, Jacques 1964. From acceptance of nature to control: the demography of the French Canadians since the seventeenth century. In Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin eds French-Canadian Society, Vol I, 104-16. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Nett, Emily M. 1981. Canadian families in social-historical perspective. Canadian Journal of Sociology 6, 3, 239-60.

This essential work on historical demography examines published historical materials and provides an extremely useful bibliography. It refutes persistent "myths" about Canadian families in the past, including beliefs about large and extended family households, low rates of geographical mobility, stereotypical roles of wives and husbands and

greater stability and protection for children who grew up on the Canadian past. The bibliography is an excellent source for information on the historical role of women in Canadian families.

Nicolson, Murray W. 1985. Peasants in an urban society: the Irish Catholics in Victorian Toronto. In R. Harney ed. Gathering Place: Peoples and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834-1945, 47-73. Toronto: The Multicultural History Society of Toronto.

This paper covers a range of issues at a general level, with a central theme of Irish Catholic defiance of the assimilative and secularizing forces of the "Protestant urban container". Demographic data are provided on immigration and population development, and the records of the Archives of the Toronto Archdiocese are used to analyze population structure, marriage and fertility rates. There is a skilled interweaving of information on family life and work.

Gaffield, Chad M. 1979. Canadian families in cultural context: hypotheses from the mid-nineteenth century. Historical Papers 1979 Communications Historiques, 48-70.

This paper attempts to fill the void in comparative work on the family and population patterns between English and French Canadians, and to challenge established stereotypes concerning, with respect to French-Canadian families, high fertility, extended structure, cohesive organization and an other-worldly focus and, with respect to English-Canadian families, average fertility, nuclear composition, detached interpersonal relationships and a strong material focus. A detailed comparative analysis of immigration and population is undertaken for Prescott County in southwestern Quebec. Tradition and heritage are found to be important, but not as straightforward as 'traditionally' depicted. Many aspects were substantially similar. A subtlety is added to the analysis by the study of settlement patterns, which shows the need to examine individual family's decisions in the context of marital and fertility expectations, commitment to family economy, specific agricultural skills. Cultural differences occur in soil preferences related to agricultural tradition, family ideology and demographic patterns, including inheritance practices, variation in ageat-marriage (and therefore family size), and the relative values of forming separate households and land acquisition.

Recommended Sources on the Family and Demography for Specific Groups

Work on individual ethnic groups has generally paid rather little attention to demographic issues. Family issues tend to be addressed in terms of tradition, values and ideology rather than in terms of family change. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of study of individual ethnocultural groups that could be better utilized by demographers who wish to explain ethnocultural variation according to the ways in which different groups structure social practice, and it is a loss to social science in general that such integration has not been undertaken more fully. One of the most promising areas of research, therefore, is in incorporating some of these predominantly qualitative work into the more quantitatively-oriented demographic studies. This work also provides a historical dimension, that helps to account for conditions in Canada today according to past events.

This listing is organized according to broad world regions of origin. This classification is provided for convenience only, and does not imply anything about the groups or their associations in Canada. No assumption is made in this organization about varying degrees of ethnicity; all groups are included, although some groups have been the subject of greater study. Although it is restricted to research on the family and demography, some work of a more general nature, including the McClelland and Stewart series on Canadian ethnic groups, is included. Most of the individual items have not been annotated, but a few that are of more general demographic interest are

annotated under substantive headings elsewhere in this bibliography.

South and Southeast Asia

- Ames, M.M. and J. Inglis 1973. Conflict and change in British Columbia Sikh family life. B.C. Studies 20, 15-49.
- Buchignani, Norman and Doreen M. Indra, with Ram Srivastave 1985.

 Continuous Journey: A Social History of South Asians in

 Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Chadney, James G. 1980. Sikh family patterns and ethnic adaptation in Vancouver. Amerasia Journal 7, 1, 31.
- Chan, Kwok B. and Doreen Marie Indra eds 1987. Uprooting, Loss and Adaptation: The Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees in Canada. Ottawa: Canadian Public Health Association.
 - Although demographic analysis is not the strong point of this collection, the implications of a sudden influx of 60,000 Indochinese refugees between 1979 and 1980 are developed in several of the papers. Issues include language use, education, labour market participation, settlement service delivery, community associations, and the impact of private sponsorship on refugees' adaptation.
- Chandrasekhar, S. ed. 1986. From India to Canada: A Brief History of Immigration, Problems of Discrimination, Admission and Assimilation. La Jolla, CA: Population Review.
 - This collection is demographically oriented, and includes articles on current demographic trends, social networks, regional distribution, occupation composition, income, fertility levels and mortality.
- Filteau, C.H. 1980. The role of the concept of love in the Hindu family acculturation process. In K.V. Ujimoto and G. Hirabayashi eds Visible Minorities and Multiculturalism: Asians in Canada, pp. 289-99. Toronto: Butterworths.
- Ghosh, R. 1981. Social and economic integration of South Asian women in Montreal, Canada. In G. Kurian and R. Ghosh eds Women in the Family and the Economy, pp. 59-71. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- Kanungo, R. ed. 1984. South Asians in the Canadian Mosaic. Montreal: Kala Bharati Foundation.
- Khosla, R. 1982. The changing familial role of South Asian women inn Canada: A study in identity transformation. In K.V. Ujimoto and G. Hirabayashi eds Asian Canadians: Regional

- Perspectives, pp. 178-84. Ottawa: Canadian Asian Studies Association.
- Kurian, G. and R. Ghosh 1983. Child rearing in transition in Indian immigrant families in Canada. In G. Kurian and R. Srivastava eds Overseas Indians. New Delhi: Central Electric Press.
- Naidoo, Josephine C. 1985. A cultural perspective on the adjustment of South Asian women in Canada. In I.R. Lagunes and H.H. Poortinga eds. From a Different Perspective: Studies of Behaviour Across Cultures, 76-92. Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets and Zeitlinger.
- Naidoo, Josephine C. and C. Davis 1988. Canadian South Asian women in transition: a dualistic view of life. Journal of Comparative Family Studies 21, 1, 311-25.
- Srivastava, R.P. 1975. Family organization and change among overseas Indians with special reference to Indian immigrant families of British Columbia, Canada. In A. Kurian ed. Family in India, pp. 369-91. The Hague: Monton.
- Siddique, C.M. 1977. Structural separation and family change: an exploratory study of the immigrant Indian and Pakistani community of Saskatoon, Canada. International Review of Modern Sociology 7, 1, 13-34.
- Vaidyanathan, Prabha and Josephine Naidoo 1991. Changing values: the arranged marriage among South Asians in Canada. In K. Victor Ujimoto and Josephine C. Naidoo eds Asian Canadians: Research on Current Issues. Guelph, Ont.: University of Guelph Department of Sociology and Anthropology.
- Wood, M.R. 1980. Hinduism in Vancouver: adjustments in the home, the temple and the community. In K.V. Ujimoto and G. Hirabayashi eds Visible Minorities and Multiculturalism: Asians in Canada, pp. 277-88. Toronto: Butterworths.

East Asia

- Adachi, Ken 1976. The Enemy that Never Was: A History of Japanese Canadians. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart.
- Chan, Anthony B. 1983. Gold Mountain: The Chinese in the New World. Vancouver: New Star Books.
- Hoe, Ban Seng 1976. Structural Changes of Two Chinese Communities in Alberta, Canada. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada.
 - This is one of the most detailed ethnographic studies of family life for a Canadian ethnic group.

- Johnson, Graham 1979. Chinese family and community in Canada: tradition and change. In J.E. Elliot ed., Two Nations, Many Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada, 371-85. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada.
- Kobayashi, Audrey 1989. A Demographic Profile of Japanese Canadians, and Social Implications for the Future. Ottawa: Department of the Secretary of State, Canada.

This analysis is based on special tabulations from the 1986 census, and examines the demographic effects of uprooting and dispersal during the 1940s, geographic distribution since 1951, regional population, age structure, marriage patterns, educational levels, language, participation in the labour force and recent immigration. The high rate of intermarriage (over 90 per cent) is especially striking, and makes Japanese Canadians the second most highly intermarried group in Canada after those of Scandinavian background. Implications for community planning are discussed.

Lai, Cheun-Yan David 1975. Home county and clan origins of overseas Chinese in Canada in the early 1880s. B.C. Studies 27, 3-29.

This article shows the importance of patterns of emigration, in particular the concentration of Chinese emigrants from a few counties in the south of China, for the population composition of the emerging Chinese-Canadian community.

Lai, David Chuenyan 1988. Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

This book contains a comprehensive history of Chinese immigration, and sections on demographic growth and distribution, as well as extensive discussions of family practices and kinship networks.

- Li, Peter 1980a. Immigration laws and family structure: some demographic changes among Chinese families in Canada. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 16, 320-32.
- Li, Peter 1980b. Immigration laws and family patterns: some demographic changes among Chirese in Canada, 1885-1971. Canadian Ethnic Studies 13, 58-73.

These two articles provide one of the most dramatic illustrations of how demographic patterns are affected by public policy and social conditions. As a result of immigration laws that excluded Chinese women and created trans-Pacific families, the Chinese-Canadian community became by the 1950s perhaps the most demographically unbalanced in Canada. The effects of pre-World War II immigration policies can still be seen among Chinese Canadians today.

Maykovich, Minako K. 1980. Acculturation versus familism in three generations of Japanese Canadians. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 65-83. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This chapter provides an overview of the generational system among Japanese Canadians. Research concentrates on a presentation of scores for socio-psychological acculturation by generation, familism and role conflicts.

- Nipp, Dora 1985. The Chinese in Toronto. In Robert Harney ed.

 Gathering Place: People and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 18341945, 147-176. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of
 Ontario.
- Verma, Ravi, Kwok B. Chan and Larry Lam 1980. The Chinese-Canadian family: a socio-economic profile. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 138-56.
 Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This chapter contains a brief overview of immigration, and 1971 statistics on a variety of demographic factors., as well as discussions of marital status, family size, language and citizenship, education, labour force participation and income. A process of nuclearization of the family is noted, and an agenda is set for understanding the struggle of a minority group to preserve socio-cultural tradition.

Wickberg, Edward et al. 1982. From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Southern Europe, Middle East

- Anderson, Grace M. and David Higgs 1976. A Future to Inherit: The Portuguese Communities of Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Abu-Laban, Baha 1980. An Olive Branch in the Family Tree: The Arabs in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Boissevain, Jeremy 1975. "Family, kinship and marriage among Italians of Montreal." In S.P. Wakil ed. Marriage, Family and Society: Canadian Perspectives, 287-94. Toronto: Butterworth.
- Caroli, Betty Boyd, Robert F. Harney and Lydio F. Tomasi eds 1978. The Italian Immigrant Woman in North America. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

Chimbos, Peter D. 1980a. The Greek Canadian family: tradition and change. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 27-40. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Although the demographic data are based on the 1971 census, the chapter provides a foundational understanding of cultural practices within the Greek Canadian family, including the background in Greece, marriage, and husband/wife and parent/children relations.

- Chimbos, Peter D 1980b. The Canadian Odyssey: The Greek Experience in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Douramakou-Petroleka, Lia 1985. The elusive community: Greek settlement in Toronto, 1900-1940. In Robert Harney ed. Gathering Place: People and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834-1945, 143-56. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Toronto.
- Sturino, Franc 1980. Family and kin cohesion among Southern Italian immigrants in Toronto. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 84-104. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This article describes cultural practices involving marriage, kinship, respect and social organization, and discusses ways in which post-World War II Italian immigrants to Toronto have preserved family and kindred cohesiveness. It postulates that "Old World" values are sufficiently consonant with "host" values to remain viable. (see also Sturino 1978).

Zucchi, John 1985. Italian hometown settlements and the development of an Italian community in Toronto, 1875-1935. In Robert Harney ed. Gathering Place: People and Neighbourhoods of Toronto, 1834-1945, 121-146. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

Eastern Europe

- Aun, Karl 1985. The Political Refugees: A History of the Estonians in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Dreisziger, N.F., with M.L. Kovacs, Paul Bödy and Bennett Kovrig 1982. Struggle and Hope: The Hungarian-Canadian Experience. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Epp, Frank H. 1982. Mennonites in Canada, 1920-1940: A People's Struggle for Survival. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada.
- Kogler, R.K. 1969. A demographic profile of the Polish Community in Canada. In T.W. Krychowski ed. *Polish Canadians: Profile and Image*. Toronto: The Polish Alliance Press.

- Kogler, Rudolph and Benedykt Heydenkorn 1974. Poles in Canada, 1971. In Benedykt Heydenkorn ed. Past and Present, 27-36. Toronto: Canadian Polish Research Institute.
- Mealing, F.M. 1980. The Doukhobors: family and rites of passage. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 181-197. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This article provides a brief history of Doukhobor immigration, and a description of the rites of meeting, birth, marriage and death.

Peter, Karl A. 1980. Problems in the family: community and culture of Hutterites. In K. Ishwaran, ed. *Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations*, pp. 221-36. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

The autobiography of a Hutterite woman is presented and analyses for what it tells about interpersonal family relations, human nature, love, the lash, morality, religion, social control and modernization.

- Peter, Karl A. 1980. The decline of Hutterite population growth. Canadian Ethnic Studies 12, 3, 97-110.
- Radecki, Henry with Benedykt Heydencorn 1976. A Member of a Distinguished Family: The Polish Group in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

(as summarized by Tavuchis, 1980, p. 130)

"New patterns of family interaction and new attitudes and beliefs are plainly discernible not only among the post-war immigrants but also among the whole Polish aggregate in Canada. Nuclear family orientations are slowly replacing the traditional extended family values. There is a generally greater permissiveness and very little authoritarianism on the part of the father; equally noticeable is the abandonment of previously rigidly held attitudes and values. It is likely that the Polish family in Canada is fast becoming indistinguishable from the Anglo-Saxon urban Canadian family, sharing many of its values and attitudes in parent-child and husband-wife relationships. The changes have taken place here while much traditionalism still seems to remain in Poland."

Radecki, Henry 1980. The Polish-Canadian family: a study in historical and contemporary perspectives. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 41-64.

Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This chapter documents phases and patterns of immigration, background of family customs, traditions and values in Poland, adjustment and changes in the Polish family in

Canada. Demographic data from the 1971 census include occupation, marital status and age structure, at a very general level.

- Rasporich, Anthony W. 1982. For a Better Life: A History of the Croatians in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
- Yedlin, T. ed. 1985. Central and East European Ethnicity in Canada: Adaptation and Preservation. Edmonton, Alta: Central and East European Studies Society of Alberta.

This collection contains ten chapters on varied topics. There is little reference to the family. Several papers, annotated separately, address demographic issues. The most relevant is Kalbach's and Richards' "Ethnic-connectedness: how binding is the tie?"

Northern and Western European

Anderson, Alan and Leo Driedger 1980. The Mennonite family: culture and kin in rural Saskatchewan. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 161-80. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Demographic data (1971 Census) focus on religion, language and intermarriage to provide a basis for a theoretically sophisticated discussion of the preservation of traditional culture through the institution of the family. Mennonites in Saskatchewan are notable for their high degree of ethnic segregation and a strong interest in maintaining group identity, but also for a number of important changes, including changes in family size, a shift from extended kin networks to small nuclear families, liberalization of attitudes towards sex roles and religious intermarriage.

Ishwaran, K. and Kwok B. Chan 1980. Time, space and family relationships in a rural Dutch community. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 198-220. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

In-depth interviews conducted in 1977 and 1978 provide the basis for a discussion of the changing family concept, as well as the intimate realm of family life as organized chronologically and spatially. The concept of ecological adaptation is used to explain the community's definition of physical and social space and their maintenance through technological innovation and mechanization, institutional specialization and differentiation, and nuclearization of the family.

Reid, W. Stanford ed 1976. The Scottish Tradition in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

French Canadian

Note: Quebecois culture is of sufficient duration in Canada, and demographic studies in Quebec sufficiently well developed, that it was deemed appropriate to include articles on French Canadians as a distinct area. This

articles on French Canadians as a distinct area. This is a select bibliography, which is not annotated.

Garigue, Philippe 1980. French-Canadian kinship and urban life. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 125-137. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Indigenous Peoples

Acheson, Ann W. 1980. The Kutchin family: past and present. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 241-65. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

Based on field work in 1968-69, this study describes traditional practices of marriage, illegitimacy, adoption, and household composition. The claim is that "even though the form of the marriage and family system has indeed changed under the impact of such things as Christianity and a new economic system, some key principles are still important" (p. 241). Changes include the abolition of polygamy, disappearance of the paired family household, breakdown of clan exogamy, decline in the importance of matrilocal residence and the introduction of formal Christian marriage practices. Recent tendencies include a low rate of new marriages and remarriages, an increase in illegitimacy, a high incidence of female-headed households, and changes in household size. Interrelated explanatory factors include reaction to economic and social circumstances under sedentarism, the introduction of wages and government aid and experiences outside the case study village of Old Crow.

Matthiasson, John S. 1980. The Inuit family: past, present and future. In K. Ishwaran, ed. Canadian Families: Ethnic Variations, pp. 266-79. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.

This chapter focuses on the structure of the Inuit family, describing the importance of the nuclear family and its division of labour, socialization practices, residence and '-muit' groups, alliances and partnerships and the importance of contact.

Norris, Mary Jane 1990. The demography of aboriginal people in Canada. In Halli, Shiva S., Frank Trovato and Leo Driedger eds 1990. Ethnic Demography: Canadian Immigrant, Racial and Cultural Variations, 33-59. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

This is a demographic profile of the aboriginal population, which in general shows high fertility, an average life expectancy 10 years below other Canadians, a higher level of mobility and a relatively young age structure.

Notwithstanding these trends, Norris provides a much-needed emphasis upon the differences among different aboriginal groups, particularly for the Inuit, who are younger and faster-growing than other groups, more rural and less mobile. This article is valuable for its recent (1986) data on aboriginal demographic characteristics.

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THE IMPLICATIONS

OF SEPARATION AND DIVORCE

FOR FAMILY STRUCTURE

DEMOGRAPHIC REVIEW

FAMILY RESEARCH PROGRAMME

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Over the past few years, I have been engaged in two large studies of divorce and the divorce process for the Department of Justice, Canada. The intent of this present paper is to draw upon that research to address the central theme of the Family Research Programme: how family members find collective as well individual strategies to develop and share resources and how these may involve familial relationships beyond the nuclear family. Clearly, just as the death of one spouse meant family reorganization and new strategies to cope with this loss, so too does separation and divorce bring about changes in family structure. Earlier views were that divorce destroys and undermines families and family life. But, as our conception of what does and does not constitute a family changed in the 1970's so did our views about the implications of divorce for family structure; the emphasis shifted from disorganization reorganization. Many argued that if we accept a broader and more pluralistic definition of family, divorce need not mean that there is an end to sharing of social emotional and economic resources and that what we are undergoing is not the demise of the nuclear family but the emergence of new family forms. Over the 1980's, however, a less sanguine view of divorce re-emerged as the negative consequences particularly for women and children became more evident. This paper is an attempt to make an empirical contribution to this debate.

IMAGES OF FAMILY AND DIVORCE

For some time the question of how to define the family has been a problem not only for sociologists and anthropologists but for Canadians generally. Canadians, whatever their position on the matter find themselves exposed to and through choice or circumstance, increasingly involved in, varied arrangements of people who claim for themselves the status of family. Fundamentalists may wish to uphold the notion of the traditional patriarchal family with a single breadwinner supporting a wife and children and to regard all other family forms as deviations. But, by the early 1970's, it became a conventional wisdom of the sociology of marriage and the family that the reality in Canadian society as in other Western societies is increasing numbers of single parent families, female headed families, dual income and dual career families, intentionally childless families, remarriage families, same sex partners and a broad range of ethnic variations.1

In the late 1970's, the Vanier Institute of the Family proposed that we stop talking about the Canadian family and instead think in terms of "familial life styles." Eichler (1988), suggests that the better term to capture present realities which avoid the various biases of the nuclear family model is "Canadian families." And, most recently, Health and Welfare Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada have, for purposes of the research initiative on "Family Violence and Violence Against Women", proposed the operational definition of family as "a grouping of individuals who are related by affection, kinship, dependency or trust."

Both those who welcome this diversity of family forms as well as those who fear it are probably operating from a rather distorted and sometimes romantic image of the family of the past. Gaffield (1990:24) reminds us, we cannot juxtapose historical image of one single and dominant family form with the wide variety of contemporary family patterns. Similarly, Lasch (1977: xx) reminds us that the present crisis of the family did not materialize overnight and that what we are today using as our base of comparison extends no further back than the probably anomalous single breadwinner nuclear family model of the 1950's. Historically, families, have often had to develop strategies and new structures to survive economically first as production units and later as a wage earning unit faced with the uncertainties and new layers of vulnerability of the labour market of industrial capitalism. ((Tilly and Scott, 1978; Morgan, 1975; Gaffield, 1990). Emily Nett (1981), for example, concludes her review of the history of the Canadian family with the observation that "Canadian families prior to this century were more malleable in that they contracted and expanded to include both kin and strangers as economic circumstances required." Thus, under a variety of situations, and at various points in the family life cycle, complex family forms may develop and, for a time, and in certain social classes, become institutionalized as, for example, in the tendency for working-class women to be kin-keepers and for the main patterns of kin relationships to be matrifocal (Moreux, 1971; Young and Willmott, 1973). Kinship, in other words, is best viewed as resource which people call upon when it is to their advantage to do so and a set of unwelcome obligations which they have resisted under other social and economic circumstances (Shorter, 1975).

At the same time, while the past was also characterized by diversity, there may have been greater consensus about what constituted the cultural ideal with respect to family structure. It was not that people did not know what they wanted but that they were often unable to actualize it, particularly in the 19th century (Scott and Tilly, 1978). Inadequate resources, unemployment, demographic imbalances, high mortality rates, later lower mortality rates and high fertility rates, war and natural disasters, meant that the preferred family form, the independent nuclear family, was a model which could often not be actualized or only temporarily.

What makes the current diversity unique is that many family patterns are the result of choice rather than circumstance there are various pressures to give these family forms social and legal legitimacy and support through social policy. As Berger and Berger (1983:63) observe, "the empirical fact of diversity is quietly translated into a norm of diversity" and "demography is translated into a new morality." Beaujot (1988) suggests we are engaged in a process of "de-institutionalization" of family and marriage: since at least the mid-1960's, people have been less

willing to live up to traditional norms or commit themselves to one family structure. Similarly Harris recognizes this shift as one in which, in traditional societies, interpersonal relationships arose from one's membership in the group: the group proceeded the individual. Whereas, today, it is more generally held that it is the nature of the relationships which define the group. Thus, marriage as an institution persists only as long as there is continuance of the interpersonal relationship (Harris, 1983: 215). In unprecedented numbers Canadians are reassessing those relationships, often finding them wanting and, in effect, breaking up the group.

So, today, an important source of diversity and complexity of family patterns is separation and divorce. Here we are dealing with a contemporary and probably permanent phenomenon, one which, in certain respects, is perhaps unique to modern society. It is only in the past two decades that more marriages are dissolved as a result of divorce than as a result of death of one spouse (Beaujot, 1988). The Canadian divorce rate is at its highest level ever and is now only slightly exceeded by four of the industrialized societies Statistics Canada uses for comparative purposes.² At present rates, and depending on which assumptions

With the exception of the three year period between 1982 and 1985, the divorce rate has steadily increased from 124 per 100,000 population in 1969 to 308 per 100,000 in 1989, the last year for which data have presently been released. In 1987, a probably anomalous year, the rate was 355 per 100,000 population. Throughout the 1970's and most of the 1980's about half of divorces involved one or

about the behaviour of cohorts of married couples are used, it is estimated by Statistics Canada demographers that between 30 to 40 percent of Canadian marriages will end in divorce. Marriage breakdown, then, has increasingly come to be perceived as a normal and perhaps even normative aspect of family life; rather than a singular event it is now one which must be factored into any life cycle or developmental model of the family (White, 1991).

Much of the rethinking of what is meant by family has made its way into social policy and family law. Just as former Prime Minister Trudeau had said that the State has no business in the bedrooms of the nation, so, by the 1970's, the prevailing view was that the State should not be attempting to buttress failed marriages or put legal and administrative obstacles in the way of those who had agreed that their marriage had broken down. While it would be exaggeration to suggest that divorce was now romanticized, it most certainly was viewed by many as an integral and normative part of marriage and family life and as offering the potential to be a creative, liberating and rehabilitative process. The Law Reform Commission did not go quite so far as to talk of "creative divorce", the title of one book in the early 1970's but it did note that:

....divorce may provide a constructive solution to marital conflict. It should not be regarded as totally

more children. However, after 1986, the proportion of divorces involving children fell to about one third.

dysfunctional and prejudicial to the institution of marriage. Many divorces enter into successful second marriages. Divorce can therefore provide an opportunity for the creation of new homes for ex-spouses and their children and holds out the prospect of a new and viable family unit. (Law Reform Commission, 1975:32)

In the 1980's, many researchers, concerned about the consequences of divorce for children, argued that often times children are better off living in a divorced family than in an unhappy, conflictive and perhaps violent, intact family (Richardson, 1987). Divorce, in other words, was seen not so much as a problem but as a solution for unhappy marriages. Rather than undermining family life, divorce was now viewed as simply bringing about a change in family structure and a reorganization and restructuring of family ties and kinship relations and the "clean break" approach advocated in the 1950's and 1960's was no longer viewed as appropriate when children are involved: the new wisdom was that marital dissolution should not mean complete family dissolution since separated or divorced spouses have ongoing parental responsibilities and extended kin, particularly grandparents, will not wish to lose contact with their grandchildren.

Moreover, as most who divorce eventually remarry, concepts such as "remarriage families" and "blended families" point to the even more complex family forms which emerge as children of divorce find themselves, potentially, with four sets of in-laws and perhaps two sets of half siblings. And, this in turn, shatters taken for granted notions of what is meant by family and

family relationships as various family members no longer share common perceptions of who is and is not a family member and what are the boundaries of the kin universe. In short, the new view was that divorce does not end family relationships, it creates new and more complicated family structures. Such structures may, as Eichler argues, be invisible if the emphasis is on structure rather than content which, in turn, leads to a misrepresentation and possibly too pessimistic view of the nature and quality of modern family life. She suggests that a focus on the single parent family misses the extent to which children of divorce may be living in "bi-nuclear" families and thereby continuing to have two (or more) parents but now in separate households.

This more sanguine view emerged as researchers focused on divorces where there was a high degree of shared parenting and also remarriage of one or both partners. While none of the researchers claimed that all divorces involve a process of reorganization, there was considerable optimism that joint legal and physical custody were at the cutting edge of new approaches to marriage breakdown and that increasing numbers of divorcing couples with children would be able to form themselves into "binuclear families" (Ahrons, 1979; Folberg and Graham, 1981; Irving et al, 1984; Morris, 1988). And, in this we see evidence of what was quite apparently a much broader and less conventional view of the family and what it means to strengthen it.

One of the principal ways in which people would be assisted to bring about these new family forms, this very different conception of the aftermath of divorce, was through divorce mediation, seen as the wave of the future with respect to resolution of the disputes surrounding marriage breakdown. (Irving, 1985; Richardson, 1988). Even a cursory glance through the mediation literature reveals the depth of commitment to the belief, within the divorce mediation community, that everyone benefits if amicable and responsible post-divorce relationships can be established and maintained. In large part, the Department of Justice, Canada initiatives (and earlier initiatives by Health and Welfare, Canada) in promoting divorce mediation and conducting research on this form of intervention were based in these same optimistic assumptions that less adversarial approaches to dispute resolution will lead to amicable postdivorce relationships and, in effect, new family forms (Richardson, 1988). So persuasive were these arguments that the drafters of the 1985 divorce legislation built in the principle of "maximum contact" and the concept of the "friendly parent": the child should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with his or her best interests and, for that purpose, courts shall consider the willingness of any person seeking custody to facilitate such contact. The question remains, however, whether these optimistic views capture the social and economic reality of most post-divorce families.

DATA SOURCES

In attempting to address this general question, I draw upon the interview data from research conducted for the Department of Justice, Canada in the area of divorce mediation and a two-phase evaluation of the Divorce Act, 1985. The first phase of the research conducted in 1985-1986 combined the collection of baseline data on divorce with an intensive study of divorce mediation in four Canadian cities: St. John's, Montreal, Ottawa The second phase replicated only the divorce and Saskatoon. portion of the research about two years after the new divorce legislation came into force and, again, in the same four cities. During the second phase of the research, evaluation of the divorce legislation, we contacted by telephone those who had been interviewed as part of the Divorce and Family Mediation Study.3 Wherever possible, the research used the statistical data generated by the Central Divorce Registry and compiled and analyzed by Statistics Canada.

In Phase I of the research, data were collected on 1773 court files and interviews were conducted with 905 divorced or separated women and men. In the second Phase, data were collected from 1478 files and 595 divorced women and men were

Full details of the samples and how the data were collected can be found in Richardson (1988a and 1988b). A separate divorce mediation study but using a similar research design was conducted by Sloan and Greenaway (1988). Details of the second Phase are set out in Department of Justice, (1990) and the follow up study is reported in Richardson (1990).

interviewed. In the follow-up study, we were successful in interviewing 326 of the 905 who had been interviewed in Phase I of the research. While this latter sample is small, it is of particular interest from the point of view of assessing the stability of post-divorce structures and the kinds of changes which must inevitably occur following divorce.

Comparisons with data collected from the court files suggests that those we were able to contact and interview are not fully representative of the divorcing population. Those who could be found and who agreed to an interview were somewhat more affluent, better educated and, in general, seemed to be experiencing or have experienced fewer problems - substance abuse, unemployment, family violence, physical and sexual abuse which the data from the court files hinted is characteristic of some divorcing families. Clearly, this is a major shortcoming of most research on divorce and its outcomes: those who researchers are able to contact and who agree to an interview are generally part of the less distressed segment of the divorcing population. And, typically, those who have used such interventions as divorce mediation and who have opted for the relatively rare option of joint custody are the most inclined to want to participate in the research project.

^{4.} Although attempts were made to interview former spouses this was not always possible. About 65 percent of the interviews involve "matched couples". Details of the distribution of respondents is set out in the above-cited references.

As well, the men available and willing to be interviewed, tend to be those who are living up to their support obligations, who are exercising their access rights or who have sole or joint custody of their children. In contrast, what we come to know of men who are in default on their orders or who are disinterested in parenting comes largely from women's accounts and perceptions of their ex-husbands. In short, the picture we are able to present depicts a more positive picture of the post-divorce situation and processes of reorganization into new and viable family forms than we think would emerge from analysis of a purely random sample of the Canadian divorce population. It is, therefore, useful to put the interview data into a wider context. I, therefore, begin by examining general trends with respect to custody as revealed by Statistics Canada analyses of Central Divorce Registry data and then examine in finer detail the data on custody and access from the interview data. I then consider briefly the flow of economic resources in these post-divorce structures and the economic implications of divorce separation.

GENERAL PATTERNS OF CUSTODY

Over this century, the majority (about 80 percent) of custody awards in Canada have been sole legal custody to the mother. However, in recent years, there has been considerable interest in contested custody cases and possibly changing conceptions as to which spouse is the more appropriate parent. In

part, this interest has been raised by Fathers' Rights groups who have challenged what they perceive as the sexist bias in the more than century - long tradition of the "tender years doctrine" and, in general, the notion of maternal preference in awarding custody. At the same time, feminists have been equally concerned about what they see as the erosion of maternal preference in the Boyd (1987: 24), for example, has examined reported custody decisions over the 1980's and finds evidence "of an absence of discussion of primary responsibility for parenting, an attendant inclination to overemphasize fatherly involvement in child care and, overall, a tendency to penalize working mothers for the perceived instability of their lifestyles." Thus, men who work full-time but show some interest in and involvement with parenting are viewed by the courts as dedicated fathers. Women who work full-time and do most, but not all, of the child care are considered "half" mothers and as uninterested in parenting. She also observes a recent tendency to award custody to the parent who can provide the greatest financial stability and highest standard of living.

However, legal trends do not quickly and obviously translate into statistical trends. The reason may be that in about three-quarters of divorce cases we have studied, who was to receive custody was never at issue; the assumption was that the wife would receive custody because both spouses were agreed that the children would be best off with the mother. In the one quarter

of cases where there was evidence of some initial dispute over custody, matters were usually resolved through personal negotiation, negotiation between lawyers or with the assistance of mediators. The result is that only about six percent of all divorces are contested cases and in only about half of these is custody one of the matters which needs to be settled in Court. In the minority of cases where men sought or ended up with sole custody our data substantiated earlier research by Gersick (1979) that this was usually because the mother was, for various reasons, incapable of parenting or did not want the children.

Despite concerns that women are faring worse with respect to the likelihood of being awarded custody, an examination of the data for the 1970's and 1980's show that there has not been a consistent shift away from the Mother as the preferred custodial parent. Rather, the pattern has been curvilinear: 79 percent in 1979 and 73 percent and 74 percent in 1970 and 1989, respectively. In contrast, in the first two time periods men were awarded sole custody over these periods in around 15 percent of cases and, in 1989, in just over 10 percent of cases.

Moreover, when women are the petitioners in the divorce and request sole custody, men are virtually excluded from obtaining legal custody; only about four percent of men were awarded custody under these circumstances. Until recently, men, as petitioners, were awarded sole custody in just over two-fifths of

this latter subset of cases. By the end of the 1980's, the proportion of male petitioners awarded custody had fallen to about 23 percent of those divorces. In contrast, where women are the petitioners, the differences are negligible, a decline of about 1.5 percent between 1970 and 1989.

An obvious question is what has happened when men are the petitioners to reduce their chances of receiving sole custody. The answer lies in the greater tendency of the courts to make, or agree to, joint custody awards, particularly where men have taken on the role of petitioner and have either contested custody or, at least, shown some interest in doing so. None of this is meant to suggest that judges are imposing joint custody as a way to resolve custody disputes. Rather, it appears that where there is some desire on the part of the father for custody, both lawyers and mediators encourage joint custody and, as the interview data revealed, couples themselves, are more likely to view this a possible option than seems to have been the case in the past.

While men are almost never denied some form of access (less than one percent of all cases studied), the interview data showed that some six months after the settlement, in about 11 percent of cases where the wife has sole custody, the father does not have access to the children. People gave a number of reasons often more than one why this has occurred. These included failure to comply with the support order (22%), the father has moved away

(30%), he is not interested in maintaining contact with the children (55%) and the children do not want to see the father (20%).

Where fathers do have access to the children, frequency of contact showed considerable variation. The most common pattern was for men to have access to the children one or two days per week (35 %). However, one-third of men and about one-quarter of women who were non-custodial parents were reported as rarely or never having contact with the children. As well, even six months after the settlement, some 38 percent of those interviewed indicated that the actual access arrangements were different from what was initially specified or agreed to by the divorcing couple. The major changes were that the father is not exercising his access rights or obligations (18 %) or sees the children less frequently than was agreed to or ordered (43%). In about one-fifth of cases, the change is in the direction of more frequent contact than what was specified in the order.

As described earlier, two years after the initial interview, a follow up telephone interview of those included in the divorce and mediation study was conducted. We were able to contact only about one-third of those previously interviewed with the result that biases in the initial interview sample are probably accentuated in the follow - up sub sample. Undoubtedly, we have overrepresented those who have remained relatively stable geographically, those divorces where there continues to be

contact with the children, where there is joint custody and often shared parenting and where there is compliance with the support order. With these caveats in mind, it is nevertheless of interest to consider what changes in post-divorce family structures and relationships have occurred. The general conclusion is that patterns which develop early in the post-divorce situation tend to persist over time.

Few couples had sought a variation of the original custody order with the result that there was little change in the legal custody arrangements between the first and second interviews. The main change was that some of what were sole custody arrangements had now become split custody arrangements. However, when asked whether custody arrangements had changed, some 28 percent of men and 19 percent of women answered in the affirmative. apparent that these were de facto changes rather than courtordered variations and that respondents did not make a very clear distinction between legal and physical custody. It is of interest to note that where there is joint legal custody, there was by the second interview joint physical custody in 73 percent of cases compared to under half at the time of the first interview and of those who indicated that there had been a change, only three percent said that joint custody had turned out to be unworkable in their particular situation. More generally, where there were changes in custody this was mainly attributed to children growing older and either no longer thinking of themselves as in the custody of one parent or that they were now spending more time with the non-custodial parent than was initially the case.

About two-fifths of men and just over half of the women indicated that there had been no change in access arrangements. Of those who have made changes, 12 percent said that there had been a legal change and just over two-fifths said that there had been an informal change from what was in force at the time of the first interview. Respondents described a combination of ways access arrangements had changed and reasons for the changes. To the extent that they can be summarized, some 42 percent said that there was now a freer arrangement and 30 percent said things had changed as a result of the children growing older. Just over half felt that at the time of the second interview the children were being seen by the non-custodial parent less than agreed. contrast, only 17 percent felt that contact between the ex-spouse and the children was now more than originally agreed. The most cited reasons for the decline in frequency of contact was that one of the parents moved and that the father gradually lost interest in seeing the children. Only 24 men with sole custody of the children were included in the follow - up interview so that percentages with respect to frequency of contact with the mother must be viewed cautiously. Nevertheless, it was apparent that where men have sole custody, it is because the ex-wife has little or no interest in the children: only 17 percent were reported to be seeing the children more than once a month, some 50 percent were seeing the children once or twice a year and the other quarter "seldom or never" saw the children. Similarly over half of women with sole custody said that there was extremely limited contact between the children and their father: in about one fifth of cases there was apparently no contact; in one-third of cases contact was a few times per year and in only one-fifth of cases was there weekly or more frequent contact.

These, then, are the general patterns of custody and In at least two-fifths of all divorces, women have legal custody of the children and in upwards of 87 percent of divorces it is women who have physical custody and are the primary caregiver. Thus, the major implication for family structure is the creation, at least temporarily, of female headed single parent families in which there is limited and often no involvement of the father in the parenting of the children. Of course, historically, the principal way in which fathers have contributed to their children has been as breadwinners and, in the case of divorced fathers through court - ordered child support payments. Before turning to the economic aspects of post-divorce family structures, it is important to examine in more detail the minority of cases where through joint legal custody there is potentially greater likelihood of shared or coparenting.

The authors of the 1983 study of divorce (McKie et al, 1983) referred to joint custody as the "elusive award" because while it known that some divorcing couples were choosing this was arrangement there was no category on the Central Divorce Registry form to capture the data. The 1986 divorce legislation makes explicit reference to the possibility of joint legal custody and this is now recorded. The statistics show that there has been a steady but not dramatic increase in joint custody awards from an estimated three percent of all awards at the beginning of the 1980's to about 14 percent of all awards at the beginning of the 1990's. Joint custody awards, then, comprise a minority of all custody awards but one which may tell us something of the potential for couples to develop viable post-divorce family structures. In the following paragraphs some aspects of joint custody, as revealed through the interviews, are described and compared with the larger group of interviews where there was sole custody.

It is important to distinguish between joint legal and joint physical custody. The former gives both parents the right to a say in the education and religious training of the children and other matters concerning their general welfare. Joint physical custody means that both are involved at least part of the time in their physical care and co-parenting. Some 43 percent of men and 49 percent of women interviewed, indicated that the award of joint legal custody also meant full joint physical custody. This

was, in part possible because most, 83 percent of spouses were, at the time of the interview still living in the same city and/or neighbourhood compared to about 70 percent of spouses with sole custody awards.

For about half of those with joint custody, parenting arrangements are not all that different from awards which have granted sole custody to one parent and "reasonable access" to the non-custodial parent. At the same time, the interview data suggest that there is a qualitative difference in post- divorce parenting and relationships when the couple have agreed to joint legal custody. This was true whatever the practical arrangements. On the basis of what people told our interviewers, spending equal time in each household was not as important as the shared knowledge, by parents and children, that the parental relationship still exists.

Critics of joint custody, have argued that though it appears an attractive option, it is one which is feasible only for the affluent. While joint custody is not confined to the most affluent segment of this population of divorced people, it does appear to be an alternative more likely to be adopted by those in higher income categories. According to the interview data average gross incomes for parents with joint custody were higher than those with sole custody. For men, the difference is about \$7750.00 and for women it is about \$6024.00. About 45 percent of

men with joint custody have gross incomes over \$30,000 per year compared to just over 25 percent of men with a sole custody agreement. Similarly, some 50 percent of women with joint custody have incomes over \$20,000 compared to 33 percent of those with sole custody. Turning it around, only 19 percent of men with joint custody have incomes below \$20,000 compared to about 41 percent of men in sole custody arrangements.

One of the concerns about family law reform and divorce mediation is that, under pressure from father's rights groups, women are being forced into joint custody arrangements against their will. The argument is that they accept these because of the fear that, should their ex-spouse fight for custody, he has a good chance of winning. Interviews with court-based mediators and observations of the mediation process left little doubt that mediators encourage couples to enter into joint custody arrangements and were often successful since those who mediated their divorce were four times as likely to choose joint custody as those who used a purely legal process. But, there was no indication that women (or men for that matter) felt compelled to accept this kind of order. Most preferred a joint custody arrangement because they felt it was in the best interests of the children. Whatever other faults they attributed to their exspouses, poor parenting was seldom among them. This was much less true for those with sole custody arrangements. And, after living with such arrangements for a time, most cited advantages rather

than disadvantages of joint legal and physical custody. Those most often cited were that the children do not lose contact with one parent (80 %), there is shared responsibility (65 %) and shared costs (34 %). The main disadvantages identified were that joint custody is unsettling for children (32 % of women and 23 % of men) and it forces one into contact with the ex-spouse (21 % of women and 9 % of men).

There were also differences between women and men with respect to level of satisfaction with joint custody. For example, if they had it to do over, 89 percent of men but only 75 percent of women would choose joint custody again. Both those with sole custody and those with joint custody were asked about satisfaction with the custody decision. Some 94 percent of women in the former group compared to 79 percent in the latter group stated that they were satisfied. For men, the figures are reversed: about 75 percent of men (whose ex-wives have custody) are satisfied compared to just over 86 percent of men with joint custody.

There is the obvious question as to why women are somewhat less satisfied with joint custody than are men. As we looked more carefully at women's comments, what emerged is that some feel the award or agreement has not resulted in equal responsibility for parenting. While their ex-husbands do look after the children, it is they who make most of the medical and

other appointments and "think ahead about clothes for the children." Perhaps the parallel is that many men in intact marriages believe that they are egalitarian because they "help out" with domestic duties and child care. It would be rather surprising if these definitions of "equality" did not carry over into the post-divorce relationship. In other words, the complaints about joint custody, have their roots not in the present situation, but in patterns of sexual inequality established or perpetuated within the nuclear family prior to its break up.

It is well to note, too, that while most joint custody arrangements probably have not resulted in a completely equal sharing of responsibilities, these couples are further along than are many caught up in sole custody and "reasonable" access situations. As just described, the quantitative and qualitative data women provided showed men as non-custodial parents were not living up to their access arrangements or were doing so irregularly and unpredictably and there had been deterioration over time. Thus, many of the children who were awarded to their mothers have little or no contact with their fathers. Their mothers, in turn, carry most and often all of the day to day responsibility for their physical care. This is simply not the case for those in joint custody arrangements. While their permanent home is often with their Mother, most see their father on a regular and consistent basis.

Thus, as might be expected, there is considerably more interaction between parents with joint as opposed to sole custody. For example, 94 percent of the former compared to 57 percent of the latter, routinely discuss matters relating to the children. These include such things as school performance, health, camps and other programs, visiting and Christmas and birthday gifts. Joint custody parents, and men more so than women, are likely to describe their relationship with their exspouse as either friendly or cordial. And, women in the joint custody group rate their ex-husband higher as a parent than do women with sole custody. In contrast, there is very little difference between men in the two groups: both tend, on the whole, to view their ex-wives as good parents.

Respondents in the divorce and family mediation research were asked to identify problems associated with visitation or access. While I have avoided including tables in this present paper, Table 1 is included to give some sense of the problems faced by divorced families and the differences between those with sole as opposed to joint custody. Looking, first at women's responses, it is evident that while from one to forty percent of women identified one or more problems, there are consistent differences between those with sole and joint custody. On virtually all items, women with a joint custody arrangement had experienced fewer problems than their counterparts with sole custody. Of particular interest is that whereas some five

percent (16 cases) of women with sole custody were concerned that their ex-husband is physically abusive to the children, this was a problem mentioned by only one woman in the joint custody group. A similar pattern of differences can also be seen in the men's responses to these various items. In short, joint custody arrangements, though not without their difficulties, appear to involve fewer problems than do those related to access by a non-custodial parent.

Table 1

Problems Identified about Visiting/Access and
Ex-spouse's Parenting for Joint and Sole Custody Cases
(Percentages)

Problem	Woren Sole Joint		Men Sole		
Children Unhappy Spending time with other parent	19	11	15	9	
Says bad things about you to the children	31	19	31	19	
New partner says bad things about you to the children	8	10	9	4	
No healthy foods	17	10	13	11	
No proper medical care	7	9	11	5	
Physically abusive to Children	5	1	6	1	
Excessive use of drugs/ alcohol when with children	22	15	12	5 .	
Verbally abusive to the children	20	12	14	10	
Favours one child	36	23	20	6	
Buys too many gifts for the children	20	10	13	13	
Children not picked up or returned on time	31	14	15	9	
Children not ready when you pick them up	11	3	22	13	
Not dependable about visiting the children	37	14	17	7	

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

viability of post -divorce family patterns structures clearly depends upon an equitable distribution of economic as well as socio-emotional resources. Indeed, proponents of joint custody and the "bi-nuclear family" in arguing that divorce does not end but rather change and reorganize the family are clearly assuming that there will also be reorganization of family income and other economic resources. It follows that separation of the family into two households may be another strategy by which families cope with changing economic circumstances, crises and chronic unemployment. During the first decades of this century, men often deserted their wives and children in order that they would be eligible for relief. The enactment in the early decades of this century of Deserted Wives and Children Maintenance Acts were clearly attempts by provincial governments to curtail the welfare costs that this strategy entailed. Similarly, today, low income families may find there to be economic benefits in separating since the wife with custody of the children will be entitled to social assistance and, until very recently, provinces have not been very aggressive in obtaining support orders from those husbands who could afford to pay child and, perhaps, spousal support. Nor is there much incentive for the wife to do so since such payments will either lower her social assistance payment or simply go into the provincial treasury. And, while as Teachman (1991) shows, this probably does not happen very frequently, there

possibility of Fathers passing some resources to the children in the form of gifts, clothing and so on and, in this way, improving the economic situation of the children beyond what is indicated by the level of social assistance being provided to the Mother.⁵

At higher income levels, the "bi - nuclear family" is from an accountant's perspective, "tax - efficient" compared to the nuclear family. Those who are legally separated or divorced enjoy certain tax advantages over those whose marriages are intact. Support payments are fully deductible to the payor and are unlikely to attract a high level of tax from the beneficiary who probably has lower income and can deduct the first child as a married or equivalent exemption. Against this is, of course, the additional cost of maintaining two households but the fact remains that less of the total family income is expended in taxes. In short, if we are prepared to accept that "marriage breakdown" creates new family forms rather than simple destroying the family, we must also situate the "bi-nuclear" family within the context of the complex set of benefits and taxation which make up the modern welfare state.

Those who deal with single parent families on social assistance are aware that sometimes when women obtain employment and are no longer entitled to social assistance there is a "reconciliation" of the separated couple. This is a phenomenon being addressed in present research on the new enforcement legislation soon to come into force in New Brunswick.

However, the reality is far different from what is envisioned in the bi-nuclear model and conceptualizations of divorce as reorganization rather than disorganization. While the percentages vary depending on the assumptions being made, the general picture is consistent: marriage breakdown is one of the leading "causes" of what has come to be called the feminization of poverty. On the basis of her highly influential research on California divorce, Weitzman concludes that:

For most women and children, divorce means precipitous downward mobility -- both economically and socially. The reduction in income brings residential moves and inferior housing, drastically diminished or nonexistent funds for recreation and leisure, and intense pressures due to inadequate time and money. Financial hardships in turn cause social dislocation and a loss of familiar networks for emotional support and social services, and intensify the psychological stress for women and children alike. On a societal level, divorce increases female and child poverty and creates an ever-widening gap between the economic well-being of divorced men, on the one hand, and their children and former wives on the other (Weitzman, 1985:323).

The Department of Justice, Canada research presents an equally dismal picture of the economic consequences of divorce for Canadian women and children (Richardson, 1988) and is in accord with American research (eg: Chambers, 1979; Hoffman and Duncan, 1988). A considerable gap was found between men's and women's income and therefore very different probabilities of living below the poverty line following divorce. Other research using income tax returns from 1983 to 1986, that these differences persist over time (Anonymous, 1992). Some 11 percent of divorced men without sole custody of the children and after paying support were found to have incomes which put them below

the poverty line estimated by the National Council of Welfare for one person households. Their average income was, in fact, \$13,500.00 above this line. In contrast, 58 percent of women had total incomes, including employment, support and other sources of income, which put them below the estimated poverty lines for various family sizes. In the phase II sample, following the introduction of new divorce legislation, 13 percent of men and 46 percent of women had incomes below the poverty line. These differences between the two phases were attributed to a larger proportion of women in the second sample having paid employment rather than more generous support quanta since changes in the latter were found to be modest and not to reflect the rate of inflation over this period.6 For some women (and a few men), the objective decline in standards of living were offset by other considerations such as greater control over the family budget and income. And, as many noted, the objective decline in family income was more apparent than real; family income previously spent by the husband on alcohol, cars etc. was now available to the family.

Child and spousal support, almost invariably flowing from men to women, is the principal mechanism by which total family income is shared in post-divorce families. Yet, in only 70

The average amount of child support increased from \$470.00 per month to \$503.00 per month whereas, to keep up with inflation, an average award of \$540.00 per month would have been required (Department of Justice, 1990).

percent of divorces with children was there a child support order and in only six percent of cases was there evidence of a spousal support order. As in the earlier American research, were these women to depend solely on support, 97 percent of them would have had incomes below these poverty lines. Still, without these support payments, some 73 percent would be living in poverty which indicates that support payments, are, for many women, an component of their total income. But, there is consensus that present levels of child support awards are inadequate and do not come close to meeting the actual costs of raising a child. Data from the evaluation of the divorce legislation reveals that average support per child, paid almost exclusively by men to women, is \$250.00 per month whereas recent estimates put the bare minimum for raising a child at \$350.00 per month. With day care this estimate rises to \$790.00 per month (Pask and McCall, 1989). While not all of this cost should be borne by the father, it is widely agreed that the proportion of men's incomes paid in support (on average about 18 percent of gross income) is too low.

Bleak as these statistics may be, they are, nevertheless, based on the assumption that the support ordered or agreed to between the separating or divorcing spouses is paid regularly and in full. The evidence is overwhelming that this is often not the

^{7.} About 42 percent of men with sole custody of the children of the marriage also had incomes which put them below the poverty line which both suggests that some families were impoverished prior to the breakup.

case with the result that an even larger proportion of women and children than the above statistics reveal are living below the poverty lines. An Evaluation Framework, prepared by the Department of Justice, Canada, estimates compliance at anywhere from 60 to 85 percent. It is likely that, in some jurisdictions, these estimates exclude cases where there is no likelihood of support ever being paid and are, therefore, conservative estimates of non-compliance. Thus, an Alberta study showed there to be progressive deterioration in compliance rates such that after five years upwards of 80 percent of orders are in default (Canadian Institute of Law Research and Law Reform, 1983). This study found that failure to pay was not solely attributable to "affordability" but more often was the result of resentment towards ex-wives, dissatisfaction with parenting arrangements and the belief by some men that they had been unfairly or badly treated by the legal system.

The interview data for both Phase I and Phase II of the evaluation of the Divorce Act, 1985 show a compliance rate of about 70 percent. However, the interviews took place only about six months after the final judgement and, as noted earlier, the sample was not fully representative of the divorcing population from which it was drawn. By the time of the follow - up study, only 55 percent of respondents said that payments are being made regularly and another 11 percent said payments are being made but irregularly. Thus, 36 percent of those interviewed reported that

there are no longer payments being made. About half of this group viewed the support order as no longer relevant because the children were no longer dependent, there was a change in physical custody, the wife was now employed or repartnered.

To put these data into perspective, at the time of the first interview, 29 percent of women reported that they were either not receiving the support payments ordered or agreed to or they were receiving them irregularly (both in promptness and amount). Two years later, this figure has now risen to about 36 percent of those women with a support order. Thus, even within this somewhat unrepresentative sub-sample of the divorcing population, there has been deterioration in compliance with the support order.

CONCLUSIONS

The research on which this paper has been based was designed to address specific information and policy needs of the Department of Justice, Canada -- to assess the impact of divorce mediation and to evaluate the new divorce legislation. The intent here has been to take a second look at the data from the point of view of assessing the prospects for new and viable family forms following separation and divorce. Conclusions to be reached from this exercise depend on whether one views the glass as half empty or half full. On the optimistic side is that, as we have seen, about one half of those with joint custody as well as some of

those with sole legal custody (perhaps in all 15 to 20 percent of the divorcing population) have achieved some degree of approximation to the "bi-nuclear model" in the sense that there is ongoing contact by both parents with the children, varying degrees of shared parenting and generally a high level of compliance with what are generally relatively generous support orders or agreements. The follow - up interviews suggests that these formal joint custody and other shared parenting arrangements are quite durable and apparently satisfying and would be the choice of most if they were doing it over. As well, these respondents reported that children are not, on the whole, experiencing problems with joint custody.

Looking at the full sample, the follow - up data show that many of the women interviewed in this smaller study have found full-time employment since the initial interview and, as a result, perceive themselves as better off than at the time of the divorce settlement. And, two years later more of the initial sample (about half of the men and one-third of the women) have remarried or are involved in a relatively permanent relationship, somewhat higher proportions than were found at the time of the first interview.

on the distaff side is that, compliance with support orders, never very good, has, in general, deteriorated over time. And, some non-custodial parents, are not seeing their

children with the level of frequency and regularity originally agreed. What was initially problematic has been exasperated by channging circumstances such as geographical mobility, children growing older and other factors such as loss of interest in the previous family rather than any denial of access by the custodial parent or other kinds of conflict. As noted earlier, the samples here described underrepresent those post-divorce couples still caught up in conflictual relationships and those where there has been total disengagement. The more fragmentary evidence in the the court files suggests that interviews with a truly representative sample of divorcing couples would show a worse picture with respect to compliance with support orders and disengagement from parenting roles than this paper has presented.

Indeed, the the findings of this research are, in general, congruent with a recent American study (Teachman, 1991), which finds that very few non-custodial divorced fathers contribute anything beyond the required support payments to their children and at least a fifth are not required to make even this contribution. It was found that for only one item, purchasing of gifts, have more than 50 percent of fathers ever provided assistance. In fact, fewer than one in seven fathers have ever provided additional assistance on a regular basis. The same study also indicates that only one father out of 27 regularly assists his children with home work or attends school events. As the study notes, "the fact that one out of five fathers has never

provided any of the types of assistance (including support) speaks to the frailty of father-child relationships outside of marriage."(p. 271).

Thus, the general conclusion is that in the vast majority of post-divorce families there is limited sharing of resources and other kinds of support and instead considerable economic and other kinds of inequalities following marriage breakdown. Clearly, the notion, entertained earlier in this paper and one at the core of the Health and Welfare, Canada initiative, of family strategies to share resources outside of and beyond the nuclear family is foreign to most divorcing people and one that is often actively resisted by men. While it is tempting to argue that marriage breakdown does not end family obligations and responsibilities, the reality for most divorcing couples is not the "development of family structures such as the bi-nuclear family" and/or shared parenting, but post-divorce relationships characterized less by overt hostility than by indifference and disengagement.

The impoverishment of women and children and the general lack of involvement of divorced fathers with their children are major social problems facing Canadian society. Since people are not voluntarily agreeing to joint parenting responsibilities and economic responsibility, there is continuing need for policies and various forms of state interference in the lives of many of

these post-divorce "families." Development of equitable, realistic and consistent child support guidelines to assist Courts in fixing support quanta in various situations is one such form of interference. Depending on the model used such guidleines would probably double the proportion of men's incomes going toward child support (Richardson, 1991). A second form of state interference is, of course, legal and administrative reform and enhancement of the support enforcement process and of tracking of those in default.

Yet there are limitations as to what can be accomplished through such social policy. Both of the above initiatives are based on the assumptions that there are sufficient resources to avoid poverty of women and children as well as the non-custodial father if there was only a more equitable division of those resources in the post-divorce family. However, as Mossman (1986:60) has pointed out, while efforts have been made to establish more satisfactory procedures for obtaining support orders, little attention has been directed to the relatively high rate of serial monogamy. Thus, "the system of familial support after marriage breakdown has inherent limitations, particularly where an income earner is required to support both a former and an existing family. Even with effective enforcement measures, there will be situations in which the state must provide

See, for example, Pask and McCall, 1989; Payne,1988; Federal/Provincial Territorial Family Law Committee, 1991.

support". And, while interventions such as divorce mediation serve to encourage more responsible parenting we can neither force people to use this approach or develop legislation to require men to be more actively involved in the upbringing of the children.

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Les modes de vie nouveaux des adultes et leur impact sur les enfants au Canada - Mise à jour 1990

par

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INTRODUCTION

Cette étude constitue une mise à jour des résultats d'un premier rapport de recherche que nous avons soumis au Secrétariat de l'étude de l'évolution démographique à l'automne 1988*. Ce premier rapport a eu des retomdées nombreuses et diversifiées, et sa pertinence nous a été confirmée bien au-delà de la communauté scientifique en général ou de celle des démographes en particulier. Que ce soit par la publication d'articles dans des revues d'organismes voués à la promotion de la famille (Institut Vanier de la Famille; Institute for American Values de New York) ou par la sollicitation de communications présentées lors de congrès destinés à des intervenants dans des domaines associés à la vie familiale (Association internationale d'éducation familiale, Association des services de garde en milieu scolaire, Congrès conjoint de la Fédération des CLSC du Québec et du Conseil québécois de la jeunesse, Colloque des Services d'expertise psychosociale et de médiation familiale à la cour supérieure), ou encore par le nombre étonnamment élevé d'acheteurs institutionnels ou privés qui ont payé pour obtenir un exemplaire du rapport malgré un mode de diffusion artisanal, tout cela nous a largement démontré l'intérêt de présenter une mesure des changements de la vie familiale tels que vécus par les générations d'enfants qui y sont soumis. La redéfinition du contexte familial dans lequel sont élevés les enfants entraîne des conséquences importantes auxquelles différents milieux d'intervention sont confrontés quotidiennement. La diffusion de nos résultats a semblé répondre à un besoin urgent d'évaluation plus précise de l'ampleur de ces phénomènes et de la fraction des enfants qui les vivent. Cette première réponse a stimulé une demande d'informations supplémentaires, à laquelle nous n'avons pu répondre à partir de ce premier rapport.

Un nouveau contrat accordé par le Secrétariat à l'été 1991 nous a permis de pousuivre, quoique de façon plus modeste, l'analyse amorcée il y a 3 ans avec

Marcil-Gratton, Nicole. Les modes de vie nouveaux des adultes et leur impact sur les enfants au Canada. Rapport de recherche soumis au Secrétariat de l'étude de l'évolution démographique et son incidence sur la politique économique et sociale. Octobre 1988. Département de démographie, Université de Montréal, 56 p. + tableaux.

les données de l'Enquête sur la famille 1984 de Statistique Canada. En particulier, les données de l'Enquête sociale générale (cycle 5) 1990, auxquelles nous avons eu accès à la fin du mois de juin 1991, ont ouvert la voie à une mise à jour des tendances que nous avions dévoilées dans la première étude. Ce document présente les premiers résultats que nous avons tirés de cette nouvelle source de données.

Etant donné le calendrier imposé par le Secrétariat, nous avons dû rédiger et soumettre notre proposition de recherche à temps pour qu'elle soit examinée et que le contrat soit signé en date du 8 mai 1991, soit longtemps avant que nous ayions pu avoir accès aux données et vérifier la faisabilité des analyses projetées. Ces contraintes nous ont amenés à remettre au Secrétariat un rapport quelque peu modifié par rapport aux objectifs annoncés dans notre proposition initiale. Les résultats pourront donc sembler minces à certains points de vue: nous croyons que ces faiblesses auront été compensées par l'ajout de certaines analyses non prévues dans la proposition originale.

Plus particulièrement, l'approfondissement de l'étude du phénomène des familles recomposées n'a pu être complété dans les délais prévus. L'examen des données nous a confrontés à la nécessité de sortir du cadre des générations d'enfants que nous avions retenues pour l'ensemble de l'analyse des deux sources de données utilisées (1984 et 1990). Recréer des générations d'enfants d'unions rompues beaucoup plus élargies, qui aient été assez nombreuses pour donner une information valable, demandait un investissement de temps irréaliste dans le cadre d'un contrat aussi limité. Nous avons tout de même pu mettre à jour les analyses amorcées dans la première étude à l'aide des données récentes: en particulier, nous avons examiné comment la multiplication des expériences de vie en famille recomposée est liée, pour les jeunes enfants, au comportement de leurs parents vis-à-vis l'union libre.

Ceci dit, l'ajout d'informations sur les tendances les plus récentes de la vie familiale des enfants nés dans les années 1970 et surtout sur de ceux nés au début des années 1980 s'est révélé aussi satisfaisant que nous l'avions estimé. Nous avons pu illustrer clairement le rôle de l'union libre comme

élément déterminant du contexte nouveau de la formation des familles et de la naissance des enfants, mais aussi sa signification en termes de l'instabilité croissante de la vie familiale.

Enfin, nous avons pu, avec les données de l'Enquête sociale générale 1990. fractionner l'analyse réalisée jusqu'ici pour l'ensemble du Canada et dégager la part des tendances dont la spécificité est apparue plus régionale. En distinguant les données québécoises de celles du reste du Canada, on a pu mieux observer les différences de comportement que certaines données officielles comme la fraction des naissances hors mariage laissaient soupçonner. Cette partie de l'analyse apporte les premières réponses aux questions nombreuses qui nous ont été posées en ce sens depuis la publication de la première étude.

1. LES DONNEES

La première étude réalisée avec les données de l'Enquête sur la famille 1984 (EF84) innovait au plan méthodologique en ce que l'analyse était effectuée auprès d'échantillons d'enfants dérivés de l'échantillon premier constitué de leurs parents. Cette approche a permis d'illustrer de façon saisissante les effets de l'évolution de la vie familiale du point de vue des enfants.

Dans cette deuxième étude, nous poussons plus loin l'innovation en utilisant la même approche avec une deuxième source de données, l'Enquête sociale générale 1990 (ESG90). Cela permet de poursuivre l'analyse amorcée la première fois, en ajoutant des informations nouvelles sur les tendances observées dans les six années écoulées depuis 1984. C'est ainsi que la vie des générations d'enfants que nous avions pu observer jusqu'à l'âge de dix ans, peut maintenant être examinée jusquà l'âge de seize ans, et leur adolescence peut donc être comparée à celle des générations plus âgées, aujourd'hui jeunes adultes dans la vingtaine.

Il faut avoir un certain goût du risque ou tout au moins une foi inébranlable en la représentativité des enquêtes successives de Statistique Canada pour tenter de suivre ainsi l'histoire des générations d'individus à travers des informations glanées à plusieurs années d'intervalle auprès d'échantillons différents. La qualité des résultats et leur concordance générale d'une enquête à l'autre nous semble justifier pleinement la démarche. Ce succès est lié d'une part à la rigueur des techniques d'échantillonnage utilisées par Statistique Canada, mais également à la formulation des questions qu'on a eu le souci de maintenir relativement similaires dans les deux enquêtes.

1.1 Comparaison des deux échantillons

Pour pouvoir tirer d'une enquête faite auprès d'adultes des renseignements fiables au sujet de leurs enfants, l'échantillon de base doit être assez étendu quant au nombre de répondants ainsi qu'à leur âge; ce dernier critère est particulièrement important, puisqu'il faut s'assurer que certains parents des enfants des générations étudiées n'ont pas été éliminés de l'échantillon des répondants parce que trop jeunes ou trop âgés au moment de l'enquête.

Les échantillons des deux enquêtes se répartissent comme suit:

P	lge des répondants	Nombres (pondérés)			
		Femmes	Hommes	Femmes 65+	Hommes 65+
EF84	18-65 ans	7069	6935	0	0
ESG90	15 ans et plus	6895	6600	1050	815

L'ESG90 convient tout autant sinon mieux que l'EF84 pour la création d'échantillons d'enfants nés depuis le début des années 1970 jusqu'à l'enquête au début de 1990. L'ajout des répondants âgés de 15 à 18 ans enrichit l'échantillon des parents adolescents pour les enfants nés de 1987 à 1989; et la présence des personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans permet d'inclure, à l'autre bout de l'échelle, ceux des enfants dont les parents, les pères surtout, étaient plus âgés lors de leur naissance au début des années 1970.

Par ailleurs, les générations d'enfants nés au début des années 1960, qui nous ont servi de point de repère de la famille traditionnelle, peuvent plus

difficilement être observés dans l'ESG90: bien que présents dans l'échantillon puisqu'aucune limite supérieure d'âge n'était fixée, les parents de ces enfants sont en 1990 suffisamment âgés pour que la morta l'été ait commencé à décimer leurs rangs. Nous avons donc préféré conserver les resultats obtenus avec l'EF84 pour ces générations comme modèle du cadre dans lequel étaient élevés les enfants au début des années 1960.

1.2 L'utilisation des réponses des femmes et des hommes

Avec les données de l'EF84, il était rapidement apparu que nous ne pouvions utiliser les informations en provenance de l'échantillon des hommes pour mesurer l'évolution de la vie familiale du point de vue de leurs enfants. Cela était essentiellement dû à une formulation déficiente de la question qui visait à établir le nombre d'enfants qu'avaient conçus les répondants de sexe masculin. En effet, la question posée aux femmes concernant leurs propres enfants, par opposition aux enfants adoptés et à ceux du conjoint (enfants "d'un autre lit"), était formulée comme suit: "avez-vous déjà eu un enfant?". Aux hommes, cette même question avait été transformée en: "avez-vous déjà élevé un enfant à vous?". Cela s'était de toute évidence traduit chez certains hommes par l'omission d'enfants avec lesquels ils n'avaient que très peu ou jamais vécu. L'analyse de l'instabilité conjugale telle que vécue par les enfants s'en trouvait suffisamment faussée pour que nous n'utilisions pas l'échantillon des hommes.

L'ESG90 a corrigé cette lacune en reformulant la question posée aux hommes de la façon suivante: "avez-vous engendré un enfant?". Nos premières analyses ont confirmé la validité de cette nouvelle formulation.

Cette amélioration s'est avérée de taille, puisqu'elle nous a permis avec l'ESG90, d'avoir des générations d'enfants assez nombreuses pour raffiner l'analyse. C'est ainsi que nous avons pu introduire la dimension régionale (Québec, reste du Canada) dans l'étude, et tenir compte de l'influence du mode d'union libre sur la stabilité familiale.

Avant de présenter nos résultats, il convient toutefois d'insister un peu

sur la comparabilité des analyses en provenance des deux enquêtes, étant donné surtout notre choix d'amalgamer cette fois les réponses des hommes à celles des femmes.

1.3 Deux enquêtes, deux bases d'échantillonnage: des risques calculés

Cette mise à jour des résultats d'une analyse antérieure comportait un premier risque de non-concordance des mesures ou des tendances. Nous aurions pu contourner en partie ce risque en choisissant des regroupements de générations d'enfants différents de la première étude. Nous avons préféré faire face au défi et regrouper les enfants exactement de la même façon, soit les générations 1971-1973 et 1981-1983, et reprendre l'analyse du déroulement de leur vie familiale en la prolongeant de six ans jusqu'à la date de la seconde enquête.

Nous n'avons pas été déçus de ce choix. Même si les résultats n'affichent pas toujours une concordance parfaite, les différences ne sont pas suffisamment significatives pour remettre en question la validité de la démarche. A titre d'exemple, nous avons repris au Tableau 1 les données pour lesquelles les différences observées entre les deux enquêtes ont été les plus importantes, soit la fraction des enfants des générations 1971-1973 qui ont vécu la séparation de leurs parents avant l'âge de 10 ans. Les résultats indiquent une intensité plus grande du phénomène à partir du fichier des femmmes de l'EF84 (23.5%), qu'à partir du fichier des femmes de l'ESG90 (19,2%): cette différence à 10 ans est toutefois à peine statistiquement significative (niveau p 0,05), et l'évolution des pourcentages cumulés de 0 à 10 ans, quoique toujours inférieurs dans la seconde enquête, montrent qu'ils ne répondent pas toujours au test de signification. L'important ici nous semble résider dans la concordance des tendances, et le fait qu'avec l'ESG90 comme avec l'EF84, la fraction des enfants qui vivent ce phénomène augmente considérablement d'une génération à l'autre.

Par ailleurs, la comparaison des résultats obtenus dans l'ESG90 à partir des seules réponses des femmes et à partir des réponses combinées des hommes et des femmes indique des intensités de phénomènes qui, malgré qu'elles ne soient la plupart du temps pas statistiquement significatives, demeurent le plus souvent

inférieures lorsque calculées à partir des données obtenues des répondants des deux sexes. Ici, l'explication est plus difficile à avancer: les études statistiques des comportements conjugaux ont presque toujours été faites à partir d'échantillons de femmes, de sorte qu'on ne sait pas si les hommes donnent une image sous-estimée des situations ou si, à l'inverse, ce sont les femmes qui traduisent une surestimation des phénomènes. Du point de vue des enfants de ces répondants, on peut toutefois penser que la mesure sera plus juste lorsque cernée par le biais des mères, puisque ce sont elles qui non seulement donnent le jour à ces enfants, mais qui les gardent encore dans une large mesure auprès d'elles lorsque les choses se gâtent et que la séparation des parents se produit. Dans ce contexte, les mesures que nous présenterons à partir des échantillons combinés d'hommes et de femmes devront être considérées comme des estimés plutôt conservateurs de la fréquence des phénomènes.

Enfin, certains pourraient s'inquiéter du caractère non exclusif des échantillons d'enfants qui proviennent de femmes et d'hommes n'habitant pas ensemble, mais qui potentiellement pourraient être des ex-conjoints; dans ce cas, il serait alors possible qu'un enfant "apparaisse" deux fois dans l'analyse, via les réponses de son père et de sa mère. Cette probabilité demeure toutefois excessivement faible, étant donné la taille de l'échantillon des ménages sélectionnés (13,495) à l'échelle du Canada et le caractère aléatoire de la méthode d'échantillonnage par numéros de téléphone (voir ANNEXE). Les bénéfices en termes de possibilités accrues d'analyse nous semblent l'emporter largement sur le risque très réduit qu'un enfant fasse partie deux fois de l'échantillon.

2.LES RESULTATS

Le recul de l'institution du mariage constitue certes le point marquant de l'évolution des comportements conjugaux au Canada au cours des deux dernières décennies. Ce recul s'est traduit d'abord par la croissance marquée des ruptures d'union aboutissant à un divorce légal, phénomène en pleine expansion depuis la loi de 1968 qui en avait libéralisé l'accès, et dont l'intensité a commencé à plafonner au milieu des années 1980. Ce plafonnement est en partie dû à la fin

de la période de rattrapage qui a suivi l'adoption de la nouvelle loi. Mais ce ralentissement apparent de la propension au divorce s'est avéré aussi largement tributaire d'une réticence nouvelle des jeunes couples à institutionnaliser leur union dans le cadre d'un mariage légal. Il s'en est suivi une difficulté de plus en plus grande pour la statistique officielle et les chercheurs qui en dépendent de mesurer de façon significative l'impact réel de ces comportements nouveaux sur la stabilité de la vie familiale. Seules des enquêtes comme l'ESG90 peuvent désormais lever le voile sur la réalité des familles d'aujourd'hui devenue impossible à cerner par le biais des indicateurs désuets des définitions légales.

L'apport principal de ce rapport sera donc d'examiner non seulement les effets du divorce sur les enfants, mais aussi comment le refus du mariage légal influence à la fois le contexte de leur naissance et la stabilité subséquente de la famille au sein de laquelle ils sont élevés. Nous savions déjà que l'union libre était devenu le choix de la majorité des jeunes qui débutent leur vie de couple: l'Enquête sur la fécondité au Canada (1984) nous enseigne que 54% des premières unions formées au début des années 1980 ne portaient pas le sceau du mariage légal. Nous verrons comment cette attitude, même lorsqu'elle aboutit ultérieurement à la consommation d'un mariage légal, n'est pas étrangère à la plus grande mobilité matrimoniale des parents et par conséquent à la multiplication des expériences familiales vécues par les enfants. Nous verrons également dans quelle mesure, au sein de l'ensemble canadien, le Québec constitue un véritable laboratoire qui nous permet d'observer les tendances les plus marquées de ces nouvelles configurations de la vie familiale.

2.1 L'union libre et le contexte familial des enfants à la naissance

Nous avions déjà souligné lors de la première étude la diversification croissante du contexte familial dans lequel naissent maintenant les enfants canadiens. Essentiellement, cette diversification s'est poursuivie au long des années 1980, et la diffusion de plus en plus grande du mode d'union libre comme cadre de formation des familles en est principalement responsable.

Au début de la première étude, la fraction des naissances "hors mariage"

se situait à 18,7% pour l'ensemble du Canada (1986); dès lors on pouvait saisir l'importance du phénomène au Québec puisque la même fraction y atteignait déjà 27% des naissances. L'analyse faite à cette époque avait toutefois confirmé que la grande majorité de ces naissances survenaient encore à des parents vivant en couple: naître hors mariage ne signifiait pas naître hors famille.

En 1990, la tendance s'est poursuivie: cependant, l'essentiel de la croissance récente de la fraction des naissances hors mariage au Canada est redevable à la véritable flambée du phénomène au Québec, où une fraction record des naissances, soit 39%, se sont produites hors mariage en 1990, le double de ce qu'on a observé dans le reste du Canada. Qu'en est-il au juste de ce phénomème? Quelle est la signification de cette substitution rapide du mariage par l'union libre comme cadre au sein duquel on donne désormais naissance aux enfants? Assistons-nous à l'émergence d'un nouveau modèle de la famille, dont le prototype se développe surtout au Québec? Selon Larry Bumpass, sociologue de l'université du Wisconsin qui a dirigé une enquête auprès de 13,000 ménages en 1987-88, aux Etats-Unis les naissances "out-of-wedlock" demeureraient encore 3 fois sur 4 des naissances survenues à des mères monoparentales (cité par Henry Aubin, The Gazette, "Startling Rise in Quebec of out-of-wedlock births puzzling",7 octobre 1991) Quelles sont les conséquences mesurables de cette tendance différente en terme de stabilité des familles ainsi fondées? Les résultats présentés dans ce rapport contribueront à lever le voile sur ces questions, en insistant sur le point de vue des enfants impliqués dans ces changements.


2.1.1 Des parents qui ont déjà vécu en union libre

Avant que l'union libre ne devienne un mode de vie jugé préférable par un grand nombre des couples désirant devenir parents, elle a d'abord progressivement remplacé le mariage comme point de départ de la vie commune. Vivre en union libre, pour une fraction de plus en plus importante des jeunes en âge de former un couple, a d'abord été conçu comme un rite d'initiation, une forme de mariage à l'essai qui permette de prendre une décision éclairée le moment venu de s'engager par mariage à fonder une famille.

La progression de cette attitude apparaît clairement à la Figure 1, cù l'on voit comment la fraction des enfants qui sont nés de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre grimpe de façon impressionnante depuis trente ans. Cette fraction était pour ainsi dire nulle (2.5%) au début des années soixante, de sorte que la donnée québécoise ne peut ici beaucoup s'éloigner de la donnée canadienne. Au début des années 1970, la croissance s'affirme timidement mais le comportement demeure marginal, au Québec comme dans le reste du Canada. Les années 1980 verront s'amplifier la tendance et les couples québécois se distanceront des autres: une bonne majorité (58% des générations 1987-89) des enfants du Québec naissent aujourd'hui de parents qui ont choisi l'union libre comme façon d'amorcer leur vie de couple; malgré une progression certaine du phénomène, on n'observe encore qu'une minorité (38% des générations 1987-89) des autres enfants canadiens dont les parents ont fait le même choix.

Ces enfants ne sont évidemment pas tous nés "hors mariage" comme on le verra plus loin. Mais l'attitude nouvelle de leurs parents, qui rompait avec le comportement traditionnel voulant que toute vie de couple soit réservée exclusivement au mariage, n'est pas sans conséquence. Ce choix de l'union libre comme premier mode d'union, largement adopté par les jeunes couples surtout au Québec, n'est pas sans lien avec le degré de stabilité de la vie conjugale par la suite. Certains pourront spontanément avancer que cette forme de mariage à l'essai, tant qu'elle ne se substitue pas au mariage comme environnement pour donner naissance aux enfants, reflète un souci louable de faire un bon choix de partenaire: il pourrait donc s'agir d'une manifestation de respect face à l'institution du mariage plutôt qu'un symptôme de rejet. Or nos résultats indiquent que même lorsque l'union libre se transforme en mariage avant que ne débute le processus de reproduction, l'instabilité de la famille sera plus prononcée que lorsque le mariage demeure la seule forme d'union. Il convient donc d'examiner d'un peu plus près l'histoire conjugale des parents au moment où ils donnent naissance aux enfants, pour mieux comprendre le déroulement de la vie familiale par la suite.

FIGURE 1
POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS DE DIVERSES GENERATIONS
DONT AU MOINS UN PARENT AVAIT DEJA VECU EN
UNION LIBRE AU MOMENT DE LEUR NAISSANCE.
CANADA, QUEBEC, CANADA SANS QUEBEC



SOURCE: TABLEAU 2

2.1.2 Le contexte de la naissance: un monolithisme disparu

Au début des années soixante, le contexte familial des enfants à la naissance présentait un caractère monolithique indiscutable:

Figure 2 Tableaux 2 & 3:

- 93% des enfants canadiens des générations 1961-63 sont nés dans le cadre d'un premier mariage qui n'avait pas, pour le parent répondant et probablement pour l'autre, été précédé d'une union libre; seulement 1,6% naissaient de parents vivant en union libre; et dans 4% des cas, le parent répondant vivait seul au moment de la naissance.


Ces enfants sont les représentants des dernières générations dont la naissance s'est produite dans le modèle le plus traditionnel de la formation de la famille. Ce modèle était si prépondérant que les données pour l'ensemble du Canada nous renseignent de façon fiable sur ce qui se passait au Québec à la même époque.

Au début des années 1970, la diversification du contexte des naissances est à peine amorcée. La situation des enfants québécois demeurent identique à celle des autres enfants canadiens. Environ 85% des naissances ont toujours lieu dans le cadre d'un premier mariage non précédé d'une union libre; et les parents qui auront d'abord vécu en union libre auront dans 75% des cas marié leur partenaire. Le pourcentage d'enfants nés dans une famille monoparentale n'a pas significativement augmenté; en fait il restera stable pour toutes les générations étudiées. Les naissances dans le cadre d'unions libres auront doublé leur part relative, mais ne compteront encore que pour 3% de l'ensemble.

C'est au début des années 1980 que la diversification apparaît clairement. Et les enfants québécois se différencient des autres; seulement la moitié d'entre eux naissent dans le cadre d'un premier mariage sans union libre l'ayant précédé, alors que dans le reste du Canada, encore les deux tiers des enfants naissent dans ce genre de mariage très traditionnel. L'union libre accueille déjà 14% des naissances au Québec, soit deux fois plus que dans le reste du Canada (7%). Les mariages précédés d'unions libres gagnent en popularité, et 29% des naissances au Québec se produisent dans ce cadre, contre la moitié moins (15%) ailleurs au Canada: 8 à 9 fois sur 10, les parents de ces enfants auront épousé le ou la conjointe avec laquelle ils ont d'abord vécu.

FIGURE 2

LE CONTEXTE FAMILIAL DES ENFANTS A LA NAISSANCE:
POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS DE DIVERSES GENERATIONS
QUI SONT NES DANS LE CADRE DU PREMIER MARIAGE DU
PARENT REPONDANT, D'UN REMARIAGE, D'UNE UNION
LIBRE, OU DONT LE PARENT REPONDANT VIVAIT SEUL
AU MOMENT DE LA NAISSANCE.
QUEBEC, CANADA SANS QUEBEC



SOURCE: TABLEAU 2

Cependant les familles issues d'unions libres se montrent alors un peu différentes au Québec: elles semblent se rapprocher davantage de la famille traditionnelle en ce que 85% des parents interrogés affirment n'avoir jamais vécu avec un autre conjoint; dans le reste du Canada, la fraction est significativement plus basse à 62%.

A la fin des années 1980, la diversification du contexte des naissances devient la règle, plus particulièrement au Québec. Le premier mariage très traditionnel et non précédé d'union libre n'y accueille plus qu'une minorité (35%) des naissances des générations 1987-89, alors que dans le reste du Canada la fraction est encore majoritaire quoique faiblement (55%). Les naissances se produisant dans le cadre d'une union libre grimpent à 31% au Québec, alors qu'elles ne comptent que pour 9% dans le reste du Canada.

Toutefois, on sent que les familles ainsi formées au Québec réflètent davantage une réticence à institutionnaliser les unions, et que l'on assiste à une certaine substitution du mariage par l'union libre; cette dernière ressemble au mariage en ce qu'encore 65% des parents qui les forment en sont à leur première expérience de vie de couple. Et ce sont les nouvelles familles en formation qui en répondent, comme nous le confirment les statistiques du Bureau de la Statistique du Québec: en 1989, 36% de l'ensemble des naissances se classaient hors mariage, mais la fraction grimpait à 46% des premières naissances.


Dans le reste du Canada, naître dans le cadre d'une union libre est encore très peu fréquent (9% des naissances dans les générations 1987-89). Et cela semble encore s'apparenter au caractère marginal et instable auquel on a traditionnellement associé ces unions: dans à peine la moitié (51%) des cas, s'agissait-il d'une première union.

Figure 3:

La Figure 3 résume très clairement l'évolution différentielle du contexte familial dans lequel naissent les enfants, au Québec et dans le reste du Canada. On y constate aisément que les changements observés pour l'ensemble canadien (Tableau 2) sont en grande partie dus à l'évolution plus marquée des indicateurs québécois.

C'est ainsi que si le monolithisme du contexte familial des enfants à la naissance s'effrite depuis 1960 dans l'ensemble du Canada, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'à l'extérieur du Québec, 8 naissances sur 10 se produisent encore dans le cadre d'un premier mariage légal à la fin des années 1980; au Québec, la fraction est maintenant inférieure à 60%. Ces premiers

LE CONTEXTE FAMILIAL DES ENFANTS A LA NAISSANCE: RESUME DE CERTAINS ELEMENTS. QUEBEC, CANADA SANS QUEBEC FIGURE 3



mariages sont de plus en plus fréquemment précédés d'une union libre, mais dans le reste du Canada, la majorité (55%) des enfants naissent encore de parents qui n'ont pas vécu en union libre avant de se marier. Au Québec, la proportion correspondante n'est plus que de 35% pour les générations 1987-89, ce qui est inférieur à la proportion des naissances hors mariage pour la même période.

Enfin, la flambée des naissances se produisant dans le cadre d'une union libre ressort indiscutablement comme un phénomène principalement québécois des années 1980. Les jeunes générations d'enfants québécois naissent aujourd'hui dans un contexte familial différent de celui des autres enfants canadiens; mais cette différence en est une du point de vue légal, puisque dans les faits ces enfants naissent, aussi fréquemment que les autres, entourés de leurs deux parents.

Le mariage comme cadre institutionnel pour fonder une famille semble avoir perdu sa place au Québec à la fin des années 1980. Et cela s'est produit très rapidement. On remarquera que ce renversement est survenu au moment où les enfants nés avec la Révolution tranquille sont arrivés à l'âge de devenir parents: ce sont ces enfants nés au tout début des années soixante qui aujourd'hui rejettent massivement l'institution du mariage non seulement pour entamer leur vie de couples, mais aussi pour exercer leur fonction de parents. Cela n'est sans doute pas étranger à l'expérience familiale qui a été la leur, alors que leurs propres parents, ceux-là même qui leur ont donné naissance dans une famille encore très traditionnelle, leur ont toutefois fait vivre, souvent au moment de l'adolescence, les soubresauts des désunions qu'ont traduits les taux élevés de divortialité des années 1970. Il faudrait sans doute chercher dans l'échec d'un nombre croissant de mariages dans les générations de leurs parents, l'explication de leur réticence à institutionnaliser leur propre engagement.

2.2 La croissance des ruptures d'unions, légales ou non

1re question:

Peut-on, dans les années 1980, observer une poursuite de la croissance du pourcentage des enfants qui connaissent la rupture d'union de leurs parents, et cela se produit-il de plus en plus tôt dans la vie de ces enfants?

Figure 4
Tableau 4:

La Figure 4 confirme la poursuite des tendances observées dans la première étude pour l'ensemble du Canada. l'intensité et la précocité des ruptures d'unions vécues par les enfants canadiens ont connu une hausse depuis 1984. Les enfants des générations 1971-73, observés jusqu'à l'âge de dix ans dans l'EF84, ont vu se poursuivre avec un rythme qui ne s'est pas ralenti l'augmentation du pourcentage d'entre eux qui ont vu leurs parents se séparer: l'ESG90 nous indique que cette fraction est passée de 18% à l'âge de 10 ans à 27% à l'âge de 16 ans, soit une croissance de l'ordre de 50% en 6 ans. L'EF84 ne pouvait nous fournir d'information sur le sort des enfants nés au début des années 1980: or l'ESG90 montre que les ruptures d'unions les touchent significativement plus tôt que leurs aînés. A leur 6e anniversaire, déjà 18% d'entre ne vivent plus avec leurs deux parents, ce qui représente une augmentation de l'ordre de 40% par rapport aux enfants des générations 1971-73 au même âge.

Note: A titre de point de repère, nous avons inscrit à la figure 4 les données pour les générations 1961-63 telles qu'observées par l'EF84. L'intensité du phénomène pour ces générations ne peut strictement être comparée à celle des générations plus jeunes, pour les raisons déjà soulignées à la section 1.3.


L'important ici nous semble résider dans l'évolution parallèle des courbes plutôt que dans la comparaison des intensités. C'est ainsi qu'on pouvait s'attendre à un certain plafonnement de la courbe pour les générations 1971-73, étant donné la précocité plus grande déjà observée à 10 ans chez ces enfants (avec l'EF84, le pourcentage cumulé à 10 ans pour les G71-73 était 75% plus élevé que pour les G61-63); or il n'en est rien, et l'on peut déjà affirmer qu'à 20 ans, ces jeunes auront connu une intensité finale du phénomène significativement plus forte. Dans ce contexte, on peut s'inquiéter de constater que, loin de s'atténuer, la pente de la courbe s'accentue chez les plus jeunes et ce à l'âge le plus tendre. On ne peut plus vraiment croire en la marginalité du phénomène, quand un enfant canadien sur cinq se présente à l'école primaire ayant déjà perdu la coexistence quotidienne avec ses deux parents.


2e question:

Ces tendances sont-elles plus marquées au Québec que dans le reste du Canada?


Figure 5:

La Figure 5 nous indique que pour le moment, l'intensité du phénomène de rupture d'union n'a pas au total touché une proportion significativement plus grande d'enfants au Québec





SOURCE: TABLEAU 4



SOURCE: TABLEAU 4

que dans le reste du Canada.

Cependant, une lecture plus attentive des courbes livre des indices précurseurs d'une évolution qui risque de se différencier au cours de la prochaine décennie. En effet, les données de l'ESG90 nous permettent de souligner qu'au cours des années 1970, mis à part une fraction comparable d'enfants nés dans une famille monoparentale, peu de jeunes enfants québécois nés au début de la décennie ont vu leurs parents se séparer avant l'âge de 8 ans (9.7%), comparativement aux autres enfants canadiens (17.0%): cela correspond à ce que nous savons de la fréquence plus faible des divorces au Québec à cette époque.

Par ailleurs, dans les années 1980, soit après leur 9e anniversaire, ces enfants semblent avoir vécu une période de rattrapage qui les conduit à l'âge de 16 ans à afficher un pourcentage légèrement plus élevé (28.9%) que les autres enfants canadiens (26.9%). Pour leurs cadets nés au début des années 1980, la courbe semble également vouloir se distancer de la courbe canadienne au cours de la même période: cela est essentiellement dû à la remarquable croissance de la proportion des enfants québécois qui voient leurs parents rompre avant l'âge de 6 ans, proportion qui atteint 20.1% des générations 1981-83 contre seulement 8.6% de celles nées dix ans plus tôt. Dans le reste du Canada, cette augmentation de la précocité des unions rompues du point de vue des enfants est à la fois plus ancienne et moins spectaculaire: elle touche 17.4% des enfants des générations 1981-83 contre 14.5% de ceux nés dix ans plus tôt.

Cette période de rattrapage conduit donc les enfants québécois à se montrer en 1990 un peu plus nombreux à avoir vécu la séparation de leurs parents. En soi, ces différences encore à peine discernables ne retiendraient pas notre attention, si nous ne pouvions les lier à la montée des familles formées en union libre et à leur plus grande instabilité.

3e question:

Les enfants qui naissent dans le cadre d'une union libre sontils plus susceptibles de connaître la rupture d'union de leurs parents?

Figure 6:

La réponse est sans équivoque positive.

Et nous sommes d'autant plus confiants de le dire que les données de l'ESG90 ne nous permettaient pas de le mesurer dans le cadre d'une définition aussi stricte. Les nombres de cas figurant au dénominateur ne nous permettaient guère de suivre les enfants nés dans une union libre, si ce n'est pour ceux

JAMAIS UNION LIBRE S DEJA UNION LIBRE CANADA, GENERATIONS D'ENFANTS 1971-73 ET 1981-83 VECU EN UNION LIBRE AU MOMENT DE LEUR NAISSANCE. POURCENTAGE CUMULE DES ENFANTS QUI SONT NES SE SEPARER AVANT L'AGE DE 6 ANS, SELON QUE LE ANNIVERSAIRE QUI LES ONT REPONDANT AVAIT DEJA OU N'AVAIT JAMAIS G1981-83 ENTOURES DE LEURS DEUX PARENTS ET FIGURE 6 ઋ 0 25 15 10 S 20 JAMAIS UNION LIBRE DEJA UNION LIBRE ANNIVERSAIRE PARENT G1971-73 25 ¬ 10 0 5 20 15

nés en 1981-83, et encore dans l'ensemble du Canada seulement. Cependant, en élargissant la définition à tous les enfants nés de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre avant leur naissance, nous pouvions comparer la stabilité de ces familles à celles dont les parents n'avaient jamais vécu en union libre, pour les générations 1971-73 et 1981-83, de même qu'en distinguant les enfants québécois de ceux du reste du Canada. Le phénomène est ici mesuré pour les enfants qui sont nés entourés de leurs deux parents.

Or les résultats nous permettent d'affirmer que le simple fait de ne pas légaliser par les liens du mariage le premier épisode de vie en couple dénote une attitude face à la conjugalité qui se traduira par une plus grande propension à la rupture, que l'on se soit engagé ou non dans le mariage au moment d'avoir des enfants.

Dans l'ensemble du Canada, les enfants dont les parents ont déjà vécu en union libre avant leur naissance les verront se séparer 3 fois plus fréquemment que les autres, et ce avant même de fêter leur 6e anniversaire de naissance.

La Figure 6 nous indique que cette tendance ne s'observe pas seulement pour les enfants nés dans les années 1980, mais qu'elle pouvait déjà se vérifier chez les enfants nés 10 ans plus tôt. Et à 10 ans d'écart, les ordres de grandeur ne diffèrent pas beaucoup. Pour les générations 1971-73, 18% des enfants auront connu la séparation de leurs parents avant l'âge de 6 ans quand ceux-ci auront déjà vécu en union libre, contre 6% seulement dans le cas contraire; pour les générations 1981-83, les pourcentages sont respectivement de 23% et 8%.

Ce qui a considérablement changé, c'est la proportion des enfants qui se retrouvent dans l'une ou l'autre catégorie: dans les générations 1971-73, seulement 9% de ces enfants sont nés de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre, contre 91% de parents ne l'ayant jamais fait; dans les générations 1981-83, la proportion des premiers est montée à 33% contre 67% pour les deuxièmes, d'où la progression sur l'ensemble, liée à ces poids différents. Il ne semble guère risqué de prédire une progression supplémentaire de la fraction des enfants nés dans une famille biparentale qui connaîtront très tôt la séparation de leurs parents, puisque l'on sait déjà que la fraction de ces enfants nés avec deux parents mais dont l'un a déjà vécu en union libre est rendue à 44% pour les générations 1987-89.

Par ailleurs, même si on ne peut en faire une analyse détaillée, on remarquera que pour l'ensemble du Canada, les enfants des générations 1981-83 qui sont nés dans le cadre d'une union libre apparaissent encore plus vulnérables à la rupture de leur unité familiale: pas loin de la moitié, 43%, ont vu leurs parents se séparer avant de fêter leurs 6 ans. Jointe aux autres, cette statistique mérite l'attention des chercheurs qui doivent s'attaquer à la tâche de comprendre la signification de la croissance des familles fondées sur l'union libre et les conséquences qui en découlent du point de vue de la socialisation des enfants qui y naissent.

4e question:

Les enfants dont les parents ont déjà vécu en union libre sont-ils soumis plus fréquemment à la séparation de leurs parents au Québec que dans le reste du Canada?

Figure 7:

La comparaison entre les enfants québécois et les autres à cet égard n'indique pas de différence significative. Le fait d'avoir des parents qui ont déjà signifié leur hésitation face au mariage en vivant en union libre influence de façon très semblable la stabilité du contexte familial des enfants, que ces enfants aient été conçus ou non dans le cadre d'un mariage. Au Québec comme dans le reste du Canada, près du quart (23%) des enfants des générations 1981-83 auront vu leurs parents se séparer si ceux-ci ont déjà vécu en union libre.

La différence ici, c'est que les enfants québécois se répartissent à peu près également dans les deux groupes. Dans le reste du Canada, seulement 1 de ces enfants sur 4 sont nés de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre.

Notre pessimisme quant à l'avenir de l'instabilité de la vie familiale, pour les enfants québécois plus particulièrement, repose sur l'évolution de ce jeu des proportions. On sait déjà que même s'ils naissent entourés de leurs deux parents aussi souvent qu'il y a trente ans, la fraction des enfants dont au moins un parent a déjà vécu en union libre ne cesse d'augmenter; pour les enfants québécois des générations 1987-89 qui sont nés dans une famille biparentale, cette fraction atteint 61%. Même si l'intensité des ruptures d'union, telle qu'elle est mesurée en fonction de l'attitude des parents à l'égard de l'union libre, n'augmentait plus, on pourrait voir, par le simple jeu du changement des proportions, croître de façon significative le pourcentage des enfants touchés par la désintégration de leur milieu familial d'origine.

5e question:


Quelle estimation pouvons-nous envisager quant à la fraction des enfants nés dans les années 1980 qui vivront la rupture d'union de leurs parents?

Figure 8:

L'histoire familiale des enfants des générations 1981-83 telle

JAMAIS UNION LIBRE **DEJA UNION LIBRE** QUI LES ONT VUS AU MOMENT DE LEUR NAISSANCE. POURCENTAGE CUMULE DES ENFANTS QUI SONT NES SE SEPARER AVANT L'AGE DE 6 ANS, SELON QUE LE ANNIVERSAIRE PARENT REPONDANT AVAIT DEJA OU N'AVAIT JAMAIS QUEBEC 1981-83 QUEBEC, CANADA SANS QUEBEC ENTOURES DE LEURS DEUX PARENTS ET GENERATIONS D'ENFANTS / リエロのコー % 257 20 10 0 15 S JAMAIS UNION LIBRE VECU EN UNION LIBRE S DEJA UNION LIBRE CANADA SANS QUEBEC ANNIVERSAIRE ઋ 257 10 Ŋ 0 20 15

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SOURCE: TABLEAU 5

que nous la connaissons maintenant jusqu'à l'âge de 6 ans, nous indique une remontée de cette fraction, remontée essentiellement liée à la plus grande diffusion de l'union libre comme mode de première union et cadre d'exercice de la fonction de parent.

Ce lien entre la propension à la rupture et le comportement à l'égard de l'union libre était déjà inscrit dans l'histoire familiale des enfants nés au début des années 1970. L'avenir pour les générations plus jeunes peut sans doute être envisagé à partir de l'expérience vécue par les plus âgées après leur 6e anniversaire.

La Figure 8 nous indique qu'à 16 ans, 2.5 fois plus d'enfants canadiens avaient vu leurs parents rompre quand ceux-ci avaient déjà vécu en union libre: 53% de ces enfants voyaient leur famille d'origine se désintégrer, contre seulement 20% des autres dont les parents n'avaient jamais vécu en dehors des liens du mariage. Le jeu des proportions d'enfants dans l'une et l'autre catégorie se traduisait ici en une fraction de 27% pour l'ensemble des enfants du Canada nés en 1971-73.

En appliquant aux enfants québécois ces propensions différentielles sans les augmenter, mais en tenant compte de la répartition déjà connue des jeunes générations selon le comportement de leurs parents à l'égard de l'union libre, on obtient une image plutôt inquiétante de leur situation à 16 ans: 40 % des enfants nés en 1987-89 pourraient alors avoir vu leurs parents rompre avant d'être sortis de l'adolescence. Cette estimation possède bien sûr la fragilité de toutes les estimations qui reposent sur des observations du passé. Mais elle ne nous semble guère pécher par irréalisme: les comportements actuels des couples ne pointent guère en faveur d'une diminution du phénomène.

2.3 Le sort des enfants d'unions rompues

La première étude avait levé le voile sur ce qu'il advenait des enfants après la séparation de leurs parents. Plus particulièrement, l'analyse avait souligné la durée relativement courte de la vie en famille monoparentale et la croissance de la fraction des enfants d'unions rompues qui connaissaient assez rapidement un nouveau contexte familial, dans une famille recomposée par l'arrivée d'un nouveau conjoint de la mère. Ce phénomène de désunion-recomposition de la cellule familiale semblait en voie de multiplication, avec une fraction grandissante des enfants des générations récentes qui verraient leur contexte familial modifié par l'arrivée et le départ des différents conjoints

de leur mère, lesquels se succédaient parfois à un rythme assez grand pour que certains enfants aient le temps de vivre plusieurs épisodes différents de vie familiale avant de fêter leurs 10 ans.

La présente étude vient confirmer l'existence de ces tendances et examine leur croissance au cours des années 1980. Mais de plus, les données nous permettent cette fois de qualifier davantage le sort des enfants d'unions rompues par l'étude du partage de la garde entre le père et la mère du point de vue du lieu de résidence des enfants. Si partielle soit cette information sur les effets de la rupture sur les enfants, tout au moins permet-elle d'en quantifier les aspects les plus visibles, ce qu'aucune statistique officielle ne réussit à faire présentement. Nous sommes donc en mesure de décrire où demeurent les enfants une fois consommée la rupture de leurs parents, et nous pouvons démêler les effets de l'âge des enfants et de la présence d'un autre conjoint ou conjointe sur la propension à rester avec sa mère ou son père. Notons ici que l'ESG90 ne nous donne pas d'indication sur le phénomène de la garde partagée, système qui permet à l'enfant de conserver à une fréquence régulière (souvent une semaine sur deux) la coexistence avec chacun de ses deux parents biologiques. La diffusion de ce système de prise en charge des enfants après une rupture n'est pas vraiment mesurable dans l'état actuel des informations dont nous disposons. Dans notre analyse, nous devons supposer que chacun des parents utilisant un tel système de prise en charge aura déclaré l'enfant comme habitant toujours avec lui. Cela aura pour conséquence de surestimer la proportion des enfants dont la prise en charge totale relève d'un seul parent. Par ailleurs, nous sousestimerons la fraction des enfants qui pourraient connaître la vie en famille recomposée, par le biais cette fois de la poursuite de la vie conjugale de leurs deux parents.

Enfin, dans cette mise à jour, nous avons pu tenir compte de la relation entre le comportement des parents à l'égard de l'union libre et la multiplication des expériences de vie familiale vécues par les enfants. A notre avis, il s'agit là d'un volet crucial des tendances des comportements conjugaux des années 1980, dont les répercussions en termes d'instabilité de l'environnement familial des enfants ne se sont pas encore pleinement manifestées.

2.3.1 La rupture d'union du point de vue de l'enfant: se séparer de maman ou de papa?

Au Canada, les mesures statistiques sur le sort des enfants d'unions rompues sont à toutes fins pratiques inexistantes, ou tout au mieux colligées de façon très partielle. C'est ainsi que l'on peut tirer des dossiers judiciaires quelques informations sur la répartition de la garde des enfants à charge (moins de 16 ans) au moment de la prononciation légale du divorce. Cependant ce genre de compilation ne nous renseigne pas sur la situation de fait qui est vécue par les enfants dès que leurs parents cessent de cohabiter, qu'ils aient été mariés ou non, et que la rupture aboutisse ou non en requête de divorce. Et par ailleurs, on ne peut lier ce genre d'informations à la suite des événements, c'est-à-dire la constitution de nouveaux noyaux de vie familiale due au remariage ou à la cohabitation de l'un ou l'autre des parents avec un nouveau conjoint.

Avec l'Enquête sur la famille de 1984, nous avions réussi à recréer l'expérience familiale d'une partie des enfants d'unions rompues après la séparation de leurs parents, soit ceux qui étaient demeurés avec leurs mères. Ceux-là, on le sait, constituent le gros des cohortes d'enfants qui voient leurs parents rompre: il n'en demeure pas moins qu'une partie de la réalité nous avait échappé, celle des enfants pris en charge par leur père. L'Enquête sociale générale 1990 nous a permis d'examiner cette réalité encore plus mal connue que la première, et de brosser ainsi un portrait de l'ensemble des "enfants du divorce", définis le plus largement possible comme ayant perdu la coexistence quotidienne avec l'un de leurs deux parents biologiques.


Figures 9A et 9B:


Les Figures 9A et 9B reprennent pour les générations 1971-73, le profil de la situation familiale des enfants d'unions rompues à chaque anniversaire de naissance jusqu'à 16 ans, tel qu'observé à travers les prismes des réponses offertes par leurs mères et par leurs pères.


Avec les données de 1984, ces enfants avaient pu être suivis jusqu'à l'âge de 10 ans, par le biais des réponses de leurs mères exclusivement. Les observations faites alors peuvent être retracées avec les données de 1990: au graphique "Fichier des mères", on note

FIGURE :

POURCENTAGE CUMULE DES ENFANTS DES GENERATIONS 1971-73 ET 1981-83 AYANT DEJA VECU EN FAMILLE MONOPARENTALE, SELON QU'A CHAQUE ANNIVERSAIRE DE NAISSANCE, ILS HABITENT AVEC UN PARENT SEUL, UN PARENT ET UN AUTRE CONJOINT, OU QU'ILS ONT QUITTE LE FOYER DU PARENT REPONDANT. CANADA. FICHIER DES FEMMES ET FICHIER DES HOMMES.







AVEC PARENT SEUL

ENFANT A QUITTÉ

AVEC PARENT SEUL AVEC PARENT ET AUTRE

SOURCE: TABLEAU 7

qu'à 10 ans, environ un enfant sur cinq avaient vu leurs parents rompre, qu'une faible fraction (2,4%) s'étaient vus confiés à la garde d'une autre personne, et que la moitié de ceux qui étaient demeurés avec leur mère l'avaient déjà vu se remettre en ménage. La poursuite de ces observations jusqu'à l'âge de 16 ans indique une remontée à 28% des enfants de ces générations qui ont vu leurs parents rompre: cependant les adolescents impliqués dans ces séparations plus tardives ne semblent pas tout à fait connaître le même sort que les premiers; entre autres, une plus grande proportion sont déclarés comme vivant ailleurs, présumément chez leur père à cet âge encore trop tendre pour avoir vraiment amorcé une vie indépendante.

Que nous en disent alors ces pères? La Figure 9B, graphique "Fichier des pères", est pour le moins éloquente quant à la différence des relations auxquelles sont soumis les enfants face à leur père séparé: dès l'âge de 8 ans, la situation la plus fréquente pour un enfant dont le père a rompu c'est de "vivre ailleurs", sans aucun doute avec sa mère comme le veut la tradition dans de telles circonstances. Avant cet âge, il faut ici se méfier des seules données provenant des réponses des hommes, lesquelles peuvent nous faire croire à une monoparentalité masculine florissante à l'égard des nourrissons: il s'agit ici d'une déformation de la réalité, intrinsèque au mode de collecte et qui disparaîtra plus loin, lorsque nous joindrons dans une exploitation unique les informations provenant des hommes et des femmes. Cela nous confirmera que la seule alternative significative à laisser partir les enfants au moment d'une séparation, demeure pour les hommes de reconstituer une cellule familiale avec une autre conjointe qui accepte d'y inclure les enfants en même temps que leur père.

Figure 9C:

La Figure 9C montre que l'effet de la précocité grandissante des ruptures vécues par les enfants nés au début des années 1980: c'est maintenant à 6 ans que l'on peut compter un enfant sur cinq appartenant à une famille rompue. Cette hausse n'entraîne pas à première vue une répartition très différente de ces enfants après la séparation, sinon une tendance plus marquée pour leurs pères de les déclarer comme ne vivant plus avec eux, et une propension plus grande des mères à demeurer en état de monoparentalité.


Figures 10A, 10B et 10C:


Ces graphiques illustrent plus clairement encore les différences d'expérience vécues par les enfants d'unions rompues à l'égard de leur mère et de leur père. Les courbes ne reposent ici que sur l'histoire des enfants d'unions déjà rompues à chaque anniversaire de naissance. A la naissance, ils sont donc par définition presque


FIGURE 10

POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS D'UNIONS ROMPUES DES GENERATIONS 1971-73 ET 1981-83, SELON QU'A CHAQUE ANNIVERSAIRE DE NAISSANCE, ILS HABITENT AVEC UN PARENT SEUL, UN PARENT ET UN AUTRE CONJOINT, OU QU'ILS ONT QUITTE LE FOYER DU PARENT REPONDANT.

CANADA. FICHIER DES FEMMES ET FICHIER DES HOMMES.







- AVEC PARENT ET AUTRE AVEC PARENT SEUL ---- ENFANT A QUITTÉ

SOURCE: TABLEAU 7

tous au foyer du parent monoparental, quelques-uns ayant été déclarés comme vivant ailleurs, par suite d'une mise en adoption ou du fait que le parent gardien n'habitait plus ou n'avait jamais habité avec le parent répondant: malgré une formulation des questions qui aurait pu théoriquement le permettre, l'enquête n'a sans doute pas saisi très bien le phénomène des maternités et des paternités qui ne se sont jamais concrétisées au-delà du stage de la grossesse. C'est l'évolution subséquente de la courbe qui nous est utile ici.

Examinons d'abord le cas des enfants d'unions rompues nés au début des années 1980 et que nous pouvons suivre jusqu'à 6 ans (Figure 10A). La première observation vient confirmer la montée en flèche de la proportion de ces enfants qui sont déclarés comme vivant ailleurs par leur père: à 5 et 6 ans, au moment où la fréquence des ruptures fait grimper à un enfant sur cinq la fraction de ceux qui ont vu leurs parents rompre, plus de la moitié ne vivent plus avec leur père; dans le fichier des mères, cette proportion n'atteint pas 10%. Par ailleurs, la probabilité pour un enfant de demeurer avec son père reposera sur la propension plus grande des hommes à reprendre rapidement la vie conjugale avec une autre femme: dès l'âge d'un an, quelque 30% des enfants d'unions rompues restés avec leur père vivent en famille recomposée, niveau qui sera atteint, voire dépassé par les enfants demeurés avec leurs mères, mais à un rythme plus lent. La monoparentalité masculine ne constitue pas une véritable alternative qui permette aux enfants de rester avec leur père: parmi les enfants demeurés avec leur père, la fraction vivant en famille monoparentale décroît et concerne moins d'un enfant sur cinq à 6 ans. A l'inverse, la monoparentalité demeure à 6 ans la situation la plus fréquente pour les enfants dont la mère a conservé la garde.

Par ailleurs, examinons ce qui s'est produit après l'âge de dix ans chez les enfants des générations 1971-73 (Figures 10B et 10C): dans quelle mesure les adolescents qui ont joint les rangs des enfants d'unions rompues ont-ils contribué à modifier les tendances observées en 1984? Dans l'ensemble, leur sort n'a pas considérablement modifié l'allure des courbes. On notera cependant que la monoparentalité masculine semble devenir le lot d'une plus grande fraction des enfants qui vivent la rupture de leurs parents à l'adolescence: si à 10 ans, à peine 13% des enfants restés avec leur père vivaient en famille monoparentale, c'est à 16 ans le cas pour 20% d'entre eux. La monoparentalité pour les enfants demeurés avec leur mère demeure beaucoup plus importante, mais concerne une fraction plus stable des enfants (de 44% à 10 ans à 47% à 16 ans). Cela joint au fait que la fraction des enfants déclarés par leur mère comme vivant ailleurs passe de 12% à 19% au cours de la même période donne à penser que la prise en charge des enfants par leur père se ferait plus aisément lorsque la séparation se produit à l'adolescence.

Cependant, ces différentes observations ont été faites à partir des outils d'analyse plus limités dont nous disposions lors de la

première étude. Voyons maintenant comment par la jonction des informations en provenance des mères et des mères, on peut mieux mesurer l'impact de ces diverses tendances sur la situation d'ensemble des enfants d'unions rompues.

2.3.2 Se séparer de papa: toujours aussi fréquent, sinon de plus en plus

L'ESG90 nous permet de tracer un portrait beaucoup plus fidèle du sort des enfants d'unions rompues en ce qu'elle nous autorise à suivre conjointement les enfants demeurés avec leur mère et ceux demeurés avec leur père, ce qui nous conduit à mieux estimer le poids relatif des destins des uns et des autres dans l'ensemble. Cela n'exclut pas toutefois la nécessité de faire quelques estimations et de poser quelques hypothèses, puisque le sort des enfants ayant quitté l'un ou l'autre parent qui le déclare ne nous est pas donné par les questions de l'enquête.

Tout d'abord, nous n'avons considéré que les départs d'enfants dont les parents s'étaient effectivement séparés: à défaut d'information directe sur le motif justifiant le départ, cela permettait d'éliminer dans une large mesure les départs pouvant être reliés à d'autres événements ou caractéristiques, comme la santé des enfants et la mise en foyer d'accueil. Par ailleurs, le fait d'observer les plus vieilles générations jusqu'à 16 ans seulement nous a permis d'éviter l'écueil des départs du foyer d'origine pour mener une vie indépendante: les données de la première étude, plus complètes à cet égard, indiquaient une fraction minime (0.3%) des générations nées au début des années 1960 l'ayant déjà fait à 16 ans.

Ceci étant, nous avons fait l'hypothèse que les enfants ayant quitté l'un de leurs parents suite à une séparation vivaient ensuite avec l'autre, et connaissaient en moyenne la même histoire familiale que les enfants d'unions rompues déclarés par les répondants de l'autre sexe. Cela nous a permis de combler les "trous" causés par la nature des données, sans que nous y ayions vu de biais flagrant. Nous sommes conscients d'avoir ainsi estimé le destin d'une fraction non négligeable des enfants d'unions rompues, soit 28% à 6 ans pour les générations 1981-83 et 33% à 16 ans pour les générations 1971-73. Ces

estimations concernent dans une très large mesure (7 et 8 fois sur 10) des enfants dont le père était répondant à l'enquête. Nous ne pensons guère nous tromper en assumant que ces enfants sont restés avec leur mère et ont connu le même sort que les autres. Voyons maintenant les résultats ainsi obtenus pour l'ensemble des enfants d'unions rompues.

Figure 11, Tableau 9:


- Une première constatation concernant l'ensemble des enfants d'unions rompues des générations 1971-73 au Canada: leur sort une fois la séparation consommée ne varie guère avec leur âge; la croissance de la fraction d'entre eux qui demeurent avec leur mère augmente proportionnellement à la croissance de leurs effectifs, et à 16 ans comme à 6 ans, la proportion des enfants vivant avec leur mère est presque deux fois celle des enfants vivant avec leur père.
- Alors que les mères monoparentales constituent le cadre familial du plus grand nombre des enfants d'unions rompues (le tiers et un peu plus, selon l'âge), la vie en famille monoparentale avec le père n'est le lot que d'une petite minorité, même à 16 ans lorsque la fraction "grimpe" à 3.7% de l'ensemble des enfants ou 13.6% de ceux dont les parents ont rompu. Du côté de la vie avec papa après la rupture, elle se poursuit deux à trois fois plus souvent en compagnie d'une nouvelle conjointe, ce qui contraste fortement d'avec la vie avec maman où les deux situations sont davantage en équilibre.
- Le déséquilibre entre la fraction des enfants qui restent avec leur père et ceux qui restent avec leur mère s'accroît chez les plus jeunes (G1981-83): ce sont trois enfants d'unions rompues sur quatre qui, à 6 ans, sont séparés de leur père, et parmi ceux-là six sur dix vivent en famille monoparentale avec leur mère. Ceux-la sont encore bien jeunes au moment de l'enquête, et l'on peut soupçonner que leur situation familiale n'a pas fini de connaître des soubresauts.

Figures 12A et 12B, Tableau 9:

Ces phénomènes ne se produisent pas partout de la même façon au Canada. Entre autres, les Figures 12A et 12B nous indiquent qu'au Québec, la monoparentalité masculine a été particulièrement absente du paysage pour les enfants d'unions rompues, tout au moins avant qu'ils arrivent à l'adolescence. Et encore là, les générations d'enfants québécois qui ont eu 16 ans à la fin des années 1980 sont trois fois plus susceptibles de vivre avec une mère monoparentale (15%) qu'avec un père sans conjointe (5%). Cette absence plus marquée de la monoparentalité masculine relève sans doute d'une tradition matriarcale plus poussée de la vie familiale québécoise. Dans le reste du Canada, la visibilité du père monoparental n'est

VECU EN FAMILLE MONOPARENTALE, SELON QU'ILS HABITENT AVEC HABITENT AVEC LEUR PERE, SEUL OU AVEC UNE AUTRE CONJOINTE POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS QUI, A DIFFERENTS AGES, ONT DEJA LEUR MERE, SEULE OU AVEC UN AUTRE CONJOINT, OU QU'ILS FIGURE 11

GENERATIONS 1971-73 ET 1981-83. CANADA.





AVEC PARENT ET AUTRE AVEC MERE/PERE SEUL

SOURCE: TABLEAU 8

FIGURE 12

POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS QUI, A DIFFERENTS AGES, ONT DEJA VECU EN FAMILLE MONOPARENTALE, SELON QU'ILS HABITENT AVEC LEUR MERE, SEULE OU AVEC UN AUTRE CONJOINT, OU QU'ILS HABITENT AVEC LEUR PERE, SEUL OU AVEC UNE AUTRE CONJOINTE. GENERATIONS 1971-73 ET 1981-83. QUEBEC, CANADA SANS QUEBEC.





AVEC MERE/PERE SEUL AVEC PARENT ET AUTRE

SOURCE: TABLEAU 8

guère plus grande, mais elle s'est maintenue avec une certaine stabilité au cours de la période d'observation.

Donc, malgré la croissance des ruptures d'unions, la visibilité des enfants restés avec leur père, que ce soit en famille monoparentale ou recomposée, n'augmente pas: ce sont les mères qui assument la prise en charge accrue des enfants après la séparation. C'est particulièrement vrai au Québec où, pour 100 enfants ayant fêté leurs six ans à la fin des années 1970, on en comptait 9 dans des familles brisées, dont 6 étaient demeurés avec leur mère et 3 avec leur père; à la fin des années 1980, pour 100 enfants du même âge, 20 avaient vu leurs parents rompre, 17 vivaient avec leur mère et on n'en comptait toujours que 3 avec leur père.

2.3.3 La multiplication des expériences de vie familiale

Jusqu'ici, l'analyse confirme donc une augmentation de la proportion des enfants qui connaissent la vie en famille monoparentale; également, on a pu observer que cette expérience était vécue de plus en plus tôt dans la vie des enfants nés dans les années 1980; la fragilité grandissante des familles semble reliée assez fortement au comportement des parents à l'égard de l'union libre; enfin, une fois le rupture d'union consommée les enfants conservent toujours la même propension à demeurer très majoritairement avec leur mère, la visibilité des pères de famille monoparentale demeurant tout à fait marginale.

Qu'arrive-t-il aux enfants une fois que la séparation s'est produite? Dans quelle mesure la vie en famille monoparentale revêt-elle une certaine stabilité, ou, au contraire, dans quelle mesure s'agit-il d'un cadre de vie transitoire, qui ne serait qu'un tremplin plus ou moins élastique propulsant les enfants dans de nouvelles expériences de vie familiale?

Concernant la multiplication des expériences familiales vécues par les enfants, nous allons vérifier la poursuite des tendances dont l'analyse avait été amorcée dans la première étude. Les données nous permettront de plus d'examiner comment le comportement des parents à l'égard de l'union libre semble déterminant dans la propension plus grande pour les enfants de vivre une succession de plusieurs contextes familiaux. Nous pourrons également analyser isolément le destin des enfants qui naissent dans une famille monoparentale, et

comparer le déroulement de leur vie familiale à celui des enfants qui naissent entourés de leurs deux parents. Les comparaisons porteront à la fois sur la nature de ces changements (épisodes de vie en famille monoparentale et en famille recomposée) ainsi que leur fréquence. On tentera également de vérifier si les enfants restés avec leur mère après la rupture connaissent une plus ou moins grande diversité d'expériences familiales que les enfants demeurés avec leur père.


Figure 13:

- La Figure 13 confirme que la multiplication des expériences familiales après la séparation des parents s'est poursuivie dans les années 1980. Après avoir connu une augmentation de 40% de la proportion des enfants ayant connu la séparation de leurs parents entre les âges de 6 et 10 ans, les générations 1971-73 voient encore cette fraction croître de 50% et atteindre 27,3% à 16 ans. De plus, pour la majorité de ces enfants d'unions rompues, la vie en famille monoparentale ne s'est avérée qu'une étape transitoire dans le déroulement de leur vie familiale: à 16 ans, pour 100 d'entre eux, seulement 39 vivaient toujours un premier épisode de monoparentalité; 61 avaient déjà vécu au moins une fois en famille recomposée; 22 avaient eu le temps de voir cette "famille biparentale" se décomposer à son tour et les propulser une seconde fois en état de monoparentalité; 11 avaient connu une deuxième recomposition biparentale; et 5 pouvaient même témoigner d'avoir vécu une troisième fois la monoparentalité. Ces histoires particulièrement mouvementées ne concernent encore que des fractions relativement faibles d'enfants, mais c'est la progression qui attire ici l'attention, progression qu'on ne peut manquer de lier au comportement des parents à l'égard de l'union libre, et qui se manifeste déjà à un âge beaucoup plus tendre pour les générations nées dans les années 1980.
- En effet, à 6 ans, les enfants des générations 1981-1983 affichaient non seulement une proportion d'enfants d'unions rompues 40% plus élevée que les enfants nés dix ans plus tôt au même âge, mais encore pouvait-on, malgré leur courte vie, déjà déceler des indices d'une plus grande propension à vivre de multiples épisodes de vie familiale au cours de leur enfance: ainsi dans ces générations, 10 enfants d'unions rompues sur 100 avaient eu le temps de vivre une deuxième fois en famille monoparentale avant même d'atteindre l'âge scolaire, contre seulement 3 sur 100 parmi leurs aînés des générations 1971-73 au même âge.

Figure 14:

- Il est difficile de ne pas lier cette progression dans la


MONOPARENTALE, SELON LE NOMBRE D'EPISODES DE MONOPARENTALITE POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS AYANT DEJA VECU EN FAMILLE LA MULTIPLICATION DES EXPERIENCES DE VIE FAMILIALE: ET LA FREQUENCE DES RECOMPOSITIONS FAMILIALES; FIGURE 13



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SELON LE NOMBRE D'EPISODES DE MONOPARENTALITE, LA FREQUENCE BIPARENTALES, QUI ONT DEJA VECU EN FAMILLE MONOPARENTALE, FAMILIALE: POURCENTAGE DES ENFANTS, NES DANS DES FAMILLES L'UNION LIBRE ET LA MULTIPLICATION DES EXPERIENCES DE VIE POUR DIVERSES GENERATIONS, A DIFFERENTS AGES. CANADA. DES RECOMPOSITIONS FAMILIALES, ET SELON QUE LE PARENT REPONDANT A DEJA VECU EN UNION LIBRE OU NON:

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multiplication des expériences familiales des enfants au comportement de leurs parents à l'égard de l'union libre: un coup d'oeil à la Figure 14 nous convainc facilement de l'interdépendance des deux phénomènes. On y trouve illustré le déroulement de la vie familiale des enfants nés au sein de familles biparentales (le cas des enfants nés de familles monoparentales sera examiné plus loin), selon que le parent répondant avait ou non déjà vécu en union libre au moment de la naissance de l'enfant.

Non seulement les enfants nés de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre les verront-ils beaucoup plus souvent se séparer que les autres (à 16 ans, 53,2% des premiers contre 19,5% des autres dans les générations 1971-73), mais encore ceux qui auront vécu l'expérience auront été soumis plus fréquemment à des contextes familiaux changeants.

Lorsque les générations 1971-76 atteignent 16 ans, plus d'un enfant d'union rompue sur deux vit toujours une première monoparentalité, quand le parent répondant n'a jamais vécu en union libre; à l'inverse, trois enfants d'unions rompues sur quatre auront vu se terminer ce premier épisode de monoparentalité, quand le parent répondant a déjà vécu en union libre.

Dans le cas de ces derniers, la distribution de l'ensemble des enfants selon les changements vécus depuis leur naissance est particulièrement parlante. Quarante pour cent ont vu leur contexte familial modifié deux fois ou plus avant de fêter leurs 16 ans: cela inclut 19,5% qui ont vécu d'abord avec un parent seul, puis avec un nouveau conjoint ou conjointe; un autre 17,7% qui ont vécu une seconde monoparentalité, laquelle s'est terminée 4 fois sur 10 par l'arrivée d'un deuxième conjoint autre qu'un parent biologique; et 2,7% qui ont même eu le temps de vivre une troisième monoparentalité et une troisième remise en ménage. Soulignons qu'il s'agit ici de proportions mesurées sur l'ensemble de la génération et non sur les seuls enfants d'unions rompues: c'est donc dire que pour ce groupe, la multiplication des contextes familiaux est devenu le lot de la majorité des enfants, alors qu'elle ne concerne qu'une fraction très marginale des enfants nés de parents qui n'ont jamais vécu en union libre.

Ces observations prennent toute leur signification lorsqu'on tient compte de l'évolution de la fraction des enfants qui naissent désormais de parents ayant déjà vécu en union libre. Il faut souligner que pour les générations 1971-73, seulement 8,7% des enfants nés dans des familles biparentales avaient un parent ayant déjà vécu en union libre, ce qui explique que sur l'ensemble, la distribution que nous venons de regarder n'ait pas eu d'énormes répercussions. Il en ira sûrement autrement pour les enfants nés dans les années 1980 qui ont vu cette proportion grimper à 33% pour les générations 1981-83 et 44% pour les générations 1987-89. Cela se fait déjà sentir pour les générations que nous pouvons observer

jusqu'à 6 ans: ceux de ces enfants dont les parents ont déjà vécu en union libre sont non seulement trois fois plus nombreux à avoir vécu la séparation de leurs parents, mais ils affichent une propension deux fois et demie plus grande à avoir déjà connu plusieurs contextes de vie familiale.

2.3.4 Le cas des enfants nés au sein d'une famille monoparentale

Nous avons choisi d'éliminer du calcul dans la section précédente les enfants nés dans une famille monoparentale, afin de mieux isoler l'effet du comportement des parents à l'égard de l'union libre sur la plus ou moins grande propension pour les enfants de vivre un ou des épisodes de monoparentalité par la suite. Or par définition, les enfants qui naissent dans une famille monoparentale ont à cet égard une longueur d'avance sur les autres, et on pourrait croire que leur vie familiale connait une évolution différente par la suite.

La différence fondamentale réside dans la très grande propension pour ces familles, qui sont monoparentales dès la naissance de l'enfant, de se recomposer rapidement. Nous avons calculé, pour les enfants des générations 1971-73, que la monoparentalité de naissance était déjà terminée dans 77% des cas à l'âge de 6 ans, dans 85% des cas à l'âge de 10 ans, et dans 91% des cas à l'âge de 16 ans; pour les générations 1981-83, la proportion à 6 ans s'avère équivalente (76%). Mesurée en terme de durée, cette propension devient encore plus évidente: dans les générations 1971-73 comme dans les générations 1981-83, 42% des enfants nés en famille monoparentale vivaient déjà dans une famille recomposée 1.5 ans après leur naissance.

Ceci dit, ces enfants une fois nés connaîtront-ils une vie familiale plus mouvementée que les autres enfants de leurs générations? Il est difficile d'établir une simple comparaison de la fréquence des épisodes de monoparentalité (tableau 12), puisque dans leur cas, ils ont tous par définition vécu en état de monoparentalité, et que le premier "changement" de contexte familial survient suite à une recomposition plutôt qu'à une rupture d'union. Cependant, on peut tout de même constater qu'en termes de nombre de changements, leur histoire familiale s'apparente davantage à celle des enfants dont les parents ont déjà

vécu en union libre, et que la multiplication des expériences familiales fera aussi partie du paysage de leur enfance. Ainsi, le tableau 12 nous indique que dans les générations 1971-73, 16,9% des enfants nés dans des familles monoparentales auront vécu deux fois des modifications de contexte familial, contre 19,5% pour les enfants dont un parent a déjà vécu en union libre: la nature de ces contextes varie toutefois puisque les premiers auront connu deux épisodes de monoparentalité et un en famille recomposée, tandis que les seconds auront d'abord vécu avec leurs deux parents, puis connu un épisode de monoparentalité, suivi enfin d'une recomposition familiale. Comment juger du degré d'instabilité d'un déroulement plutôt que de l'autre? Il faudrait disposer d'autres outils que ceux mis ici à notre disposition pour pouvoir l'évaluer adéquatement. On peut quand même souligner que la proportion des enfants dont le contexte familial aura été très instable, soit ceux qui auront connu au moins trois changements avant d'atteindre l'âge de 16 ans (G1971-73), se situe à 13% des enfants nés dans une famille monoparentale, contre 20% des enfants nés dans une famille biparentale quand le parent répondant a déjà vécu en union libre, et seulement 3% quand le parent répondant n'a jamais vécu en union libre.

2.3.5 La multiplication des expériences familiales due à maman ou à papa?

On peut se demander si les enfants demeurés avec leur père après la séparation connaîtront ou non une vie familiale plus instable que les enfants demeurés avec leur mère. Les données dont nous disposons ne nous permettent pas de répondre de façon satisfaisante à cette question, entre autres parce que nous en arrivons rapidement à n'observer que des nombres de cas insuffisants.

Pour les générations 1971-73, avec la centaine d'enfants d'unions rompues demeurés avec leur père et les quelque 160 demeurés avec leur mère, nous pouvons toutefois souligner à nouveau les effets de la propension plus grande des hommes à se remettre en ménage après une séparation. Les enfants n'ayant connu qu'un seul épisode de monoparentalité représente environ les trois quarts de ces enfants d'unions rompues, qu'ils soient demeurés avec leur mère ou avec leur père: 45% des premiers vivront toujours en famille monoparentale au moment de l'enquête contre seulement 29% des deuxièmes. Quoique statistiquement difficile

à vérifier, il semble que les deuxièmes et troisièmes épisodes de monoparentalité aient également tendance à se terminer plus rapidement lorsque les pères sont impliqués plutôt que les mères.

2.3.6 L'union libre et le caractère insaisissable de la famille recomposée

En terminant notre analyse, nous souhaitons attirer l'attention sur le phénomène des familles recomposées et la difficulté d'en saisir l'ampleur, tant par la nature des données habituellement disponibles que par le caractère de plus en plus fluide des nouvelles formes d'unions.

Il n'est pas rare de voir expliquer dans la littérature la croissance de la monoparentalité par une propension décroissante des hommes et des femmes à conclure une nouvelle union suite à une rupture. Une telle interprétation résulte de l'utilisation des données disponibles et traditionnellement utilisées sur les divorces et les remariages. Or, notre étude confirme ce que d'autres ont déjà souligné: le mariage n'est plus le seul cadre accessible aux couples qui désirent fonder une famille; au Québec, nous l'avons vu, il s'agit même maintenant d'un choix minoritaire. Par voie de conséquence, il est normal que non seulement ceux-là qui ne se sont jamais mariés légalement, mais également ceux dont le mariage, conclu à une époque où cela demeurait la norme, s'est rompu alors l'union libre devenait acceptable, il est normal que de moins en moins de secondes unions soient sanctionnées légalement. D'où la difficulté d'en mesurer l'ampleur par les voies traditionnelles. L'Enquête sociale générale 1990 appartient à ces nouvelles sources de données qui permettent, grâce à une collecte d'information sur l'ensemble des unions légales ou non, une meilleure saisie de la réalité des familles contemporaines et de leur mobilité.

Du point de vue des enfants, nous pouvons donc constater qu'avec le temps, l'issue des épisodes de monoparentalité a beaucoup évolué. Le tableau 13 indique qu'au début de la décennie 1970, la monoparentalité ne pouvait se terminer que par un mariage, ou tout au moins une union libre qui aboutissait à un mariage: c'était tout au moins le cas pour les enfants nés de familles monoparentales des générations 1971-73, dont le premier épisode terminé de monoparentalité alors

qu'ils avaient 6 ans s'est conclu par un mariage dans 69% des cas et une union libre suivie d'un mariage pour un autre 15%. Les enfants des mêmes générations nés de familles biparentales (9 fois sur 10 de parents mariés) ont également vu leurs parents se remarier après la rupture, mais après avoir marqué d'abord leur hésitation par une union libre avec leur éventuel conjoint légal: à 6 ans, 63% des premiers épisodes de monoparentalité terminés résultaient d'une union libre ayant précédé le remariage, alors que 30% ne s'en étaient déjà tenus qu'à l'union libre. Dans les années 1980, l'union libre devient tranquillement le choix de la majorité des parents concluant une seconde union: la recomposition familiale s'est effectuée par le biais de l'union libre dans 52,5% des cas pour les enfants nés dans des familles biparentales qui ont atteint l'âge de 16 ans (G1971-73), et dans 48,8% des cas pour ceux qui ont atteint l'âge de 6 ans (G1981-83); la tendance a même rejoint les enfants nés dans des familles monoparentales, lesquelles ont toujours eu tendance à se recomposer par mariage, et qui, pour les générations 1981-83, n'auront vécu le mariage direct que dans 38 % des cas.

Ce phénomène de l'union libre accentue la fluidité des nouvelles unions dont la trajectoire devient très difficile à suivre si ce n'est à coup d'enquêtes rétrospectives ou à passages répétés. La rapidité et l'intensité de leur évolution, que nous avons pu saisir ici par le biais des conséquences engendrées sur la vie familiale des enfants, méritent qu'on poursuive les efforts amorcés. Car tout n'a pas encore été compris. En particulier, jusqu'à maintenant, seules les unions dont les partenaires habitent ensemble ont été saisies par les enquêtes du type utilisé ici. Or, que savons-nous des unions de conjoints n'ayant pas de résidence commune? Il s'agit d'une tendance qui pourrait devenir particulièrement significative lorsque des enfants d'unions précédentes sont impliqués dans la recomposition de la vie de couple de leurs parents. L'absence de corésidence résulte-t-elle alors surtout de problèmes liés aux relations entre les enfants et les nouveaux conjoints de leurs parents? Ou s'agit-il d'une tendance plus générale à l'implantation de règles de plus en plus souples de la vie de couple, où l'autonomie individuelle l'emporterait sur le désir de créer une nouvelle unité familiale? Seule la poursuite des efforts d'analyse assortis de collectes d'information appropriées pourra nous aider à répondre à ce genre de questions.

CONCLUSION

Nos résultats confirment que l'union libre n'est plus un comportement marginal, ni seulement un rite d'initiation, sorte de mariage à l'essai qui permette aux jeunes couples de conclure éventuellement un mariage adéquat et viable à long terme. L'union libre est en voie de remplacer le mariage comme cadre privilégié non seulement pour amorcer la vie de couple, mais aussi pour fonder une famille en y donnant naissance aux enfants, et pour recomposer un second noyau familial lorsque le premier s'est désintégré. Au Canada, le Québec témoigne particulièrement de cette nouvelle tendance.

Du seul fait que l'union libre devienne le comportement de la majorité ne signifie pas automatiquement qu'il s'agisse d'une simple substitution au cadre institutionnel de l'engagement des couples, engagement qui au plan individuel ne différerait guère de celui exprimé par le mariage. Sans porter de jugement sur le mérite intrinsèque de l'une ou l'autre institution comme mode de gestion de la vie de couple ou de la vie familiale, on doit reconnaître qu'elles ne véhiculent pas nécessairement les mêmes valeurs, qu'elles ne répondent pas toujours aux mêmes priorités, et par conséquent qu'elles auront des effets différents sur le déroulement de la vie familiale qui en dépend.

Ainsi, la caractéristique qui distingue le plus l'union libre du mariage légal, demeure sa très grande souplesse dans la régie des rapports conjugaux. Or par opposition à la rigidité du mariage qui rendait difficile voire moralement impossible la dissolution de l'engagement des couples, l'union libre permet des ruptures sinon plus faciles, tout au moins plus fréquentes. Et les données confirment que les couples n'hésitent pas à se servir de cette souplesse qu'ils ont sans doute recherchée au départ, pour mettre rapidement fin à une union devenue insatisfaisante.

Quand ces remises en question de la vie de couple n'impliquent que deux adultes consentants, le processus peut s'avérer pénible, mais on peut constater que certains réussissent mieux que d'autres à passer au travers des turbulences

engendrées: de façon générale, les répercussions demeurent limitées à la sphère des relations interpersonnelles au sein du couple.

La présence d'enfants rend beaucoup moins évidente les vertus de la souplesse comme règle de base de la vie familiale. Cette souplesse, accueillie comme façon de sauver la vie de couple du cul-de-sac auquel le mariage acculait les individus soucieux de développer leur personnalité dans un monde moderne de plus en plus exigeant à cet égard, cette souplesse, du point de vue des enfants, revêtera plus facilement les attributs moins heureux de l'instabilité. La recherche du côté des sciences du développement accumule les preuves des effets les plus néfastes associés à l'instabilité de la vie familiale chez les enfants.

Cependant, tous les enfants ne souffrent pas de la même façon des tribulations conjugales de leurs parents; certains mêmes y fleurissent de façon inespérée, trouvant dans un nouveau contexte les outils de développement qui ne leur étaient plus accessibles dans leur famille d'origine en désintégration. C'est pourquoi nous estimons que la tâche nouvelle de la recherche sera de tenter d'identifier les facteurs qui permettent aux familles en transition de réussir là où d'autres échouent. La réponse ne viendra pas d'un retour en arrière, vers des formes d'unions dont la stabilité forcée ne garantissait ni le succès de l'épanouissement personnel des individus, ni la socialisation réussie des enfants qui en étaient issus. Il faut plutôt chercher à identifier les mécanismes qui font qu'aujourd'hui on puisse faire place à une souplesse certaine des liens conjugaux, mais sans compromettre le développement des enfants qui demeurent entièrement dépendants des adultes qui en prennent charge. Notre étude aura fourni l'arrière-plan de départ à cette démarche: nous pouvons mieux estimer désormais l'ampleur et les caractéristiques de la population des enfants canadiens concernés par les nouveaux styles de vie conjugale de leurs parents.

ANNEXE

par Jacques Henripin

Estimation de la probabilité qu'un enfant vivant avec un seul de ses deux parents soit déclaré deux fois dans l'Enquête sociale générale 1990

La question: un enfant vivant avec un seul de ses deux parents (survivants) at-il des chances d'être déclaré deux fois dans l'enquête?

- Supposons: 1) que dans le cas d'une séparation, les deux parents parleront de leur enfant;
 - que la "strate" qui sert de base à l'échantillonnage est grande et que la probabilité pour un ménage d'être choisi est faible; disons 0.01
 - N.B. Montréal est une strate. Il y a là près de 1 000 000 de ménages. On a dû en prélever 2000 pour constituer l'échantillon. Cela fait une probabilité de 0,002. La valeur retenue de 0,01 paraît donc très forte.

La probabilité pour que les ménages de deux parents séparés soient tous les deux sélectionnés (et donc que l'histoire du même enfant soit racontée deux fois), est égale à 0,01 * 0,01 = 1 sur 10 000. Elle est donc négligeable.

Voyons les choses autrement. Supposons qu'on trouve acceptable que cette dernière probabilité soit aussi forte que 0,05. Il faut alors que la probabilité élémentaire soit de 0,2236 (N.B. 0,2236 au carré = 0,05). Cela veut dire que, en sélectionnant au hasard 22 ménages sur 100, on a 5 chances sur 100 de tomber sur les deux parents séparés du même enfant. Il me semble que ce problème peut être ignoré.

TABLEAU 1

Comparaison des données obtenues par l'Enquête sur la famille 1984 (EF84) et l'Enquête sociale générale 1990 (ESG90).

Pourcentage cumulé des enfants des générations 1971-1973 qui sont nés d'un parent vivant seul ou qui ont connu la séparation de leurs parents, à chaque anniversaire jusqu'au 10e.

Fichier des femmes EF84, fichier des femmes ESG90, fichier des hommes et des femmes ESG90.

Anniversaire	EF84 femmes (N=954)	ESG90 femmes (N=702)	ESG90 sexes réunis (N=1385)
Naissance	6.9	6.2	6.4
1 an	8.2	7.6	7.2
2 ans	10.1	9.0	8.5
3 ans	11.7	10.3	10.2
4 ans	13.8	10.8	11.2
5 ans	15.1	12.6	12.2
6 ans	16.2	13.4	13.0
7 ans	18.6	15.1	14.4
8 ans	21.6	16.5*	15.2
9 ans	23.1	17.8*	16.8
10 ans	23.5	19.2*	18.3

^{*} La différence entre le pourcentage obtenu par le fichier des femmes EF84 est statistiquement significative (niveau: $p \le 0.05$) du pourcentage obtenu par le fichier des femmes ESG90.

Eléments du contexte familial de fait des enfants canadiens à leur naissance, pour différentes générations. Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec. Enquête sociale générale 1990, Statistique Canada.

		CANADA	DA			QUEBEC			CANADA SANS QUEBEC	
Contexte familial	G1961-63* (N=1181)	G1971-73 (N=1385)	G1981-83 (N=1330)	G1987-89 (N=1384)	G1971-73 (N=350)	G1981-83 (N=345)	G1987-89 (N=315)	G1971-73 (N=1034)	G1981-83 (N=984)	G1987-89 (N=1070)
% des enfants dont le parent répondant a déjà vécu en union libre au moment de leur naissance: oui	2.5 97.5 100.0	8.7 91.3 100.0	32.2 67.8 100.0	42.9 57.1 100.0	8.6 91.4 100.0	47.0 53.0 100.0	58.1 41.9 100.0	8.7 91.3 100.0	27.0 73.0 100.0	38.4 61.6 100.0
Liens entre le père et la mère de l'enfant: -le père (ou la mère) est le premier conjoint du parent répondant	95.0	89.3	84.0	77.2	90.1	88.7	73.9	89.1	82.3	78.1
deuxième (ou plus) conjoint du parent répondant	1.1	4.3	10.2	17.0	4.0	7.8	20.7	4.4	11.0	15.9
seul, n'a jamais vécu en couplet	2.9	4.7	4.1	3.5	4.8	2.3	3.5	4.6	4.7	3.6
seul, a déjà vécu en couple TOTAL	1.0	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.1	100.0	1.9	1.9	100.0	100.0
Naissances des enfants selon la situation matrimoniale du parent répondant:										
-au cours du premier mariage .sans union libre avant .précédé d'une union libre	92.8	84.9	61.6	50.9	83.8 4.0 87.8	50.0 29.1 70.1	35.2	3.2	65.6 15.2 80.8	55.5 24.3 70.8
-au cours d'un remariage	1.0	2.6	5.0	5.1	2.9	3.5	4.1	2.5	5.6	5.3
(première ou subséquente)	1.6	2.7	8.7	13.9	3.4	13.9	30.8	2.4	6.9	8.9
vécu en couple -parent seul, a déjà vécu en	5.9	4.7	4.1	3.5	4.8	2.3	3.5	9-4	4.7	3.6
couple une ou plusieurs fois TOTAL	1.001	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.1	1.2	1.9	1.9	100.0	100.0

^{*} Les données pour ces générations proviennent de l'échantillon des femmes de l'Enquête sur la famille 1984 de Statistique Canada.

TABLEAU 3

Pourcentage des enfants dont le parent répondant en était à sa première union ou non, selon qu'ils sont nés dans le cadre d'un mariage légal précédé d'une union libre ou dans le cadre d'une union libre. Générations 1981-83 et générations 1987-89.

Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec.

Contexte de la naissance	Canada	Québec	Canada sans Québec
Générations 1981-83			
-ler mariage précédé d'une			
union libre			
ler conjoint	86.0	91.9	82.0
2e conjoint ou plus	14.0	8.1	18.0
Total	100	100	100
Nombre de cas	250	99	150
-Union libre			
1er conjoint	71.6	85.4	61.8*
2e conjoint ou plus	28.4	14.6	38.2
Total	100	100	100
Nombre de cas	116	48	68
Générations 1987-89			
-ler mariage précédé d'une			
union libre			
ler conjoint	75.1	76.6	74.6
2e conjoint ou plus	24.9	23.4	25.4
Total	100	100	100
Nombre de cas	337	77	260
-Union libre			
ler conjoint	58.1	64.9	51.0*
2e conjoint ou plus	41.9	35.1	49.0
Total	100	100	100
Nombre de cas	191	97	96

^{*} La différence entre le pourcentage obtenu pour le Québec est statistiquement significative (niveau: p≤0.05) du pourcentage obtenu pour le reste du Canada.

TABLEAU 4

Pourcentage cumulé des enfants qui sont nés d'un parent vivant seul cu qui ont connu la séparation de leurs parents, à chaque anniversaire de naissance et pour diverses générations. Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec.

Enquête sociale générale 1990.

		CANADA		QUE	EBEC	CANA SANS (ADA QUEBEC
Anniversaire de l'enfant	G1961- 1963* N=1181	G1971- 1973 N=1385	G1981- 1983 N=1329	G1971- 1973 N=351	G1981- 1983 N=346	G1971- 1973 N=1036	G1981- 1983 N=985
Naissance**	3.9	6.4	5.9	6.3	3.5	6.5	6.6
1 an	4.5	7.2	7.4	7.4	6.1	7.2	7.9
2 ans	4.9	8.5	9.3	8.3	9.9	8.7	9.2
3 ans	5.6	10.2	11.4	8.3	11.9	10.8	11.2
4 ans	6.4	11.2	13.7	8.3	15.1	12.2	13.1
5 ans	6.6	12.2	16.0	8.3	18.0	13.5	15.5
6 ans	7.8	13.0	18.1	8.6	20.1	14.5	17.4
7 ans	9.4	14.4		9.7		15.9	
8 ans	10.8	15.2		9.7		17.0	
9 ans	12.1	16.8		12.0		18.3	
10 ans	13.4	18.3		15.1		19.3	
11 ans	13.9	19.4		17.4		20.0	
12 ans	14.6	20.5		18.6		21.1	
13 ans	15.6	21.2		19.7		21.8	
14 ans	17.5	23.1		23.7		23.0	
15 ans	18.4	24.6		24.9		24.5	
16 ans	19.8	27.3		28.9		26.9	
17 ans	21.8						
18 ans	22.9						
19 ans	23.6						
20 ans	24.2						

^{*} Les données pour ces générations d'enfants proviennent du fichier des femmes de l'Enquête sur la famille 1984 de Statistique Canada.

^{**} Le parent répondant vivait seul à la naissance de l'enfant.

TABLEAU 5

Pourcentage cumulé des enfants des générations 1971-1973 qui sont nés entourés de leurs deux parents et qui les ont vus se séparer avant l'âge de 16 ans, selon que le parent répondant avait déjà ou n'avait jamais vécu en union libre avant. Canada.

Enquête sociale générale 1990.

Anniversaire de l'enfant	Jamais vécu en union libre (N=1184)	Déjà vécu en union libre (N=111)
Naissance	0.0	0.0
1 an	0.7	1.8
2 ans	2.0	5.4
3 ans	3.4	10.8
4 ans	4.5	12.6
5 ans	5.3	15.3
6 ans	6.0	18.0
7 ans	7.1	22.3
8 ans	7.7	26.4
9 ans	8.6	36.0
10 ans	10.1	38.4
11 ans	11.2	40.5
12 ans	12.4	41.4
13 ans	13.3	44.1
14 ans	15.3	45.1
15 ans	16.7	46.9
16 ans	19.5	53.2

TABLEAU 6

Pourcentage cumulé des enfants des générations 1981-1983 qui sont més entourés de leurs deux parents et qui les ont vus se séparer avant l'âge de 6 ans, selon que le parent répondant avait déjà ou n'avait jamais vécu en union libre avant.

Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec. Enquête sociale générale 1990.

	CA	NADA	QUI	EBEC	CANA SANS (ADA QUEBEC
Anniversaire de l'enfant	Jamais vécu en union libre (N=840)	Déjà vécu en union libre (N=412)	Jamais vécu en union libre (N=172)	Déjà · vécu en union libre (N=160)	Jamais vécu en union libre (N=668)	Déjà vécu en union libre (N=253)
Naissance	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1 an	0.8	3.4	1.7	3.1	0.6	3.6
2 ans	1.7	7.8	4.1	8.1	1.1	7.5
3 ans	3.1	11.7	5.2	11.9	2.6	11.9
4 ans	4.1	17.0	5.8	18.1 3.6		16.2
5 ans	6.2	20.2	8.7	20.6	5.6	19.8
6 ans	8.0	23.1	11.1	22.5	7.1	22.9

TABLEAU 7

Pourcentage des enfants canadiens de diverses générations, selon qu'à chaque anniversaire de naissance, ils vivent avec leurs deux parents, avec un parent seul, avec un parent et un autre conjoint, ou qu'ils ont quitté le foyer du parent répondant. Fichier des femmes et fichier des hommes, Enquête sociale générale 1990.

							Annive	Anniversaire	de nai	naissance							
Contexte familial de l'enfant	0		2	е	4	2	9	7	8	6	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Cénérations 1971-73											***						
Fichier des fermes																	:
-Avec mère seule -Avec deux parents -Avec mère+autre conjoint -Enfant vit ailleurs	6.0 93.7 0.0 0.3	5.6 92.3 1.9 0.3	5.6 90.9 3.0 0.4	5.8 89.5 4.0 0.7	5.0 88.8 5.3 0.9	6.6 87.0 5.3 1.1	6.8 86.0 5.6 1.6	7.7 84.5 6.1	7.6 83.0 7.4 2.0	7.4 81.8 3.4 2.4	80.3 80.3 8.7 2.4	7.8 79.6 9.8 2.7	8.5 78.9 9.7 2.9	9.8 77.8 9.1 3.3	75.8 9.1 3.6	12.3 74.5 8.7 4.5	13.3 71.8 9.4 5.4
TOTAL (N=702)	100	100	100	100	100	1.00	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	001	100	100
Fichier des hommes																	,
-Avec père seul -Avec deux parents -Avec père autre conjoint -Enfant vit ailleurs	6.3 93.3 0.0	4.8 92.0 1.8 1.5	4.4 90.9 2.6 2.1	89.6 3.5	3.5 38.0 5.4 3.1	1.9 87.7 6.3 4.1	2.3 86.1 6.3 5.3	2.5 85.3 6.2 6.0	2.2 85.2 6.6 6.1	2.3 34.2 6.7 6.7	2.3 82.0 8.0 7.6	2.9 80.7 7.9 8.5	3.7 79.2 7.2 9.9	3.5 78.5 7.5 10.5	3.9 76.9 8.5 10.7	75.3 8.9	5.6 72.4 9.1 13.0
TOTAL (N=683)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	001	100	100
Générations 1981-83																	
Fichier des fermes			1														
-Avec mère scule -Avec deux parents -Avec mère+autre conjoint -Enfant vit ailleurs	6.7 93.1 0.0 0.3	6.8 91.1 1.5 0.6	7.6 89.2 2.6 0.6	9.3 86.5 3.5 0.7	10.1 84.0 4.9 1.0	9.3 82.1 7.1 1.5	10.7 80.7 6.9 1.7										
TOTAL (N=720)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100										
Fichier des hommes	a-mak : 82-74																
-Avec père seul -Avec deux parents -Avec règerautre conjoint -Enfant vit ailleurs	95.4 0.0	3.1 93.8 1.8	3.0 91.8 2.6 2.6	3.3 90.6 2.5 3.6	33.4	35. 35. 3. 3. 3. 3.	3.1 4.4 5.4 5.4					dendade van kunst. Seef 1996		geologiga en enge en	in the second second contraction of the second		
TYTAL (N 609)	001	001	100	100	001	100	100		i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i					. 1			

Répartition des enfants de diverses générations, selon le contexte familial où ils vivent à 6 ans, 10 ans et 16 ans, en estimant* la distribution des enfants d'unions rompues ayant quitté le foyer du parent répondant. Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec. Enquête sociale générale 1990.

Contexte familial de l'enfant	Canada	Québec	Canada sans Québec	
G1971-73 à 6 ans				
.Mère seule .Mère+autre conjoint .Père seul .Père+autre conjoint -Sous-total -Avec deux parents	4.6 3.7 1.3 3.5 13.0 87.0	3.0 2.8 0.0 2.8 8.6 91.4	5.1 4.0 1.7 3.6 14.5 85.5	
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0 1385	100.0 351	100.0	
G1971-73 à 10 ans				
.Mère seule .Mère+autre conjoint .Père seul .Père+autre conjoint -Sous-total -Avec deux parents	6.0 6.1 1.4 4.7 18.3 81.7	6.5 4.1 0.3 4.3 15.1 84.9	5.8 6.8 1.8 4.9 19.3 80.7	
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0 1385	100.0	100.0 1036	
G1971-73 à 16 ans				
.Mère seule .Mère+autre conjoint .Père seul .Père+autre conjoint -Sous-total -Avec deux parents -Total -Nombre de cas	10.3 7.2 3.7 6.1 27.3 72.7	15.0 3.8 5.0 5.0 28.9 71.1 100.0 351	8.7 8.5 3.2 6.4 26.9 73.1 100.0 1036	
G1981-83 à 6 ans				
.Mère seule .Mère+autre conjoint .Père seul .Père+autre conjoint -Sous-total -Avec deux parents -Total	8.2 5.6 1.8 2.6 18.1 81.9	8.6 8.3 0.3 3.0 20.1 79.9	8.0 4.6 2.3 2.5 17.4 82.6	
-Nombre de cas	1329	346	985	

^{*} Nous avons fait l'hypothèse que les enfants ayant quitté le foyer du parent répondant suite à une rupture d'union connaissaient la même expérience familiale que les enfants d'unions rompues de mourés avec le parent de l'autre sexe.

Répartition des enfants d'unions rompues de diverses générations, selon le contexte familial où ils vivent à 6 ans, 10 ans et 16 ans, en estimant* la distribution de ceux qui ont quitté le foyer du parent répondant. Canada, Québec, Canada sans Québec.

Enquête sociale générale 1990.

Contexte familial de l'enfant	Canada	Québec	Canada sans Québec
G1971-73 à 6 ans			
-Mère seule -Mère+autre conjoint -Père seul -Père+autre conjoint	35.1 28.2 9.9 26.7	34.9 32.6 0.0 32.6	35.4 27.8 11.8 25.0
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0	100.0	100.0 150
G1971-73 à 10 ans			
-Mère seule -Mère+autre conjoint -Père seul -Père+autre conjoint	33.0 33.5 7.7 25.8	42.8 27.0 2.0 28.3	30.1 35.2 9.3 25.4
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0 253	100.0	100.0
G1971-73 à 16 ans			
-Mère seule -Mère+autre conjoint -Père seul -Père+autre conjoint	37.7 26.4 13.6 22.3	52.1 13.2 17.4 17.4	32.5 31.7 11.9 23.9
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0	100.0	100.0 279
G1981-83 à 6 ans			
-Mère seule -Mère+autre conjoint -Père seul -Père+autre conjoint	45.1 30.8 9.9 14.3	42.6 41.1 1.5 14.9	46.0 26.4 13.2 14.4
-Total -Nombre de cas	100.0	100.0	100.0

^{*} Nous avons fait l'hypothèse que les enfants ayant quitté le foyer du parent répondant suite à une rupture d'union connaissaient la même expérience familiale que les enfants d'unions rompues demeurés avec le parent de l'autre sexe.

TABLEAU 10

La multiplication des expériences de vie familiale: le nombre d'épisodes vécus en famille monoparentale, à différents âges et pour différentes générations d'enfants. Ensemble du Canada. Enquête sociale générale 1990.

	Gén	érations 19	71-73	Générations 1981-83
Nombre d'épisodes de monoparentalité	De 0 à 6 ans	De 0 à 10 ans	De 0 à 16 ans	De 0 à 6 ans
Aucun	87.0	81.7	72.7	81.9
Un	12.5	16.3	21.2	16.3
-En cours	5.5	6.3	10.7	8.4
-Terminé	7.0	10.0	10.5	7.8
Deux -2e en cours -2e terminé	0.5	2.0	4.6	1.8
	0.3	1.0	3.0	1.5
	0.1	0.9	1.7	0.3
Trois -3e en cours -3e terminé	-	-	1.5	-
	-	-	0.3	-
	-	-	1.2	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nombre de cas	1385	1385		1329

Note: nous avons fait l'hypothèse que les enfants ayant quitté le foyer du parent répondant suite à une rupture d'union connaissaient la même expérience familiale que les enfants d'unions rompues demeurés avec le parent de l'autre sexe.

La multiplication des expériences de vie familiale: le nombre d'épisodes vécus en famille monoparentale*, à différents âges et pour différentes générations d'enfants, selon que le parent répondant avait déjà ou n'avait jamais vécu en union libre lors de la naissance de l'enfant. Ensemble du Canada.

Enquête sociale générale 1990.

	Géné	rations 197	1-73	Générations 1981-83	
Nombre d'épisodes de monoparentalité	De 0 à 6 ans	De 0 à 10 ans	De 0 à 16 ans	De 0 à 6 ans	
Le parent a déjà vécu en union libre					
Aucun	82.0	61.6	46.8	76.9	
Un -En cours -Terminé	18.0 11.3 6.8	36.8 16.0 20.8	32.8 13.3 19.5	20.1 14.1 6.0	
Deux -2e en cours -2e terminé	- - -	1.6 1.6	17.7 10.6 7.1	2.9 2.2 0.7	
Trois -3e en cours -3e terminé	- - -		2.7 - 2.7	- - -	
TOTAL Nombre de cas	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Le parent n'a jamais vécu en union libre					
Aucun	94.0	89.9	80.5	92.0	
Un -En cours -Terminé	5.8 3.6 2.1	9.3 5.0 4.3	16.4 10.4 6.0	7.9 4.5 3.3	
Deux -2e en cours -2e terminé	0.2	0.8 0.4 0.4	2.1 1.3 0.8	0.1	
Trois -3e en cours -3e terminé	- - -	- - -	1.0	- - -	
TOTAL Nombre de cas	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

^{*} Les enfants qui sont nés dans une famille monoparentale sont exclus de ce tableau.

TABLEAU 12

La multiplication des expériences de vie familiale: le nombre d'épisodes vécus en famille monoparentale, à différents âges et pour différentes générations, par les enfants qui sont nés dans une famille monoparentale. Ensemble du Canada.

Enquête sociale générale 1990.

	Gén	érations 19	71-73	Générations 1981-83
Nombre d'épisodes de monoparentalité	De 0 à 6 ans	De 0 à 10 ans	De 0 à 16 ans	De 0 à 6 ans
Un	94.8	86.7	69.2	85.1
-En cours	23.4	14.7	9.2	23.9
-Terminé	71.4	72.0	60.0	61.2
Deux -2e en cours -2e terminé	5.2 5.2	13.3 6.7 6.7	24.6 16.9 7.7	14.9 13.4 1.5
Trois	-	-	6.2	-
-3e en cours	-	-	3.1	-
-3e terminé	-	-	3.1	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nombre de cas		75	65	67

Note: les enfants ayant quitté le foyer du parent répondant sont exclus du tableau.

TABLEAU 13

Distribution des enfants dont le premier épisode de monoparentalité est terminé, selon la nature de l'union qui a conduit à une recomposition familiale, et selon que l'enfant est né dans une famille monoparentale ou dans une famille biparentale, à différents âges et pour différentes générations.

Ensemble du Canada. Enquête sociale générale 1990.

Générations 1981-83 à 6 ans	Famille Famille monoparentale biparentale	38,0 11,6	30,0 39,5	32,0 48,8	100,0 100,0	50 43	
71-73 à 16 ans	Famille biparentale	6,6	37,6	52,5	100,0	101	
Générations 1971-73 à 16 ans	Famille monoparentale	66,2	. 12,7	21,1	100,0	71	
171-73 à 6 ans	Famille biparentale	7,4	63,0	29,6	100,0	27	
Générations 1971	Famille monoparentale	68,9	14,8	16,4	100,0	61	
Nature de l'union		Mariage	Union libre suivie d'un mariage	Union libre	Total	Nombre de cas	

17/1 HW33/1 -7771 Veb

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vers des perspectives de familles/ménages

D'UN MODÈLE DE TYPE MULTIDIMENSIONNEL

par

Jacques Ledent

Rapport d'étude remis à Santé et Bien-être National

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RPILOGUE

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La modification rapide des rapports sociaux en cours depuis un quart de siècle a fortement influencé les modes de vie au point d'entraîner de profondes transformations familiales et par suite d'importants changements d'ordre socio-économique (par exemple, au niveau de la structure de la consommation en biens et services). À l'avenir, ces tendances sont appelées à se poursuivre, sinon à s'accélérer. Aussi, afin de mieux anticiper le sens et l'importance des changements futurs, les planificateurs tant économiques que sociaux ont besoin de perspectives démographiques axées sur les familles et les ménages.

Malheureusement, les perspectives de familles/ménages habituellement disponibles se réduisent à de simples projections extrapolant les tendances du passé et donc ne permettent pas d'apprécier la sensibilité des résultats à tout changement d'hypothèses relatives aux déterminants du processus d'évolution des familles/ménages. A vrai dire, la nature mécanique de la méthode couramment utilisée pour produire de telles projections (la méthode des taux de chefs) empêche non seulement la réalisation d'analyses de sensibilité mais rend également suspect la qualité et la fiabilité de ces projections.

Devant un tel état de faits, tout un chacun s'accorde sur la nécessité de développer une méthodologie capable de soustendre de véritables perspectives de familles/ménages bâties autour de diverses hypothèses plausibles au niveau des déterminants structurals responsables de leur évolution. Au cours de la dernière décennie, plusieurs essais de modélisation ont été entrepris à la poursuite d'un tel objectif. S'inscrivant dans la lignée des développements

méthodologiques les plus récents concernant le traitement d'évènements démographiques à états multiples, ils peuvent être qualifiés soit de microdémographiques (pour ceux ayant fait appel à des modèles de micro-simulation), soit de - macrodémographiques (pour ceux ayant eu recours aux méthodes démographie mathématique la modèles de multidimensionnelle). Mais à ce jour, qu'ils soient de type micro ou macro, ces essais se sont toujours cantonnés à de l'évolution des aspects particuliers certains familles/ménages et n'ont donc pas encore abouti à la mise en avant d'une méthode compréhensive et robuste capable de se subsistuer à la méthode des taux de chefs.

Aussi, privilégiant l'approche macrodémographique, nous nous proposons ici de faire progresser la réflexion vers la définition à terme d'une méthode de projection appropriée ayant ses fondements dans la démographique mathématique multidimensionnelle.

Un tel objectif est réalisé ci-après au moyen d'une revue minutieuse, à la fois critique et constructive, des méthodes et modèles proposés à date pour projeter le nombre et les caractéristiques des familles/ménages. Cette revue comprend trois chapitres, chacun d'eux étant consacré à un type particulier de méthodes ou modèles. Ainsi le chapitre 1 examine les méthodes statiques de nature conventionnelle. Le chapitre 2 aborde les modèles dynamiques s'appuyant sur la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle, mais on n'y " traite que des modèles les plus généraux de ce type, ceux portent aucune attention aux événements démographiques responsables de l'évolution temporelle des familles/ménages. Les autres modèles dynamiques, ceux qui mettent l'accent sur les événements démographiques sousjacents ou modèles de familles nucléaires, font l'objet du

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chapitre 3. La revue des méthodes et modèles ainsi effectuée débouche dans l'épilogue sur l'esquisse d'un modèle plus ou moins bien circonscrit qu'il nous faudra à l'avenir peaufiner et ... éventuellement mettre en oeuvre.

On sait que la démographie est une science où l'unité usuelle d'analyse — est l'individu. Alors que les problèmes démographiques de portée sociale aigüe concernent de plus en plus des groupes d'individus présentant un lien biologique, social ou même économique, la démographie se trouve être mal outillée pour traiter de ces problèmes.

La seule possibilité qu'elle offre d'anticiper l'évolution de groupes, tels les familles/ménages, consiste à projeter l'ensemble des individus distingués selon leur groupe d'appartenance puis à dériver d'une telle projection les groupes qui en résultent. La méthode de projection peut être plus ou moins compliquée selon que le groupe d'appartenance à un instant donné est pris indépendamment ou non des groupes antérieurs d'appartenance. Dans le premier cas, il s'agit d'une méthode statique, dans le second d'une méthode dynamique.

Les perspectives de familles/ménages s'appuyant sur une méthode statique sont normalement réalisées en deux étapes. Dans une première étape, on projette la population suivant un certain nombre de caractéristiques démographiques pertinentes. Puis, dans une deuxième étape, on transforme les nombres projetés d'individus en nombres de familles/ménages en leur appliquant un ensemble de quantités exogènes appropriées. Traditionnellement, une telle transformation est réalisée au moyen de la méthode des taux de chefs.

Développée il y a plus d'un demi-siècle par le Comité national de la planification des resources des Etats-Unis (USNRPC, 1938), la méthode des taux de chefs a été rapidement adoptée par le Bureau du recensement américain (USBC, 1943) avant de l'être après la guerre par nombre de bureaux statistiques nationaux de pays européens. Mais ce n'est qu'à la suite d'une recommandation émise par les Nations-Unies (United Nations, 1973) que l'usage de cette méthode se répandit à travers le monde.

La méthode des taux de chefs repose sur le concept de taux de chefs qui se refère à la proportion des individus qui dans un groupe donné sont désignés comme chefs de ménage. Dans la version originelle de la méthode, les groupes démographiques considérés reflètent le croisement de deux variables, l'âge et le sexe des individus. Soit n_i le nombre d'individus appartenant au groupe i $(n_i = i \mathbb{E} n_i)$ et c_i le nombre de ceux qui parmi les n_i sont désignés comme chefs de ménage $(c_i = i \mathbb{E} n_i)$. Alors, le ratio

$$h_i = c_i / n_i$$
 (1.1)

définit le taux de chefs se rapportant au groupe i.

Il s'ensuit que, pour déterminer les ménages attendus à toute date future, il suffit d'appliquer un ensemble approprié de taux de chefs h_i aux-nombres attendus d'individus n_i . Le nombre de ménages ayant pour chef un individu appartenant au groupe i découle de (1.1) ré-écrit comme suit

^{1.} Chaque groupe démographique i compte donc des chefs en nombre $c_i = h_i$ n_i et des non-chefs en nombre $n_i - c_i = (1 - h_i)$ n_i .

 $c_{\frac{1}{2}} = h_{\frac{1}{2}} n_{\frac{1}{2}} \tag{1.2}$

et le nombre total de ménages de

$$c_{i} = i \Sigma h_{i} n_{i} \qquad (1.3)$$

de telle sorte que la taille moyenne des ménages s'obtient à partir de

$$t = n_i / c_i = (i \Sigma n_i) / (i \Sigma h_i n_i)$$
 (1.4)²

A noter qu'en raison de la forte association existant entre états matrimoniaux et types de familles/ménages, nombre deux ajoutent aux la méthode d'utilisateurs de -caractéristiques d'âge et de sexe une troisième, matrimonial. Ainsi, les projections de familles/ménages préparées par Statistique Canada reposent sur la réalisation préalable de projections de population3 selon trois états matrimoniaux: célibataire, non-célibataire dont le conjoint est présent et non-célibataire dont le conjoint est absent4 (Larrivée, 1990). Evidemment, avec l'importance croissante de la cohabitation hors mariage, l'utilité de l'état matrimonial comme critère d'observation et de projection des ménages tend . à s'affaiblir et certains bureaux statistiques nationaux, tel l'INSER en France, tendent à l'abandonner (Louvot, 1988).

4. Ce dernier état comprend donc les veuf(ve)s, divorcé(e)s et les personnes mariées ne vivant pas avec leur conjoint

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^{2.} La taille moyenne des ménages est donc l'inverse de la somme pondérée des taux de chefs où les poids sont les effectifs des divers groupes démographiques.

^{3.} Ces projections sont réalisées séparément pour les hommes et les femmes et un ajustement ad hoc est effectué afin que le nombre de non-célibataires vivant avec leur conjoint soit identique pour les deux sexes.

Selon les fondateurs de la méthode (qui eux ne considéraient que l'âge et le sexe des individus), les taux de chefs évolent peu dans le temps et peuvent donc être gardés constants à leurs valeurs observées. Mais s'il est vrai qu'ils pouvaient être considérés comme stationnaires dans le contexte retenu pour la première application de la méthode, les taux de chefs ne le sont généralement pas de sorte qu'il importe de les projeter aussi précisément que possible. Les méthodes les plus couramment utilisées à cet effet sont de trois types (United Nations, 1973:36-40):

- méthodes d'extrapolation,
- méthodes de régression et
 - méthodes normatives.

Passons rapidement sur ces dernières dans lesquelles les taux de chefs sont projetés plus ou moins a priori. L'usage de ces méthodes (principalement dans les pays scandinaves) est en fait limité aux études ayant pour but d'évaluer certaines conséquences que les changements attendus dans la structure de la population sont susceptibles d'entraîner dans le domaine du logement ou, plus généralement, au niveau de l'activité économique. 5

Généralement, la projection des taux de chefs s'effectue en prolongeant l'évolution du passé à l'aide d'une méthode d'extrapolation appropriée ou, en l'absence des données nécessaires comme tel est le cas dans nombre de pays en développement, en ayant recours à une méthode de régression. Dans le premier cas, les taux de chefs sont projetés sur la base d'une fonction plus ou moins simple du temps étalonnée à

^{5.} Une liste d'études ayant utilisé cette approche apparaît dans Kono (1987:290).

partir de deux ou plusieurs observations récentes tandis que dans le second cas ils sont projetés sur la base d'équations statistiques les liant à un certain nombre d'indicateurs socio-économiques et établies à partir d'un échantillon d'observations relatives à un ensemble suffisant de pays (Kono, 1981).

Afin de projeter l'évolution passée des taux de chefs, les bureaux statistiques nationaux font appel à une grande diversité de méthodes d'extrapolation. En Amérique du Nord, on --- ne retient que les deux observations les plus récentes de sorte que les fonctions utilisées sont comparativement simples. Ainsi, Statistique Canada (1981) utilise une formule exponentielle modifiée tandis que le Bureau du recensement américain utilise une fonction linéaire appliquée logarithme des taux de chefs (USBC, 1979). Ailleurs, il est souvent fait appel à un plus grand nombre d'observations et donc à des fonctions plus complexes. Tel est le cas en France où l'INSEE retient les trois dernières observations afin d'estimer une fonction logistique (Louvot, 1987) et en Grande-Bretagne où le Ministère de l'Environnement retient les quatre dernières observations afin d'estimer une fonction tangente hyperbolique (UK Department of Environment, 1985).6

A noter que ces extrapolations sont presque toujours basées sur des données du moment. On pourrait sans doute remplacer une telle approche transversale par une approche longitudinale (par cohorte). Mais une telle approche mieux à même de refléter les changements qui dans le temps affectent les taux

^{6.} A noter que l'utilisation comme variable dépendante d'une fonction dérivée du taux de chefs plutôt que le taux de chefs lui-même a pour but de garantir que la valeur projetée du taux de chefs est comprise entre 0 et 1. Tel n'est cependant pas le cas du logarithme du taux de chefs utilisé par le Bureau du recensement américain.

de chefs (en éliminant l'effet d'interférence de la taille des cohortes successives) ne permet pas de projeter les taux de chefs pour les cohortes les plus jeunes en raison du manque d'observations disponibles.

Aussi, idéalement, la projection des taux de chefs devrait se faire en ayant recours à une méthode bidimensionnelle combinant les avantages des deux approches précédentes en rendant le taux de chefs h, ou toute variable dérivée de celle-ci, fonction à la fois de l'âge et de l'année de naissance. Une telle méthode a été explorée par Conner (1987) au moyen de la fonction suivante

$$\ln \left(h/(1-h)\right) = \sum_{i=0...4}^{n} \left(b_{i0} + b_{i1} x^{i}\right) y \qquad (1.5)$$

(où x est l'année de naissance et y l'âge) étalonnée en rapport aux données relatives à 13 groupes d'âge quinquennaux couvrant le continuum 20-84 ans issues des deux derniers recensements.

1.2 Raffinements de la méthode des taux de chefs

Selon la méthode des taux de chefs, le chef de ménage s'identifie au ménage de sorte que les seules caractéristiques du ménage connues sont les caractéristiques démographiques de son chef (sexe, âge et, éventuellement, état matrimonial). Il est cependant possible d'élargir la méthode de façon à prendre en compte une caractéristique du ménage telle son type ou encore sa composition.

Prise en compte du type de ménages

L'élargissement de la méthode des taux de chefs est relativement aisé dans le cas où la caractéristique du ménage à prendre en compte est unidimensionnelle, telle son genre ou sa taille. En effet, il suffit de désagréger chaque taux de chefs h_i en éléments kh_i représentatifs du type de ménage suivant la caractéristique retenue, genre ou taille ($k\Sigma$ kh_i = h_i). L'application directe des taux de chefs désagrégés kh_i aux niveaux de population correspondants n_i mène immédiatement aux nombres de ménages kc_i suivant le genre ou la taille:

$$kc_{i} = kh_{i} \pi_{i} \cdots \qquad (1.6)$$

Telle est la technique utilisée par Statistique Canada (1981) pour préparer des perspectives de ménages selon le genre, détaillées au point que la catégorisation utilisée permet d'obtenir des résultats se rapportant tant aux familles qu'aux ménages.

Alternativement, on peut mettre en avant la distribution catégorielle des ménages symbolisée par la proportion $_{\rm k}{\rm H_{i}}$ des ménages de type k dans l'ensemble des ménages dont le chef appartient au groupe i. Dans ce cas, les nombres de ménages $_{\rm k}{\rm C_{i}}$ s'obtiennent par application des $_{\rm k}{\rm H_{i}}$ aux nombres de ménages $_{\rm c_{i}}$ = $_{\rm h_{i}}$ $_{\rm n_{i}}$ déterminés au moyen de la méthode de base ou, de manière équivalente, par application directe des produits $_{\rm k}{\rm h_{i}}$ h_i aux nombres d'individus $_{\rm n_{i}}$. Quoiqu'il en soit,

$$kC_{i} = kH_{i} h_{i} n_{i}$$
 (1.7)

Cette deuxième technique d'élargissement du modèle de base est généralement utilisée pour produire des projections de familles/ménages selon la taille tant au Japon (Itoh et

Yamamoto, 1977) qu'au Québec (Bureau de la statistique du Québec, 1979), au Canada (Larrivée, 1990) ou encore en France (Louvot, 1988).7

Il va de soi qu'en raison de l'idendité formelle existant entre $_kh_i$ et $_kH_i$ h_i , les deux techniques décrites ci-dessus sont deux manifestations (manières d'appliquer) d'une même équation liant $_kc_i$ à n_i de sorte qu'elles s'utilisent indifféremment pour tenir compte du genre ou de la taille des familles/ménages ou de tout autre catégorisation pertinente par type. Mais elles ne mènent aux mêmes résultats que si les valeurs projetées de $_kh_i$ d'une part et de $_i$ et de $_kH_i$ d'autre part respectent l'idendité formelle ci-dessus.

Sur un plan pratique, l'élargissement de la méthode des taux de chefs à la prise en compte du genre des ménages accroît de manière substantielle le nombre de paramètres à utiliser. La projection de ceux-ci est plus ou moins complexe selon la technique d'élargissement retenue. Dans le cas de la première technique reposant sur des taux de chefs désagrégés par type de ménage, on peut projeter ces taux sans inconvénient de la même manière que dans la méthode originelle. Par contre, dans le cas de la seconde technique reposant sur des taux de chefs accompagnés d'une distribution en pourcentage selon le type de ménage, 8 il importe de projeter les kHi de sorte que l'égalité

^{7.} A noter dans ce cas que la taille moyenne des ménages de la catégorie de taille la plus élevée (K personnes et plus) est endogène:

 $K^{t} = i \Sigma [n_i - k=1..(K-1)^{\Sigma} k_{k} c_i] / K^{c_i}$

Comme cette taille doit nécessairement est supérieure à K, les paramètres kh_i du système doivent vérifier:

^{8.} A des fins de simplification, la distribution des ménages selon le type peut être réalisée au niveau de l'ensemble

LE kHi = 1 soit maintenue. Bien souvent on se contente de projeter les kHi comme dans la méthode originelle avant de les ajuster de manière ad hoc pour que l'égalité en question soit vérifiée (Itoh et Yamamoto, 1977; Larrivée, 1990). Néanmoins, plusieurs tentatives ont été faites afin de projeter directement la distribution des kHi suivant le type (pour i donné). Ainsi, pour réaliser des projections de ménages suivant la taille, le Bureau de la statistique du Québec (1979) s'appuie sur une distribution constituée d'un mélange "gammaien" de lois de Poisson faisant intervenir deux paramètres: la moyenne et la variance de la distribution des ménages suivant la taille (Bamas et Tribaillat (1962).

A noter que, telle que décrite ci-dessus, ce raffinement de la méthode des taux de chefs ne permet de connaître ni structure démographique ni la taille des ménages par type. En effet, les non-chefs, obtenus en retirant les chefs des individus, ne sont connus que globalement, sans distinction du type de ménages auxquels ils appartiennent. Une telle distinction peut cependant être effectuée pour peu que le complément à 1 de chaque taux de chefs h_i (correspondant à la proportion de non-chefs dans le groupe i) soit désagrégé en K éléments $_kG_i$ représentatifs de la fraction des non-chefs du groupe i faisant partie d'un ménage de type k. Si tel est le cas, les $_kC_i = {}_iE_{ik}C_i$ ménages de type k comprennent $_kG_i = (1-h_i)_kG_i$ non-chefs appartenant à la catégorie i. Le nombre total d'individus $_kN$ faisant partie de ces ménages s'écrit alors

 $k^{18} = i^{2} [k^{1} h_{i} + k^{2} G_{i}] (1-h_{i})] n_{i}$ (1.8)

des chefs (plutôt qu'au niveau de chaque catégorie de chefs).

^{-9.} Bien str, cette extension de la méthode des taux de chefs à la prise en compte du genre ou de la taille peut s'appliquer à la prise en compte du genre et de la taille.

$$k^{t} = 1 + [i E_{k}G_{i} (1-h_{i}) n_{i}] / [i E_{k}H_{i} h_{i} n_{i}]$$
 (1.9)

En pratique cependant, une telle désagrégation du complément à 1 du taux de chefs est problématique. Bien entendu inapplicable si le type retenu reflète la taille des ménages, elle peut être source de grandes difficultés au cas où le type retenu reflète le genre du ménage. En effet les valeurs choisies des divers paramètres intervenants (h_i, k^G_i et k^H_i) ne garantissent pas l'intégrité des projections en ce sens qu'elles ne respectent pas nécessairement les inégalités ou même les égalités découlant de rapports de quantité existant entre les membres de certains types de ménages. Ainsi supposons que l'un des types de ménages considérés, désigné par l, soit celui des familles monoparentales. Alors le nombre de non-chefs doit être au moins égal au nombre de chefs, c'est-à-dire

$$- \cdots_{i} \Sigma_{i} G_{i} (1-h_{i}) + n_{i} \geq i \Sigma_{i} H_{i} h_{i} n_{i}$$
 (1.10)

Ou encore supposons que la catégorie l consiste de familles époux-épouses sans enfants. Pour ce type de ménages, le nombre d'époux non-chefs doit être égal au nombre d'épouses désignées comme chefs

$$i \in \mathbb{H}^{\Sigma} \ 1^{G_i} \ (1-h_i) \ n_i = i \in \mathbb{F}^{\Sigma} \ 1^{H_i} \ h_i \ n_i$$
 (1.11a)

tandis que le nombre d'épouses non-chefs doit être égal au nombre d'époux désignés comme chefs

$$_{i \in F} \Sigma_{1} G_{i} (1-h_{i}) n_{i} = _{i \in F} \Sigma_{1} H_{i} h_{i} n_{i}$$
 (1.11b)

où F et H désignent l'ensemble des catégories de sexe féminin et masculin, respectivement.

A priori, les inégalités telles que (1.10) et surtout les égalités telles que (1.11a) et (1.11b) n'ont aucune raison de tenir pour les valeurs retenues des paramètres. Aussi l'application de la méthode requiert-elle de faire en sorte que de telles relations soient vérifiées, au besoin au moyen d'une technique appropriée. Étant donné les complications que cela implique, on a donc tout intérêt à définir les types de ménage sans introduire de rapports de quantité trop contraignants ou même, afin d'éviter l'apparition de toute incohérence malencontreuse, d'ignorer un tel raffinement de la méthode des taux de chefs visant à mettre en valeur la structure démographique par type de ménages.

Prise en compte de la composition démographique des ménages

L'élargissement de la méthode des taux de chefs de manière à déterminer les caractéristiques des non-chefs par type tel que nous venons de le décrire peut être repris sans difficulté afin de déterminer les caractéristiques démographiques des non-chefs associés aux chefs appartenant à un groupe donné (Pitkin et Masnick, 1987). Soit Gij la fraction des non-chefs (1-hi) ni du groupe i qui font partie d'un ménage ayant pour chef un individu du groupe j. Il s'en suit que les ménages cj = hj nj ayant pour chef un individu du groupe j comprennent aij = Gij (1-hi) ni non-chefs issus du groupe i. Le nombre total d'individus composant ces ménages est tel que

$$N_j = h_j n_j + i \Sigma G_{ij} (1-h_i) n_i$$
 (1.12)

de sorte que la taille moyenne de ces ménages est donné par

Il s'agit donc ici de projeter j éléments représentatifs des diverses catégories de non-chefs et constituant ensemble le complément à 1 du taux de chefs. Encore une fois, on peut projeter la valeur de ces éléments $\alpha_{ij} = G_{ij} \ (1-h_i)$, soit directement, soit en projetant séparément h_i et les divers éléments G_{ij} tel que $j \Sigma G_{ij} = 1$.

Enfin, rien n'empêche de combiner les deux généralisations cidessus en désagrégeant les taux de chefs h_i comme les éléments G_{ij} constituant le complément à 1 de ce dernier en sous-éléments kh_i et kG_{ij} respectivement qui soient représentatifs du genre du ménage, ¹⁰ mais ressurgissent alors, au niveau de la structure démographique, les difficultés signalées plus haut dans le cas de la simple prise en compte des ménages par type. A tout le moins, les paramètres du système ne peuvent garantir que les non-chefs d'un ménage de type l ayant pour chef un individu du groupe j soient plus nombreux que les chefs de tels ménages, c'est-à-dire que

$$_{i}E_{1}G_{ij} (1-h_{i}) n_{i} \ge _{1}h_{j} n_{j}$$
 (1.14)

A nouveau, afin d'éviter toute incohérence malencontreuse, on aura intérêt à ne pas croiser type et composition démographique des ménages.

1.3 Une vue globale de la méthode des taux de chefs et de ses raffinements

^{10.} Bien entendu, ces quantités doivent être prises telles que $k^{\Sigma} (k^{h_i} + j^{\Sigma} (1-k^{h_i}) k^{G_{ij}}) = 1$.

D'après ce qui précède, il est clair que la méthode des taux de chefs et ses raffinements sont des expressions particulières d'une même méthode générale. Celle-ci consiste à appliquer à chaque valeur projetée d'individus ni appartenant au groupe démographique i un vecteur de distribution représentant une version plus ou moins complexe d'un même vecteur de distribution. Ce vecteur de distribution comprend deux parties principales mettant en valeur la notion de chef de ménage sous-jacente à cette approche:

- l'une relative aux chefs de ménage, éventuellement divisée en K éléments représentatifs du type de ménage et
- l'autre relative aux non-chefs, éventuellement divisée en KJ éléments issus du croisement des K types de ménages et des J groupes démographiques de chefs.

Il est aisé de voir ce que devient ce vecteur de distribution selon les valeurs de K et J:

- (a) Si R=1 et J=0, il se réduit à deux éléments h_i et 1- h_i : c'est le cas de la méthode originelle des taux de chefs.
- (b) Si K est quelconque et J=0, il se réduit à deux éléments \mathbf{k}^{h_i} et \mathbf{k}^{a_i} pour chaque type de ménage \mathbf{k} (\mathbf{k}^{Σ} \mathbf{k}^{h_i} + \mathbf{k}^{a_i} = 1): c'est le cas de l'extension à la prise en compte du type de ménages.
- (c) Si K=1 et J est quelconque, il se réduit à h_i plus J éléments du type α_{ij} (h_i + $_j\Sigma$ α_{ij} = 1): c'est le cas de l'extension à la prise en compte de la composition démographique
- (d) Si K et J prennent une valeur quelconque, il se compose de \mathbb{Z}_{k} hi plus J éléments de type \mathbb{Z}_{k} pour chaque type de ménages k [\mathbb{Z}_{k} (\mathbb{Z}_{k}) + \mathbb{Z}_{k} \mathbb{Z}_{k} (\mathbb{Z}_{k}) = 1]: c'est le cas de

l'extension à la prise en compte du type et de la composition démographique des ménages.

Quelles que soient les valeurs de K et J, le nombre total de ménages est donc donné par (1.3) où hi est pris

- comme tel: cas (a)

- égal à kī hk : cas (b)
- égal à 1 4E aij: cas (c)
- égal à k^{Σ} h_k ou $1 k^{\Sigma}$ j^{Σ} $k^{\alpha}ij$: cas (d)

On voit donc que la distribution des taux de chefs selon le type et de leurs compléments à 1 selon le type et/ou le groupe démographique du chef n'influence pas le nombre total de ménages! De fait, le rôle de cas distributions se limite à préciser les caractéristiques principales des ménages, telles leur genre, taille et structure par âge, que ce soit séparément ou de manière croisée. Mais tel qu'indiqué plus haut, la structure par âge ne peut être croisée avec la taille et par ailleurs s'accommode assez mal d'un croisement avec le genre de sorte que seuls genre et taille peuvent être croisés sans difficultés.

En d'autres termes, la méthode des taux de chefs et ses raffinements permettent de projeter l'évolution des ménages et de leurs principales caractéristiques à l'intérieur d'un cadre cohérent reposant sur la projection préalable non seulement des taux de chefs h_i mais aussi

- de leur distribution $_kH_i^{(1)}$ selon le genre $(_k\Sigma H_i^{(1)}=1)$,
- de leur distribution $1^{H_1}(2)$ selon la taille $(1^{E} H_1^{(2)} = 1)$ et
- de la distribution G_{ij} de leurs compléments à 1 selon le groupe démographique du chef de ménages encore que

le genre et la taille puissent être croisés au moyen de la considération de la distribution $_{kl}H^{(3)}$ des h_i selon le genre et la taille: $_{k}H_i^{(1)} = _{1}\Gamma _{kl}H^{(3)}$ et $_{1}H_i^{(2)} = _{1}\Gamma _{kl}H^{(3)}$.

Un tel cadre cohérent permet de projeter le nombre de ménages ayant un chef appartenant à un groupe démographique donné, de désagréger ce nombre selon le genre, la taille (et éventuellement les deux) et de préciser l'âge des autres membres. Les projections de familles/ménages publiées par le Bureau de la statistique du Québec (1979) constituent sans doute l'illustration la plus avancée de ce cadre.

T.4 Autres méthodes basées sur la notion de chef de ménage et prenant en compte la composition démographique des ménages

Selon la méthode des taux de chefs, la composition démographique des ménages, c'est-à-dire la structure démographique des non-chefs par catégorie de chefs, n'influence pas, on l'a vu plus haut, les nombres projetés de ménages. Néanmoins, il existe d'autres méthodes de projection dans lesquelles elle joue un rôle plus actif. Nous nous proposons ci-dessous d'examiner de telles méthodes, non sans avoir auparavant présenté une vue d'ensemble du problème soulevé par la prise en compte de la composition démographique.

Préliminaires

Soit M la matrice dont le $i-j^{\text{ème}}$ élément est le nombre m_{ij} d'individus faisant partie d'un ménage dont le chef est issu de la catégorie démographique j. Bordons cette matrice à

droite par un vecteur colonne dont le i de élément est le nombre de chefs c_i et en bas par un vecteur ligne dont le jième élément est le nombre de chefs c_j . Il en résulte un tableau T

$$m_{11}$$
 m_{1j} m_{1z} c_1 m_{1z} m_{1z} c_1 m_{2j} m_{2z} c_2 c_2 c_3 c_4 c_5 c_5 c_7

dans lequel chaque ligne (sauf la dernière) décrit la distribution des individus du groupe i en chefs et non-chefs (par groupe de chefs) de sorte que

$$n_{\underline{i}} = d^{\underline{\Sigma}} m_{\underline{i}\underline{j}} + c_{\underline{i}}$$
 (1.15)

et chaque colonne (sauf la dernière) décrit la distribution par groupe d'appartenance des individus faisant partie des ménages ayant un un chef donné de sorte que

$$H_{j} = i \mathbf{E} \, \mathbf{m}_{ij} + \mathbf{c}_{j} \tag{1.16}$$

où N_{j} est le nombre total de personnes faisant partie d'un ménage ayant pour chef un individu du groupe j.

Naturellement, la possibilité de dériver c_i à partir de cette équation requiert de lier les m_{ij} à l'une ou l'autre des quantités intervenantes. On se souvient que, selon l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs vue à la sous-section

précédente, le nombre typique d'individus m_{ij} est lié à l'ensemble des individus n_i appartenant au groupe i au moyen de

$$m_{ij} = \alpha_{ij} n_i \tag{1.17}$$

où α_{ij} est un coefficient reflétant la part des individus du groupe i qui sont membres (mais non-chefs) d'un ménage ayant pour chef un individu du groupe j. Plus précisément, ce coefficient représente une fraction G_{ij} du complément à 1 du taux de chefs h_i , c'est-à-dire

$$\alpha_{i,\bar{i}} = G_{i+1} \cdot (I - h_i) \tag{1.18}$$

avec

En combinant les relations (1.16) à (1.19), on obtient sans peine: $c_1 = h_1$ n_1 ; ce qui nous ramène, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, au point de départ de la méthode des taux de chefs.

Alternativement, au lieu de lier les individus m_{ij} aux groupes dont ils sont issus, on peut les lier aux ménages auxquels ils se joignent. Dans ce cas, on pose

$$- m_{ij} = \delta_{ij} H_j \tag{1.20}$$

où N_j est le nombre d'individus faisant partie des ménages ayant pour chef un individu issu du groupe j. En substituant (1.20) dans (1.16), nous avons donc

$$N_{j} = (i \Sigma \delta_{ij}) N_{j} + c_{j}$$
 (1.21)

ou encore

$$N_{j} = (1 - i E \delta_{ij}) c_{j}$$
 (1.22)

Il s'ensuit que

$$m_{ij} = a_{ij} c_{j}$$
 (1.23)

où le coefficient

$$a_{i,j} = a_{i,j} \neq (1 - k E a_{k,j})$$
 (1.24)

est nécessairement positif, du fait de la relation (1.21). Brièvement, ce coefficient exprime le nombre d'individus issus du-groupe i appartenant à <u>un</u> ménage dont le chef est issu du groupe j.

En fait, la relation (1.23) à laquelle nous venons d'aboutir n'est pas nouvelle. En son temps, Akkerman (1980) l'avait posée a priori.

La méthode d'Akkerman

Partant de (1.23), la relation (1.15) permet à Akkerman d'écrire

$$\mathbf{n}_{i} = \mathbf{c}_{i} + \mathbf{c}_{i} \tag{1.25}$$

ou, en ayant recours à une notation plus compacte,

$$n = \{ I + \lambda \} C \tag{1.26}$$

où n est un vecteur colonne dont le ième élément est ni

 ${f c}$ est un vecteur colonne dont le lème élément est ${f c}_i$ I est une matrice unité et

A est une matrice dont le i-jème élément est a_{ij} . La matrice I \leftarrow A est qualifiée par Akkerman de matrice de composition des ménages. Il s'ensuit que c s'obtient à partir de n au moyen de

$$c = (I + A)^{-1}$$
 (1.27)

c'est-à-dire en prémultipliant le vecteur de population par l'inverse de la matrice de composition des ménages.

Dans quelle mesure la méthode d'Akkerman est-elle reliée à la méthode des taux de chefs? Tout d'abord, notons que le taux de chefs relatif au groupe i est égal à

$$c_i / n_i = 1 / [1 + (j = a_{ij} c_j) / c_i]$$
 (1.28)

de sorte qu'une valeur constante de la matrice A conduit à une modification des taux de chefs au cours du temps. Par contre, la taille moyenne des ménages dont le chef appartient au groupe j n'est pas affectée puisque dans ce cas nous avons

$$t_{j} = 1 + i \Sigma a_{ij}$$
 (1.29)

Ce résultat se situe donc à contrepied de l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs prenant en compte la composition démographique où, comme on l'a vu plus haut, l'hypothèse de paramètres constants laisse les taux de chefs inchangés mais pas la taille des ménages par catégorie de chefs.

De plus, si F_{ji} désigne la proportion des individus issus du groupe i (autres que les chefs de ménage) faisant partie de ménages ayant un chef issu du groupe j, c'est-à-dire

$$P_{ji} = m_{ij} / k^{\Sigma} m_{kj} = a_{ij} / k^{\Sigma} a_{kj}$$
 (1.30)

alors le coefficient aij peut s'écrire

$$a_{ij} = F_{ji} (_{k} \Sigma a_{kj}) = F_{ji} (t_{j} - 1)$$
 (1.31)

oğ

$$i \mathbf{F}_{fi} = 1 \tag{1.32}$$

La méthode d'Akkerman peut donc être vue comme une méthode dans laquelle la taille des ménages moins 1 (plutôt que le complément à 1 du taux de chefs) est désagrégée en éléments représentatifs des catégories démographiques auxquelles appartiennent les membres non-chefs.

Dans la pratique capendant, l'utilisation de la méthode d'Akkerman est problématique car, du fait de l'inversion de (I + A), la formule (1.27) ne mène pas nécessairement à un vecteur c dont toutes les entrées sont positives!

La méthode de Pitkin et Masnick

Selon Pitkin et Masnick, læ difficulté rencontrée par Akkerman peut être évitée en liant m_{ij} non pas à c_j (ou de manière équivalente à N_j) mais plutôt à n_j au moyen de

$$m_{ij} = \beta_{ij} n_j \tag{1.33}$$

où β_{ij} reflète le nombre des individus du groupe i qui sont membres (non-chefs) d'un ménage ayant pour chef un individu du

groupe j pour chaque individu de type j. L'équation (1.15) mène alors à

$$c_{i} = n_{i} - j E \beta_{ij} n_{j}$$
 (1.34)

ou, en faisant appel à une notation plus compacte, à

$$c = (I - B) - n$$
 (1.35)

où B est une matrice dont le i-jème élément est β_{ij} .

A noter que, selon cette méthode, la constance des éléments intervenants, c'est-à-dire de la matrice B, entraîne nécessairement la variation du taux de chefs associé avec chaque groupe démographique

de même que la variation de la taille moyenne des ménages ayant un chef appartenant à un groupe démographique donné

$$t_{j} = 1 + (i - \beta_{ij}) \cdot [1 - (i - \beta_{ji} n_{i}) / n_{j}]$$
 (1.37)

Peut-on malgré tout interpréter aisément la méthode proposée par Pitkin et Masnick? A ce propos, observons que la coefficient β_{ij} est lié très simplement au coefficient a_{ij} défini par Akkerman. En combinant (1.23) et (1.32), nous voyons que

$$\beta_{ij} = a_{ij} c_{j} / n_{j} = a_{ij} h_{j}$$
 (1.38)

de sorte que la proportion F_{ji} définie précédemment est aussi égale à β_{ij} / ($_{i}$ Σ β_{ij}). Il s'ensuit que le coefficient β_{ij} peut s'écrire

$$-\beta_{ij} = F_{ji} (k^{\Sigma} \beta_{kj})$$

En substituant h_j dans t_j ou inversement t_j dans h_j, il est aisé de montrer que

$$_{i}\Sigma \beta_{i+} = (t_{i} - 1) h_{j}$$
 (1.40)

de sorte que

$$\beta_{ij} = F_{ji} (t_j - 1) h_j$$
 (1.41)

où les Fij vérifient toujours la relation (1.32).

En fin de compte, la méthode de Pitkin et Masnick est une méthode dans laquelle le produit (t_j-1) h_j — plutôt que l — h_j comme dans l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs ou t_j — I dans la méthode d'Akkerman — est divisé en éléments représentatifs des divers groupes d'individus (non-chefs) associés à un chef du groupe j. De plus, la constance des paramètres intervenants, c'est-à-dire de la matrice B, signifie que le taux de chefs h_j et la taille moyenne des ménages t_j ne varient pas indépendamment l'un de l'autre puisque le produit (t_j-1) h_j reste constant. Comme ce produit implique à la fois un paramètre relatif aux groupes auxquels appartiennent les individus (n_i) et un paramètre relatif aux groupes de ménages auxquels ils se joignent (N_j) , on n'est ni plus ni moins conduit à s'interroger sur la cohérence interne de cette méthode.

En fait, il n'est pas nécessaire de pousser trop loin nos investigations car, contrairement à ce qu'avancent Pitkin et Masnick, cette méthode ne pallie pas le problème présenté par la méthode d'Akkerman. Puisque la matrice I - B n'est pas nonnégative, la formule (1.35) ne garantit pas que les entrées du vecteur c soient nécessairement toutes positives!

Retour sur l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs

D'après ce qui précède, il existe une dualité évidente entre l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs et la méthode proposée par Pitkin et Masnick. Elles reposent toutes deux sur un même tableau à double entrée (le tableau T présenté plus haut) tel que la première est issue d'une lecture selon les lignes et la seconde d'une lecture selon les colonnes. L'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs (Méthode I) s'appuie sur des coefficients $\alpha_{ij} = m_{ij} / n_i$ que Pitkin et Masnick qualifient de taux partiels d'appartenance eu égard au fait qu'ils se réfèrent aux groupes desquels les m_{ij} sont issus. Par contraste, la méthode qu'ils ont eux-mêmes développée (Méthode II) s'appuie sur des coefficients $\beta_{ij} = m_{ij} / n_j$ qu'ils qualifient de taux partiels d'admission eu égard au fait qu'ils se réfèrent aux groupes d'individus dont sont issus les chefs auxquels les m_{ij} se joignent.

Il est clair que la Méthode I ne prend en compte ni le nombre ni la qualité des individus définis comme chefs de ménage et que la Méthode II ne prend en compte ni le nombre ni la qualité des individus définis comme membres des ménages. Ainsi, indépendamment du fait que la méthode I est légitime (puisqu'on choisira les α_{ij} tels que $j\Sigma$ $\alpha_{ij}=1-h_i < 1)$ et que la Méthode II ne l'est pas, aucune des deux méthodes n'est capable de représenter à elle seule la composition des ménages sous toutes ses facettes. Selon Pitkin et Masnick, cette situation est analogue à celle que l'on rencontre dans la représentation d'un système de marché; les ventes de tout bien économique dépendant de l'offre et la demande et non pas de

l'offre ou la demande. Pitkin et Masnick laisse entendre qu'il serait souhaitable d'utiliser les deux approches ensemble plutôt que séparément. Malheureusement, la non-légitimité de la Méthode II signalée plus haut nous suggère qu'il serait sans doute préférable d'élargir la méthode I à la prise en considération du nombre et de la qualité des individus définis comme chefs de ménage. Probablement, la façon la plus simple de réaliser ceci est de rendre G_{ij} , la proportion des individus du groupe i (autres que les chefs de ménage) associés à un chef du groupe j, proportionnelle au nombre d'individus n_j du groupe j, c'est-à-dire de spécifier

$$G_{ij} = q_{ij} n_j / (k^{\Sigma} q_{ik} n_k)$$
 (1.42)

où q_{ij} est défini à un facteur multiplicatif près. Dans ces conditions, nous avons

$$-m_{ij} = i q_{ij} n_j / (k^{\Sigma} q_{ik} n_k) l (1 - h_i) n_i$$
 (1.43)

de sorte que la décomposition élémentaire du complément à 1 de chaque taux de chefs s'effectue maintenant en relation directe à la distribution des individus.

1.5 Du passage de la notion de chef de ménage à celle de personne de reférence

Héritée d'une époque où les ménages s'organisaient sous "l'auto_ité" d'une seule personne, en principe de sexe masculin, la notion de chef de ménage centrale aux méthodes de projection examinées jusqu'ici est désormais incompatible avec la réalité sociale. En effet, elle est inhabile à refléter le partage accru des responsabilités entre les membres adultes des ménages ayant découlé des transformations sociales des

divorce, forment plus souvent leur propre ménage de sorte qu'un ménage s'identifie plus facilement à une femme qu'un homme. Aussi, suivant une suggestion de Brass (1983), nombre d'utilisateurs tel l'Agence de planification économique du Japon (Kono, 1987) retiennent maintenant comme personne de référence la personne de sexe féminin la plus âgée du ménage. Cependant, la possibilité d'utiliser une telle personne de référence dépend de l'étendue de la collecte de l'information relative aux membres du ménage autres que la personne de référence retenue par les bureaux statistiques.

Si comme on l'a vu plus haut le choix de la personne de référence n'a aucun impact sur le plan méthodologique, il n'en est pas de même sur le plan des résultats puisque différents choix de la personne de référence sont susceptibles de mener à des chiffres de montant et de nature forts différents. S'il se peut que les écarts entre les nombres de ménages issus de divers choix de la personne de référence ne soient pas aussi importants que l'on puisse l'imaginer de prime abord (Murphy, 1986), les résultats relatifs aux caractéristiques démographiques des personnes de référence sont nécessairement variés et plus ou moins informatifs sur la nature des ménages concernés.

En conclusion, si le passage de la notion de chef de ménage à celui de personne de référence a l'avantage de mettre la méthode des taux de chefs à l'heure de la réalité sociale, elle ne semble guère nous avancer sur un plan tant méthodologique que pratique.

I.6 Une méthodologie axée sur la taille des ménages

Dans une contribution récente passée quelque peu inaperçue, Linke (1987) suggère une méthode quelque peu différente axée sur la taille moyenne des ménages.

On se souvient que la méthode des taux de chefs met l'accent sur les divers groupes démographiques dont sont issus les chefs de ménage et s'appuie au niveau de chaque groupe sur la proportion des individus qui sont chefs de ménage. A l'inverse, la méthodologie mise en avant par Linke met l'accent sur les ménages eux-mêmes et s'appuie, au niveau de chaque catégorie de ménages éventuellement distinguée, sur la proportion des individus qui sont chefs de ménage, c'est-àdire sur l'inverse de la taille moyenne des ménages.

Si elle faisait abstraction de toute catégorisation des ménages, cette méthodologie conduirait tout simplement à obtenir le nombre total de ménages en divisant la population totale par la taille moyenne de l'ensemble des ménages. Bien entendu, cette dernière variable est trop agrégée (comparativement aux taux de chefs définis au niveau de divers groupes démographiques) pour pouvoir sous-tendre une évolution crédible du nombre total de ménages. Pour être viable, cette méthodologie doit donc au moins prendre en considération diverses catégories de ménages selon le type ou bien encore selon le groupe démographique du chef.

Prise en compte du type du ménage

Soit $_kn_i$ le nombre d'individus (chefs et non-chefs) du groupe i faisant partie d'un ménage de type k ($_k\Sigma$ $_kn_i$ = n_i) et $_kr_i$ la part de n_i que représente ce nombre

$$k^{r_i} = k^{n_i} / n_i \tag{1.44}$$

Si l'ensemble des proportions kr_i est connu, alors le nombre d'individus faisant partie d'un ménage de type k s'écrit

$$_{k}N = _{i}\Sigma _{k}n_{i} = _{i}\Sigma _{k}r_{i} n_{i}$$
 (1.45)

de sorte que le nombre de ménages de type k s'obtient à partir de

$$k^{c} = (i^{c} k^{r_{i}} n_{i}) / t_{k}$$
(1.46)

où t_k est la taille des ménages de type k. Dans le cas où les ménages sont distingués selon la taille tels que les ménages de type k sont des ménages de k individus, alors le nombre de ménages de taille k est donné par

$$k^{c} = (i^{c} k^{r} i^{n}) / k \qquad (1.47)$$

pour tout groupe de taille k autre que le groupe de taille K et plus. 12

Prise en compte de la composition démographique du ménage

$$k^{\Sigma}_{i\geq 15^{\Sigma}} k^{n_i} \geq k^{\Sigma}_{k^{n_i}} / k^{t}$$

En vérité, cette inégalité n'est pas très contraignante (tant que les khi se rapportent à une situation réelle) et, à toutes fins pratiques, elle peut être considérée comme ayant peu d'influence.

^{12.}Si on adopte le point de vue que tout ménage doit comprendre au moins un individu âgé de 15 ans et plus, cette méthode n'est cohérente que si, pour chaque type de ménages, le nombre projeté d'individus de 15 ans et plus est supérieur au nombre projeté de ménages, c'est-à-dire que si

Alternativement, on peut distinguer les individus selon le groupe démographique du chef. Dans ce cas, les équations (1.44) à (1.46) demeurent valides sauf que le remplacement du type k des ménages par le groupe démographique j auxquels appartiennent les chefs de ménage nous incite, pour être cohérent avec nos notations antérieures, à remplacer kni, kri, kN et kt par nij, rij, Nj et tj respectivement.

Malheureusement, cette méthode n'est pas intrinsiquement cohérente. En effet, les quantités r_{ij} associées avec chaque groupe i d'individus 13 sont également liées aux catégories de chefs de sorte que les valeurs de t_j ne sont pas indépendantes de celles des r_{ij} ! Par suite, le taux de chefs calculé comme le ratio de c_j à n_j peut être supérieur à r_{jj} alors qu'il lui est nécessairement inférieur. 15

$$(iE r_{ij} n_i) / t_j n_j) < r_{jj}$$

^{13.}A noter qu'il existe une relation simple entre les r_{ij} et les c_{ij} définis dans l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs à la prise en compte de la composition démographique des ménages:

 $r_{ij} = \alpha_{ij}$ pour j différent de i et

 $r_{jj} = 1 - k$ diff de $i^{\Sigma} \alpha_{jk}$.

14.Le taux de chefs relatif au groupe j est inférieur à r_{jj} si

une inégalité que les nombres d'individus par groupe ne vérifient pas nécessairement. 15. Cette affirmation découle de ce que

 $r_{jj} = 1 - k \text{ diff de } i^{\Sigma} \alpha_{ik} + \alpha_{jj} = h_j + \alpha_{jj}$

où h_j est le taux de chefs des individus appartenant au groupe j; ce qui par ailleurs montre que, contrairement à α_{ij} (i différent de j), α_{jj} n'est pas fixé et varie au gré des valeurs de r_{jj} et t_j sans être nécessairement positif.

On en conclut donc que la méthodologie mise en avant par Linke est incapable de sous-tendre une projection des non-chefs par catégorie de chefs et que son utilité se limite à projeter les ménages par type, surtout par catégorie de taille. Dans ce qui suit, la variante relative à cette dernière projection est désignée sous le nom de méthode de Linke.

Une brève comparison avec la méthode des taux de chefs

Sans nul doute, la méthode de Linke constitue une alternative intéressante à l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs prenant en compte le type. Comme cette dernière, elle permet de projeter le nombre de ménages selon le type (genre et/ou taille), mais en plus elle permet de préciser la structure par âge pour chaque type de ménages. On se rappelle que l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs ne l'autorisait point (pour ce qui est de la taille) ou alors avec difficulté (dans le cas du genre).

Cette information additionnelle fournie par la méthode de Linke, il est bon de le souligner, s'obtient sans requérir pour autant un volume plus considérable d'intrants. En effet, alors que l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs à la prise en compte du type de ménages (sans toutefois inclure la considération des non-chefs) requiert un ensemble de IK taux de chefs khi désagrégés par type de ménage, la méthode de Linke fait appel à IK - I + K paramètres. Brièvement, ce nombre de paramètres découle de ce que cette méthode repose sur:

⁻ IK paramètres kri représentatifs des parts des individus de chacun des I groupes démographiques i faisant partie d'un

ménage de type k -- mais ces paramètres sont liés entre eux par I idendités du type $_k\Sigma$ $_k$ r $_i$ = 1 -- ainsi que sur

- K paramètres kt représentatifs de la taille moyenne de chacun des K types de ménages.

En général, on aura K plus petit que I de sorte que le nombre de paramètres requis est moindre que celui requis dans la méthode alternative mais, à moins que K soit nettement plus petit que I, les deux nombres prendront des valeurs peu différentes. En pratique, donc, le volume des intrants est similaire pour les deux méthodes.

Enfin, insistons sur une propriété intéressante qu'offre la méthode de Linke. La projection de la structure d'âge par type de ménages ne fait aucune distinction parmi les individus d'un même ménage, car de fait la méthode en question ne fait pas réellement appel à la notion de chef de ménage (ou de personne de référence). En effet, la transformation des individus en ménages ne découle pas ici de l'identification des ménages au moyen d'un individu représentatif (chef de ménage ou personne de référence), mais simplement de la connaissance des rapports moyens liant les ménages d'un type donné aux individus qui les composent, c'est-à-dire des tailles moyennes de ménages par type.

Ainsi la méthode de Linke peut-elle sous-tendre des perspectives de ménages à même de nous renseigner sur leurs caractéristiques principales (genre, taille et structure par âge) considérées tant séparément que de manière croisée. Puisqu'elle ne semble pas avoir été beaucoup utilisée à date, il importerait bien sûr de la mettre en pratique dans un ensemble assez large de contextes différents afin d'évaluer son comportement en toute connaissance de cause. Si ce comportement s'avérait cohérent et robuste, alors la méthode

de Linke pourrait avantageusement remplacer la méthode des taux des taux de chefs et ses raffinements comme méthode privilégiée des bureaux statistiques nationaux pour la production de perspectives de ménages. En effet, elle permettrait de se débarasser de la notion de plus en plus contestée de chef de ménage sans pour autant qu'en soit affectée la simplicité de la méthode de projection sous-jacente.

I.7 Les méthodes statiques: une évaluation

Vue d'ensemble

Quoique remontant à plus d'un demi-siècle, la méthode originelle des taux de chefs demeure largement utilisée pour préparer des perspectives de ménages. Ceci s'explique avant tout par la simplicité de sa formulation qui a pour effet (Bongaarts, 1983):

- de la rendre transparente et donc aisément compréhensible,
- de requérir un volume réduit d'intrants relativement commodes à projeter et
- de lui conférer une robustesse garantissant la cohérence des résultats.

Cependant, l'information qu'elle est capable de fournir est minimale (nombre de ménages suivant les caractéristiques démographiques du chef) de sorte que de plus en plus on tend à lui préférer l'une ou l'autre de plusieurs versions élargies permettant de désagréger cette information selon le type (genre et/ou taille) des ménages ou encore de préciser la composition démographique des ménages (c'est-à-dire, la

structure démographique des non-chefs pour chaque catégorie de chef).

Comme on l'a vu plus haut, un tel élargissement de la méthode des taux de chefs ne remet pas en question les avantages offerts par la version originelle si ce n'est que le nombre de paramètres à prendre en considération est plus élevé. Pour chaque groupe démographique, il ne s'agit plus d'observer et de projeter un seul paramètre (le taux de chefs) mais un ensemble de paramètres dont les uns ont pour somme le taux de chefs et les autres le complément à 1 de celui-ci. Cependant, l'effort requis à cet effet demeure très raisonnable dans la mesure où, par nécessité, on se contente de laisser ces paramètres inchangés ou de les projeter en ayant recours à une technique d'extrapolation des plus simples.

La méthodologie des taux de chefs et ses raffinements sont néanmoins la source d'une insatisfaction grandissante. Initialement adressée à la notion de chef de ménage, cette insatisfaction a entraîné le remplacement de celle-ci par la notion plus acceptable de personne de reférence mais, sur le plan méthodologique, cela n'a provoqué aucune amélioration notable puisque les ménages continuent à être caractérisés avant tout par une seule personne (la personne de reférence). Mais une amélioration dans le sens désiré pourrrait provenir de l'utilisation d'une méthode récemment proposée par Linke (1987) qui elle ne fait, en aucune façon, appel à la notion de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence. Sur le plan des intrants requis, cette méthode s'apparente au plus simple des raffinements de la méthode des taux de chefs et, si une expérimentation intensive devait confirmer la cohérence et la robustesse présumées de cette méthode, elle pourrait être adoptée en lieu et place de la méthode des taux de chefs et de ses extensions.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la méthode de Linke partage avec la méthode des taux de chefs (et ses variantes) un certain nombre d'inconvénients qui ont pour effet de suggérer que l'une comme l'autre de ces deux méthodes est de toutes les manières condamnés à terme:

- d'une part, elles sont <u>statiques</u> en ce sens qu'elles offrent un portrait des familles/ménages à plusieurs instants dans le temps sans qu'il soit possible de relier entre eux chacun de ces portraits et
- d'autre part, elles sont <u>mécaniques</u> au point d'être incapables de nous aider à comprendre pourquoi et comment s'effectueront à l'avenir les transformations sociales amorcées depuis deux ou trois décennies.

Caractère statique

Les méthodes examinées plus haut reposent sur une image de la structure des familles/ménages à divers instants dans le temps sans toutefois fournir d'indications sur le passage d'une image à l'autre. En termes plus techniques, elles nous renseignent sur le stock de ménages attendu à la fin de chaque intervalle de projection mais ne produisent pas une information suffisante pour faire le lien avec le stock à la fin de l'intervalle précédent.

Certes, comme le souligne Kono (1987) sur la base d'une reformulation de la méthode des taux de chefs dans laquelle individus et chefs sont projetés simultanément plutôt que successivement, 16 ces méthodes sont susceptibles de nous

^{16.}Cette reformulation est fondée sur les principes de la table classique d'activité (Durand et Miller, 1968), le

renseigner sur les flux nets subis par le stock de ménages entre deux instants dans le temps. Mais elles ne nous renseignent pas sur les flux bruts, c'est-à-dire les additions et soustrrations que ce stock de ménages est appelé à subir. A priori, une telle information pourrait être obtenue er modélisant directement le passage vers ou hors du statut de chef, c'est-à-dire les transitions de non-chef à chef et inversement; ce qui donne lieu à une autre classe de méthodes, dites méthodes dynamiques que nous examinerons en détail à partir de la section suivante.

Caractère mécanique

Comme on l'a vu plus haut, la méthode des taux de chefs (et ses extensions) tout comme la méthode de Linke reviennent à appliquer à la population projetée d'un groupe démographique donné un vecteur de distribution selon le statut dans le statuts ménage où la part de chacun des deux est éventuellement divisée en éléments représentatifs du type et/ou la composition démographique des ménages. Mais projection de ce vecteur de distribution sur la base d'une équation estimée à partir de données transversales longitudinales est réalisée mécaniquement avec au plus un effort pour que le vecteur projeté soit un vecteur distribution légitime. La projection en question est largement disconnectée de la réalité et en particulier des événements démographiques responsables des valeurs prises par les différentes entrées du vecteur de distribution, c'est-à-dire, les changements d'états matrimoniaux et l'évolution des modes de vie (pour ce qui est des taux de chefs élémentaires) et de la fécondité (pour la désagrégation du complément à 1 des taux de chefs en éléments représentatifs de la composition

taux de chefs ou de personnes de référence se substituant au taux d'activité.

âge) des familles/ménages. Ce qui veut dire que si l'usage de méthodes dynamiques pour projeter l'évolution des familles/ménages est un "must", il est d'ailleurs fortement désirable que ces méthodes dynamiques mettent l'accent sur la façon dont les événements démographiques pertinents (changements d'états matrimoniaux et fécondité en particulier) affectent la formation et dissolution des ménages.

CHAPITRE 2 : LES MODÈLES DYNAMIQUES

Après avoir longuement examiné les méthodes de projection de ménages affichant un caractère statique, nous passons maintenant à l'examen des méthodes présentant un caractère dynamique.

Nous avons vu plus haut que les méthodes statiques projettent les ménages au moyen de l'application de vecteurs de distribution appropriés à l'ensemble des individus projetés au puissent être qu'ils (encore simultanément). Ces vecteurs de distribution, il est important de le rappeler, sont indépendants l'un de l'autre d'une période à l'autre. Nous avons par ailleurs avancé distinction selon laquelle les méthodes statiques mettant l'accent sur les stocks et les méthodes dynamiques sur les flux. Aussi est-il aisé d'imaginer que les méthodes dynamiques projettent les ménages sur une base identique à celle des méthodes statiques, sauf que cette fois les vecteurs de distribution sont liés entre eux dans le temps. En d'autres termes, les méthodes dynamiques prennent en compte les transitions qu'entre le début et la fin de chaque intervalle de projection les individus effectuent entre les états correspondant aux divers éléments constituant les vecteurs de distribution juste mentionnés.

Le traitement de ces transitions peut être plus ou moins compliqué et donc nous débutons notre examen des méthodes dynamiques par la considération des méthodes se présentant comme de simples extensions dynamiques des méthodes statiques que nous avons précédemment passées en revue.

2.1 Extensions dynamiques des méthodes statiques

On se souviendra que notre analyse des méthodes statiques a permis de mettre en valeur deux manières de passer des individus aux ménages. La première, sous-jacente à la méthode des taux de chefs et ses extensions, consiste à "marquer" les ménages, c'est-à-dire à privilégier un certain nombre d'individus comme représentants des ménages auxquels ils appartiennment tandis que la seconde, spécifique de la méthode de Linke, permet de passer des individus aux ménages au moyen d'une méthode appropriée axée sur la taille des ménages. On ne s'étonnera donc pas de retrouver ces deux manières au niveau des méthodes dynamiques ici pertinentes.

Modèles basés sur la notion de chef de ménage (ou de personne de référence)

Le propre de la majorité des méthodes statiques examinées plus haut est de distinguer parmi les individus projetés les chefs ou, là où l'évolution sociale est plus avancée, les personnes de référence qui dans les deux cas s'identifient avec les ménages-mêmes. En vérité, la "dynamisation" de ces méthodes ne pose guère de difficulté puisqu'elle se résume à la prise en compte explicite de l'acquisition ou de la perte du statut de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence.

Cette prise en compte peut prendre deux formes différentes suivant que les individus sont ou non projetés au préalable, Dans le cas où ils le sont, on peut obtenir aisément les vecteurs de distribution (en chefs et non-chefs) se rapportant au temps t+1 à partir de ceux se rapportant au temps t. En effet, la connaissance de l'ensemble des matrices t_{ij} de dimension 2x2 contenant les probabilités de transition entre

les statuts de chef et non-chef relatives aux individus appartenant aux groupes démographiques j et i au début et à la fin, respectivement, de l'intervalle de projection permet de dériver le vecteur de distribution $p_i(t+1)$ de dimension 2 relatif au groupe démographique i au temps t+1 sur la base de

$$p_{i}(t+1) = j \sum_{j} t_{ij} p_{j}(t)$$
 (2.1)

Telle est la méthode suggérée par Murphy (1991:890-894), laquelle peut sans inconvénient être élargie au cas où le statut de chef est désagrégé de façon à prendre en compte le type et/ou la composition des ménages. Murphy présente d'ailleurs une illustration de sa méthode élargie à la prise en compte du type, en fait de la classe sociale, des ménages.

Cependant, cette méthode de projection des ménages doit être considérée comme approximative, car elle revient à obtenir des distributions en pourcentage d'individus à partir d'autres ne se rapportant pas exactement aux mêmes groupes! Le groupe d'arrivée contient un certain nombre d'individus (ceux nés ou ayant immigré entre les temps t et t+1) qui ne font pas partie du groupe de départ et, inversement, ce dernier groupe contient un certain nombre d'individus (ceux décédés ou ayant émigré entre les temps t et t+1) qui ne font pas partie du groupe d'arrivée. Les deux groupes ont cependant en commun un ensemble d'individus (ceux vivant dans l'unité spatiale de référence aux temps t et t+1), auquel se rapportent en fait transition appliquées aux matrices de distributions en pourcentage relatives au groupe de départ. Il s'ensuit que l'extension dynamique de la méthode des méthodes statiques ne peut être réalisée fidèlement sans qu'individus et ménages soient projetés simultanément.

Si on ne peut ou veut projeter les individus au préalable, une méthodologie appropriée est nécessaire pour les projeter simultanément. Parmi les caractéristiques démographiques des individus considérés dans la méthode des taux de chefs, séparons l'âge des autres auxquelles on ajoute par ailleurs une caractéristique indiquant le statut éventuel de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence. Soit x une variable représentative de l'âge, i un indice représentatif des groupes démographiques issue du croisement des autres caractéristiques (y compris le statut éventuel de chef) et n_i X(t) le nombre de personnes qui au temps t sont d'âge (x, x+n-1) où n est la longueur de l'intervalle de projection et appartiennent au groupe i. Alors le nombre d'individus n_i X+1(t+1) s'obtient à partir de

$$-n_i^{x+1}(t+1) = {}_{j}\Sigma s_{ij}^x n_j^x(t)$$
 (2.2)

où $\mathbf{s_{ij}}^{\mathbf{x}}$ est la fraction des individus âgés $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x+n-1})$ et appartenant au groupe j au temps t qui appartiennent au groupe i n années plus tard. Cette formule ne s'applique bien sûr que dans le cas d'une population fermée et, dans le cas d'une population ouverte, requiert l'addition d'un vecteur représentatif des immigrants $\mathbf{m_i}^{\mathbf{x+1}}$ qui sont âgés $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x+n-1})$ et appartiennent au groupe i à la fin de l'intervalle de projection.

$$n_i^0(t+1) = i \in E^{\Sigma} b_{ij}^{X} n_j(t)$$

 Dans le cas du premier groupe d'âge s'ajoute un terme représentatif des nouveaux-nés survivants issus des femmes ayant immigré entre les temps t et t+1.

Dans le cas du premier groupe d'âge, cette formule fait place à

où b_{ij}^x est le nombre de nouveaux-nés issus de femmes âgées (x, x+n-1)au temps t qui survivent et appartiennent au groupe i au temps t+1 (F désignant l'ensemble des groupes de personnes de sexe féminin).

Dans ces conditions, le nombre total de ménages c(t+1) attendu au temps t+1 s'obtient très simplement à partir de

$$c(t+1) = _{i \in H^{\Sigma}} _{x^{\Sigma}} n_{i}^{x}(t+1)$$
 (2.3)

où H désigne l'ensemble des catégories d'individus identifiés comme chefs de ménage (personnes de référence).

Tout comme la précédente, cette méthode peut sans inconvénient être élargie au cas où le statut de chef (personne de référence) est désagrégé de façon à prendre en compte le type et/ou la composition des ménages. Il suffit en effet de croiser le statut éventuel de chef de ménage par une variable représentative du type et/ou la composition des ménages. Une telle généralisation de la méthode a été explorée par van Wissen et Rima (1987) pour la réalisation de projections de ménages suivant la taille (1, 2, 3 et 4+ personnes). 3

Modèles axés sur la taille des ménages par type

Plutôt que de privilégier certains individus comme chefs de ménage ou personnes de référence comme dans les modèles décrits ci-dessus, certains modèles classent les individus par type de ménage d'appartenance selon le même principe que la méthode de Linke. Dans un premier temps, ils projettent les individus par type de ménage d'appartenance en ayant recours au même algorithme de projection que précédemment (chaque vecteur n_i x contenant cette fois autant d'éléments que de groupes d'appartenance). Puis la taille de chaque type de

^{3.} De même que la méthode des taux de chefs, ce modèle ne garantit en rien que la taille moyenne des ménages de 4 personnes et plus est au moins égale à 4 personnes.

ménage étant connue (soit $_k$ t la taille des ménages de type $_k$), ils regroupent les individus projetés précédemment en ménages. Si $_k n_i$ * est le nombre d'individus d'âge (x, x+n-1) appartenant au groupe i et faisant partie d'un ménage de type $_k$, alors le nombre $_k$ c de ménages de type $_k$ s'obtient simplement à partir de

$$k^{c} = (i^{\epsilon} x^{\epsilon} k^{\epsilon} i^{\epsilon}) / k^{\epsilon}$$
 (2.4)

Une telle méthodologie est particulièrement adaptée au cas où les ménages sont distingués selon la taille comme dans le cas du modèle de l'Université de Gothenburg (Hårsman et Snickars, 1983; Holmberg, 1987) où sont distinguées cinq catégories de ménages (k = 1, 2, 3, 4 et 5+ personnes avec 5+t = 5,25). A noter qu'elle est également applicable au cas où la taille moyenne de chaque catégorie ne découle pas de sa définition même mais est connue de manière exogène. Mais en ce cas on introduit une information non endogène qui a l'heur de saper le caractère dynamique du modèle.

Pour résumer, on peut donc remédier sans difficulté au caractère statique des deux types de méthodologie examinés à la section 1. Au lieu de définir la répartition au temps t des individus considérés indépendemment de celle constatée au temps t-1, on la lie à cette dernière en mettant l'accent sur les changements de catégories intervenus au temps t+1 par rapport au temps t entre les diverses catégories considérées, que ces catégories représentent le statut éventuel de chef de ménage comme dans la méthode des taux de chefs ou le type de ménages d'appartenance comme dans la méthode de Linke. A noter cependant que la dynamisation en question n'est pleinement

^{4.} Dans la réalité, ce modèle est plus complexe dans la mesure où, comme on le verra plus loin, il distingue parmi les ménages d'au moins deux personnes ceux avec ou sans enfant.

justifiée dans le second cas que si les types de ménages considérés se traduisent par une taille bien définie. Il s'ensuit que la dynamisation des méthodes statiques ne nous laisse, dans le cas général, qu'avec un seul type de modèles qui, malheureusement, a l'inconvénient de faire toujours appel à la notion de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence.

2.2 Autres modèles dynamiques

Comme on vient de le voir ci-dessus, les extension dynamiques des méthodes statiques conventionnelles sont loin d'être satisfaisantes. D'une part, les modèles du premier type reposent sur la notion de chef de ménage devenue aujourd'hui désuète. D'autre part, ceux du second type ne concernent que la situation particulière où les ménages sont distingués selon leur taille.

Aussi, convaincus de la nécessité de s'affranchir de la notion de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence, certains modélisateurs ont cru bon d'assigner aux individus une "étiquette" représentative du type de ménages desquels ils font partie avant de les regrouper en ménages par la suite.

Sur le plan méthodologique, l'adoption de cette alternative consistant à étiqueter les individus n'a guère de conséquences puisque le modèle décrit plus haut demeure valide, avec la seule différence que le type de ménages d'appartenance remptace le statut éventuel de chef de ménage ou de personne de référence. Pourtant une fois projetés les individus par type de ménage, il reste à les regrouper en ménages; une opération pour laquelle, contrairement à ce qui passait dans le cas des versions dynamiques des méthodes de projection conventionnelles, aucune méthode ne s'impose a priori.

l'absence d'une telle méthode, certains n'ont trouvé d'autre solution que de s'inspirer de l'une ou l'autre des méthodes statiques de la section 1 mettant l'accent sur la composition des ménages. Ainsi, dans la première version du modèle LIPRO (LIPRO 1), Keilman et van Dam (1987) ont, pour passer des individus aux ménages, fait appel à la méthode d'Akkerman qui, on le sait, est problématique. De fait, appliquant cette méthode séparément pour chaque type ménage, ils ont obtenu pour plusieurs types de ménages un vecteur de ménages selon le groupe démographique du chef présentant des entrées non-positives! Devant un tel résultat, Keilman et van Dam ont eu recours à une solution très pragmatique (et peu satisfaisante sur un plan méthodologique) consistant à regrouper les groupes démographiques utilisés jusque là en groupes de plus en plus larges jusqu'à éliminer l'apparition de toute entrée non-positive.

En fait, Keilmann et van Dam auraient pu utiliser la même information à leur disposition pour s'appuyer, en lieu et place de la méthode d'Akkerman, sur l'extension de la méthode des taux de chefs à la prise en compte de la composition démographique qui elle, on le sait, est une méthode légitime.

Quoiqu'il en soit, le recours à la méthode d'Akkerman ou à toute autre méthode statique du même acabit n'est pas satisfaisante car elle revient (1) à faire appel à une information exogène volumineuse et (2) à réintroduire la notion de taux de chefs de ménages; ce que précisément avec le type de modèles ici considéré on cherchait à rejeter aux oubliettes.

Une autre possibilité est de recourir à une technique de regroupement identique ou similaire à celle sous-jacente à la

méthode de Linke. En ce cas, on regroupe les individus faisant partie d'un type donné de ménages avant de diviser le chiffre obtenu par la taille moyenne correspondante (s'il s'agit de l'ensemble des individus) ou un ratio approprié (s'il s'agit seulement d'une partie de ces individus).

Un exemple de ce type de regroupement est fourni par le modèle PRIMOS développé par Gordijn et Heida (1985). Dans ce modèle, les individus vivant hors institution sont classés selon quatre statuts: enfant, adulte jamais marié, adulte anciennement marié ou cohabitant et adulte présentement marié ou cohabitant. Etant donné la simplicité de ces statuts, le nombre total de ménages est simplement égal au nombre d'adultes vivant seuls plus celui des adultes anciennement mariés ou cohabitants et à t fois le nombre d'adultes mariés ou cohabitants où t, un nombre légèrement supérieur à deux, représente un ratio exogène du nombre de ménages comprenant au moins deux adultes au nombre d'adultes faisant partie de tels ménages (Brouwer, 1988). Là encore, il est fait appel à une information exogène qui, quoique de nature plus réduite, contribue également à affaiblir le caractère dynamique de la méthodologie utilisé.

Ainsi, la possibilité de développer un modèle dynamique d'évolution des familles/ménages qui soit satisfaisant achoppe-t-elle sur une question particulièrement épineuse, à savoir le regroupement des individus en ménages.

2.3 Estimation et projection des intrants

Par ailleurs, une difficulté pratique que posent les modèles dynamiques, qu'il s'agisse ou non d'extensions des méthodes statiques conventionnelles, a trait aux intrants, c'est-à-dire

aux quantités s_{ij}^{x} relatives aux changements de catégories démographiques entre les temps t et t+1.

En règle générale, on n'a pas le loisir d'observer tous les transferts effectués par les individus au cours de la période de référence. Tout au plus peut-on mesurer à l'aide d'un recensement ou d'une enquête rétrospective, les changements de catégorie résultant d'une comparison directe des catégories occupées au début et à la fin de la période de référence. Il n'est pas rare que ces changements aient trait à une période assez longue, atteignant 5 ans ou même plus. Ainsi, Murphy (1990) utilise des données en provenance d'un jumelage de deux recensements britanniques pris à dix ans de distance.

Le fait est que la longueur de la période de référence détermine la largeur des groupes d'âge et que si l'on désire effectuer des projections de ménages sur une base annuelle il faut nécessairement disposer de changements de catégorie entre le début et la fin d'une même année et, qui plus est, se rapportant à des groupes d'âge d'un an. Comme on vient de le voir, c'est loin d'être toujours le cas de sorte que l'on doit souvent se contenter de changements de catégorie entre le début et la fin d'une période quinquennale se rapportant à des groupes d'âge de cinq ans.

Une fois les intrants (s_{ij}^x) estimés sur la période de référence, il reste à déterminer leurs valeurs attendues dans le futur. Bien souvent, en l'absence d'information additionnelle sur leur évolution passée, le modélisateur n'a d'autre solution que de les garder constants. Une telle hypothèse a évidemment pour conséquence de rendre l'évolution des changements de catégorie d'un groupe d'âge donné indépendante de celle des autres groupes. Il s'agit là d'une

hypothèse extrêmement forte que certains trouvent fort irritante.

Aussi les auteurs du modèle de l'Université de Gothenburg ontils fait appel à une méthode d'optimisation qui, au sens de la théorie de l'information, est la plus proche d'une prévision. Basée sur le principe de l'information minimale (Harsman and Marsjo, 1977 Snickars and weibull, 1977), elle a pour but de minimiser l'ensemble des écarts entre changements de catégorie attendus et observés sur la période de référence.

Tel que déjà indiqué plus haut, ce modèle est axé sur les transitions effectuées par les individus -- entre le début et la fin de chaque intervalle de projection -- entre cinq catégories de ménages distingués selon la taille (1, 2, 3, 4 et 5+ personnes. D'un point de vue formel, il se présente comme un modèle d'optimisation dont l'objectif est de minimiser l'ensemble des transitions attendues et celui des transitions observées lors d'une période antérieure

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}^{\Sigma}} \mathbf{i}^{\Sigma} \mathbf{j}^{\Sigma} \mathbf{p}_{ij}^{\mathbf{x}} \ln \left(\mathbf{p}_{ij}^{\mathbf{x}} / \mathbf{Q}_{ij}^{\mathbf{x}}\right) \tag{2.5}$$

avec pour contraintes

$$_{i\Sigma} P_{ij}^{x} = P_{i}^{x}$$
 (2.6)

et

$$i \Sigma j \Sigma P_{ij}^{X} = P...^{X}$$
 (2.7)

où P_{ij} x est le nombre projeté de personnes d'âge x qui appartiennent à un ménage de type i au début de la période et à un ménage de type j à la fin de la période

- P_i. * est le nombre initial de personnes d'âge x appartenant à un ménage de type i au début de la période
 - p. x est le nombre projeté au préalable de personnes du groupe d'âge x à la fin de la période et
 - Q_{ij} * est le nombre de personnes d'âge x qui appartiennent à un ménage de type i au début de la période de référence et à un ménage de type j à la fin de cette période.

A noter que dans une version améliorée du modèle, les catégories de ménages de deux personnes et plus sont subdivisés en deux sous-catégories selon qu'il existe ou non des enfants présents d'où un total de 9 types de ménages d'appartenance. En ce cas, le modèle précédent demeure valide mais, étant donné la nouvelle typologie de catégories, un certain nombre de contraintes lient les individus appartenant aux ménages de deux personnes ou plus avec enfants viennent s'ajouter aux contraintes précédentes. De manière spécifique, ces contraintes stipulent que

- a) le nombre d'enfants dans les ménages de 2 personnes avec enfants est égale au nombre d'adultes dans la même catégorie de ménages et que
- b) le nombre d'enfants dans les ménages de 3, 4 et 5+ personnes doit être au moins égal au nombre de ménages dans cette catégorie.

En guise de conclusion à cette sous-section, on peut donc dire que les paramètres relatifs aux changements d'état (de type de ménages) intervenant dans les modèles dynamiques ne sont guère plus parlants que les paramètres des méthodes statiques relatifs à la distribution des individus en chefs et non-chefs (éventuellement précisée selon le type de ménage). Dès lors, il n'y a guère d'autre solution que de les projeter de manière

assez simple (par exemple, en les gardant constants), mais comme l'on bien vu les auteurs du modèle de Gothenburg, une telle solution ne manque pas de poser un problème de cohérence entre les individus qu'ils proposent de résoudre à l'aide d'un modèle d'optimisation.

2.4 Un modèle dynamique d'application générale: le modèle LIPRO 2.0

Pour Willekens (1985), la modélisation des ménages doit s'appuyer sur un ensemble d'états (entre lesquels se déplacent les individus) reflétant non seulement le type de ménage d'appartenance mais aussi leur rôle dans le ménage:

"The type and the strength of the relations among household members constitute the basis for household definition. In other words, the definition of a household is in terms of the relations among its members" (Willekens, 1985:2).

A partir du moment où les états entre lesquels se déplacent les individus reflètent non seulement le type de ménage auquel ils appartiennment mais aussi leur rôle dans le ménage, la difficulté signalée plus haut de regrouper les individus en ménages disparaît. Pour un type de ménages donné, la connaissance du rôle des individus dans le ménage permet de déduire de la présence d'un ou plusieurs individus ayant le ou les rôles requis le nombre de ménages constitués. Néanmoins, dans le cas où un type de ménages donné requiert la présence d'au moins deux individus de rôles donnés il importe que le nombre des individus en question concordent entre eux. Ainsi, dans le cas des familles époux-épouses, il faut autant d'époux que d'épouses une contrainte analogue à celle sous-jacente à la "réconciliation" des deux sexes dans les modèles de

nuptialité (Keilman, 1985). Évidemment, plus la classification des individus selon les modalités de vie est détaillée, plus le nombre de contraintes liant les individus appartenant à un même état augmente en nombre et en complexité.

A l'occasion du développement d'une version améliorée du modèle LIPRO (LIPRO 2.0),5 van Imhoff (1990) a fourni une solution générale à ce problème de cohérence qui comme on va le voir permet un regroupement satisfaisant des individus en ménages.

Puisqu'il se situe dans la perspective de modèles dynamiques, van Imhoff approche ce problème en ajustant les nombres initiaux d'événements de telle sorte que les contraintes éventuelles liant les individus à l'intérieur de chaque type de ménages soient satisfaites.

Pour fins d'illustration, considérons un simple modèle de changements d'état matrimonial où il existe quatre états: (1) jamais marié(e); (2) présentement marié(e); (3) divorcé(e); et (4) veuf(ve). Dans ce cas, la contrainte selon laquelle le nombre d'hommes présentement mariés est égal au nombre de femmes présntement mariées est simplement prescrite au moyen de quatre conditions relatives aux changements d'état matrimonial:

- Nombre d'hommes s'étant mariés = nombre de femmes s'étant mariées
- Nombre d'hommes ayant divorcé = nombre de femmes ayant divorcé
- 3. Nombre d'hommes devenus veufs = nombre de femmes mariées ayant décédé

^{5.} A signaler que le modèle LIPRO 2.0 est un modèle opérationnel écrit en Turbo Pascal.

4. Nombre d'hommes mariés ayant décédé = nombre de femmes devenues veuves.

La procédure par laquelle ces ajustements sont réalisés consiste à trouver un vecteur ajusté des événements satisfaisant les conditions de cohérence aussi proche que possible du vecteur de ces évéments initialement calculé.

Soit $N = G(\Phi)$ le vecteur des événements calculés et $n = g(\phi)$ le vecteur des événements ajustés où Φ et ϕ sont les valeurs calculées et ajustées des paramètres du modèle. L'algorithme de cohérence consiste à trouver la valeur de ϕ qui minimise la fonction d'écart $F(\Phi, \phi)$ entre les événements calculés et les événements ajustés sous la contrainte $A n(\phi) = c$ où A et c sont une matrice et un vecteur appropriés.

En partant d'une expression quadratique de la fonction F

$$P = (n - N) \hat{N}^{-2p} (n - N)^{T}$$
 (2.8)

où $\mathbf{Y^T}$ dénote la matrice transposée de \mathbf{Y} et $\mathbf{N_X}$ une matrice diagonale dont la diagonale est identique au vecteur \mathbf{N} , van Imhoff montre que le vecteur \mathbf{n} ne peut être dérivé que si $\mathbf{p}=0$ ou \mathbf{Y} . Dans le premier cas, cela conduit à des ajustements égaux en termes absolus (généralisation de la méthode de la moyenne arithmétique) alors que dans le second cas cela mène à des ajustements égaux en termes relatifs (généralisation de la méthode de la moyenne harmonique).

A signaler que pour chacun de ces deux cas les ajustements effectués au niveau de l'ensemble des groupes d'âge se traduisent par des ajustements de même nature au niveau des groupes d'âge, ce qui a l'avantage de grandement simplifier les calculs.

En conclusion, on peut abandonner la notion de chef de ménage et néanmoins obtenir automatiquement les ménages des individus pourvu que:

- (1) l'ensemble des rôles individuels auxquels donnent lieu les divers types de ménages distingués constituent l'ensemble des états entre lesquels les individus se déplacent et
- (2) un ensemble de contraintes numériques liant les individus de deux ou plusieurs états soit satisfait au moyen d'une méthode d'optimisation appropriée.

^{6.} Ne pourrait-on pas élargir la méthode d'optimisation retenue de façon à prendre en compte, comme dans le modèle de l'Université de Gothenburg, les inégalités qui affectent les membres de certains types de ménages?

L'objectif de ce troisième chapitre est d'examiner une classe particulière de modèles dynamiques: la classe des modèles servant à décrire et anticiper l'évolution des familles nucléaires. Plus précisément, il s'agit de modèles qui visent à projeter la population féminine selon l'âge et l'état matrimonial tout en précisant le nombre et l'âge des enfants vivant auprès d'elles. Les modèles construits à date qui se réclament de cette classe se comptent sur les doigts de la main. Ils se subdivisent en deux groupes d'envergures assez différentes. Le premier qui s'appuie sur la notion de probabilité d'agrandisement des familles (Pressat, 1972) est avant tout axé sur les enfants tandis que le second qui fait appel aux méthodes et modèles de la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle met l'accent sur les mères.

3.1 Modèles basés sur la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles

A notre connaissance, deux modèles entrent dans cette catégorie: l'un a été construit en France par Rallu (1986) et l'autre aux Pays-Bas par Kuijsten (1986). Bien que développés indépendemment, ils témoignent d'une morphologie commune du fait même de la décision de leurs auteurs respectifs de recourir à la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles. Cependant, la spécificité des objectifs ayant présidé à la construction de ces deux modèles a donné lieu à des techniques d'application assez différentes qui se traduisent par des différences importantes au niveau de leur mise en oeuvre.

Ci-dessous, nous présentons les principes généraux communs ayant présidé à la construction de ces deux modèles avant de passer en revue les détails de chacun des deux modèles.

Principes généraux communs

Pour Rallu et Kuijsten, la projection des familles nucléaires requiert une approche par cohorte consistant à mettre en évidence l'évolution de toutes les cohortes annuelles de femmes qui au départ de la projection (au ler janvier de l'année ♦) -- ou au terme de la projection (le 31 décembre ϕ + π) si les résultats de la projection ne sont pas requis pour les années intermédiaires -- sont susceptibles d'avoir auprès d'elles des enfants d'âge inférieur à une limite supérieure donnée. Mais alors que Rallu considère les générations successives de femmes nées en une même année, Kuijsten met l'accent sur les cohortes successives de femmes ayant contracté un premier mariage en une même année. En dépit de cette différence, qui a pour effet de conduire Kuijsten à subdiviser chaque cohorte annuelle de premiers mariages en sous-cohortes représentatives de grands groupes d'âge, les deux modèles procèdent de la même manière au moyen de trois étapes successives appliquées à chacune des cohortes pertinentes:

- tape 1: Détermination des naissances survenues aux membres de la cohorte selon l'année et le rang en s'appuyant sur un jeu de probabilités d'agrandissement des familles et d'intervalles entre naissances.
- Etape 2: Détermination de l'état matrimonial des mères au moment de la naissance puis à chaque année dans le temps au moyen d'un sous-modèle de changements d'état matrimonial (tenant également compte de la mortalité.

indication de l'état matrimonial de la mère et du rang dans la famille (obtenu en soustrayant du rang de naissance le nombre d'aînés décédés) et par suite (sur la base du pricipe que les mères ayant renfants auprès d'elles s'obtient en soustrayant les naissances survivantes de rang (r+1) de celles de rang r) du nombre de mères selon l'état matrimonial et le nombre d'enfants présents.1

Dans les deux cas, la projection s'effectue sur une base annuelle mais, étant donné les techniques d'application assez différentes utilisées pour chacun des deux modèles, seul le modèle de Kuijsten fournit des valeurs projetées pour chacune des années de la période de projection. Le modèle de Rallu ne fournit de valeurs projetées que pour l'horizon (le terme) de la période de projection.

Le modèle de Rallu²

Destiné à anticiper l'évolution du montant des allocations familiales versées aux mères d'enfants de 16 ans et moins, ce modèle met l'accent sur les naissances issues des cohortes de femmes nées dans une même année.

(1) #tape 1

 Du fait que la méthodologie utilisée met l'accent sur les naissances survenant aux membres de chaque cohorte, cette dernière étape fournit également sans peine l'âge des enfants de chaque rang (dans la famille).

^{2.} Les divers documents disponibles se rapportant à ce modèle (Festy et Rallu, 1981; Rallu, 1985; Rallu, 1986a; Rallu, 1986b) sont de nature littéraire de sorte que la description analytique que nous présentons ci-dessous découle de notre propre interprétation de ces documents et donc ne reproduit que plus ou moins fidèlement les équations effectivement utilisées par Rallu.

Afin de décrire et projeter les naissances survenues dans chaque cohorte selon la durée écoulée depuis l'année d'origine de la cohorte et le rang de naissance p, Rallu a recours à la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles ou, plus précisément, à la probabilité ap qu'une femme de parité p (ayant déjà mis p enfants au monde) en ait un autre par la suite.

Soit une cohorte de femmes nées en une année donnée t dont la taille initiale est de l. Si $\alpha_{x+i,p}$ désigne la proportion des naissances de rang p+1 survenues en l'année t+x+i chez les femmes ayant eu leur naissance de rang p en l'année t+x [$i \Sigma \alpha_{x+i,p} = 1$], alors le nombre d'enfants $B_{y,p+1}$ mis au monde par les membres de cette cohorte en l'année t+y alors qu'elles sont de parité p vérifie la relation

$$B_{y,p+1} = y=0, ..., x^{\sum B_{x,p}} a_p \alpha_{y-x,p}$$
 $p > 0$ (3.1)

avec

$$B_{y,1} = 1 \ a_0 \ \alpha_{y,0} \tag{3.2}$$

auquel cas y correspond à l'année t+y en laquelle survient la naissance de rang 1.

A première vue, l'utilisation des relations ci-dessus requiert de déterminer l'ensemble des $B_{Y,p}$ pour chaque valeur de p successivement mais, alternativement, on peut déterminer l'ensemble des $B_{Y,p}$ pour chaque valeur de y successivement car

$$B_{y,p+1} = 1 y^{\Sigma} x=0..y^{\Sigma} \cdots j=0..k^{\Sigma} i=0..j^{\Sigma}$$

$$a_0 \alpha_{i,0} a_1 \alpha_{j-i,1} \cdots a_{p-1} \alpha_{x-w} a_p \alpha_{y-x,p}$$
(3.3)

où les a_p et $\alpha_{Z,p}$ sont des quarrités dont les valeurs doivent être projetées tant que la période de fécondité de la cohorte concernée n'est pas terminée.

A noter que, puisque les naissances sont d'autant plus rapprochées que la taille finale des familles est élevée, Rallu utilise pour chaque valeur de r > 0 deux jeux de valeurs de $\alpha_{z,r}$: le premier $(1^{\alpha}_{z,r})$ caractérise les naissances qui sont suivies d'une autre tandis que le second $(2^{\alpha}_{z,r})$ caractérise celles qui ne le sont pas. Plus précisément, tous les termes de type $\alpha_{z,r}$ figurant dans la version de l'équation (3.3) utilisée en pratique sont issus du premier jeu sauf le dernier $\alpha_{y-x,p}$. Puisque par définition une proportion ap+1 des naissances de rang p est suivie d'une autre et une proportion (1 - ap+1) ne l'est pas, $\alpha_{y-x,p}$ s'évalue comme ap+1 $1\alpha_{y-x,p}$ + (1-ap+1) $2\alpha_{y-x,p}$ de sorte que:

$$B_{y,p+1} = 1 \quad y^{\Sigma} \quad x=0...y^{\Sigma} \quad \cdots \quad j=0...k^{\Sigma} \quad i=0...j^{\Sigma}$$

$$a_{0} \quad 1^{\alpha}i, \quad 0 \quad \alpha_{1} \quad 1^{\alpha}j-i, \quad 1 \quad \cdots \quad \alpha_{p-1} \quad 1^{\alpha}x-w$$

$$a_{p} \quad \{ap+1 \quad 1^{\alpha}y-x, p \quad + \quad (1-ap+1) \quad 2^{\alpha}y-x, p\}$$

$$(3.4)$$

En pratique, les équations décrites ci-dessus s'appliquent aux générations successives de femmes nées à partir de l'année T correspondant à la génération de femmes la plus ancienne susceptible d'avoir encore des enfants auprès d'elles au terme de la projection³ (car comme on le verra plus loin le traitement choisi pour le traitement de l'étape 2 a pour conséquence de rendre fictifs les résultats pour les années intermédiaires). Cependant, les données de

^{3.} Avec comme hypothèses que la période de fécondité se termine à l'âge de 49 ans et que seuls les enfants de 16 ans et moins sont réputés vivre auprès de leur mère, l'opérationalisation de ce modèle requiert en principe la considération de toutes lehs générations féminines nées dans les 50 + 16 = 66 années précédant le (premier) horizon de la projection (1/1/90), soit depuis 1923.

fécondité relatives à ces générations sont plus ou moins complètes de sorte que l'information antérieure au point de départ de la projection (le 1/1/1984) ne peut pas toujours être observée. Aussi le modèle est-il utilisé sur le mode projection dès l'année T, ce qui permet de recouvrer l'information manquante relative au passé.

En vérité, Rallu distingue les naissances légitimes (survenues dans le mariage) des naissances illégitimes (survenues hors mariage). Un tel traitement non seulement contribue à la détermination de l'état matrimonial des mères mais aussi a l'heur de permettre la prise en compte de jeux d'intervalles entre naissances spécifiques aux deux types de naissances. Brièvement, la détermination des naissances illégitimes $^{11}B_{y,p+1}$ se fait sur la base de la relation (3.1) dans laquelle les termes $B_{x,p}$, a_p et $\alpha_{y-x,p}$ figurant dans le membre de droite se rappportent aux naissances illégitimes 4

$$^{i1}B_{y,p+1} = y^{\Sigma} ^{i1}B_{x,p} ^{i1}a_{p} ^{i1}\alpha_{y-x,p}$$
 (3.5)

avec

$$il_{B_{y,1}} = 1 \quad il_{a_0} \quad il_{\alpha_{y,0}}$$
 (3.6)

où ^{il}a₀ est la probabilité pour une femme de la génération t d'avoir une première naissance qui soit illégitime.

Quant à la détermination des naissances légitimes 1 B $_{y,p+1}$, elle s'effectue sur la base de la même relation dans laquelle le terme $B_{x,p}$ se rapporte à l'ensemble des

^{4.} La probabilité d'agrandissement a_p est ici la probabilité pour une femme ayant eu p naissances illégitimes d'avoir une (p+1) ième naissance illégitime

naissances et les termes a_p et $\alpha_{y-x,p}$ aux naissances légitimes 5

$${}^{1}B_{y,p+1} = {}_{y^{\Sigma}} ({}^{1}B_{x,p} + {}^{i1}B_{x,p}) {}^{1}a_{p} {}^{1}\alpha_{y-x,p}$$
 (3.7)

avec

$$^{1}B_{y,1} = 1 ^{1}a_{0} ^{1}\alpha_{y,0}$$
 (3.8)

où ^la₀ est la la probabilité pour une femme de la génération t d'avoir une première naissance qui soit légitime.

Les équations ci-dessus se rapportent en principe à un pays sujet à aucune migration externe. Néanmoins, compte tenu de la façon dont on mesure habituellement les probabilités d'agrandissement des familles, les naissances auxquelles ellles donnent lieu rendent compte de l'ensemble des naissances survenues dans le pays. Ainsi elles comprennent les naissances des immigrées survenues après l'installation dans le pays. Par contre, elles ne rendent pas compte de celles survenues avant l'installation au pays. Afin d'évaluer ces naissances par âge de la mère et par rang, 6 Rallu applique aux effectifs d'étrangères immigrées des taux de fécondité par âge et rang jugés appropriés. 7

^{5.} Dans ce cas, la probabilité d'agrandissement ap représente la probabilité qu'une femme ayant eu p naissances, légitimes ou non, ait une (p+1) lème naissance qui soit légitime.

^{6.} En limitant l'impact des migrations externes à ces seules naissances, Rallu ignore donc les sorties d'enfants d'étrangers nés en France et les mouvements de Français de naissance.

^{7.} Il s'agit en fait de taux par âge de l'Algérie répartis par rang comme en Bulgarie au début de ce siècle, ensuite ajustés de façon que le nombre de naissances antérieures au dernier recensement soit égal à l'effectif recensé des enfants immigrés.

deux ou trois dernières décennies. De fait, depuis déjà plusieurs années, les bureaux statistiques d'un certain nombre de pays développés ont, pour fins statistiques, remplacé l'identification d'un chef de ménage par la désignation d'une personne de référence, définie de manière aussi neutre que possible, c'est-à-dire en dehors de toute relation de pouvoir à l'intérieur du ménage. Dans la foulée, cela a conduit à remplacer le concept de taux de chefs par celui de taux de personnes de référence, sans pour autant invalider les méthodes décrites plus haut qui s'appliquent mutatis mutandis.

A noter qu'il n'existe aucun consensus sur la façon de désigner la personne de référence. Pour certains bureaux statistiques nationaux, cette désignation est laissée au hasard. Ainsi, au Royaume-uni, la personne de référence est la première personne du ménage ayant 15 ans et plus entrée sur le formulaire du recensement rempli par chaque ménage. Mais, pour d'autres bureaux statistiques, la désignation de la personne de référence s'effectue sur la base d'un critère économique bien précis. Aux États-Unis, c'est la personne qui est légalement propriétaire ou locataire du logement où réside le ménage 11 tandis qu'au Canada c'est la personne qui est responsable des paiements du ménage.

Devant cette situation et aussi parce que, sur le plan de la modélisation des familles/ménages, la désignation d'une personne de référence autre que celle définie sur le plan de la collecte de l'information peut être avantageuse, certains ont préconisé de retenir, dans la mesure du possible, une femme plutôt qu'un homme. Par rapport aux hommes, les femmes se marient plus tôt, vivent plus longtemps et, en cas de

^{11.} Mais au cas où le logement est possédé ou loué conjointement par les deux époux d'un couple marié, ce peut être aussi bien l'époux que l'épouse.

Soit $e, z_{B_X,p}$ le nombre de naissances de rang p survenues dans l'année t+x aux immigrantes de l'année t+z $(x \le z)$. Dans ces conditions, le nombre total de naissances de rang p survenues en l'année t+x aux membres de la génération t (y) compris les immigrées présents à la fin de l'année t+y s'écrit:

$$N_{x,p}[y] = {}^{1}B_{x,p} + {}^{1}{}^{1}B_{x,p} + z=0 ... y^{\Sigma} {}^{e,z}B_{x,p}]$$
 (3.9)

A partir de là, le nombre de femmes issues de la génération t qui à la fin de l'année t+y sont de parité au moins égale à p n'est autre que

$$N_{\perp}p[\gamma] = \chi \Sigma N_{\chi,p}[\gamma]$$
 (3.10)

Le nombre Ly,p de femmes qui sont de parité p s'obtient alors en soustrayant les femmes de parité au moins égale à (p+1) celles de parité au moins égale à p, c'est-à-dire à partir de

$$L_{y,p} = N_{.,p}[y] - N_{.,p+1}[y]$$
 (3.11)⁸

où $N_{.,0}[y]$ est par définition égal à la taille initiale l de la génération considérée (comprenant les immigrées nées en la même année).

ttant donné la nature de la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles, le cadre comptable ci-dessus ne considère pas la mortalité des femmes au delà de leur naissance la plus récente. Ce phénomène démographique est

^{8.} Evidemment, les diverses quantités lx,p -- dont la somme pour chaque valeur de x est nécessairement égale à la taille l de la cohorte initiale -- incluent ces femmes qui sont décédées après avoir mis au monde leur pième enfant. Celles-ci seront retirées plus loin en mème temps que sera précisé l'état matrimonial des autres.

cependant pris en compte dans le cadre de l'étape suivante du modèle.

(2) Etape 2

L'objectif est avant tout de préciser l'état matrimonial des femmes appartenant à chaque groupe Ly,p. Pour ce faire, Rallu assigne aux mères des naissances survenues dans chaque génération un état matrimonial au moment de la naissance: les naissances légitimes sont naturellement assignées aux femmes mariées tandis que les naissances illégitimes sont assignées uniquement aux femmes célibataires (une hypothèse certes valide dans le passé mais qui s'accorde difficilement avec la réalité d'aujourd'hui). Puis, ignorant encore pour le temps de cette seconde étape la mortalité des enfants, Rallu s'évertue à suivre au long de la période de projection les changements d'états matrimoniaux enregistrés par les mères correspondantes.

De manière spécifique, une telle approche équivaut à déterminer l'évolution avec y du nombre ${}^hN_{x,p}[y]$ de naissances de rang p survenues en l'année t+x à des femmes de la génération t qui à la fin de l'année t+y sont d'état matrimonial h^9 où h=c (célibataire), h=m (mariée), h=d (divorcée) et h=v (veuve). Pour chaque état matrimonial, le passage de y-1 à y requiert de retirer les enfants des femmes décédées au cours de l'année t+y et de celles ayant acquis un autre état matrimonial et d'ajouter celles adoptant l'état matrimonial en question.

Dans le cas où h=m, Rallu retire, pour chaque paire de valeurs de z (z≤y) et p, une proportion $m^{\sigma}_{y,\delta}$ d'enfants

^{9.} La somme des quatre termes de type ${}^hN_{X,p}[y]$ n'est pas égale à $N_{X,p}[y]$ mais en diffère par une quantité représentative des mères ayant décédé avant la fin de l'année t=y.

égale à la fraction des femmes mariées qui meurent en l'année t+y, une proportion $_{m}\sigma_{y,v}$ égale à la fraction de celles qui deviennent veuves ainsi qu'une proportion $_{m}\sigma_{y,d}$ égale à la fraction de celles qui divorcent. L'application de cette dernière proportion, cependant, est réalisée de telle manière que les femmes mariées n'ont qu'un nombre d'enfants de chaque rang égal à celui des femmes mariées de la même génération un an auparavant.

Mais en même temps que d'appliquer ces proportions, il convient d'ajouter les enfants légitimés durant t+y (à retrancher plus loin des familles des femmes célibataires) et les enfants nés à l'étranger des femmes arrivées en t+y. 10 Si $\mu_{\rm Z,p}$ désigne le pourcentage des naissances de rang p qui sont légitimées par suite de mariage z années plus tard, alors nous avons

$${}^{m}N_{x,p}[y] = ({}^{m}N_{x,p}[y-1] + {}^{i1}B_{x,p} \mu_{y-x,p}) (1 - {}_{m}\sigma_{y,\delta} - {}_{m}\sigma_{y,v})$$

$$- {}^{m}N_{x,p}[y-1] {}_{m}\sigma_{y,d} + {}^{e,y}B_{x,p}$$
(pour y>x) (3.12)

avec

$$m_{N_{x,p}[x]} = ({}^{1}B_{x,p} + {}^{i1}B_{x,p} \mu_{0,p}) (1 - {}_{m}\sigma_{x,\delta} - {}_{m}\sigma_{x,v}) + e_{,}x_{B_{x,p}}$$
 (3.13)

A noter que les proportions de veuves et divorcées utilisées par Rallu sont ajustées - au moyen de proportions de remariage selon la durée depuis la dissolution de la première union à l'état civil - de façon à tenir compte des veuves et divorcées qui se remarieront avant l'horizon de la projection. Une conséquence immédiate de ce traitement est

^{10.} Ainsi les naissances survenues avant l'arrivée au pays sont supposées être des naissances intervenues dans le mariage.

que les nombres ${}^mN_{\times,\,p}[y]$ sont des nombres fictifs tant que l'horizon de la projection n'est pas atteint.

Dans le cas où h=c, nous avons

$${}^{c}N_{x,p}[y] = ({}^{c}N_{x,p}[y-1] - {}^{i}{}^{l}B_{x,p} \mu_{y-x,p})$$

$$(1 - {}_{c}\sigma_{y,\delta} - {}_{c}\sigma_{y,m}) \quad (pour y)x) \quad (3.14)$$

avec

$$c_{N_{x,p}[x]} = (i_{x,p}^{i_{x,p}} - i_{x,p}^{i_{x,p}})_{0,p}$$

$$(1 - c_{x,s} - c_{x,m}) \qquad (3.15)$$

Dans le cas où h=v, nous avons

avec

$$\forall N_{x,p}[x] = (^{1}B_{x,p} + ^{i1}B_{x,p} \mu_{0,p}) m^{\sigma}_{x,v}$$
 (3.17)

et finalement dans le cas où h=d

$$d_{N_{x,p}[y]} = d_{N_{x,p}[y-1]} (1 - d_{y,s}) + m_{N_{x,p}[y-1]} m_{y,d} (pour y>x)$$
 (3.18)

avec

$$d_{N_{x,p}[x]} = 0 (3.19)$$

évidemment, les équations ci-dessus ignorent les mouvements de sortie des mères immigrée (c'est-à-dire, n'ayant pas la nationalité française) ainsi que les mouvements (entrées et

sorties) des mères de nationalité française nées à l'étranger, mais aussi celles nées au pays.

Dans ces conditions, les nombres ${}^hN_{.,p}[y]$ et ${}^hL_{y,p}$ de femmes issues de la génération t (y compris les immigrées) qui à la fin de l'année $\emptyset+\pi$ sont d'état matrimonial h et de parité au moins égale à p dans le cas du premier nombre et de parité p dans le cas du second s'obtiennent selon le même principe que plus haut, c'est-à-dire sur la base de (3.10) et (3.11) où chacun des termes p figurant est affecté d'un indice p représentatif de l'état matrimonial. A noter que la formule (3.11) peut, ici également, être étendue au cas p=0 en utilisant des valeurs de p c'est-à-dire du nombre total de membres de la génération p qui sont d'état matrimonial p haut terme de la projection) déterminées sur la base d'un simple modèle de changements d'états matrimoniaux p s'appuyant sur les diverses proportions p p p utilisées précédemment.

En fait, en raison de la baisse de la nuptialité, les femmes mariées représentent une fraction sans cesse décroissante des femmes vivant en couple et donc il ne suffit plus — et il n'est peut-être même plus nécessaire — de distinguer les femmes selon qu'elles sont mariées ou non. Il importe avant tout de les distinguer selon qu'elle vivent ou non avec conjoint. Conscient de cette réalité, Rallu effectue bien le passage de la première à la seconde distinction mais, la méthodologie utilisée à cet effet étant de nature ad hoc, il est inutile de l'examiner ici.

(3) Étape 3

Mais plus que le nombre d'enfants mis au monde à date (parité), c'est le nombre (et l'âge) des enfants encore présents auprès de leur mère qu'il importe de déterminer afin d'éclairer l'évolution des familles. Cette

détermination qui, du fait du traitement de l'état matrimonial dans l'étape 2, est limitée à l'horizon de la projection ($\emptyset + \pi$) s'appuie sur une procédure dans laquelle sont introduits la mortalité des enfants et leur départ du foyer maternel.

Rallu traite d'ailleurs de ce dernier phénomène assez simplement puisqu'il suppose que les enfants quittent tous leur mère dans la seizième année suivant leur naissance. A noter que cette hypothèse a pour corollaire qu'en cas de changement d'état matrimonial de la mère (y compris dans le cas d'un divorce), les enfants continuent nécessairement à vivre auprès de leur mère. 11

Dans ces conditions, la détermination du nombre et de l'âge des enfants présents auprès de leur mère à l'horizon de la projection se limite à la considération des enfants nés au cours des 16 années précédant le terme de la projection.

Quelle est la procédure permettant de passer du rang de naissance p (enfants déjà nés de la mère) au rang r dans la famille (enfants survivants de 16 ans et moins)? En premier lieu, Rallu applique aux naissances de rang 1 survenues en chacune des 16 dernières années t+y une probabilité $p_{\pi+\frac{k_1}{2}}$ de survie jusqu'à l'horizon de la projection. La même opération est effectuée sur les naissances de rang 2 réparties selon l'intervalle avec la première naissance. Les naissances survivantes dont l'aîné(e) a plus de 16 ans à l'horizon de la projection sont alors ajoutées aux naissances survivantes de rang 1 de même qu'une proportion 1 — pa des autres naissances de rang 2 où pa est la probabilité de survie de l'aîné(e). Le reste, soit une

^{11.} Évidemment, les enfants des femmes décédées ne sont pas comptabilisés de sorte qu'au cas où une femme se marie (ou remarie) avec un veuf ayant des enfants d'un précédent mariage les enfants du nouveau mari ne sont pas inclus.

proportion p_a des autres naissances, constitue les enfants de rang 2 dans la famille.

Une opération similaire est effectuée avec les naissances de rang 3 selon les intervalles avec la deuxième et la première naissance (ce dernier étant obtenu par croisement des tableaux de deuxièmes naissances selon l'intervalle avec la première, dans les familles de 3 enfants et plus, et de troisièmes naissances selon l'intervalle avec la deuxième. Selon que les naissances de rangs 1 et 2 ont dépassé ou non 16 ans et selon que, dans le cas où elles ne l'ont pas dépassé, elles soient survivantes, les naissances survivantes de rang 3 sont comptées avec les enfants de rang 1, 2 ou 3 dans la famille.

Les naissances de rang 4 sont réparties selon l'âge avec les trois naissances précédentes en construisant un tableau croisé d'intervalles sur le modèle précédent mais, dans le cas de l'aîné(e), Rallu se contente de savoir si il (elle) a plus de 16 ans, et de plus, s'il (elle) n'a pas atteint cet âge, omet le risque de mortalité.

Au delà du rang 4 (x = 5, 6, ...), les naissances sont réparties selon l'âge avec les quatre naissances précédentes afin de déterminer les cas où l'enfant de rang x - 4 a plus de 16 ans et de distinguer parmi ce cas ceux où l'enfant de rang x - 3 a plus de 16 ans (comme il a été fait pour les ainés dans le cas des enfants de rang 4). Ceci est suffisant car la probabilité pour une naissance de rang x d'âtre reclassée comme enfant survivant de rang 1, 2 ou 3 dans la famille est à peu près nulle si l'enfant de rang x-4 a luimême moins de 16 ans, car cela impliquerait le decès de deux au moins des enfants plus âgés!

En fin de compte, la procédure décrite ci-dessus -- qui curieusement est disjointe de la procédure sous-jacente à

l'étape 1 ayant permis de caractériser au terme de la projection les enfants issus de chaque génération de femmes — permet à Rallu d'obtenir, pour chaque groupe de mères d'âge et d'état matrimonial donnés, un tableau des enfants survivants de 16 ans et moins selon leur âge détaillé et celui de leur aînés éventuels.

Le modèle de Kuijsten

Destiné à servir comme point d'appui à une étude de la participation future des femmes non-célibataires au marché du travail, l'effort de modélisation réalisé par Kuijsten au milieu des années 1970 — à un moment où le nombre de naissances hors mariage (du moins aux Pays-Bas) était encore peu élevé — met l'accent sur les naissances issues de cohortes de femmes ayant contracté leur premier mariage en une même année.

(1) Étape 1

Comme Rallu, Kuijsten a recours à la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles pour décrire et à projeter les naissances survenues dans chaque cohorte selon la durée depuis l'origine de la cohorte (ici depuis l'année de célébration du mariage) et le rang de naissance p.

A première vue, le fait de considérer des cohortes de premiers mariages plutôt que des générations comme le fait Rallu est source de complication. En effet, les femmes d'une même cohorte ne sont plus nées en ume même année et donc ne sont plus soumises au même risque vis-à-vis des divers évènements démographiques auxquels elles sont sujettes. Aussi chaque cohorte de premiers mariages est-elle divisée en cinq sous-cohortes selon l'âge au mariage (qui pour fins de simplification de la formulation des équations du modèle

est l'âge au 31 décembre de l'année dans laquelle le mariage est contracté): 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34 et 35-49). 12

Soit j l'indice désignant chacune des cinq sous-cohortes de femmes contractant leur premier mariage en une même année t dont la taille initiale est $j^{1.13}$ Alors, le nombre de naissances $j^{\rm B}y,p+1$ survenues aux membres de la sous-cohorte $j^{\rm l}$ en l'année t+y alors qu'elles sont de parité p vérifie la relation (3.1) et par suite la relation (3.3) relatives au modèle de Rallu mais où les termes a_p et $\alpha_{y-x,p}$ sont maintenant précédés d'un indice j représentatif de la sous-cohorte d'appartenance. De plus si a_0 (lui aussi précédé de l'indice j) désigne la prrobabilité pour un membre de la cohorte d'avoir un premier enfant; la relation (3.2) relative aux naissances de rang 1 reste également valide, auquel cas y représente la différence entre l'année de la naissance de rang 1 et l'année du mariage.

Il s'ensuit que la considération de cohortes de premiers mariages plutôt que de générations n'affecte pas les équations (3.1)-(3.3) et que donc la complication présumée plus haut se limite à mettre en oeuvre ces équations non pas une seule fois mais autant de fois qu'il y a de sous-cohortes de premiers mariages.

En fait, par rapport au modèle de Rallu, la mise en œuvre de ces équations (pour chaque sous-cohorte) est à la fois plus simple et compliquée. D'une part, elle est plus simple

^{12.}Les premiers mariages de femmes âgées de 50 ans et plus ne sont d'aucun intérêt puiqu'avec une limite supérieure de la période de fécondité placée à 49 ans ils ne peuvent donner lieu à aucune naissance.

^{13.}A souligner que les valeurs de il (i=1, ..., 5) pour les années T appartenent à la période de projection ne sont pas déterminées dans le modèle. Elles sont tout simplement tirées de projections démographiques selon l'état matrimonial réalisées paar le Bureau central de la statistique des Pays-Bas.

puisque (1) toutes les naissances sont réputées avoir lieu dans le mariage et que (2) la migration externe est ignorée. D'autre part, elle est plus compliquée en raison du mécanisme retenu par Kuijsten pour tenir compte du rapprochement des naissances à mesure que la taille de la famille augmente.

Alors que Rallu se contente de retenir deux types d'intervalles selon que les naissances sont suivies d'une autre ou pas, Kuijsten vise à ce que les femmes ayant eu leur première naissance plus tôt(tard) que la moyenne des femmes de la sous-cohorte à laquelle elles appartiennent ait également leur naissance suivante plus(moins) rapidement. A cet effet, il attache au terme $B_{x,p}$ figurant dans le membre droit de l'équation (3.1) un coefficient multiplicatif $\beta_{x,p}$ indicatif de l'arrivée plus précoce (pour les valeurs les plus basses de x) ou plus tardive (pour les valeurs les plus hautes de x) de la naissance de rang p chez les femmes en ayant une $(p+1)^{1\text{ème}}$. L'équation (3.3) devient alors (en omettant l'indice j représentatif de la sous-cohorte de femmes considérées):

$$B_{y,p+1} = x=0 ... y^{\sum \beta_{x,p}} B_{x,p} a_{p} \alpha_{y-x,p}$$
 (3.20)

En pratique, les coefficients $\beta_{x,p}$ ne sont pas indépendants car l'ensemble des naissances de rang donné est connu. En d'autres termes, les coefficients $\beta_{x,p}$ doivent vérifier la relation

$$_{x}\Sigma \beta_{x,p} \beta_{x,p} = _{x}\Sigma \beta_{x,p}$$
 (3.21)

C'est pourquoi, afin de déterminer les naissances de parité (p+1), Kuijsten fait appel à un ensemble prédéterminé de coefficients $\beta_{\rm X,p}$ auxquels il applique un facteur multiplicatif correctif

$$x^{\Sigma}$$
 $B_{x,p}$ / x^{Σ} $B_{x,p}$ $B_{x,p}$

de sorte que les coefficients corrigés $\beta'_{x,p}$ qui en résultent vérifient (3.21). A noter que ce mécanisme requiert la détermination de toutes les naissances de rang 1, puis de toutes celles de rang 2, etc ... même si celles-ci surviennent au delà de l'horizon de la projection!

Dès lors, le nombre Ly,p de femmes issues de la sous-cohorte j de femmes ayant contracté leur premier mariage en l'année t qui à la fin de l'année t+y sont de parité p s'obtient de la même façon que dans le modèle de Rallu, c'est-à-dire sur la base de (3.10) et (3.11).

En pratique, les équations décrites ci-dessus s'appliquent aux cohortes successives de femmes contractant leur premier mariage à partir de l'année T où T correspond à l'année d'origine de la cohorte la plus ancienne de femmes susceptibles d'avoir des enfants auprès d'elles au point de départ de la projection (le 1/1/75) et non pas au terme de la projection (le 1/1/90). Le non pas au terme de la projection (le 1/1/90). Le non pas au terme de fécondité sont plus ou moins complètes de sorte que le modèle est également utilisé selon le mode projection dès l'année T.

(2) Étape 2

La détermination de l'état matrimonial des femmes appartenant à chaque groupe Ly,p est réalisée à l'aide d'un sous-modèle décrivant les mouvements effectués dans chaque sous-cohorte annuelle de premiers mariages entre trois états

^{14.} Puisque seules les femmes de 15 à 49 ans sont considérées dans ce modèle, il suffit ici de considérer toutes les cohortes de femmes ayant contracté leur premier marriage depuis 1941. Mais à mesure que l'on remonte dans le temps, chaque cohorte annuelle se réduit en fait aux sous-cohortes d'âge dont les membres ont nécessairement tous moins de 50 ans au départ de la projection.

matrimoniaux -- 'mariée' (h=m), 'veuve' (h=v), 'divorcée' (h=d) -- et l'état 'décédée' (h = δ).

On sait que, de par l'orientation du modèle, toute naissance survient dans le mariage. De façon plus spécifique, Kuijsten avance la règle que les naissances survenues en l'année t+x sont le fait des femmes mariées au début de l'année (ou des femmes s'étant marié en cours d'année dans le cas où x = 0). Mais, alors que dans la réalité l'état matrimonial de chaque mère est susceptible de changer entre le moment de la naissance et la fin de l'année dans laquelle est survient, Kuijsten exclut une telle possibilité lorsqu'il adopte cette autre règle selon laquelle tout changement d'état matrimonial effectué entre le début et la fin d'une année laisse chaque femme concernée avec la même parité dans le nouvel état matrimonial que dans l'ancien. En raison de l'assimilation de l'état 'décédée' à un état matrimonial, cette seconde règle a pour résultat que toute femme ayant une maissance en l'année t+x n'est pas soumise au risque de mortalité jusqu'à la fin de l'année t+x. Il s'ensuit que le nombre $h_{N_{x,D}}[x]$ d'enfants issus des naissances de rang p survenues en l'année t+x et dont la mère à la fin de cette même année est d'état matrimonial h est donné par

$$h_{N_{x,p}[x]} = B_{x,p}$$
 si $h = m$ (3.21)

et

$$h_{N_{x,p}[x]} = 0$$
 si $h = v$, d ou δ (3.22)

Par ailleurs, au delà de l'année t+x, Kuijsten suppose que l'état matrimonial des mères évolue de la même manière que chez l'ensemble des membres de la sous-cohorte concernée. Soit Sy hk la probabilité pour un membre de cette sous-cohorte d'être d'état matrimonial h à la fin de l'année t+y-1 et d'état matrimonial k à la fin de l'année t-y-1 et d'état matrimonial k à la fin de l'année t-y-1 et

nombres ${}^hN_{\times,\,p}[y]$ d'enfants issus des naissances de rang p survenues en l'année t+x et dont la mère à la fin de l'année t+y (y>x) est d'état matrimonial h peuvent être aisément générées au moyen de la relation de récurrence suivante

$$h_{N_{x,p}[y]} = k^{\sum k} N_{x,p}[y-1] S_y^{kh}$$
 (3.23)

en partant de y=x+1, auquel cas les nombres d'enfants figurant dans le membre droit de cette relation proviennent de (3.21) et (3.22).

A partir de là, les relations (3.10) et (3.11) — avec ajout d'un indice caractéristique de l'état matrimonial — mènent aux nombres de femmes $^{\rm h}L_{\rm y,p}$ qui dans la cohorte concernée sont d'état matrimonial h et de parité p à la fin de l'année T=y. A signaler que, dans le cas où p=0, l'application de la relation (3.11) requiert la valeur de $^{\rm h}N_{\rm c,0}[\rm y]$, laquelle peut aisément être obtenue par récurrence sur la même base que (3.23):

$$h_{N_{...0}}[y] = {}_{k} \Sigma {}^{k} N_{...0}[y-1] S_{y}^{kh}$$
 (3.24)

mais en partant de

$$h_{N_{..0}}[0] = 1 s_0^{kh}$$
 (3.25)

A noter que les diverses probabilités $\frac{S_kh}{K}$ de changements d'état matrimonial impliquées dans les équations ci-dessus proviennent d'un modèle de changements d'état matrimonial faisant avancer les femmes à mesure qu'elles vieillissent de l'état 'mariée' vers les états 'veuve', 'décédée', 'divorcée' et 'décédée' tout en autorisant un retour des états 'veuve' et 'divorcée' vers l'état 'mariée'. Ce modèle consiste en un ensemble d'équations dont la spécification élémentaire résulte en grande partie d'une hypothèse simplificatrice mais raisonnable, à savoir que dans une

année donnée seules peuvent se remarier les femmes réputées être veuves et divorcées en début d'année. 15

Compte tenu du fait qu'il existe pour réaliser cet objectif un modèle nettement plus satisfaisant (voir plus loin), il ne nous paraît pas nécessaire, du moins dans le contexte du présent travail, de présenter les équations utilisées par Kuijsten. Aussi nous nous contenterons ici de remarquer que la mise en oeuvre de ces équations (effectuée pour chacun des cinq grands groupes d'âge de chaque cohorte annuelle de premiers mariages) dépend d'un ensemble de probabilités annuelles de (1) décéder, devenir veuve ou divorcer pour les femmes mariées et (2) décéder ou se remarier pour les femmes veuves et divorcées. Ces probabilités dépendent uniquement de l'âge des femmes auxquelles elles s'appliquent sauf que:

- les probabilités des femmes mariées de devenir veuve sont estimées comme les probabilités de leur mari de décéder (en supposant un écart d'âge constant égal à la différence moyenne des âges au mariage) et que
- les probabilités de ces mêmes femmes de divorcer sont estimées séparément pour chaque cohorte de premiers mariages. 16

(3) **Étape** 3

Comme dans le modèle de Rallu, le passage de la parité ou nombre d'enfants mis au monde au nombre d'enfants présents (du point de vue des mères) ou encore du rang de naissance au rang dans la famille (du point de vue des enfants)

^{15.} Dans le cas de l'année t (c'est-à-dire de l'année de contraction du premier mariage), le modèle exclut donc la possibilité d'un remariage avant la fin de l'année.

^{16.} Dans la mesure où l'ensemble des divorces concernent une majorité de premiers mariages, un tel traitement revient à rendre plus ou moins compte de la durée du mariage.

s'effectue en introduisant la mortalité des enfants et leur départ du foyer maternel.

Ici aussi, ce dernier phénomène est traité assez simplement puisqu'il suppose que les enfants quittent tous leur mère dans la quatorzième (au lieu de la seizième dans le cas de rallu) année suivant leur naissance. 17 Par suite, la détermination du nombre et de l'âge des enfants présents auprès de leur mère à l'horizon de la projection se limite à la considération des enfants nés au cours des 14 années précédant le point de départ de la projection (1/1/75), c'est-à-dire depuis le 1/1/1970.

La procédure utilisée par Kuijsten pour passer du rang r de naissance au rang r dans la famille est similaire à celle utilisée par Rallu. Mais, au lieu de considérer la probabilité de survie du dernier né des femmes de parité donné ainsi que celles de ses aînés, Kuijsten met l'accent sur la probabilité de survie de chaque naissance ainsi que sur toutes celles l'ayant précédé. De plus, au lieu de prendre en compte la distribution des intervalles entre deux naissances de rangs successifs, Kuijsten a recours à une procédure tendant à la "gommer" et, en quelque sorte, à la remplacer par un intervalle moyen.

Soit hN'x,p[y] le nombre d'enfants de rang (de naissance) p nés en t+x qui survivent auprès d'une mère d'état matrimonial h à la fin de l'année t+y (l'ajout au symbole N du signe 'indiquer qu'il s'agit ici d'enfants survivants). Ce nombre est évidemment donné par

$$h_{N_{x,p}[y]} = h_{N_{x,p}[y]} p_{y-x+\frac{1}{2}}$$
 (3.26)

^{17.}On rappelle que cette hypothèse a pour corollaire qu'en cas de changement d'état matrimonial de la mère (y compris dans le cas d'un divorce), les enfants continuent nécessairement à vivre auprès de leur mère.

où comme plus haut p_z représente la probabilité de survie jusqu'à l'âge z (p_z = 0 pour y > x+14) et par suite la proportion de survie (au temps t+y) des enfants de rang p selon l'état matrimonial de la mère s'obtient à partir de

$$h_{\tau_p[y]} = h_{N',p[y]} / h_{N,p[y]}$$
 (3.27)

Bien entendu, pour qu'un enfant de rang p de naissance soit de rang f dans la famille $(f \le p)$, il faut qu'il ait perdu f - p de ses aînés, soit du fait de la mortalité, soit du fait qu'ils aient atteint la limite d'âge de 15 ans. Il en résulte f = f = f = f que la probabilité f = f = f = f = f qu'un enfant (dont la mère est d'état matrimonial h) enregistre un tel changement de rang est égale à

$$h_{z_{pf}} = k=1..K^{\Sigma} r=1..p^{\pi} \{(1-h_{\tau_{p}}[y])^{u(p)} h_{\tau_{p}}[y]^{1-u(p)}\}$$
 (3.28)

où f des exposants u(p) sont égaux à 0 et les (p-f) autres à 1^{19} et où K représente le nombre de possibilités de choisir f éléments parmi p, c'est-à-dire K = C_p^{-f} = p! / I(p-f)! f! I où z! = z (z-1) (z-2) 3 2 1.

Il en découle immédiatement que le nombre ${}^hN"_{\times,\,f}$ [y] d'enfants nés en t+x qui à la fin de l'année t+y survivent auprès d'une mère d'état matrimonial h (l'ajout au symbole N du signe " indique qu'il s'agit d'enfants survivants mais repérés selon le rang dans la famille plutôt que selon le

^{18.}Ce qui suit est une description systématisée de la procédure présentée par Kuijsten sous forme très détaillée.

^{19.}Si u(p)=0, la probabilité élémentaire entre les signes (et), égale à ${}^h\tau_p[y]$, est indicative d'une survie de l'enfant correspondant tandis que, si u(p)=1, elle est égale à $1{}^{-h}\tau_p[y]$ et est donc indicative du décès de l'enfant correspondant (ou de son départ du foyer maternel si cette probabilité est nulle).

rang de naissance) de femmes d'état matrimonial h et ayant p enfants auprès d'elles est égal à

$$h_{N''_{x,f}[y]} = p^{\sum_{p} h_{N'_{x,p}[y]} h_{z_{pf}}}$$
 (3.29)

Le nombre de femmes $^{h}L^{"}_{y,f}$ d'état matrimonial h ayant f enfants auprès d'elles à la fin de l'année t+y s'obtient alors sur la base de (3.10) et (3.11) (après inclusion du signe " et de l'indice h et remplacement de p par f). A noter que la quantité $^{h}N''$., $_{0}[y]$ requise pour l'application de (3.11) au cas f=0 est tout simplement égale à la quantité $^{h}N_{...0}[y]$ déterminée plus haut à l'aide de (3.24) et (3.25).

Après réarrangement transversal des résultats de chaque cohorte, 20 la procédure ci-dessus fournit donc la population féminine projetée selon l'âge, l'état matrimonial et le nombre d'enfants présents en même temps que l'âge des enfants par rang.

Extensions possibles

D'après ce qui précède, il est clair que le recours à la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles désagrégée en éléments représentatifs de l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance débouche sur une approche distinctive en trois étapes permettant de modéliser fort sensément l'évolution des familles nucléaires. Néanmoins, les modèles de Rallu et Kuijsten recèlent des imperfections, soulignées ci-dessus en partie seulement, auxquelles il importerait de remédier avant de porter un jugement définitif sur la valeur réelle de cette approche.

^{20.} Vu que les groupes d'âge retenus ne sont pas des groupes d'un an, ce modèle comprend une étape additionnelle visant à désagréger les résultats de l'étape 3 en groupes d'âge d'un an au moyen de distributions d'âge prédéterminées.

En premier lieu, pour ce qui concerne le choix des cohortes à suivre au cours du temps, le choix de cohortes de premiers mariages tel que le fait Kuijsten est évidemment très peu satisfaisant. Il en est ainsi non seulement à cause de l'accroissement généralisé de la natalité hors mariage mais aussi en raison de la complication qu'un tel choix entraîne sur le plan opérationnel (élaboration de la procédure pour différentes sous-cohortes appartenent à de grands groupes d'âge²¹ qui en bout de chaîne réclame la réalisation d'une désagrégation par groupes d'âge d'un an). Il ne fait donc aucun doute que l'on se doit de travailler comme le fait Rallu avec des générations successives de femmes nées en une même année.

Ceci étant précisé, le premier problème à examiner concerne les modalités d'application de l'étape 1, c'est-à-dire, les modalités relatives à la détermination du nombre et du calendrier des naissances selon le rang dans chaque génération. Il en est au moins trois qu'il importe de débattre ici:

- La distinction entre naissances légitimes et naissances illégitimes

A priori, une telle distinction n'est possible que si l'on dispose de données de naissances selon le rang de naissance, l'état matrimonial de la mère (mariée ou autre) et surtout le temps écoulé depuis la naissance précédente. Malheureusement, de telles données croisées, certes disponibles en France, le sont rarement ailleurs. Et quand bien même elles le seraient, il n'est pas certain, dans le contexte social actuel où les naissances

^{21.}L'utilisation de groupes d'âge d'un an peut conduire, même dans le cas de pays fortement peuplés, à des nombres de faible valeur.

illégitimes ne sont plus le fait quasi exclusif des femmes célibataires et parfois même font suite à une naissance légitime, qu'on ait intérêt à maintenir la distinction entre les deux types de naissances.

- La différentiation de l'espacement des naissances selon la parité finale des mères

On sait que plus la parité finale d'une mère est élevée, plus les intervalles entre les naissances de rangs consécutifs qui en sont issus sont inférieurs à la moyenne des intervalles correspondants constatés pour l'ensemble mères. Rallu essaie de rendre compte de cette observation assez simplement, grâce à l'introduction de jeux d'intervalles avec la naissance précédente (selon que les naissances auxquelles ils s'appliquent en sont suivies d'une autre ou pas). Comme l'indique clairement la formule (3.4), ce procédé fait en sorte que la naissance de rang p survient plus rapidement chez les femmes de parité finale p+1 que chez celles de parité finale p et plus rapidement chez les femmes de parité finale p+2 que chez celles de parité p+1. Par contre, elle arrive tout aussi rapidement dans toutes les familles des mères de parité au moins égale à p+2 ou, pour prendre un exemple plus concret, l'enfant de rang 1 arrive aussi rapidement dans les familles des mères dont la parité finale est de 3 que dans celles de parité finale supérieure à ce nombre. Vu que de nos jours, la grande majorité des naissances dans les pays développés sont de rangs 1, 2 ou 3, il s'ensuit que le procédé imaginé par Rallu reflète assez bien -- mais pas totalement -- les écarts présntés par les intervalles entre naissances selon la descendance finale.

Quant à lui, le procédé imaginé par Kuijsten pour rendre compte de la même observation est plus systématique et

réussit en pratique à accélérer l'arrivée de la naissance d'un rang donné à mesure que la descendance finale de la mère augmente. Cependant, son utilisation nécessite des données additionnelles qui normalement sont difficilement observables (Kuijsten utilise des données tirées de). Aussi, en dépit de ses faiblesses, le procédé de Rallu lui semble préférable.

- Le traitement de l'impact des migrations externes

Il est coutume d'estimer la probabilité d'agrandissement des famille ap relative à une génération donnée comme le quotient des naissances de rang (p+1) aux naissances de rang p survenues dans le pays concerné. De la sorte, le numérateur comme le dénominateur de ce quotient et par suite les nombres de naissances projetés au moyen du modèle de Rallu incluent les naissances survenues après leur arrivée aux femmes immigrées (et plus généralement entrées au pays); mais en revanche ils n'incluent pas les naissances survenues après leur départ aux femmes émigrées (ou plus généralement sorties du pays); ce qui est approprié.22 Par contre, ne sont pas inclues un ensemble de naissances pertinentes: celles survenues avant leur arrivée aux femmes immigrées qui, comme le montre Rallu, peuvent néanmoins être déterminées sur le même mode que les naissances survenues au pays.

Toutefois, cette manière de traiter des naissances avant l'entrée au pays fait en sorte qu'elles ne sont liées en aucune manière à celles survenues après l'entrée au pays. Dans ces conditions, la composition démographique des familles immigrées n'est pas connue; ce qui a sans nul doute conduit Rallu à projeter la population féminine

^{22.} Cette observation vaut également pour le modèle de Kuijsten, même si ce dernier affirme avoir totalement ignoré le rôle des migrations externes.

selon le nombre d'enfants présents (étape 3) sur la base d'un substratum n'empruntant que partiellemment à la détermination des naissances selon le rang (étape 1).

Puisque la cohérence de ces deux étapes est par ailleurs un objectif désirable (voir plus loin), comment peut-on amender les équations sous-jacentes à la détermination des naissances selon le rang pour ne pas y entraver? A première vue, on pourrait appliquer (3.3) séparement aux femmes nées au pays et aux femmes nées à l'étranger (ces dernières désagrégées en sous-groupes spécifiques de l'année d'arrivée), en utilisant des probabilités d'agrandissement des familles spécifiques à chaque groupe ou sous-groupe; ce qui nécessiterait tant un ajustement qu'un élargissement des intrants.²³ Comme une telle procédure aurait pour effet d'introduire les naissances survenues après le départ du pays, il faudrait par ailleurs introduire dans l'équation (3.3) relative à chaque groupe ou sous-groupe un facteur multiplicatif correcteur (proportion cumulative des femmes sorties du pays).

Dans le cas de l'étape 2, dont on se souvient que le but est de préciser l'état matrimonial des mères, trois points méritent ici qu'on s'y arrête:

- L'ensemble des différents états matrimoniaux à retenir

^{23.} D'une part, les probabilités d'agrandissement des familles et les intervalles entre naissances doivent être ajustées pour refléter les naissances survenues aux femmes nées au pays (en l'absence d'émigration) au lieu de toutes les naissances survenues au pays. D'autre part, les mêmes quantités relatives aux immigrées doivent être élargies de façon à inclure les naissances survenues après l'arrivée au pays, possiblement avec une fécondité différente de celle des femmes nées au pays).

Dans le contexte social actuel, il est clair que l'on ne peut plus se contenter, comme Rallu et surtout Kuijsten, de considérer l'état matrimonial d'un point de vue purement juridique. Faut-il pour autant remplacer l'état matrionial de jure ('célibataire', 'mariée', 'veuve', 'divorcée') par l'état matrimonial de facto ('sans conjoint', 'avec conjoint')? Personnellement, nous ne le pensons pas. D'une part, les états matrimoniaux de facto recouvrent une grande variété de situations qui dans la réalité se caractérisent par des probabilités de sortie fort différentes (la probabilité de passer de l'état 'sans conjoint' à l'état 'avec conjoint' est forte différente pour un célibataire vivant seul qui se marrie que pour une veuve qui en vient à cohabiter); d'autre part, il serait dommage de se passer des données de l'état-civil dont la fiabilité est bien connue. Il s'ensuit que l'on aurait tout intérêt à retenir des états matrimoniaux combinant l'état de facto avec l'état de jure. Idéalement, ils consisteraient de 4 X 2 = 8 états ou plutôt 9, étant donné la désirabilité de distinguer parmi les 'mariées avec conjoint' celles vivant avec leur mari de droit et celles vivant avec un conjoint autre que leur mari de droit). Mais, en raison d'une certaine difficulté prévisible à obtenir toutes les données nécessaires, on pourrait être amené à combiner certains d'entre eux.

- L'assignation d'un état matrimonial aux mères des nouveaux-nés

Au lieu d'assigner toutes les naissances aux femmes mariées (comme le fait Kuijsten), on peut tout simplement assigner celles-ci aux différents états matrimoniaux retenues proportionnellement aux effectifs de chacun de ces états corrigés au moyen d'une propension relative à procréer (que l'on doit pouvoir estimer à partir d'un

recensement sur la base des nombres d'enfants âgés de 0 à 1 an par femme selon l'état matrimonial).

- Le choix d'un sous-modèle permettant de suivre les changements d'état matrimonial des mères

Comme déjà indiqué ci-dessus, l'algorithme de projection considéré par Kuijsten pour projeter l'état matrimonial peut être avantageusement remplacé par un autre plus satisfaisant. Il s'agit de la table de changements d'états matrimoniaux (Schoen, 1974, Land et Schoen 1977 et Willekens et al. 1982) dont la modification éventuellement requise par la considération du type d'états matrimoniaux à retenir ne pose aucune difficulté sur le plan théorique. Cet algorithme permettrait également de tenir compte de l'émigration des mères (phénomène négligé tant par Rallu que par Kuijsten) en ajoutant à l'état 'décédée' un autre état absorbant ('émigrée').

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'étape 3, les efforts initiaux de Rallu et Kuijsten peuvent être améliorées sans peine dans au moins deux directions:

- Le traitement du départ des enfants du foyer maternel

Une plus grand conformité avec le monde réel requiert ici d'étaler dans le temps le départ des enfants qui est concentré au moment du dix-septième aniversaire (chez Rallu) ou du quinzième (chez Kuijsten). Ceci peut être aisément réalisé en forçant la probabilité de survie auprès de la mère p_z jusqu'à l'âge z à tenir compte (en plus de la mortalité) du départ du foyer maternel supposé se produire de manière continue jusqu'à un âge maximum qu'il serait réaliste d'élever à 25 ans, eu égard à la tendance actuelle des enfants à vivre plus longtemps auprès de leur(s) parent(s). Les valeurs de p_z pourraient

même être estimées sur la base d'une table multidimensionnelle à deux états ('chez les parents', 'ailleurs') axée sur le mode de vie des enfants et donc capable de rendre compte des retours au foyer maternel qui, de nos jours, sont monnaie courante.

- L'amélioration éventuelle du processus de passage du rang de naissance au rang dans la famille

Une des grandes faiblesses du modèle de Kuijsten est de déduire le rang dans la famille à partir du rang de naissance (c'est-à-dire de déterminer le nombre d'aînés décédés et même de ceux ayant atteint la limite d'âge supérieure de 17 ans) sans faire un usage direct des intervalles de temps entre naissances successives, tels que déterminés dans l'étape 1. En fin de chaque année, les aînés de tout enfant survivant se voit assigner une proportion de survie moyenne égale à la proportion des enfants du rang de naissance correspondant qui vivent toujours auprès de leur mère; ce qui constitue une procédure on ne peut plus approximative.

Le traitement du même problème par Rallu est également criticable. Il semble même plus faible encore que celui offert par Kuijsten: la survie des aînés est réalisée sur la base d'une procédure largement déconnectée de la détermination des naissances selon l'étape 1 mais utilisant néanmoins la même source d'information. Mais après réflexion, la conclusion inverse s'impose car, en fin de compte, le traitement de Rallu (mais pas celui de Kuijsten) fait usage d'intervalles entre naissances fort réalistes.

Quoiqu'il en soit, le passage du rang de naissance au rang dans la famille est une faiblesse des modèles de familles nucléaires construits à date. Cependant, il serait aisé d'y remédier en calculant directement le nombre de naissances d'une année et de rang donnés qui survivent à la fin de chaque année désagrégé selon le rang dans la famille et de là le nombre total d'enfants qui survivent selon le rang dans la famille.

Un tel calcul se ferait au moyen d'une équation obtenue en introduisant le principe élémentaire de passage du rang de naissance au rang dans la famille proposé par Kuijsten dans l'équation (3.3). Ainsi le nombre N"x,f[y] d'enfants nés en t+x et survivant en tant qu'enfant de rang f au temps t+y peut être obtenu à partir de:

$$N''_{x,f}[y] = p=1...p^{\Sigma} k=1...K^{\Sigma} k_{x,p}$$
 (3.30)

où K est comme plus haut le nombre de façons de choisir f éléments parmi k et où $^k\mathrm{Ex}$, p est dérivé de Bx , p en affectant chaque probabilité d'agrandissement $\mathrm{a_i}$ d'une probabilité de survie appropriée qui ajoute à la mortalité le départ du foyer parental comme cause de la non-présence auprès de la mère.

A noter par ailleurs que la procédure de passage du rang de naissance au rang dans la famille proposée ci-dessus présente une cohérence intertemporelle évidemment absente dans les modèles de Rallu et Kuijsten. Alors que chez ces derniers la survie des aînés est déterminée indépendemment de leur survie l'année précédente, tel n'est pas le cas ici du fait de l'application répétée à chaque année de la formule proposée. 24

^{24.} Si l'on tient compte des migrations externes tel que suggéré plus haut, cette équation ne s'applique qu'aux femmes nées au pays de sorte qu'une équation similaire appliquée aux femmes immigrées est également nécessaire.

En fin de compte, la prise en considération des améliorations méthodologiques suggérées ci-dessus — notamment le traitement plus explicite des migrations externes, l'assignation des mères des nouveaux-nés aux divers états matrimoniaux sans exclusive, l'incorporation d'une table de changements d'état matrimonial, l'étalement dans le temps du départ des enfants du foyer maternel et la mise en cohérence des étapes 1 et 3) — contribueraient grandement à faire de l'approche initialement suggérée par Rallu et Kuijsten une approche à la fois viable et prometteuse pour modéliser l'évolution des familles nucléaires.

3.2 Modèles basés sur le paradigme de la table de mortalité à états multiples

Le trait le plus frappant des modèles de Kuijsten et de Rallu est le faible degré d'interdépendance qu'y présentent les naissances (et donc les enfants survivants) et les mères correspondantes. L'apport de correctifs et d'extensions appropriés, tel que proposé plus haut, permet certes d'améliorer la situation mais pas au point de saisir de manière satisfaisante les caractéristiques principales des familles nucléaires. Cette insuffisance est naturellement à mettre au compte de l'inaptitude des méthodes et modèles de la démographie classique à rendre compte d'évènements multiples.

On sait qu'au cours des années soixante-dix a vu le jour une branche nouvelle de la démographie mathématique permettant de traiter de tels évènements (Rogers, 1975). Fondés sur un élargissement du paradigme de la table de mortalité (Rogers, 1973; Hoem and Fong, 1976; Schoen and Land, 1977), les méthodes et modèles de la démographie multidimensionnelle ont rapidement donné lieu à la construction d'une part de tables de fécondité selon la parité de la mère (Sechsli, 1973) et d'autre part de tables de changements d'état matrimonial (Schoen, 1975). Mais ce n'est que bien plus tard qu'elles aboutirent à la construction de tables prenant en compte les deux phénomènes simultanément. Bongaarts fut le premier à esquisser le cadre comptable de telles tables (Bongaarts, 1981) avant de préciser un peu plus tard les modalités présidant à leur calcul (Bongaarts, 1986). Une

^{1.} A signaler que Krishnamoorthy (1981) a proposé un modèle axé sur la fécondité selon la parité de la mère dans lequel il introduit partiellement l'état matrimonial. Adoptant l'hypothèse que les naissances ont lieu exclusivement dans le mariage, il subdivise l'état 'parité O' en deux états: l'état initial 'célibataire' et l'état 'mariée' par lequel toutes les femmes transitent avant d'atteindre l'état 'parité 1'.

version améliorée de la table de statut familial proposée par Bongaarts fut ensuite présentée par Zeng Yi (1987) qui par la même occasion s'efforça de l'élargir au cas des familles étendues, ou plus exactement au cas des familles comprenant trois générations comme tel est souvent la cas dans les pays en développement. Cependant, les modalités originelles de Bongaarts comme celles améliorées de Zeng Yi s'appuie sur un ensemble d'équations que nous qualifierons d'ad hoc. Nous verrons plus loin qu'il est en fait possible de construire la table de statut familial proposée par Bongaarts — et même de l'élargir en prenant en compte l'intervalle depuis la dernière naissance — en s'inspirant directement des méthodes et modèles de la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle.

3.2.1 Les tables de statut familial de Bongaarts

Le modèle initialement proposé par Bongaarts (1981) est un modèle visant à projeter la population féminine selon l'âge, l'état matrimonial, la fécondabilité et la parité. Brièvement, ce modèle consiste d'un ensemble d'équations comptables qui, au contraire de celles de Kuijsten et de Rallu, permettent, sur une base annuelle, de faire évoluer simultanément l'état matrimonial et la parité des femmes. Ces équations s'appuient sur un ensemble de probabilités selon l'âge de (1) survivre, (2) former une union, (3) subir une rupture d'union (par divorce ou veuvage), (4) devenir inféconde et (5) avoir un enfant, dont la considération simultanée s'appuie sur un certain nombre d'hypothèses simplificatrices (afin de rendre le modèle calculable).

Mais en raison de la multiplicité des groupes de femmes suivis simultanément, un tel modèle se prête difficilement à la détermination du nombre et de l'âge des enfants vivant auprès de leur mère ce qui amène Bongaarts à reconsidérer son modèle à la lumière d'une approche par cohorte. Faisant

appel au paradigme de la table de mortalité à états multiples (multistate life table) dont l'usage tend à se généraliser dans les divers domaines de la démographie, Bongaarts (1986) met alors en avant une table de statut familial décrite ci-après. Cette table consiste d'une table principale mettant l'accent sur l'état matrimonial et la parité des mères et d'un ensemble plus ou moins fourni de tables 'partielles' centrées sur la détermination du nombre et de l'âge des enfants présents auprès de leur mère.

La table principale

Soit une génération de femmes qui au moment de leur $x^{i \, \hat{e} \, me}$ anniversaire se subdivisent en groupes $N_{x,\,m,\,p,\,f}$ d'état matrimonial m, de parité p et de fécondabilité f. Au cours de l'année qui suit, chacun de ces groupes enregistrent nombre d'entrées et de sorties que Bongaarts modélise en supposant que:

- les passages de l'état fécond à l'état stérile ont lieu en début d'année et que
- les transferts entre états matrimoniaux comme les décès prennent place au milieu de l'année²

de sorte que

- seules les naissances sont supposées avoir lieu de manière continue tout au long de l'année.

Comme de juste, les équations introduites par Bongaarts précisent la valeur de $N_{\rm X,m,p,f}$ avant et après la réalisation de chacun des événements démographiques considérés. Cette valeur est affectée de l'indice 1

^{2.} Dans la version initiale (Bongaarts, 1981), ces transferts étaient également supposés prendre place en début d'année

immédiatement après la prise en compte (en début d'année) des changements de fécondabilité, des indices 2 et 3 immédiatement avant et après la prise en compte (en milieu d'année) des changements d'état matrimonial et des décès et de l'indice 4 juste avant d'atteindre (en fin d'année) leur (x+1)ième anniversaire.

i) Détermination de ${}_{1}N_{\times,\,m,\,p,\,f}$

Si l'on suppose que la stérilité des femmes est irréversible, les nombres de femmes appartenant aux divers sous-groupes féconds (f=0) s'obtient aisément à partir de

$$1^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = [1 - s_{x,m,p}] N_{x,m,p,0}$$
 (33)

et ceux des femmes appartenent aux divers sous-groupes stériles (f=1) à partir de

$$1^{N_{X,m,p,1}} = N_{X,m,p,1} + s_{X,m,p} N_{X,m,p,0}$$
 (34)

où $s_{x,m,p}$ est la proportion de femmes fécondes d'âge x, d'état matrimonial m et de parité p qui deviennent stériles. 3

ii) Détermination de $2^{N_X, m, p, f}$

Toutes les entrées et sorties effectuées ici (au cours de la première demi-année) sont le fait de la fécondité. Dans le cas des groupes féconds, il convient de soustraire les femmes dont la parité passe de p à p+1 et d'ajouter celles dont la parité passe de p-1 à p de sorte que

$$2^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = 1^{N_{x,m,p,0}}$$

^{3.} En pratique, l'inexistence des données nécessaires peut conduire, comme le fait Bongaarts, à prendre des valeurs de $s^m, P(x)$ indépendentes de m et p.

- 0.5
$$B_{x,m,p}$$
 ${}_{1}^{N}_{x,m,p,0}$
+ 0.5 $B_{x,m,p-1}$ ${}_{1}^{N}_{x,m,p-1,0}$ (25)⁴

où $B_{x,m,p}$ est la probabilité d'une femme féconde d'âge exact x, d'état matrimonial m, de parité p et de fécondabilité 0 d'avoir une naissance avant d'atteindre l'âge (x+1). Pendant ce temps là la taille des groupes stériles reste inchangée:

$$2^{N_{x,m,p,1}} = 1^{N_{x,m,p,1}}$$
 (36)

iii) Détermination de $3N_{x,m,p,f}$

La prise en compte en milieu d'année des changements d'états matrimoniaux et des décès s'effectue en appliquant des probabilités de transfert appropriées:

$$3^{N}_{x,n,p,f} = n^{\Sigma} n^{p}_{x,m,p,f} 2^{N}_{x,m,p,f}$$
(37)

où nPx,m,p,f est la probabilité pour une femme d'âge exact x, d'état matrimonial m, de parité p et de fécondabilité f d'être d'état matrimonial n à l'âge (x+1). Devant la difficulté à obtenir des données présentant le degré de détail requis par les différents croisements envisagés, Bongaarts suppose l'indépendence des décès et des transferts matrimoniaux vis-à-vis du rang des naissances et de la fécondabilité. Il s'ensuit que nPx,m,p,f est égale à la probabilité de passer de l'état matrimonial m à l'âge x à l'état matrimonial n à l'âge (x+1) que Bongaarts tire d'une table de changements d'état matrimonial calculée sur la base de l'algorithme proposé par Schoen (1975) et repris par d'autres (Espenshade et Braun, 1982; Espenshade, 1986; Willekens et al., 1982; Willekens, 1986).

^{4.} Dans cette équation comme dans celles qui suivent, les termes présentant l'indice p-1 (ou plus loin l'indice c-1) n'apparaissent pas si p=0 (ou c=0).

iv) Détermination de $4N_{x,m,p,f}$

Les entrées et sorties constatées au cours de la deuxième demi-année sont à nouveau à mettre au compte de la fécondité, ce qui donne lieu à deux équations similaires à (35) et (36):

$$4^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = 3^{N_{x,m,p,0}}$$

$$- 0.5 B_{x,m,p} 3^{N_{x,m,p,0}}$$

$$+ 0.5 B_{x,m,p-1} 3^{N_{x,m,p-1,0}}$$
(38)

et

$$4^{N_{x,m,p,1}} = 3^{N_{x,m,p,1}}$$
 (39)

Une fois la seconde demi-année achevée, les femmes atteignent leur $(x+1)^{\mbox{ième}}$ anniversire de sorte que

$$N_{x+1,m,p,f} = 4N_{x,m,p,f}$$

En fin de compte, si on arrange les $N_{\rm X}, m, p, f$ sous la forme d'un vecteur $N_{\rm X},$ on a donc

$$N_{x+1} = P_x N_x$$

où P_X est une matrice qui peut être aisément explicitée à partir des intrants apparaissant dans les équations $\bigcirc+\bigcirc$.

Les tables partielles

La table ci-dessus -- que Bongaarts qualifie de table de statut familial -- permet la détermination du nombre d'enfants mis au monde par chaque type de mère mais pas celui du nombre d'enfants vivant auprès de chacune d'elles. Afin d'obtenir cette précision, il faut nécessairement

croiser les caractéristiques associées à chaque mère par une autre représentant le nombre d'enfants c vivant effectivement auprès de leur mère c'est-à-dire de diviser chaque $N_{\rm X}$, m, f, p en éléments du type $N_{\rm X}$, m, f, p et par suite modifier de manière appropriée l'algorithme ci-dessus.

Une telle modification pose le problème a priori délicat de tenir compte simultanément d'événements affectant les mères d'une part et les enfants d'autre part. Fort heureusement, ce problème est plus apparent que véritable dans la mesure où un artifice proposé par Bongaarts lui-même permet de s'an affranchir. La solution consiste à considérer tout âge supérieur à la limite inférieure de fécondité comme un âge-horizon et à appliquer l'algorithme ci-dessus (jusqu'à l'âge-horizon considéré) tout en prenant en compte le décès des enfants survenus avant que leur mère n'atteigne l'âge-horizon.

En pratique, cela conduit à la construction de tables partielles de statut familial — une pour tout âge-horizon retenu — sur le modèle de la table décrite ci-dessus mais où les probabilités $B_{x,m,p}$ sont, le cas échéant, affectées d'une probabilité p_{z-x-4} des naissances survenues à l'âge \times de la mère à survivre jusqu'à ce que la mère atteigne l'âge-horizon z ou d'une probabilité $(1-p_{z-x-4})$ de décéder avant qu'elle atteigne cet âge.

Ainsi le dernier terme de l'équation (35) relative aux naissances enregistrées lors de la première demi-année doit-il être remplacé par deux autres mettant en valeur les naissances de rang p [les passages de la parité p à la parité (p+1)] qui (1) survivent et entraîment l'accroissement d'une unité du nombre d'enfants présents ou qui (2) ne survivent pas et entraîment aucune modification du nombre d'enfants présents. On aboutit ainsi à:

$$2^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = 1^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = 0.5 B_{x,m,p} 1^{N_{x,m,p,0}} = 0.5 B_{x,m,p-1} P_{z-x-0.5} 1^{N_{x,m,p-1,0}} = 0.5 B_{x,m,p-1} (1 - P_{z-x-0.5}) 1^{N_{x,m,p-1,0}} = 0.5 B_{x,m,p-1} (40)$$

De même l'équation (38) relative à la seconde demi-année doit être remplacée par une équation similaire. Les nombres $N_{x,m,p,f}$ résultant de l'application de l'algorithme ainsi modifié sont naturellement des nombres artificiels sauf dans le cas où x=z où ils représentent les nombres effectifs de femmes ayant pour caractéristiques celles figurant en indice.

Bien entendu, la mortalité n'est pas le seul facteur responsable des changements de rang constatés chez les enfants. Il faut y ajouter le départ des enfants du foyer maternel, ce qui conduit à remplacer p_u par p_u tel que déjà défini plus haut.

Par ailleurs, il est possible de recourir au même artifice, celui des tables partielles, afin de déterminer le nombre d'enfants d'âge y vivant auprès de leur mère à chaque âgehorizon z. Le nombre de femmes N' $_{z,m,p,f}$, qui parmi les N $_{z,m,p,f}$ femmes ont un enfant d'âge y à (y+1) s'obtient une fois de plus sur la base de l'algorithme décrit plus haut mais où cette fois chaque $B_{x,m,p}$ est affecté d'une probabilité $q_{z-x-0.5}$ égale à p' $_{x-z-0.5}$ si y est égal à z-x mais nulle si y est différent de z-x. La répétition des calculs pour toutes les valeurs acceptables de y permet alors de déterminer la structure par âge des enfants vivant avec leur mère suivant l'âge de cette dernière.

A signaler que le nombre et la structure par âge des enfants peut être précisée selon le sexe grâce (1) à l'utilisation de probabilités d'absence p'u spécifiques aux deux sexes et (2) à l'affectation à chacune de ces probabilités d'un coefficient multiplicateur représentatif du pourcentage des naissances qui sont du sexe correspondant.

Modifications introduites par Zeng Yi

L'examen de la table de statut familial proposée par Bongaarts conduit Zeng Yi (1987) à émettre deux-critiques de nature méthodologique:

- La première a trait à la décomposition de la -p#obabilité $B_{\rm X,p,m}$ en deux probabilités relatives à chaque demi-année de l'intervalle (x, x+1), égales toutes deux à $^{-1}$ 4 $B_{\rm X,p,m}$.
- La seconde a trait à certaines hypothèses sous-jacentes aux équations de passage à une parité supérieure.

Dans le premier cas, Zeng Yi indique à juste titre que, du fait de la nature multiplicative des probabilités sur une succession de périodes, la probabilité relative à la seconda demi-année ne peut être égale à $B_{\rm X,p,m}$. Si l'on supposs une distribution homogène des naissances dans le temps, elle est plutôt égale à $B_{\rm X,p,m}$ / (1 - $B_{\rm X,p,m}$).

Dans le second cas, Zeng Yi remarque que les équations relatives aux changements de parité mises en avant par Bongaarts pour chaque demi-année reposent sur quelques hypothèses implicites peu réalistes. D'une part, les femmes nouvellement mariées ont la même probabilité d'avoir des enfants que celles déjé mariées alors qu'elle est dans la réalité bien plus forte. D'autre part, toute femme est susceptible d'avoir deux naissances au cours d'une même année alors même que la probabilité d'un tel événement est très faible.

^{5.} De manière spécifique, les équations posées par Bongaarts supposent que (1) les femmes ayant eu une naissance au cours de la première demi-année ont la même probabilité

Afin de remédier à cette difficulté, Zeng Yi divise la population féminine $N_{x,m,p}^{\ \ \ \ \ \ \ }$ en trois groupes:

- un premier groupe de femmes qui, célibataires au début de l'intervalle (x, x+1), n'enregistrent des naissances que dans le deuxième demi-intervalle (c'est-à-dire après le mariage pour celles qui ne restent pas célibataires)
- un deuxième groupe de femmes qui, non-célibataires au début de l'intervalle, enregistrent une naissance dans le premier demi-intervalle mais pas dans le second et
- un troisième groupe de femmes qui, non-célibataires également au début de l'intervalle, enregistrent une naissance dans le deuxième demi-intervalle mais aucune dans le premier

et offre une respécification en conséquence de l'ensemble des équations tenant aux changement's de parité. Étant le caractère relativement secondaire des modifications introduites, nous nous contentons ci-dessous d'en faire une description littérale plutôt que de présenter les nouvelles équations suggérées par Zeng Yi.

Le premier groupe de femmes considéré par Zeng Yi est facilement identifiable au début de l'intervalle. Il s'agit de l'ensemble de femmes $N_{\rm X,1,p}$ où m=1 correspond à l'état célibataire. Le groupe reste inchangé jusqu'au milieu de l'intervalle où un certain de femmes du groupe subissent des changements d'état matrimonial. Dans la seconde moitié de l'année, les femmes restées célibataires changent de parité

6. Zeng Yi n'utilise pas la variable de fécondabilité de sorte que le nombre de caractéristiques considérées tombe à trois et que ${}_{1}N_{x,m,p} = N_{x,m,p}$.

que les femmes qui n'en ont pas eu d'en avoir une dans la seconde demi-année et (2) les femmes ayant une naissance au cours de la seconde demi-année avaient la même probabilité que celles n'en ayant pas d'en avoir eu une dans la première demi-année.

sur la base de l'équation (38) déjà proposée par Bongaarts mais où les $B_{x,m,p}$ sont affectés du coefficient multiplicatif 1 plutôt que 0.5 tandis que celles ayant changé d'état matrimonial changent de parité sur la base de la même équation mais où F (la proportion de femmes ayant une naissance dans l'année de leur premier mariage) remplace $B_{x,m,p}$.

Par hypothèse, les deux autres groupes distingués par Zeng Yi recouvrent l'ensemble $N_{x,m,p}$ des femmes tels que m est différent de 1. Comme ils se différencient l'un de l'autre qu'au niveau de leur comportement en matière de fécondité, ils ne peuvent être identifiés qu'au terme de la première demi-année. En se référant à l'équation (35), il est facile de voir que le deuxième groupe, celui des femmes noncélibataires qui n'enregistrent pas de naissance au cours de la première demi-année, est simplement égal au troisième terme du membre de droite alors que le troisième groupe, celui des femmes non-célibataires qui n'en enregistrenet pas, est égal à la somme des deux premiers termes. Après mavoir subi les changements d'état matrimonial (et les décès) à la mi-période, le deuxième groupe qui n'enregistre pas de naissances au cours de la deuxième demi-année reste inchangé tandis que le troisième en enregistre sur la base de l'équation (38) où, comme il se doit, % B_{x.m.p} est remplacé par & B_{x.p.m} / (1 - & B_{x.p.m}).

Finalement, chaque valeur de $N_{\chi+1,m,p}$ s'obtient en sommant les valeurs de $_4N_{\chi,m,p}$ déterminées pour chacun des trois groupes de femmes distinguées par Zeng Yi.

Les modifications apportées par Zeng Yi aux équations de Bongaarts ayant trait aux naissances constituent une tentative louable de les rendre plus conforme à la réalité : sur le plan de la liaison marriages-naissances ainsi que des naissances multiples. Cependant, ces modifications tiemnent

compte uniquement du comportement de fécondité des femmes entre deux âges consécutifs x et x+1. Ainsi, une femme qui a un enfant peu après avoir atteint l'âge x ne peut en avoir un autre avant d'atteindre l'âge x+1. Par contre, cela n'empêche pas une femme ayant un enfant juste avant d'atteindre l'âge x d'en avoir un autre juste après avoir atteint cet âge! Pour être réalistes, les modifications à introduire devraient mettre en jeu deux groupes d'âge consécutifs; ce qui n'est pas simple à réaliser. Nous verrons plus loin comment le problème peut être contourné de manière satisfaisante au moyen de la considération explicite de l'intervalle depuis la dernière naissance.

élargissement au cas des familles comprenant trois générations

Pour Zeng Yi (1987) particulièrement intéressé à étudier l'évolution de la famille en Chine, la table de statut familial introduite par Bongaarts présente un intérêt tout relatif car, en Chine comme dans nombre de pays en développement, la famille nucléaire est loin de représenter la norme. Les enfants continuent souvent, même après leur mariage, à vivre chez leurs parents de sorte que nombre de familles sont constituées de parents, d'enfants mariés et de grands enfants et donc comprennent trois générations.

La possibilité d'identifier des familles comprenant trois générations conduit Zeng Yi à ré-introduire le concept de personne de référence. La personne choisie comme telle est, de préférence, la femme non-célibataire la plus âgée de la famille (laquelle perd rarement son statut de personne de référence sauf s'il s'agit d'une fille qui, ayant quitté le foyer parental avant le mariage, retourne y vivre pour quelle qu'en soit la raison). En cas de décès, le statut de personne de référence est transmis à la fille mariée ou à la

belle-fille vivant avec elle⁷ ou à défaut à une fille adulte non-mariée. Ainsi, une fille ne peut devenir personne de référence avant d'atteindre l'âge adulte. Au delà de cet âge, elle peut acquérir ce statut si elle quitte la maison familiale avant même de se marier ou bien, au cas où, déjà mariée, elle vit auprès de sa mère ou belle-mère, elle décide d'établir une famille indépendante, soit dans l'année du mariage, soit plus tard. Mais elle peut également hériter du statut de personne de référence si sa mère ou belle-mère qui le possède décède.

Le statut de personne de référence s'ajoute donc aux caractéristiques démographiques considérées par Bongaarts, moins celle de fécondabilité que, comme on l'a vu plus haut, Zeng Yi ignore. Bien entendu, l'acquisition du statut de personne de référence dépend plus ou moins du statut matrimonial ce qui conduit Zeng Yi à supposer que les changements de statut de personne de référence s'effectuent également à mi-période en même temps que les changements d'états matrimoniaux et les décès (indépendemment de toute considération relative aux naissances et aux enfants). En partique, les probabilités afférentes au passage de $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathsf{N}}_{X},\mathfrak{a},\mathfrak{p}$ 1^{N} x,n,p -- où n est un état représentatif de la combinaison des états matrimoniaux (m = 1, 2, 3 et 4) et du statut de personne de référence (h = 0 ou 1)-- sont dérivées des probabilités de changer d'état matrimonial utilisées par Bongaarts par le truchement de probabilités de changements de statut conditionnelles à chacun des changements d'état matrimonial.8

Soit

^{7.} Pour Zeng Yi, une femme ne peut avoir auprès d'elle plus d'un fils ou d'une fille marié(e).

^{8.} Le mot changement est à prendre au sens large et inclut le cas d'un non-changement.

- $_{1}\mathbf{O}_{\times}$ la probabilité d'une fille célibataire de quitter le foyer parental entre les âges \times et $\times +1$
- k_{0} la probabilité d'une fille de quitter le foyer parental juste après le mariage
- $2^{ extsf{O}_{ extsf{X}}}$ la probabilité d'une fille non-célibataire d'établir une famille indépendante entre les âges $extsf{X}$ et
- $F_{\rm X}$ la probabilité de la mère ou de la belle-mère d'une fille d'âge ${\rm x}$ de décéder. 10

Alors l'acquisition du statut de personne de référence par une femme d'âge x donne lieu aux probabilités conditionnelles suivantes:

- célibataire le demeurant:

 $1 - (1 - _{1}O_{X})(1 - F_{X})$

- célibataire se mariant et

qui éventuellement devient veuve

ou divorce la même année:

 $1 - (1-k_0)(1-F_x)$

- déjà mariée le demeurant:

 $1 - (1-20_{x})(1-F_{x})$

- mariée qui devient veuve ou divorce

 F_{X}

- veuve ou divorcée le demeurant

 F_{x}

veuve ou divorcée se remariant
 et qui éventuellement divorce ou devient veuve dans la même année

 $1 - (1-20_x)(1-F_x)$

Chacune de ces probabilités implique la considération de deux évènements indépendants — le départ de la maison familiale (pouvant se manifester sous trois formes) et le décès de la mère ou la belle-mère — sauf quelques cas où le départ de la maison familiale n'est pas compatible avec le changement d'état matrimonial concerné.

10. Cette probabilité est estimée par Zeng Yi à partir de la probabilité qu'une fille d'âge x ait une mère qui survive

(voir Goodman et al., 1984).

^{9.} Cette probabilité est obtenue par Zeng Yi comme une moyenne pondérée des probabilités ky de quitter le foyer parental y années après le mariage.

Par contre, par souci de simplification, la perte du statut de personne de référence s'appuie sur une probabilité \mathbb{R}_{\times} dépendante de l'âge de la personne à laquelle elle s'applique mais pas ... de l'état matrimonial.

Soit $_1\mathbf{h}_{_X}$ la probabilité qu'un enfant survive à l'âge $_X$ auprès de sa mère et $_2\mathbf{h}_{_X}$ la probabilité que ce même enfant survive au même âge auprès de sa mère mais sans âtre marié.

Une reformulation de la table de statut familial de Bongaarts

Laissons de côté l'ensemble des modifications introduites par Zeng Yi et retournons à la table de statut familial suggérée par Bongaarts. On se rappelle que la table principale décrit l'évolution de l'état matrimonial et de la parité des femmes d'une génération de femmes. 11 Si $N_{\rm X}, {\rm m,p}$ représente le nombre de femmes de cette génération qui sont d'âge x, d'état matrimonial m et de parité p, alors les équations proposées par Bongaarts permettent d'obtenir de manière approximative l'ensemble des $N_{\rm X+1}, {\rm m,p}$ à partir de l'ensemble des $N_{\rm X,m,p}$.

A priori le passage du premier au second ensemble est un problème qui relève de la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle. En lieu et place des équations proposées par Bongaarts, on doit être en mesure d'utiliser

$$N_{x+1} = P_x N_x$$

où $N_{\rm X}$ est un vecteur de dimension M(P+1) x 1 (où M est le nombre d'états matrimoniaux et p le nombre de parités considérées) dont l'élément courant est $N_{\rm X,\,m,\,p}$ et $P_{\rm X}$ une

^{11.} Nous laissons ici de côté, sans perte de généralité, la variable relative à la fécondabilité.

matrice de transition de probabilités (Rogers et Ledent, 1976)

$$P_{x} = (I + 0.5 M_{x})^{-1} (I - 0.5 M_{x})$$

où \mathbf{M}_{X} est une matrice appropriée de taux de passage d'un état à l'autre ("occurrence/exposure" rates). Toutes ces matrices sont de dimension $\mathrm{M}(\mathrm{P}{+}1)$ x $\mathrm{M}(\mathrm{P}{+}1)$.

Quant aux tables partielles, elles peuvent être calculées selon le mçme principe. Dans ce cas, la variable courante du vector \mathbf{N}_{g} reflète trois caractéristiques, le nombre d'enfants présents venant s'ajouter à l'état matrimonial et à la parité. A noter que le nombre d'enfants présents est inférieur ou égal à la parité ou, de manière équivalente, qu'une femme de parité p a un nombre d'enfants vivant auprès d'elles pouvant prendre p+1 valeurs (0, 1, 2, ..., p). La combinaison de ces deux caractéristiques donne donc lieu à 1 + 2 + 3 + (p+1) sous catégories. Comme la somme des n premiers entiers est égal à n(n+1)/2, le nombre de souscatégories est égal à (P+1)(P+2)/2 de sorte que les matrices \mathbf{M}_{X} et \mathbf{P}_{X} sont de dimension $\mathbf{M}(\mathrm{P+1})(\mathrm{P+2})/2 \times \mathrm{M}(\mathrm{P+1})(\mathrm{P+2})/2$. Avec quatre états matrimoniaux (M=4) et une parité pouvant aller jusqu'à 8 (P=8), on aboutit ainsi à des matrices de dimension 180 x 180 qui se prêtent peu au calcul numérique.

En fait, la matrice \mathbf{M}_{X} est une matrice dont un petit nombre seulement de cellules sont non-nulles et qui, pour un choix judicieux de l'ordre des caractéristiques considérées permet de mettre en valeur un petit nombre nombre de sous-matrices non-nulles de dimension M x M et par la suite de réaliser l'ensemble des calculs impliqués dans la détermination de \mathbf{P}_{X} à partir de \mathbf{M}_{X} sur des matrices de dimension M x M uniquement.

Démontrons d'abord cette proposition dans le cas de la table principale et choississons comme première caractéristique la parité p. Dans ces conditions, \mathbf{M}_{X} est une matrice constituée de P+1 rangées et P+1 colonnes de sous-matrices M x M. Étant donné le caractère particulier du phénomène de fécondité selon le rang, On ne peut à partir d'une parité p donnée que passer à la parité p+1 de sorte que seules les sous-matrices de la diagonale et de la sous-diagonale sont non-nulles

Il en est de même pour la matrice X = I + 0.5 ${
m M}_{
m X}$

$$|X_{00}|$$
 $|X_{10}|X_{11}|$
 $|X_{21}|X_{22}|$
 $|X_{32}|$
 $|X_{32}|$
 $|X_{32}|$
 $|X_{21}|$
 $|X_{22}|$
 $|X_{32}|$
 $|X_{21}|$
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 $|X_{22}|$
 $|X_{21}|$
 $|X_{22}|$
 $|X_{21}|$
 $|X_{21$

Soit A la matrice inverse de X. Puisque la matrice X est triangulaire, la matrice A l'est nécessairement

Afin de trouver son inverse, procédons par récurrence. Soit \mathbf{B}_n la matrice de type \mathbf{X} prenant en compte jusqu'au nombre n. Nous avons donc la relation suivante entre \mathbf{B}_n et \mathbf{B}_{n-1} :

$$\mathbf{B}_{n} = \begin{bmatrix} & \mathbf{B}_{n-1} & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & \\ & & & \\ & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & \\ & & \\ & \\ & & \\ & \\ & & \\ &$$

où \mathbf{Q}_{n} est égal à [0 0 0 . . . 0 $\mathbf{X}_{n,n-1}$]. L'inverse d'une telle matrice vérifie

$$B_{n}^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} B_{n-1}^{-1} & 0 & 0 \\ B_{n}^{-1} & A_{nn} & A_{nn} \end{pmatrix}$$

où la rangée de sous-matrices $R_n = [A_{n1} A_{n2} ... A_{n,n-1}]$ est égale à

$$R_{n} = - x_{nn}^{-1} Q_{n} B_{n-1}^{-1}$$

et où

$$A_{nn} = x_{nn}^{-1}$$

étant donné la valeur de \mathbf{Q}_n , le produit \mathbf{Q}_n \mathbf{B}_{n-1}^{-1} est simplement égal au produit de $\mathbf{X}_{n,n-1}$ par la dernière rangée de \mathbf{B}_{n-1}^{-1} qui par suite de () s'écrit [$\mathbf{A}_{n-1,1}$. · $\mathbf{A}_{n-1,i}$. · $\mathbf{A}_{n-1,n-1}$]. Dans ces conditions,

$$A_{ni} = - x_{nn}^{-1} x_{n,n-1} A_{n-1,i}$$

pour i ≤ n-1. Il s'ensuit que

$$A_{ni} = (-1)^{n-i} x_{nn}^{-1} x_{n,n-1} x_{n-1,n-1}^{-1} x_{i+1,i}^{-1}$$

où $A_{ii} = X_{ii}^{-1}$. On peut donc écrire

$$A_{ni} = (-1)^{n-i} k=n,...(i+1)^{\pi} [X_{kk}^{-1} X_{k,k-1}] X_{ii}^{-1}$$

$$\mathbf{A}_{\text{ni}} = (-1)^{n-i} \ \mathbf{x}_{\text{nn}}^{-1} \ _{\mathbf{k}=\mathbf{n},\ldots(i+1)^{\pi}} \ \mathbf{E} \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{k},\mathbf{k}+1} \ \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{k}+1,\mathbf{k}+1}^{-1} \mathbf{1} \ \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{i}}^{-1}$$

(une formulation qui recouvre également le cas où i = n).

Pour obtenir P_X , il reste à multiplier A par $Y=(I-0.5\ M_X)$, c'est-à-dire à effectuer:

Il est aisé de voir que

$$P_{i,j} = A_{i,j} Y_{j,j} + A_{i,j+1} Y_{j+1,j}$$

où toutes les matrices impliquées sont de dimension M x M.

Passant maintenant au cas des tables partielles où le nombre d'enfants présents s'intercalent entre la parité et l'état matrimonial. Dans ce cas, la matrice \mathbf{M}_{X} se présente ainsi: 12

^{12.}La matrice présentée ci-dessous correspond au cas où P = 5.

		O	1	2		3			_	4					5						
		01	0	110	1	210	1	2	31	0	1	2 ·	3	4:	o 	1	2	3	4	5!	
01	0	lxl		1		!			!					!							
1:		x x		; ;		:			:					:						!	
2!	-			xi xi	×				:					:						1	
31	0 1 2 3	1		l x	×	ix xi xi	×	Х			å 40 40			:							
4!	0 1 2 3 4	8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8				i ×	×	×	× i		X		×	× 1							
5:	012345	:									×	X	×	×	l ×	×	Х	×	×		

où chaque croix représente une sous-matrice non-nulle de dimension M x M. Comme de juste, chaque croix en dehors de la diagonale correspond au passage d'une parité p à la parité p+1 tandis que le nombre d'enfants présents passe de c à c+1 (si l'enfant survit auprès de sa mère) ou demeure égal à c (s'il ne survit pas) tandis que chaque croix sur la disgonale représente une matrice égale à la somme des matrices figurant dans la même colonne (plus une matrice diagonale de taux de mortalité).

La matrice \mathbf{M}_{X} est du même type que précédemment sauf que chaque sous-matrice $\mathbf{M}_{\mathrm{p},\,\mathrm{p}-1}$ est maintenant une matrice de dimension $\mathbf{M}(\mathrm{p}+1)$ x $\mathbf{M}\mathrm{p}$ et chaque matrice $\mathbf{M}_{\mathrm{p},\,\mathrm{p}}$ est une matrice

de dimension M(p+1) x M(p+1) où p est variable. Il n'empêche que les formules établies précédemment pour obtenir les éléments ${\bf A_{i,j}}$ de l'inverse de ${\bf X}$ = (${\bf I}$ + 0.5 ${\bf M_{X}}$) et les éléments ${\bf P_{i,j}}$ de ${\bf P_{X}}$ demeurent valides.

 ${\bf A_{i,j}}$ est maintenant de dimension Mi \times Mj mais peut néanmoins s'obtenir en n'effectuant des calculs que sur des sous-matrices de dimension M \times M. Afin de voir ceci, posons

$$\mathbf{x}_{kk} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{k}_{0} & & & & \\ & \mathbf{k}_{1} & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & \\ & & \\$$

et

$$x_{k,k-1} = \begin{bmatrix} x_{00} & x_{11} & x_{10} & x_{11} \\ x_{k} & x_{21} & x_{22} & x_{k,k-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

où chaque $_k\mathbf{R}_i$ et $_k\mathbf{S}_{i,j}$ est une matrice de dimension M \times M. Il s'ensuit que

οù

$$k^{\alpha}j1 = k^{\alpha}j^{-1} \quad k^{\alpha}j1$$

est une matrice de dimension M x M. D'après l'expression () de ${\sf A}_{ni}$, la sous-matrice ${\sf \beta}_{jl}$ de ${\sf A}_{ni}$ s'obtient à partir de

$$\beta_{j1} = ?^{\Sigma} \cdots e^{\Sigma} d^{\Sigma} c^{\Sigma} b^{\Sigma} a^{\Sigma}$$

$$n^{\alpha}j? \cdots \alpha_{dc i+2}\alpha_{cb i+1}\alpha_{ba i}\alpha_{al i}R_{1}^{-1}$$

où ${}_{i}R_{1}^{-1}$ est une matrice diuagonale sauf dans le cas où i se refère à la parité 'P et plus'. D'apparence compliquée, le calcul de cette sous-matrice n'est pas trop lourd en partique puisque ${}_{k}\alpha_{i,j}=0$ tant que j n'est pas égal à i ou i+1.

De la même façon, on peut expliciter l'équation () afin de mettre en lumière la sous-matrice δ_{jl} de P_{in} correspondant à chaque sous-matrice β_{jl} de A_{in} .

Élargissement possible à la prise en compte des intervalles entre naissances successives

La reformulation fournie ci-dessus de la table de statut familial de Bongaarts suppose une approche totalement Markovienne telle que toute femme venat de subir un événement (par exemple, une naissance de rang p) est prête à en subir une autre (par exemple, une naissance de rang p+1). Afin d'accroître le réalisme de cette reformulation, il serait souhaitable, comme le font Rallu et Kuijsten, de prendre en compte l'intervalle depuis la dernière naissance. Est-ce possible?

En théorie, un élargissement de la table de statut familial telle que reformulée ci-dessus ne pose aucun problème. Il suffit de croiser les variables considérées jusqu'ici (état matrimonial, parité et, dans le cas des tables partielles, nombre d'enfants présents) par une variable additionnelle, l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance et donc d'augmenter en conséquence la matrice \mathbf{M}_{X} , la formule générale de dérivation de \mathbf{P}_{X} en fonction de \mathbf{M}_{X} demeurant valable.

En pratique cependant, cette formule peut se révéler d'utilisation difficile lorsque le nombre d'états considérés est large. Mais, comme on l'a vu plus haut, un ordonnancement approprié des variables considérées de façon à regrouper les éléments non-nuls en un ensemble minimal de sous-matrices non-nulles peut permettre la dérivation de P_{χ} à partir de M_{χ} sur la base de matrices de dimension réduites. L'addition à la parité (et à l'état matrimonial) de l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance autorise-t-elle également une telle possibilité?

A première vue, la réponse à cette question est positive pour peu que l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance procède du concept de durée écoulée tel qu'introduit par Wolf (1987) dans la table de mortalité à états multiples.

Rappelons que, selon ce concept, une personne d'âge exact x est réputée appartenir à une catégorie donnée d de durée si l'anniversaire le plus récent dans l'état présentement occupé était le dième anniversaire. Ce concept de durée, un peu particulier dans le but de faciliter la formulation mathématique, est tel qu'une personne d'âge exact x appartenant à la catégorie de durée d est dans l'état présentement occupé depuis au moins d années mais au plus (d+1) années. Ainsi à l'âge $x+\delta x$ $(0 < \delta x < 1)$, cette personne peut avoir passé le $(d+1)^{i \text{ème}}$ anniversaire, dépendant de l'instant précis de la transition précédente.

En d'autres termes, le concept de durée de Wolf est tel que les individus sont classés selon la durée uniquement en relation à la catégorie occupée au moment d'un anniversaire de naissance donné.

Les catégories de durée à considérer sont d = δ , 0, 1, 2, ..., D où δ est la catégorie de durée entrée lorsqu'une transition a lieu entre les âges x et (x+1) et où $_{\rm X}$ D est la catégorie de durée supérieure, laquelle est au plus égale à l'âge du groupe d'individus considérés; soit en tout $_{\rm X}$ D+2 catégories. Si $M_{\rm X}$ désigne la matrice des taux de transfert sans considération de la durée d, alors à chaque catégorie de durée d correspond une matrice $_{\rm d}M_{\rm X}$ construite sur le même modèle. Dès lors, la matrice des taux de transfert avec considération de la durée d s'écrit (Wolf, 1987):

où D $_{\rm d}M_{\rm X}$ est une matrice dérivée de $_{\rm d}M_{\rm X}$ en posant les éléments diagonaux égaux à zéro et C $_{\rm d}M_{\rm X}$ une matrice dérivée de la même $_{\rm d}M_{\rm X}$ en posant les éléments non-diagonaux égaux à zéro. On voit donc que $M_{\rm X}$ est de la forme

$$M_{X} = 1 - -1 - 1$$

où B est une matrice ligne dont la ième entrée est D $_i$ M $_{\rm X}$ et où C est une matrice diagonale dont le ième entrée est D $_i$ M $_{\rm X}$. Il s'ensuit que

$$I + 4 M_X = 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 1$$

 $I + 4 M_X = 1 - - - - 1 - - - - 1$

et

$$| I - \frac{1}{2} A | - \frac{1}{2} B |$$

$$| I - \frac{1}{2} M_{X} = | - - - - | - - - - |$$

$$| O - | I - \frac{1}{2} C |$$

Par suite

de sorte que le produit [] + % $\mathrm{M_{X}}\mathrm{J^{-1}}$ [] - % $\mathrm{M_{X}}\mathrm{J}$ est égal à

La matrice B est une matrice ligne dont la i^{ème} sous-matrice est C $_i$ M $_{\rm X}$ de sorte que le i^{ème} élément de la matrice située dans le quadrant en haut et à droite est égal à

-
$$\mathrm{EI}$$
 + M $\mathrm{g}^{\mathrm{M}\mathrm{S}^{-1}}$ C $\mathrm{i}^{\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{X}}}$ EI + M D $\mathrm{O}^{\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{X}}\mathrm{S}^{-1}}$

Par ailleurs, la matrice C est une matrice diagonale dont la ième sous-matrice de la diagonale est D $_iM_{\chi}$ de sorte que le ième élément diagonal de la matrice située dans le quadrant en bas et à doite est égal à

$$\mathbf{r}\mathbf{i} + \mathbf{k} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{-i}\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{x}}\mathbf{I}^{-i} \cdot \mathbf{r}\mathbf{i} + \mathbf{k} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{-i}\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{x}}\mathbf{I}$$

A noter qu'étant donné l'introduction de la catégorie δ , la probabilité $P_{\rm X}$ n'est pas égale à $\Pi+\frac{1}{2}$ $M_{\rm X}\Pi^{-1}$ $\Pi-\frac{1}{2}$ $M_{\rm X}\Pi$ mais s'obtient à partir de cette dernière en omettant la première colonne et la dernière rangée de matrices non sans avoir auparavant déplacé l'élément de la dernière rangée à la rangée précédente (sans changer de colonne), 12 c'est-à-dire

$$P_{x} = 1$$
 $P_{x-2, x-1}$
 $P_{x-1, x} P_{x, x}$

où tous les éléments sont nuls sauf

$$P_{0,i} = - II + 4 SMJ^{-1} C_i M_X II + 4 D_0 M_X J^{-1}$$

$$P_{i+1,i} = II + 4 D_i M_X J^{-1} II - 4 D_i M_X J pour i \le x-1$$

$$P_{x,x} = II + 4 D_x M_X J^{-1} II - 4 D_x M_X J$$

On voit donc que la table de statut familial telle que reformulée plus haut peut être étendue, sans grosses difficultés partiques, à la considération de l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance pourvu que l'intervalle en question soit la première variable démographique considérée. Dans ces conditions, l'ordre de considération des caractéristiques démographiques est donc le suivant:

- intervalle avec la dernière naissance
- parité
- nombre d'enfants présents (dans le cas des tables partielles) et

^{13.}A souligner que l'équation exprimant P_{χ} présentée ici est poussée un peu plus loin que celle présentée par Wolf.

- état matrimonial.

De la table de statut familial au modèle de projection correspondant

Toute la problématique de la table de statut familial tourne autour du passage d'un âge exact x à l'âge exact suivant x+1. Évidemment, à cette de statut familial correspond un modèle de projection de la même façon qu'à la table de mortalité correspond le modèle de projection de Leslie. Cette fois, il s'agit d'assurer le passage d'un groupe d'âge (x, x+1) au groupe d'âge suivant (x+1, x+2). Si lx,n,p,c,m désigne le nombre de femmes issues de la génération considérée (celle des femmes nées en l'année T) qui sont d'âge x, d'état matrimonial m et qui ont eu p enfants -- le dernier il y a n années -- dont c d'entre eux vivent auprès d'elles, alors le nombre de femmes correspondant d'âge (x, x+1) à la fin de l'année T + x s'obtient au moyen de

$$L_{x,n,p,c,m} = \% [1_{x,n,p,c,m} + 1_{x+1,n,p,c,m}]$$

une équation cohérente avec la dérivation linéaire de \mathbf{P}_{χ} à partir de \mathbf{M}_{χ} .

Quant à la taille des générations futures, elle s'obtient en cumulant les naissances issues de chacune des générations antérieures survenant dans l'année considérée.

3.3 Une brève comparaison des deux approches

Comme nous l'a fait découvrir ce troisième chapitre, la modélisation des familles nucléaires a pour objectif principal de projeter la population féminine selon les mèmes caractéristiques démographiques (âge, état matrimonial,

parité, intervalle avec la dernière naissance et nombre d'enfants présents) sur la base des mêmes données relatives aux changements matrimoniaux, décçs, naissances selon la rang et des départs des enfants du foyer maternel.

Vu la complexité héritée du croisement de plusieurs caractéristiques démographiques, cet objectif n'est pas atteint au moyen d'une projection simultanée de l'ensemble de la population féminine année après année mais plutôt au moyen de projections distinctes réalisées pour chacune des générations successives de femmes. Cette projection peut, on l'a vu plus haut, s'effectuer au moyen de l'une ou l'autre de deux approches qui se différencient surtout au niveau des moyens utilisés:

- la première approche, celle suivie par rallu et Kuijsten, est enracinée dans la démographie mathématique classique et s'appuie en particulier sur la notion de probabilité d'agrandissement des familles tandis que
- la seconde approche, celle suivie par Bongaarts et Zeng Yi, fait appel aux méthodes et modèles de la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle (en particulier au paradigme de la table de mortalité à âtats multiples).

On a vu plus haut que la première approche tend à claisonner les événements démographiques et que la natalité y est indépendante des changements d'état matrimonial et vice versa. Par contre, dans la seconde approche particulièrement adaptée à la considération simultanée de plusieurs événements, natalité et changements d'état matrimonial sont interdépendents, du moins en théorie. 14

^{14.} En pratique, c'est une autre histoire car, en l'absence d'indications pertinentes, la modélisateur est conduit à utiliser des taux de fécondité qui ne varient pas avec l'état matrimonial et des taux de changements d'état matrimonial qui ne varient pas avec la fécondité.

Laissons de côté la variable représentative de l'état matrimonial qui, comme on l'a vu plus haut, n'intervient pas dans la première approche au niveau de la fécondité et essayons maintenant de contraster les inputs relatifs à la fécondité (ou taux de fécondité selon l'âge, le rang et l'intervalle avec la dernière naissance) utilisés dans les deux approches.

Dans la première approche, chaque taux de fécondité $^1F_{\times,\,\rho,\,\alpha}$ est défini comme le quotient du nombre $B_{\times,\,\rho^{\pm 1},\,\alpha}$ de naissances de rang p survenues à une mère d'âge \times α années après la dernière naissance par le nombre $B_{\times^+\alpha,\,\rho,\,\alpha}$ de naissances de rang p survenues à l'âge $\times^+\alpha$, soit

$$^{1}F_{x,p,\alpha} = B_{x,p+1,\alpha} / B_{x-\alpha,p,\alpha}$$

Par contre, dans la deuxième approche, chaque taux de fécondité ${}^2F_{x,p,\alpha}$ s'obtient comme le quotient des mêmes naissances $B_{x,p+1,\alpha}$ par le nombre $I_{x,p,\alpha}$ de femmes d'âge x ayant leur dernier (p^{ième}) naissance à l'âge $x-\alpha$

$$2_{F_{x,p,\alpha}} = B_{x,p+1,\alpha} / 1_{x,p,\alpha}$$

Les deux types de taux se distinguent donc par le dénominateur qui:

- dans la première approche est l'effectif "initial" (l'effectif des femmes ayant eu leur p^{ème} naissance à l'âge x-x) et
- dans la seconde approche est l'effectif "réel" (l'effectif des feemes soumises au risque d'une p+1ème naissance à l'âge x).

Ces deux effectifs sont bien entendu liés ensemble. Nous avons

 $1_{x,p,\alpha} = p_{x-\alpha/x,p} B_{x-\alpha,p,\alpha}$

où $p_{x-\alpha/x,p}$ est la probabilité d'une femme d'âge $x-\alpha$ et de parité p de survivre jusqu'âl'âge x sans changer de parité. Bien entendu, c'est le cloisonnement des événements démographiques qui dans la première approche est responsable de l'utilisation de taux définis en rapport à des effectifs "initiaux' alors que c'est leur considération simultanée dans la seconde approche qui permet l'utilisation de taux définis par rapport à des effectifs réels.

EPILOGUE

Au terme de la revue critique et constructive des chapitres précédents, nous voici prêts à esquisser les contours d'un modèle réaliste de familles et ménages autour de quelques principes simples.

On sait que la complexité du phénomène à modéliser ne permet en aucune façon de suggérer un modèle simple couvrant l'ensemble des événements intervenant dans l'évolution des familles/ménages. À ce propos, il est généralement admis que les événements responsables de l'évolution des familles sont avant tout démographiques et que ceux responsables de l'évolution des ménages (en dehors de ceux affectant les familles composant les ménages) sont avnt tout conomiques (Ermisch, 1987). Tout naturellement, une telle observation suggère l'adoption d'un modèle à deux étages où:

- la première étape est axée sur le regroupement des individus en familles sur la base d'une méthodologie dynamique empruntée aux méthodes et modèles de la démographie mathématique multidimensionnelle examinées aux chapitres 2 et 3 et
- la deuxième étape est centrée sur le regroupement des familles en ménages sur la base d'une méthodologie statique faisant appel à des proportions et ratios sur un mode similaire à celui que l'on trouve dans la méthode des taux de chefs et les autres méthodes qui lui sont apparentées.

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
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THE FUTURE(S) OF THE FAMILY:
An International Perspective*

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper is the result of a survey of the international literature on recent changes in family life, commissioned by Canada's Department of Health and Welfare, Demographic Review Secretariat.

Our research has found similar changes in the family around the world, although these changes have begun at different times and progressed to different degrees. Our paper specifies the world trends in family and household structure, marriage, divorce, relations between husbands and wives, and fertility. We also discuss impact of these changes on health, and on care for the aged.

Economic development leads inevitably, through social, cultural and demographic change, to what we call the "individualization" of adult lives. Accordingly, it brings a transition from the traditional "corporate" family to three new forms: the collected, concatenated and cyclical family. We conclude our paper with some predictions about the future of kinship, spousehood and parenthood.

Introduction

In March of 1990, Health and Welfare Canada's Demographic Review Secretariat asked us to complete a review of the literature on changes in family life around the world. The result is a book-length report that reviews the major trends in family life and problems that are arising in respect to aging and health of the population.

In this paper, we summarize the main findings of this project and indicate how family life is likely to change in the future. Our particular focus is on Canada and, secondarily, North America. However we believe that these same projections will apply to the whole industrial world in due course.

WORLDWIDE CHANGES IN THE FAMILY

In Canada, as elsewhere, many people still believe in the traditional image or model of the family. For example, a British psychiatrist, Levine (1981: 172), argues that "modernity ... has both required and made possible changes from more traditional family forms, roles and outlooks". "Modifications in marital and family roles and responsibilities" are due to women's claims that traditional roles of domestic and child-care duties have denied them the "fulfilment and satisfaction that men had traditionally found in their work."

Levine sees the nuclear family as the ideal family.

Accordingly, current changes in family form are symptoms of a

steadily weakening consensus about the value, roles, and form of the family.

Levine's view illustrates how conventional thinking about the family is still dominated by a "monolithic model" of the family (Eichler, 1981). When we examine many of the debates about the family, we realize that change has made traditional approaches less useful than they were in the past.

Around the world today, we find little consensus on the question of how we ought to define "the family". This only proves that the topic of "family" is complex, variable and emotionally charged. Debate on the family is ideologically charged and subject to cultural, social and political pressure. Discussing the family is not a simple scientific process, a problem of mere measurement and theory testing.

Using a historical approach we have asked, Are families today better for the average person than they were in the past? What major changes have occurred in families and are they reversible? Like most other Canadians, we believe that it is better to have a low infant mortality rate than a high one, and a high life expectancy than a lower one. It is also better to make family decisions in an open manner and base family life on freedom, not constraint.

By these criteria, we have no doubt that families today are, on the whole, better than they were in the past. Glowing accounts of family life in the past prove to be either complete fabrications or, at best, descriptions of structures that --- for

demographic reasons --- could have existed only very rarely and briefly.

Recent thinking has rightly linked the spread of the nuclear, egalitarian families with that set of processes we call "modernization". This includes industrialization, urbanization, higher education and a demographic transition. In turn, modernization is aided by the mass media and an increasing exposure to different ways of life (Inkeles and Smith, 1984).

However, other factors are important too. There is no convergence of family forms around the world and we continue to find a wide variation in families, despite modernization. Families change their form continually, without losing any of their importance. They do this to adapt to new economic and political challenges. A persisting commitment to family life (of one kind or another) helps people (especially, poor people) survive in harsh social and economic environments.

It is doubtful that current family forms are the only social forms that can perform "modern" family functions. In modern societies, intimate relationships work similarly, whether they are legal or common-law marriages, for example.

Parent-child relations are also changing. Rural change demonstrates the pervasive influence of Western cultural notions about the life cycle. We find new ideas about childhood, a glowing importance of education, and socialization for an urban, industrial lifestyle even in the countryside.

Yet people are changing their behaviour even faster than

their ideas. For example, in most industrializing and early industrial countries, marital status, education and number of children at home determine women's labour force participation. Family attitudes and values play little part in determining whether women work for pay. They only influence what women say: typically, cultural stereotypes about the gender-based division of labour.

Around the world, women are increasingly expected to fill both traditional and modern roles. The problem of confused and conflicting roles is most severe in newly industrialized societies. There, women are only starting to challenge the idea of "separate but equal" spheres of influence and control for men and women.

In post-industrial societies like Canada, the situation is somewhat different. Female labour force participation is ever less related to marital status, education or number of children at home. From the standpoint of demographic and social "predictors", women's lives are much more idiosyncratic than in the past. Women have more scope and responsibility for defining their own goals.

In this context, myths about the "traditional family" promise a relief from uncertainty. Nonetheless, ever fewer women are willing to put their faith in the backward-looking ideology of the traditional family. Some women have counter-attacked with mythologies of their own, glamorizing traditionally female social roles or paying tribute to female superiority. In any case, women

are ever less likely to accept an undervalued role in society.

The process of change from a rural, traditional marriage system to a more modern, urban one is an important transition in human history. Urban living and exposure to Western culture speed up the processes of freer choosing. So does the growth of a cash economy. For example, with the development of a cash economy in countries like Iran, children gain more independence from their parents. This allows them to select their own mate and plan their own wedding, as they wish.

In developed countries, people are less inclined to marry than they were in the past. Many Australians, Swedes and North Americans, among others, have rejected the institution of marriage as irrelevant. In future, marriage may no longer be the main form of adult living.

Cohabitation offers most of the benefits of marriage without the same expectation of permanence or binding obligation. Unmarried cohabitation is also coming to take the place of remarriage. Reforms in Scandinavia have eliminated many of the traditional reasons for women to marry by improving childcare, welfare, and work opportunities for women.

The institution of marriage is not about to die from lack of interest, however. People continue to see the decision to marry as a decision to commit themselves sexually. In North America, we find a continued increase in the variety and acceptance of spousal forms, but no less desire for exclusive intimacy within a spousal relationship. In future, legal marriage will not be the

only form such exclusive intimacy will take; but neither will marriage die out.

Change of the family is a pre-condition for fertility decline. In the traditional family system, high fertility provided three main benefits to those controlling the family: old-age support by children, child labour, and insurance against risk. Today, we have a different kind of family largely because -- in urban, industrial societies --- we do not have the same need for children.

Most childless couples today attach little importance to the traditional goals of childbearing. Nor do they expect to feel pride and achievement in raising a child. Fertility is also falling because of increased female education, labour force participation, and marriage delayed to an average of 27 years. Couples who postpone or reject parenthood are usually well-off, career-oriented city dwellers.

Today, North American women are half as likely to bear two children or more as they were twenty years ago. Fertility change is dramatic in the developing world as well, especially where contraceptives are readily available. The availability of contraceptives has an important impact on fertility where there is a motivation to reduce fertility, and that motivation is growing around the world. Sterilization and abortion also play important roles in fertility reduction.

However family planning programs succeed less than expected when too little attention is paid to people's desire to insure

themselves against risk by bearing children (especially, sons.)

State policy can play an important role in fertility reduction. For example, data from the 1980s reveal a significant change in the demographic behaviour of Chinese people in response to state efforts to reduce fertility. Recent evidence suggests that state control may be weakening with increased geographic mobility; but the reduction to date is remarkable.

In Europe, new attitudes toward personal relationships and the family have produced a decline in fertility without state intervention. A second demographic transition is underway, with a growing proportion of married people choosing not to become parents at all (van de Kaa, 1987).

Divorce rates have increased as the desire for children has declined. They have also increased as legal divorce has become easier to attain. When divorce laws are liberal, divorce rates go up. No-fault divorce has taken note of fundamental social changes in family patterns. Such legislation alters the definition of marriage, the relationship between husbands and wives, and the economic and social obligations of former spouses after divorce.

A key assumption of the no-fault divorce law is that a woman can support herself, and her children, right after divorce. This assumption may not be warranted in many cases. Still, as more women earn an income and achieve the potential for economic self-sufficiency, divorce rates are rising.

Women who have the financial means to free themselves from an unhappy marital situation usually do so. The financial

position of many divorced women -- usually those least able to afford it -- declines, however. They are most likely to get custody of the children and also suffer discrimination in the labour market in a great many countries.

Eliminating marriage might eliminate divorce, but not the dissolution of families: in fact, the opposite is true. Studies typically show that premarital cohabitation predicts marital instability. Women who cohabit without marrying for more than three years have much higher marital dissolution rates than those who cohabit for shorter durations. Women who cohabit for under three years have dissolution rates that are similar to married women. For cohabitants, it is the birth of the first child within the marriage that solidifies a relationship.

Cohabitation is a less stable form of union than marriage. It is becoming much more common, even among formerly married people who, in the past, would have remarried. Thus, divorce is becoming a more common experience. Yet divorce works a hardship - indeed a threat to health --- among the spouses and children of a marriage. Many children end up in single-parent families and such children are disadvantaged in comparison to those living in two-parent families. On average, they do not do as well at school, for example. Partly this is due to economic dislocation and the stress that a reduced income creates. Partly it results from the stress and uncertainty caused by a missing parent. It may also be a consequence of the stigmatisation of children of divorced couples.

Children who experience divorce or separation also experience a deterioration in health. Again, this may be due to a reduction in resources, or to stress associated with the family breakup, or both. Rates of reported illness are higher for children in families that have experienced separation than for those who have not.

Both spouses suffer an increased chance of depression, illness and death upon divorce, and these risks do not disappear overnight. Of course, the loss of a marital role --- "spouse" --- affects people differently. The effect varies with their social supports and psychological resources. Nonetheless, unmarried people suffer emotional and economic disadvantages, despite their increased numbers and the decreased stigma attached to their status. This fact helps to explain why so many move so rapidly toward remarriage or cohabitation following a divorce.

A MODEL OF THE CHANGING FAMILY

Throughout our study we have seen a pattern of change repeated over and over in respect to the main aspects of family life:

(1) <u>Industrialization changes the family</u>. Given a variety of starting cultural and social conditions, families change in similar ways due to industrialization and modernization.

The degree to which industrialization changes people's lives is proportional to social mobilization, especially the rate of

creation of new jobs. The faster new jobs are created and women fill them, the more opportunities for personal change adults in the society will have.

(2) <u>People's lives individualize</u>. A growth in jobs hence leads to what we have elsewhere (Jones, Marsden and Tepperman, 1989) called "individualization": an increase in variety, fluidity and idiosyncrasy.

The growth of a post-industrial or service economy, which contains more opportunities for women than an early industrial economy, accelerates individualization. In fact, anything that increases job creation changes the family in the direction of individualization. Individualization means more people with their own resources, even if they have little.

A number of factors increase the rate at which jobs are filled: the mobilization of women for work, the immigration of workers, or a reduction in the period of youthful or aged dependency, among them. Controlling for job creation, anything that increases the rate of job-filling will decrease individualization by constraining the range of choices available to each competitor.

In family life, we find more variety, fluidity and idiosyncrasy in all of the major demographic processes. There is more migration, union formation, union dissolution, child-bearing, familial decision-making, women's personal and working lives. Invariably, when people have a greater opportunity to choose their lives --- for example, their mate, their living

arrangement, the number of children they will bear --- they exercise this choice. In doing so, they often ignore traditional norms and expectations.

As women gain opportunities and the human capital to exercise these opportunities, the ratio of female opportunities to constraints will increase. Constraints will begin to fall with the exercise of new choices and the cultural definition of new norms.

especially, female choice --- comes a growth in normative uncertainty. Dukrhiem called it a condition of anomie, a century ago. Many new social forms have evolved to cope with family change. However, most people are uncertain about their propriety. They are still confused about same-sex couples, gender blurring in the home, the new grand-parenthood, and male custodial parents, to name a few.

As uncertainty increases, people make new efforts to define what is socially acceptable. This struggle to find new norms is especially for people, like women, who have been excluded from a wide range of choices until very recently.

- (4) <u>Uncertainty produces cultural creativity</u>. With the growth in normative uncertainty comes adaptations which may resolve the problem. They include:
- (a, <u>Formal Facilitation</u>. This includes formal legislative initiatives (and activities by companies) to define marriage and its rights and obligations; support gender equality

and affirmative action for women; improve daycare; or encourage childbearing or fertility control. At the extreme, the state attempts an ideological re-definition of the family (as in China);

- efforts to "negotiate" new social roles and norms. For example, people work out rules for disciplining the children of their spouse's first marriage, interacting with their mother's latest lover, or getting to know a co-worker's same-sex spouse.
- mythologizing of existing arrangements (for example, the contribution of fathers) and earlier family arrangements. At the extreme, it is a traditionalist reaction to recent changes in the family.

The ratio of facilitating to conservative (or resistant) responses will vary with the rate at which (1) the growth in opportunities is exceeding the growth in competitors for these opportunities, and (2) cultural creativity is exceeding cultural uncertainty. Anything that slows down the rate of growth in opportunities, or speeds up the rate of entry of competitors; slows the creation of new cultural "meanings" and "norms"; or otherwise produces uncertainty (for example, a war, or environmental disaster), will produce a backward-looking mythology of the family.

Also, anything that imports traditional ideas about the family (for example, the immigration of rural people into a

developed, urban society) will promote resistance.

(5) A new culture of intimate life emerges. All of these social and cultural changes, in turn, change the original cultural context within which industrialization occurred. They bring pressure for further structural change in the economic arena. For example, the growth in part-time work, "Mommy tracks", work sharing, and workplace childcare all reflect a changing conception of the relationship of work to family life. Pressures on employers to pay health, retirement or death benefits to non-traditional "spouses" tend in the same direction.

In turn, these changes further increase choice, uncertainty, and cultural change; so the cycle of change continues. As well, the process increases the number of isolated, disrupted and/or lonely people in society.

By and large, this cycle works similarly in different cultural milieux. That is, our data argue in support of "convergence theory." In the long run, industrialization will have similar effects wherever it occurs, regardless of the starting cultural and social conditions. However starting cultural conditions will only affect: (1) the time of introduction of economic growth; (2) the pace of economic growth; (3) the rate at which economic growth translates into more choice, and the particular forms those increased choices take.

Economic growth sets off a similar sequence of changes in intimate life, wherever it occurs. This sequence is irreversible: there is no evidence it can be prevented, reversed or

mythologized out of existence. Thus, we shall have to accept it and prepare for it.

Considering these processes and trends, what kinds of families are likely to emerge in the future?

FOUR TYPES OF FAMILY

We distinguish among nuclear families along two main dimensions: role separability and personal interchangeability.

Role separability exists when people can satisfactorily fulfil one central family role --- for example, spousehood --- without having to satisfactorily fulfil any other --- for example, parenthood. In the modern family, role separability refers mainly to the separation of spousehood from parenthood.

In some societies, such a separation is both culturally and legally difficult, if not impossible. The household unit is so tightly organized as to compel the senior male --- the paterfamilias in old terminology --- to play both husband and father, the senior female to play both wife and mother. A "failure" in either role is generally considered a failure to perform adequately as an adult household member.

In a society like Canada, the family is no longer monolithic (Eichler, 1981). There is no assumption a woman's husband will be (or act like) her child's father. If he does, that is an added benefit to family cohesion. Conversely, a child may consider he has more than one father: a natural one, who may not reside with

the child and may or may not act fatherly; and a mother's mate, who also may or may not act fatherly.

Personal (and personnel) interchangeability exists when family members can come and go without significantly influencing the functioning of the family unit. They are important only as satisfactory role-performers. They are not valued for the unique way in which they play their familial role.

Thus, the traditional family order values a husband for being a good provider; a wife, for keeping house well and producing sons; a mother, for being nurturant; and a father, for dispensing justice. Such idiosyncratic and role-irrelevant characteristics as beauty, wit, intelligence, or imaginativeness may be an added bonus, but are not part of the basic package.

The institution of "arranged marriage", found in India and many other parts of the world, makes perfect sense under an assumption of personal interchangeability. It makes no sense otherwise.

Conversely, our current Western marriage pattern based on romantic love only makes sense because it reverses the order of priorities. In this frame of reference, one selects a mate for his/her unique characteristics --- intelligence, wit, beauty, and so on --- because he or she is Mr. or Ms. Right. The mate's ability to contribute income, cook dinner, produce and raise children --- all practical or instrumental considerations --- are secondary. If they are present, it is a matter of good fortune.

For these reasons, people in a modern Western culture will have very different marriages over time, and one from another.

Like our work lives, our family lives will be individualized. Your second marriage may be very different from your <u>first</u>: everything depends on the people you have chosen on each goround, and their unique characteristics. And <u>your marriage will</u> be very different from <u>mine</u>, since mate selection largely shapes the character of the marriage.

within the constraints of the mating market --- for example, limits on whom you will meet --- marriages will be true reflections of the personalities of the participants. For good reason, people will be known by their spouses (and secondarily, by their children.)

In cultures with arranged marriage, the opposite is true. People are expected to fit into their familial roles, whatever their personality types, secret hopes and fears, and so on. Marriages are similar, though personalities vary. Thus, marriage is a procrustean bed, especially for women who aspire beyond their role of housekeeper and mother.

From our modern standpoint, families featuring personal interchangeability have many psychologically horrible aspects. As they come into conflict with new ideas about, and opportunities for, personal freedom they make family life a psychic war zone. On the other hand, families with personal interchangeability are like the feudal system on a smaller scale: they have a strong survival capacity under the most adverse economic conditions. Romantic mate selection --- the search for uniqueness --- is only possible in prosperous times.

We can cross-classify families along these two dimensions.

Doing so yields four possibilities: we call them the (1) corporate, (2) collected, (3) concatenated and (4) cyclical family, respectively.

The corporate family

The corporate family is characterized by inseparable family roles and personal (and personnel) interchangeability. In this kind of family, people can come and go without changing the essential structure and functioning of the family. This feature is well-suited to a high rate of mortality. Here, the husband serves as father to the younger generation in the household, and the wife serves as mother.

It is only in a society of corporate families that people can reasonably think and speak of "the family" as a clearly understood social institution. In culture and by law, "the family" has a social importance, enjoys its own resources, and commands its members' loyalties. Families identify and protect their members, under a system Banfield () has called "amoral familism."

In turn, the institution of "the family" is protected in religion as well as by the state. This kind of family is best suited to a theocratic, undifferentiated social structure. The state, the law, and religion are closely tied together and all lean the same way on "family matters".

In a society like this, modern beliefs (for example, the belief that individuals have rights and liberties) and

institutions (like the secular school) either do not exist or hold little sway.

Not surprisingly, the corporate family is rare in modern societies. It has ever less support in law or public opinion, despite its idealization in the mass media and churches.

The collected family

The collected (or reconstituted) family is characterized by separable roles and interchangeable performers. Like the corporate family, the collected family demands the conformity of family members to traditional, stereotyped notions of husband, wife, father, mother, and child. However, with the increased incidence of personnel change, people tend to concede the impossibility of compelling mates to be both good spouses and good parents to the resident children.

In collected families, the component roles --- not the family as a whole --- are the locus of loyalty, meaning and resources. Children are permitted to feel close to their mothers without having to love (or call "daddy") their mother's spouse, for example. Mothers can feel they are doing their duty as a "good mother" even if they mate with someone who, they have reason to believe, will not turn out to be a "good father"; and so on.

In societies like our own, with a significant number of such reconstituted families, legislation increasingly delivers social resources to spouses or to parents or to children, not to the paterfamilias. Legislators do not assume that a paterfamilias

exists, nor do they think it is proper to invent one for the purpose of dispensing state funds to individuals. So, for example, Canadian family allowance cheques are made payable to the custodial parent of a child and, typically, the mother. The notion of "family head" is dead.

Such legal re-thinking has commanded much attention for decades in various countries around the world. It is still going on in many jurisdictions. The change is opposed by people who live in, or idealize, corporate families. That is because it concedes that corporate families are now a minority and, normatively, they are less important to modern life than they once were.

The concatenated family

The concatenated family is characterized by separable roles and unique performances. From the outside, the concatenated family is a chance event --- individuals colliding in time and space to form a household. Indeed, the concatenated family is nothing more than a household at a particular moment in time.

Here, meanings, loyalties and resources are vested in individuals, not roles. Families exist only so long as their members share these meanings and resources. For a family to "survive", its members must constantly affirm and re-negotiate the bases for this sharing.

In such a family, the meaning of "spouse" or "parent" is no longer certain. It varies from one person to another, and from one household to another. Sometimes definitions will mesh for

long periods of time. Sometimes, a shortage of alternatives will keep the household/family from dissolving, despite a failure of definitions to mesh. We cannot that, in such families, there is a permanent commitment to "the family" in general; or even to current spousal and parental responsibilities.

Mothers are more likely than fathers to remain with their children in the event of a marital dissolution. For this reason, in practice concatenated families (with children) are primarily matrifocal. Men come and go; women and children are "the family".

The concatenated family is an extension of radical individualism. It honours the principal that people should have free choice in their living arrangements. This freedom is only subject to the legal protection of minors from the consequences of family breakdown and the protection of all family members from household violence.

Concatenated family life, then, is perceived as a lifestyle or consumer choice --- a supermarket for intimate relations. Not surprisingly, this family type creates an enormous number of kinship connections. Along with this comes a lot of confusion about parental responsibilities and property rights (for example, inheritance).

As noted earlier, mating is motivated primarily by considerations of the spouse's unique characteristics; these may or may not continue to allure. Childbearing is a form of self-expression --- a psychic consumption of children for personal pleasure. Marital dissolution is very likely, because of the high

premium put on varied experience.

Childbearing, on the other hand, will be increasingly rare. It is expensive, infringes marital satisfaction, and makes household dissolution more difficult.

The Cyclical Family

Like the corporate family, the cyclical (or recycled) family features separate roles, with the husband and wife behaving in a traditional fashion. Unlike the corporate family, the cyclical family does not exhibit personal interchangeability. Rather, the performances of its members are unique. Each is a "return engagement" entered into because of the unique relationship of family members.

This return engagement may be a second marriage of the same people (relatively rare). More often, it is a second parenthood, in which people are called upon to parent their now-adult children (sometimes called "boomerangs") a second time.

Many reasons, alone or in combination, account for these children's returns. They include unemployment, insufficient income for accommodation, the need for additional education, baby-sitting help, or savings towards a house. The unique performances in this family's situation emerge from an interaction of reasons for return and the unique expectations of the children and parents.

The parents may expect the children to be tidy, follow curfews and be independent. The children may expect to be looked after, even to the point of receiving an allowance, and yet be

independent of rules regarding use of stereo systems, the family car, and so on. Given these differences in expectations, problems may arise out of feelings of guilt or a desire to maintain good relations with one another (usually, parents trying to maintain good relations with their children.) Since norms to guide behaviour in these circumstances are not yet established, we witness what amounts to a series of unique performances.

The concatenated family is likely to prevail in prosperous times and the cyclical family, in hard times. Given today's gloomy economic forecast, the cyclical family may become much more common in the future. In any event, given the firm and growing hold of individualism on societies worldwide, we are unlikely to see a shift back toward the corporate family, however the economy may change.

THE FUTURES OF THE FAMILY

To summarize, research on the family from around the world has shown that: (1) nuclear families are becoming more common and laterally extended families are becoming less common; (2) people generally have fewer kin available to them; (3) more people live alone or outside conventional families; (4) variation in domestic forms is increasing; however, (5) domestic form seems to make less difference to people's lives than in the past; (6) family functions are being performed by non-families; and, perhaps as a consequence of these changes, (7) people continue to

sentimentalize the imagined traditional family.

In relations between husbands and vives, we note (1) a persistence of dual marriages and traditional husbands' behaviour; (2) the mythologizing and exaggeration of actual change in spousal roles; (3) a continued discontinuity between female socialization in childhood and female activity as adults; (4) continued difficulty in adopting modern spousal roles; (5) new efforts to bring about societal change in spousal behaviour; and (6) increasing uncertainty attached to the performance of familial roles.

Where marriage is concerned, (1) people have less need of it than in the past; (2) people around the world enjoy more independence in mate selection than they did in the past, so they choose across what used to be rather rigid boundaries of religion, ethnicity and social class; and (3) they are tending to marry for love rather than for the potential spouse's characteristics as a provider or a housekeeper; (4) yet traditional forms of spousehood persist amid more choice and variety; (5) as legal marriage declines in popularity, cohabitation increases and (6) people exhibit less desire to marry after dissolving a previous union.

In the realm of fertility and childbearing, increasingly, (1) decisions about childbearing are being made primarily by the wives involved, not by their spouses or kin; (2) accordingly, women's education and labour force participation (and aspirations) are playing an ever greater part in fertility

decisions; (3) facilitating these decisions to avoid or delay childbearing is a reduced cost of contraception; (4) another factor reducing fertility is a declining preference for sons over daughters; (5) some states are succeeding with a rigorously enforced birth limitation plan; and, (6) around the developed world, individualistic values are pushing fertility levels towards below-replacement fertility voluntarily.

Finally, in divorce today, (1) less reproduction is contributing to higher rates of divorce; (2) easier divorce laws are making divorce more common; (3) more women are divorcing their spouses as they become able to earn an income; (4) cohabitation is increasing the rates of dissolution of both formal and informal unions; (5) more children are feeling the health and income consequences of marital dissolution; and (6) more adults are also feeling these consequences of marital dissolution.

How will these trends affect kinship, marriage and parenthood?

The futures of kinship

It is by no means certain how many children parents are likely to have in the future. However most children will have at least two living parents, even if the persons occupying the role may change. What's more, parents will be "available" to their children for more years, due to increased longevity.

Thus, in the future children will receive more person-years of parenting than in the past. This parenting is made ever more

significant by the prolonging of education and the adult dependency. Children need more and more parenting, particularly in periods of economic recession when unemployment is high and the costs of education, food and separate living arrangements are also high.

Parents in the future are going to have fewer children available to them, because they bore fewer children. However, due to increased longevity, they will have more person-years of availability from each child. Indeed, by age seventy, they may have as many living children as parents did a century ago, when they bore twice as many shorter-lived children.

parents will be also be physically and economically strong for a longer period of time. However they too will live longer in economic dependency --- after retirement from the work force. In due course, they will need the "parenting" that their (few) children will provide.

In future, there will be fewer siblings to share the tasks of taking care of younger children and the elderly. Young children will be less likely to have older brothers and sisters. And because their own parents did not have many brothers and sisters, people will grow up with fewer uncles and aunts. In general, we can foresee a shortage of lateral extended kin at every age, including cousins, nephews, nieces and so on. The vertical extended kin group will persist, through a long survival of parents, grandparents and even great-grandparents. The lateral extended kin network may disappear from social significance.

Other social processes may compensate for these losses of kin support. Such processes may include adoptive caring roles (where young people care for older people who are not their natural parents or kin by conventional definition), increased time and effort expended by the kin who are available, or kinship inventions (such as "step-grandchildhood" or "half-nephewhood") which would double-count the scarce young people into more kinship roles and obligations than people had in the past. We may also see older people caring for foster grandchildren.

The futures of marriage

Like kinship, marriage is changing dramatically and its future is by no means certain. The trends we have examined tell us that some things have not changed very much in the last century (or longer). For this reason, we may be right to suppose they will not change much in the foreseeable future.

First, the evidence shows that most people still marry at least once in their lives and almost everyone has one "spousal" equivalent relationship or more --- whether in marriage or cohabitation.

Second, most people still have their first marriage (or cohabitation) in the second quarter of their lives. As lives get longer and childhood dependency is extended, the age of first spousehood is delayed; but the delay is strictly proportional. Thus, if future people live to 160 years of age and complete four times as much education in their youth as they do now, we would predict they will cohabit for the first time between the ages of

40 and 80, being much occupied with education and travel before that time.)

Third, spousal dissolution rates are likely to remain high. There is no sign of a decline in legal divorce rates and, indeed, higher rates of dissolution in Scandinavia than in North America. People increasingly prefer cohabitation to marriage. At the same time, cohabitation produces higher rates of dissolution than marriage does. So family "breakdown" is not likely to diminish.

Fourth, however, people are likely to spend about the same proportion of their adult lives in spousal relationships as they have done in the past.

Those are the "constants" of married life. Many things will continue to change. Cohabitation is becoming increasingly popular at the expense of dating, marriage and remarriage, for example. This increase is likely to continue. As well, women are spending an ever larger number of person-years in the paid workforce; this too is likely to continue increasing. As a result, the number of two-income and two-career families will continue to increase.

As noted earlier, the result is greater individualization. Women's lives will become more and more different --- more varied, fluid and idiosyncratic --- from one another. The individualization of lives will continue to increase both at work and at home. At home, women will have an increasing (average) number of spouses over their lifecime, and spouses will appear and disappear from the household in unpredictable ways.

As a result, mothers and children will be the constant

family unit --- the nuclear family of the future. The caring, sharing fathers heralded by Pitrou () have yet to materialize in any numbers; they are the ostrich-like humans Malthus warned us against praising until we saw them actually exist.

People will also spend more years as "singles" in the future. They will do this as bachelors and spinsters (before first marriage), divorcees and widows/widowers (after first marriage). It is likely we shall develop new words that adequately describe the many varieties of single status --- whether short-lived or long-lived, intentional or unintentional, following a legal marriage or informal cohabitation, and so on.

In this context, people will spend a smaller proportion of their single lives as a widow or widower.

The futures of parenthood

In future, parenthood is likely to change in dramatic ways. It will remain the same in at least one way: the proportion of adults experiencing parenthood at least once is not likely to decline by much. The total number of children borne will continue to fall as fewer people produce large families. One- or two-child families will be much more common than they are today and three-or more child families will be relatively rare.

What will increase will be the proportion of life that people spend with no children around. This period will extend because people will marry (slightly) later than in the past. Mainly, it will extend because women will bear few children and will bear them within a short space of time. Other things being

equal, this will mean fewer years until the youngest child leaves the family home. Offsetting this (partially) is the continuing extension of child dependency and the return of formerly independent children who, for economic reasons, need renewed economic support.

All countries that now count as developed have seen a decline in fertility over the last one hundred years. In a broad perspective, the "baby boom" years of the 1950s and early 1960s can be seen as a temporary aberration before the restoration of the long-term downward trend in fertility with the introduction of oral contraception in the late 1960s.

It is difficult to predict how future couples in general, and women in particular, will use reproductive technology. We do not know whether it will ever be possible for a woman to choose the sex of her child and if so, what effect this might have on fertility. In general, sex preference is weak in North America although the births of sons seem to hold marriages together better than the births of daughters (Balakrishnan et al,).

Further, we do not know whether women's childbearing period will ever be lengthened by as much as ten years. Finally, we do not know whether a male oral contraceptive pill will be invented and what effect this might have on decision-making about fertility.

Continued efforts by well-educated Canadians to limit their fertility will be partly offset by continued high fertility in certain sub-groups such as Canadian native peoples, teenagers and

recent immigrants. Teenagers may ignore birth control out of indifference, having little stake in an educational and economic future that would make childbearing costly. Or birth control may offend their feelings by implying preparedness and a lack of romantic spontaneity. Social or religious movements will try to encourage higher fertility rates. Recent immigrants may continue high fertility patterns that were normal in their countries of origin, but will lower their fertility as they assimilate economically.

Taken together, the evidence argues that most women will continue to bear a few children early in their lives. Other patterns will be found, however, because of (1) increased professional education and careers for women and (2) remarriage and re-entry into childbearing in second marriages. These patterns may well remain unusual. Research on individualization (Jones, Marsden and Tepperman, 1989) argues women will not shape their family concerns around career concerns; rather, the reverse will continue. Re-entry into childbearing after divorce will, for biological (and possibly social and economic) reasons, remain less common than childbearing in first unions.

CONCLUSIONS

Our model of changes in the family is largely driven by economic change and cultural adaptation to that change. What would happen to family life if the economic patterns of the

1890s or the 1930s depressions returned? On our argument, this would clearly diminish choice and reduce individualization.

However this does not mean that people will simply go back to earlier forms of the family. Changes tend to accumulate through a discontinuous layering of new ideas and practices. The transition in women's lives that is taking place today is so fundamental, universal and pervasive that one cannot conceive of a return to the exclusion of women from the work world and the world of public responsibility; nor, to a patriarchal corporate family.

In Canada we have witnessed a remarkable transformation of women's work and intimate lives in the last twenty to thirty years. Family life in Canada may be a decade or two behind family life in Sweden and a decade or two ahead of family life in Greece, Singapore or Argentina. We predict that women's lives will continue to individualize around the world, at work and in the home.

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* Here, we provide a small portion of the references used in producing our report. See the report for a complete listing.







